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January/February 1972

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Publications

International Perspectives

Journal of the Department of External Affairs


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International Perspectives

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Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Co-editors: Murray Goldblatt
Pierre Ducharme

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Foreword

After considering various ways of improving the Department's monthly bulletin, *External Affairs*, it became clear that something new was required, and *International Perspectives* is the result.

The change is not only of appearance and presentation. Each issue of *International Perspectives* will contain, as did its predecessor, *External Affairs*, essential material of an informative and archival kind. But each issue will also contain contributions from people who have no connection with the Department and who are expressing their own personal views on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions of interest to Canadians.

Readers will be invited to submit their own criticisms and comments on material presented, and I hope that by printing a selection of these from time to time the new publication will be able to offer a variety of views.

Appearing every second month and dealing to the extent possible with current issues, *International Perspectives* will not compete with the learned periodicals published by the universities and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

International Perspectives is an experiment, with all the risks that accompany experimentation. It remains to be seen if one publication can combine expressions of official and unofficial opinions with comments and criticisms from the public, comparing and contrasting the views of the practitioners and the theorists of international affairs.

Accepting this challenge, the Department is fortunate in having the services of Murray Goldblatt, formerly Ottawa Bureau Chief of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, and Pierre Ducharme, an officer in the Department, as editors.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Mitchell Sharp". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "M".

Secretary of State for External Affairs

Looking at the 20-year debate over China's voice at the UN

Marion A. Macpherson

The question of Chinese representation has been a problem for the United Nations since the government of the People's Republic of China gained effective control over Mainland China and the Chinese Nationalists withdrew to the island of Taiwan, claiming, however, to be the sole legal government of all of China, a claim they continue to maintain.

Over the years Canada has been required to take a position in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation and on occasions has taken the initiative in suggesting ways to resolve this problem.

The first occasion was more than 20 years ago. The issue first came before the General Assembly in 1950 when resolutions were introduced seeking support for the immediate seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian delegation submitted a resolution providing for the establishment of a Special Committee of Seven to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back with recommendations to the same session of the General Assembly. It also proposed that, pending a decision by the General Assembly, the Nationalist Government delegates should continue to sit with the same rights as their representatives. This resolution was approved by a large majority and amounted, in effect, to the postponement of a decision on Chinese representation. Although the Special Committee held one meeting, the question was overshadowed by the Korean crisis and no further action was taken.

At the 1950 session, the General Assembly approved a resolution (396 (V)) commending that, whenever more than one authority claimed to be the government entitled to represent a member state in the United Nations, and this question became a subject of controversy, the attitude adopted by the General Assembly should be taken into account in the other organs of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.



—UPI Photo

Members of the delegation of the People's Republic of China take their seat in the UN General Assembly for the first time. From left to right: Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, Huang Hua, China's permanent representative at UN; and Fu Hao, his deputy.

For the next ten years no resolution to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China was voted on in the General Assembly, although the question came up in various ways. Each time it did, the Assembly approved a resolution postponing consideration of any proposal to exclude representatives of the Nationalists or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China.

This moratorium ended in 1961, when a proposal to change Chinese representation was considered but not approved by the General Assembly. In that year it was also agreed that any proposal to change the representation of China was an "important question" within the provisions of

Article 18 (3) of the Charter, which meant that this question would have to be decided by a two-thirds majority. In the calculation of a two-thirds majority only the "yes" or "no" votes are considered; abstentions are not included. Canada supported this "important question" resolution and voted against the proposal to seat the People's Republic of China. At the same time, it was indicated that Canada was willing to consider carefully any proposal to settle the question of Chinese representation equitably. Canada voted the same way each year until 1966.

Canada's Initiative

In 1966, the Canadian delegation again took an initiative on the question of Chinese representation in an attempt to end the impasse in which the United Nations found itself. For this purpose Canada had consulted closely with a number of governments on a suggestion that the political realities could be reflected by: (a) participation of the "Republic of China" in the General Assembly as representing the territory over which it exercised effective jurisdiction, (b) the participation of the People's Republic of China as a member representing the territory over which it exercised effective jurisdiction and (c) the participation of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council as a permanent member. In relation to this interim seating proposal, Paul Martin, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, made it clear that the solution was in no way intended to imply the existence of two Chinas. It was simply recognized that the real situation was that there were two governments exercising control over two areas of territory, each claiming to be the government entitled to the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

Although Canada would have liked to see its proposal translated into a resolution, it was apparent that it would not be acceptable to the majority of the General Assembly or the parties immediately concerned. What emerged from the discussions was a proposal for the establishment of a committee to explore the whole question of Chinese representation and to make appropriate recommendations to the next session of the General Assembly. Canada supported this, but the Canadian Government did not consider that it represented much forward movement over the proposal which Canada had initiated in 1950. The proposal was, in the event, defeated.

In deciding on Canada's voting position on the resolution providing for the

seating of the People's Republic of China it was considered that, having suggested an interim seating of representatives of the two governments and having, in effect, rejected both the existing situation and the solution proposed by the co-sponsors of the resolution providing for the seating of the PRC, the Canadian position could best be reflected in voting terms by an abstention. In 1966, therefore, the Canadian vote on the resolution to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China changed from a negative role to an abstention. Canada continued to abstain in the voting on the resolution in 1967 and in the two subsequent years but continued to vote for the "important question" resolution.

The Canadian effort of 1966 failed for two basic reasons: the unwillingness of the parties concerned to accept a formula which would have permitted dual representation, and the inability of the international community to press such a solution in the light of the attitudes of those most directly affected. This resulted to the conclusion that, if it was not possible to establish contact with the effective government of China through multilateral action, consideration would have to be given to a bilateral approach. It was in this direction that the Canadian attitude was evolving. In May 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau declared that it was Canada's aim to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy China's seat at the UN.

Reversing the order

The order of business, it will be noted, was reversed. Negotiations with the representatives of the People's Republic of China culminated on October 13, 1971 with the announcement of mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

After that announcement, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Yvon Beaulne, stated in the General Assembly, on November 13, 1970, that the Canadian Government believed that the government of the People's Republic of China should occupy the seat of China in the United Nations. Canada would, therefore, vote in favour of the resolution proposing this. He added that Canada would also vote in favour of the "important question" resolution. But he emphasized that Canada's vote on this resolution in the past had not been a procedural tactic designed to frustrate the will of the majority of the membership but that its purpose had been to ensure that a decision on

question which was important *per se* did indeed reflect the considered judgment of a significant proportion of the membership. Mr. Beaulne made it clear, however, that if in its judgment the continued support of such a resolution could in the future frustrate the will of the General Assembly, the Canadian Government could change its position.

Seating pattern

Over the years during which the question of China's representation had been considered in the United Nations, the voting was consistently against seating the People's Republic of China. Although the vote was tied in 1965 (47-47), after that the vote was decisively defeated by majorities in the order of 12 to 14 votes. In 1970, for the first time, the resolution opposing the seating of the People's Republic of China received a majority, though a very slight one, of two votes. The vote was 51 in favour to 49 against, with 25 abstentions. It was not approved because the General Assembly had previously decided that the issue was an important one requiring a two-thirds majority. (A two-thirds majority would have required 67 votes in favour on the basis of the actual vote).

In the months after the vote on Chinese representation in 1970, a number of other governments recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. It was apparent there was now a clear trend towards the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and that the solution on this question would receive a much larger majority than in 1970. The Canadian Government therefore decided, in the light of this trend, that the "important question" procedure had served its purpose of ensuring against an ephemeral and reversible majority, and that it would no longer support the usual resolution that the question was an important one, nor would it support any resolution which stated that a proposal to expel the representatives of the Republic of China was an important question.

There then occurred the development which had a substantial impact on the attitude of the members of the UN toward the question — the announcement of the decision that U.S. President Richard Nixon would visit China. Shortly afterward, the United States announced that it would support action at the General Assembly calling for the seating of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the United States announced that it would oppose any action to expel the

Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations.

In support of their policy, the United States and a number of other countries tabled two resolutions. One stated that any proposal which would result in depriving the "Republic of China" of representation in the United Nations was an important question under Article 18 of the Charter. The second proposal would have affirmed the right of representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and would have recommended that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This draft resolution also affirmed the continued right of representation in the United Nations of the "Republic of China" and recommended that all UN bodies and the Specialized Agencies take into account the provisions of the resolution in deciding the question of Chinese representation.

Albania and other countries had before this submitted their usual draft resolution on the "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China". By this resolution, the Assembly would decide to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it".

The U.S. resolutions providing for representation of both the People's Republic of China and the "Republic of China" in the UN posed political and legal difficulties for many countries, including Canada. The main difficulty was political. As noted above, a variant of this type of solution had already been cavassed by Canada in 1966 (although never formally submitted), but it was quite evident that the political accommodation that would have been required to make this solution work could not be achieved at that stage.

Hardening of positions

Since 1966, moreover, the positions of the parties had, if anything, hardened. The PRC had stated over and over again, publicly and privately, that it would not appear at the United Nations if Taiwan continued to be represented and Taiwan continued to claim that it represented all of China, a position it reiterated in its final speech before the General Assembly. In the absence of agreement between the two contending parties, an attempt to impose a solution of the type suggested in the U.S. resolution would obviously not have resulted in the seating of the People's Republic of China. Moreover, it would

have been in contravention of the United Nations Charter, because, in effect, it required the admission of a new member of the United Nations without complying with the Charter provisions, one of which is the prior agreement of the Security Council. Thus, while Canada welcomed the United States statement that it was in favour of the seating of the People's Republic of China, it considered that the resolution proposed would, if adopted, make this impossible and might well result in no Chinese representation at all.

Speaking in the debate on the three main resolutions on October 18, the Canadian Ambassador outlined Canada's position. Mr. Beaulne said that Canada would again support the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, that this should be the clear purpose of the United Nations and that Canada would oppose any procedural or substantive proposal which would tend to defeat this clear purpose.

While there were a number of resolutions and procedural motions put to the General Assembly when the issue came to a vote on October 25, three were of major importance. The first was a request for priority (that is, to vote first) for the draft resolution, sponsored by the United States and others, stating that any proposal to deprive the "Republic of China" of representation in the United Nations was an important question. The Assembly elected to vote on the question first.

The next vote was perhaps the most crucial. The General Assembly rejected by a vote of 55 in favour to 59 against (including Canada), with 15 abstentions, the proposal that the question was an "important" one and that under Article 18 (3) of the Charter a two-thirds majority was required. This meant, of course, that the Albanian Resolution could be approved by a simple majority.

Since it was quite clear that this resolution would obtain a simple majority, the representative of the "Republic of

China" made his final statement before the General Assembly and withdrew from the hall. When the Albanian Resolution was put to a vote, it received 76 in favour (including Canada) to 35 against, with 11 abstentions. In fact, therefore, it received more than a two-thirds majority of those voting in the affirmative or negative.

It is possible, however, that, if the resolution declaring the matter to be an "important" question had been adopted the Albanian Resolution might not have received a two-thirds majority since it is believed that a few countries which might otherwise have abstained decided to vote in favour of the Albanian Resolution when it was quite apparent that it would be approved. It was also obvious that many countries which had not recognized the People's Republic of China voted in favour of Peking occupying China's seat in the United Nations.

The representatives of the People's Republic of China, after 23 years of being in effective control of the Chinese mainland, now speak for China at the United Nations. Already there have been decisions by organizations related to the United Nations such as UNESCO, the ILO and ICAO that the Chinese seats there should be occupied by the representatives of the People's Republic of China rather than by representatives from Taiwan. The presence of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and its related organizations can only strengthen the world organization's capacity to deal realistically with the issues of international peace and security, and thus become an effective centre for harmonizing the actions of nations, to ensure the greatest possible degree of international co-operation in solving the world's political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems.

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A shifting Asian power balance and China's changing priorities

by William Saywell

"China watching" has always been an intriguing and exciting, but hazardous occupation. Hard, cold information on the policy-making process and the shifting loci of power in Peking is hopelessly inadequate at the time new policies are unfolding. Most of us have fallen off the proverbial limb more often than we wish to recall. In the past five years the record has been staggering.

Yet, for the courageous or foolhardy, the contemporary remains compelling. With the height of the Cultural Revolution having been safely passed by the autumn of 1968, the attention of China-watchers riveted on what was then labelled the "warming trend" in Chinese foreign policy. It was at about that time that China appeared intent upon improving its foreign image, which had become badly tarnished in many capitals during the summer of 1967.

When Sino-Canadian talks opened in Stockholm in February 1969, they were watched with keen interest in countless world capitals. But as they dragged on terminably observers warned that the road to normal relations with the People's Republic of China remained a long and empty one, with Peking more insistent than ever that there could be no detour around the Taiwan tangle. It took the Canadians more than 18 months not only to find the magic formula of "taking note" of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan but also to convince the Chinese that we were sincere in our position and not about to use it as some kind of "Two-China" ploy.

In the next 12 months, the walls quite literally came tumbling down — walls in many capitals and the procedural ones in the United Nations General Assembly. The past year has afforded the spectacle of dozens of new diplomats struggling to find accommodation in Peking, ping-pong players and American newsmen meeting Zhou En-lai, Henry Kissinger slipping in and out of China announcing that President Nixon would soon follow, and the

vote giving the Chinese entry into the United Nations.

It was an extraordinary year. As one looks back over it, a personal confession must preface any attempt at analysis. I applauded the long overdue establishment of Canadian-Chinese diplomatic relations, but warned Canadian audiences that it would not have very momentous international implications. After all, we had been forced to confront the Taiwan issue more squarely than the French, who in 1964 simply recognized the People's Republic of China without any mention of Taiwan at all. In this respect the Chinese had grown tougher, not more flexible. Yet, despite this and the more obvious limitations to the influence a "middle power" can exert, it now appears that Canada did play a very significant role in breaking the log-jam, both in bilateral relations between other nations and China, including the United States, and at the United Nations.

Other nations encouraged

Canada's role has not been limited simply to finding the diplomatic formula that could be used by other nations. Our success unquestionably encouraged other nations like Italy and Belgium to believe that Washington's China policy was itself changing. It had become widely rumoured that on at least two earlier occasions direct American pressure helped dissuade Ottawa from beginning negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Indeed, even if direct pressure from the

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highest offices in Washington had not been exerted, the intimate and complex relationship between Canada and the United States and the prospect of provoking Congressional reprisals by a dramatic change in our China policy would have made any attempt at a Canadian initiative exceedingly risky as long as Washington's policy of containing "Communist China" was frozen in the pattern of the Dullesian Fifties. Other nations, especially our NATO allies, were fully aware of our dilemma. This time, however, Ottawa's initiative provoked ripples of dissent and some rhetoric of caution, but no torrent of protest in the United States. Indeed, there was even speculation that some circles in Washington were interested in seeing us "run interference" in a forum where the United States was itself re-evaluating the ground rules. The successful negotiation of Canada-China diplomatic relations, therefore, undoubtedly had the effect of encouraging other nations sensitive to both the American and Chinese response to follow suit.

U.S. Response under scrutiny from Peking

No one watched the American response more intently than the Chinese. It is conceivable that Peking also interpreted Washington's reaction to our move as a signal (along with others) that the United States itself was genuinely interested in altering its own China policy. It was certainly as useful a signal to Peking as American cutbacks on its trade embargo with China, its easing of visa restrictions and the virtually open-ended travelling of Americans of many political persuasions and professions to Ottawa to "exchange views" with Chinese officials frankly yet confidentially on a broader scale than at any other time since 1949.

It must, however, be stressed that this interpretation of the Canadian role as a catalyst in improving Sino-Western contacts does not imply that Canada's position was motivated by Ottawa's having anticipated Washington's response. Indeed, it is likely that Canada would have pursued its diplomatic initiative just as aggressively this time even had it been faced by strong American opposition. The point is that the establishment of Ottawa-Peking diplomatic relations also had these important international implications far beyond our relations with China as such.

It is also clear that China's receptiveness to these indicators of changing attitudes in Washington was expressed in the Canadian context before their more dramatic revelation in the sequence of events that began with ping-pong in Tokyo and ended with the announcement of Mr. Nixon's visit.

The announcement that Huang Hu, one of China's leading diplomats, was to be appointed Ambassador to Canada underlined the fact that Peking was interpreting the role of the Ottawa mission in both North American and an international context. The Chinese simply would not have appointed as senior and influential a diplomat as Huang if only Sino-Canadian relations were at stake. Clearly, his appointment meant that Ottawa would play a pivotal role in China's strategy *vis-à-vis* both the United States and the United Nations. The delay in the Ambassador's arrival in Canada so that he could participate in the Kissinger talks, and his subsequent appointment to the United Nations served to underline the obvious

Canada's influence

Canada's support of the Albanian Resolution at the United Nations in October may also have had somewhat the same international implications as its establishment of diplomatic relations. Canada's position on both supporting the Albanian Resolution and opposing the two-third procedural issue was articulated with unusual clarity and force. The vote on the procedural issue was, of course, the major one, and since it was defeated by only four votes it might not be exaggerating our influence to suggest we may have influenced significantly the two votes that gave China its triumph.

Thus Canada both directly and indirectly played a major role in breaking the diplomatic log-jam on the bilateral level of contacts between China and other countries, including the United States, at the United Nations. Yet we must not exaggerate either the importance of our role in the past or the influence we can exert in the future. It has been, and will remain, of secondary importance to other international considerations and changes within both China and the United States.

In the United States, China policy has been under constant and intensive review during the past two or three years. I cannot claim the competence required to analyze these trends in any depth, but clearly the most important single factor that helps account for Washington's interest in a policy change is the tragic consequences of Viet-Nam. However one interprets "Vietnamization", American policy seems to have become one of eventual withdrawal from Indochina and a cutback generally on military involvement in Southeast Asia. The cost of that involvement in men, money and international social and political upheaval in the United States has been so enormous that we

rawl has become a political necessity if nothing else.

Whether this reflects the first substantive stage of a tide of American neo-isolationism, as many believe, is not yet entirely clear. But withdrawal is by definition a retreat from the policy of containing China, which in very large part was the essential rationale of involvement from the early 1950s. Of those who persist in believing that China does have to be contained, some are hopeful that their Southeast Asian allies are themselves now sufficiently strong to play part of this role, while others look more directly to Japan to fill the vacuum created by the American pull-back. Others, however, have come to realize that the only long-term alternative is accommodation with the People's Republic of China.

On the Chinese side, so far as the events of recent months reflect a significant change in China's foreign policy, it could appear at this point to be more of a change in priorities than in principles — though, in the long run, shifts in priorities often have the effect of changing principles. Essentially, I would argue that the "warming trend" in Chinese foreign policy has been the result of China's reaction to the shifting balance of power in Asia and its implications for China's national security interests and influence in the region. At least in relative terms, China perceives the position of the United States as a receding threat to both these areas of concern, while, on the other hand, it has viewed with alarm the increasing threat from the Soviet Union and, particularly since the autumn of 1969, of Japan.

Sino-Soviet conflict

To do justice to the Sino-Soviet conflict one would have to trace its development since at least the late 1950s, and in fact probe much more deeply its distant historical roots. However, in the past five or six years, the full thrust of the Soviet threat to China's national security and regional influence has become obvious to even the casual observer. Important ideological and other differences aside, the millions of square miles of disputed territory along the Sino-Soviet border sustain a potentially explosive dimension to China's relations with the U.S.S.R. that is entirely absent from Sino-American relations.

Although the border dispute went back to the negotiating table after the March 1969 border clashes, it remains a volatile area fortified by more than a million Soviet troops. Moreover, the physical and cultural topography of much of this disputed area of grasslands and nomadic

minority groups makes it a socially fluid region difficult to define in a permanently viable settlement. It is conceivable that the advantages Moscow had in presenting its case on the 1969 border clashes to the international community encouraged the Chinese to view more favourably the returns they would receive from increased diplomatic relations and membership in the United Nations.

China's concern with the Soviet threat has been overwhelmingly focused on the border. Yet the Chinese have also been sensitive to the diplomatic offensive launched by Moscow since the mid-1960s throughout the area from Japan in the northeast to India in the south. Moscow has signed new airline, trade, aid and diplomatic agreements with several nations on China's periphery. Although the Soviet call for a collective security agreement in the region fell on deaf ears, it accentuated Peking's concern with what China has called the attempts of "the new Tsars in the Kremlin to contain China". In the south, rapidly accelerating Soviet influence in New Delhi, capped by the recent Soviet-Indian treaty and reinforced by Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, has encouraged China to tighten its bonds with Pakistan. In the northeast, improved economic and diplomatic links between Tokyo and Moscow, including discussions on the possible joint exploitation of Siberian resources, led to repeated Chinese charges of "collusion between Soviet revisionism and Japanese militarism". The main Chinese concern, however, remains the Sino-Soviet border.

Thus, as the American threat to China's national security and regional interests can be interpreted as having begun to recede, the Soviet threat has continued to grow and is both more pervasive and potentially explosive. At the same time, Chinese attention has also begun to swing decisively to Japan and what it calls the "revival of Japanese militarism". China's mounting concern with Japanese power can be traced back to the Korean War years, when American policy on Japan shifted from reform to accelerated reconstruction. However, the most serious developments in the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations have occurred since Prime Minister Sato assumed office in 1964.

Sato has been much more clearly identified with the right wing of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) than his predecessor, Hayato Ikeda. As Prime Minister he also more clearly aligned Japanese foreign policy with that of the United States. The famous Yoshida Letter, by

*China sensitive
to Soviet goals
in diplomacy*

which Japan refused the use of Export-Import Bank facilities to finance important sales to China, and Japan's normalization of relations with South Korea in 1965 provoked major Chinese verbal swipes at the revival of Japanese "militarism". The corner had been turned, but it was not readily apparent until 1969, because in the interim China's attention riveted on the American escalation in Viet-Nam, the Cultural Revolution at home and the border clashes with the Soviet Union.

Attention on Japan

With the beginnings of American withdrawal from Viet-Nam, the at least temporary end of open hostilities with the Soviet Union, and improved conditions within China, Peking swung its attention decisively to Japan. The pivotal events were the Nixon-Sato communique of November 1969 and the renewal of the United States-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security. The sections of the communique most offensive to Peking were those which referred to South Korea as "essential" to Japanese security and stated "that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan". With a background of several years of increased Japanese trade with Taiwan, the prospect of direct Japanese involvement in the security of the area understandably outraged Peking. It was interpreted in China as a threat of direct Japanese military intervention in an internal Chinese affair.

Western and Japanese critics of the Nixon-Sato communique supported the Chinese claim that it represented at least the start of an overt Japanese commitment to the conception of regional defence in compliance with Mr. Nixon's Guam doctrine, and that this was the price Japan had to pay for the reversion of Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyus. Western and Japanese critics also warned that this kind of regional commitment would force Japan to increase its defence budget and give greater priority to its air and naval offensive capability.

Behind China's reaction to these events was, of course, its basic concern with Japan's growing economic power. Japan's gross national product now ranks third in the world. Some predictions see it jumping into second place by 1980 and perhaps parity with the United States by the end of the century. China is acutely sensitive to the international implications it sees inevitably flowing from this super-power economic status. In essence, the

Chinese interpretation is that of the Leninist view of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. Japan's spiralling economy, so the argument runs, is largely dependent upon resources and markets abroad. These depend upon increased foreign trade and investment, which, in turn will lead to greater Japanese political influence in these areas and inevitable military commitments to secure the trade routes and the established political order in those nations where Japanese investment is highest.

More specifically, China claims that this interpretation has already been borne out by the growing power of Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF), which now number about a quarter of a million men backed by thousands of reservists and paramilitary police. They also cite increased military expenditures in Japan's fourth Five-Year Defence Plan and the tabling of Japan's first postwar defence White Paper. The genuineness of China's concern with Japan's military posture should not be underestimated. Relatively Japan's military strength is still below that of the major powers. But, unlike that of any other Asian country, it is backed by such enormous economic power and one of the world's most highly sophisticated technological infrastructures that the gap could be closed very rapidly by any Japanese Government intent on doing so. In the light of a history of close to a century of Japanese aggression against China, much of it within the lifetime of China's present rulers, the Chinese position is understandable.

Tougher trade stance

Peking has not stopped at slinging verbal abuse in Tokyo's direction. In recent months it has taken a much tougher stance on its trade relations with Japan and has thereby helped encourage opposition within Japan to Prime Minister Sato's China policy. Certainly Peking is fully aware of the leverage it has in promoting this kind of opposition, which comes not only from the political left but from within Sato's own party and, perhaps most importantly, from some of Japan's largest business firms. The combination of mounting political opposition within Japan, and the embarrassment suffered by the Sato Government because of defeat in opposing the Albanian Resolution at the United Nations, the cruel economic blow of the Nixon surtax, and the fact that Washington's China policy appears to be changing more rapidly and successfully than Tokyo's, will almost certainly lead to a new leadership in Japan that will

A basic concern with Japan's economic surge

apt as quickly as possible to improve relations with China.

This interpretation of recent developments in Sino-Western relations has focused on the shift in the balance of power in Asia and China's perception of the implications of this in terms of threats to both its national security and regional influence. It is, however, meant to cover only one — though an important — dimension of the complex set of domestic and international reasons behind the events of the past year.

The role Canada played in breaking the diplomatic log-jam was extremely important. The Canadian position symbolically and substantively, including the total role played by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, was also of very real

value in the field of direct Sino-American relations. Finally, the strong and unequivocal stand Canada took at the United Nations undoubtedly influenced the outcome of the vote on the China issue.

There is still a long and difficult road to be travelled before Sino-American relations can be normalized. But the first important steps have been taken. Ottawa-Peking relations will now level off to a less dramatic position as bilateral ties between the world's most populous nation and a middle power dictate. Yet the events of the past year must be reassuring for those who believe, without any inflated sense of importance, that the role of a middle power in international affairs can still be a very important one.

The question facing Canada in wake of monetary pact

Stephen Woollcombe

Saturday afternoon, December 18, the government of the United States agreed to devalue its dollar in terms of gold for the first time in 37 years. This decision is part of an international monetary agreement which the U.S. President described as the most significant in the history of the world. It marked the culmination of a four-month series of monetary talks, which had almost reached fever pitch before the settlement.

The story behind this event began on August 15, when President Nixon appeared on television to jolt the economies of the world with one of the sharpest blows struck in modern times. The announcement he made had no less an effect than the drastic and fundamental reordering of established world monetary and trading systems. What Mr. Nixon presented was a complex package of internal and international measures designed to provide major strengthening of the American economy and, in his words, "to lay the basis for renewed confidence, to make it possible for us to compete fully with the rest of the world".

The root cause of the whole crisis is generally recognized to be the serious and growing disequilibrium in the United

States balance of payments. The postwar era was characterized by the role of the U.S. dollar as the principal monetary base of international commerce.

But there was also, especially in recent years, a tremendous net outflow of U.S. dollars, for a variety of reasons including the need for international liquidity, to numerous other countries of the world. At the same time, the United States was supporting governmental budgetary deficits on a huge scale and prices were rising in an inflationary manner. Concurrently, Europe and Japan were making rapid economic progress, and the relative price competitiveness of U.S. manufactured goods, both for export and for domestic consumption, was significantly affected. International fears for the collapse of the U.S. dollar and the prospect of a consequent breakdown of the whole international monetary and trading structure were generated.

The need for determined action by the United States and other countries was thus widely recognized. The desirability of adjustments in the international monetary system so that it would be less dependent on the U.S. dollar and more reflective of the new economic and com-

mercial strength of Europe and Japan was generally admitted. However, the sudden shock of the combined measures, and particularly the import surcharge, was quite unexpected.

Nixon program

The various features of Mr. Nixon's new economic policy covered a broad spectrum. On the domestic side, they included wage-price controls (preceded by a 90-day wage-and-price freeze), repeal of the excise tax on automobiles, earlier-than-expected increases in personal income tax exemptions, reduction of government expenditures, postponement of certain welfare measures and a job-development investment credit plan. Measures having a more direct international impact were the suspension of dollar convertibility, a 10 percent import surcharge, the "Buy America" provisions of the above-mentioned tax credit, the DISC program for tax deferrals on export earnings and a 10 percent reduction in foreign aid. As a whole, the measures were designed to curb inflation and stimulate U.S. employment and exports.

World reaction was immediate and, outside the United States, strongly critical. Widespread concern was expressed regarding the serious danger of ill-conceived retaliatory measures which would escalate to involve several countries, the development of virtually self-contained trade blocs and permanent damage to the process of trade liberalization.

Long-run implications aside, the short-term effects of the measures clearly helped the U.S. economy and hurt those of other countries. Canada, one of the first countries to react, was in many ways the most vulnerable. It is by far the largest trading partner of the United States.

Approximately 70 per cent of Canadian exports go to the United States, and of these the surcharge potentially affected a quarter of the total, or about \$2.5 billion. This, in turn, represents 3.2 per cent of Canada's GNP, considerably more than in the case of any other industrialized country. The "Buy America" feature of the tax credit plan affected about a billion dollars worth of Canadian exports, nearly a third of which was also subject to the import surcharge. Fortunately these two measures were removed at the time of the international monetary settlement.

The DISC plan, which has, however, been enacted, is specially harmful for Canada. In addition to subsidizing U.S. products competing against Canadian products, it in effect encourages firms to cut down on investment in Canada and, indeed, to

transfer export-oriented operations across the border. Moreover, it chiefly affects the labour-intensive manufacturing sector of Canada's economy.

Canada responded to the August 13 measures on three separate fronts. First at home, the Canadian Government introduced an Employment Support Program by which a fund of \$80 million was made available for grants to firms which would otherwise have to cut back manpower due to the surcharge. To supplement this, the General Adjustment Assistance Program (GAAP) was amended to provide loan insurance and direct loans to affected companies.

Second, bilaterally, Canada took two lines of attack. The extremely serious implications for Canada of the U.S. measures were energetically explained to American officials, legislators and the U.S. public at large. To the extent that the American Administration, Congress and the press now clearly demonstrated much greater knowledge of the Canadian situation than formerly, these efforts were not in vain. At the same time, Canada stepped up the tempo of discussions on trade matters. While bilateral discussions on a host of items have been taking place for many years, the U.S. measures brought into sharp focus the importance of certain trade issues.

On November 4, senior officials and ministers began a series of closed-door meetings with their U.S. counterparts on these issues. Each side has its complaints. These include such items as the Automotive Products Agreement, U.S. restriction on uranium, Canadian tourist allowance, defence production sharing and trade in aircraft and agricultural machinery. At the time of writing, December 20, no conclusive agreements had been reached and trade talks were continuing, the monetary settlement notwithstanding.

The third area of action on the U.S. measures has been with multilateral bodies. Several major international organizations gave urgent attention to the crisis. One of the first to react was the GATT. The GATT Council, meeting August 24 and 25, appointed a Working Party to examine the implications of the import surcharge on international trade. The Working Party, of which Canada was a member, concluded that the United States was not justified in applying the surcharge or other trade restrictive measures to remedy its balance-of-payments problem.

The six countries of the European Economic Community decided to maintain a united position in dealing with

*In many ways
Canada was most
vulnerable*

United States and, in the GATT and elsewhere, voiced particularly strong opposition to the U.S. measures. The EEC, and others, underlined the impediment created by the surcharge in arriving at realistic exchange rates and a readjustment of parities.

The United Nations has been an important forum for the developing countries. Resolutions have been put forward to the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD, at a meeting of developing countries, known as the Group of 77, held in Lima, Peru, and within the General Assembly itself. The "LDCs" called for exemption from the surcharge, restoration of United States foreign aid to its former level and other steps to prevent further damage to their economies.

Most of the above meetings focused principally on trade problems. On the monetary side, the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund, September 7 to October 1, provided an occasion for the airing of views and identifying problems, even if no important agreements were reached. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development directed the Working Party No. 3 of its Economic Policy Committee to examine and define the size of the change in the balance of payments required for the United States as well as the implications for other countries.

Swing in payments

Their report, submitted October 4, suggested a swing in the over-all U.S. balance of payments. The United States claimed a \$13 billion swing in its favour was necessary, while at the beginning of negotiations its trading partners were prepared to offer at most concessions amounting to \$3 billion.

It was in the meetings of the Group of Ten that the most significant negotiating of a multilateral nature took place. In successive meetings, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the ten most industrialized non-Communist states have focused on the main monetary issues, adjusted and defined their respective positions on balance of payments, and addressed themselves to the vital question of realignment in exchange rates.

The over-all picture was one of the United States and its major trading partners (Canada, the EEC and Japan) conducting bilateral discussions, chiefly on trade issues, which complemented multilateral discussions on monetary matters. The scenario was elaborate, and at times

confusing. But the mood was tense and urgent, for the businessmen of the world cannot long survive great uncertainty. The stakes were very high.

The general agreement on the realignment of currencies was finally reached at the last of the Group of Ten meetings, on December 18 in Washington. The settlement included the devaluation of the U.S. dollar by 8.57 per cent, the revaluation of several other currencies, and the removal of the import surcharge and the discriminatory feature of the job-development tax credit. It was agreed that the Canadian dollar, alone among the major currencies of the world in this respect, would continue to float for the time being.

The full impact of the Washington agreement cannot be assessed immediately. The ultimate shape of an overhauled monetary system and new patterns and practices of trade between industrialized countries will not be determined for some time.

There now exist, however, some grounds for optimism. Finance Minister Edgar Benson reported to the House of Commons on December 20 that the Washington monetary settlement "restores an orderly exchange situation on the basis of which world trade and financing can proceed with confidence. This will be of benefit to all countries, not least Canada, having in mind the vital importance of international trade to the Canadian economy".

Many of the immediate anxieties and doubts have been removed, but some basic questions do remain in the minds of many. Indeed, perhaps the most important long-run conclusion for Canada arising out of the crisis is the acute sensitivity of the whole Canadian economy to events across the border. The realization of this has underlined the need for a comprehensive review of Canada's place in the new world environment, including the fundamental economic interrelation between Canada and the United States. Prime Minister Trudeau pointed up the central theme of the problem, when, after his December 6 meeting with President Nixon, he referred to "the century-old desire of Canadians to benefit from our North American neighbourhood and to profit from our relations with the United States, while at the same time remaining Canadian to the degree and extent that we choose".

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Determining the full impact will take time

A time for superpowers to halt the trend to nuclear 'overkill'

By George Ignatieff

Nuclear testing — what is the fuss all about? In order to understand the case against continued testing of nuclear weapons and why Canada has taken a leading part in trying to bring about international agreements to constrain and end such tests, it is necessary to cast an eye back to the salient aspects of the history of this issue, which is so much in the news today, and then to look more closely at the present deadlock.

The problem of verification bedevilled efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban (CTB) from the start in the discussions among the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, which lasted from 1958 to 1962; in its successor body, the subcommittee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), consisting of the same three nuclear powers, which was set up in March 1962, and lasted until December of that year; and in the ENDC itself between February and July 1963.

The United States consistently insisted upon the need for a number of obligatory on-site inspections to resolve doubts about ambiguous seismic events where seismological facilities and data-analysis could not discriminate between underground nuclear explosions and natural earthquakes. In the 1960s it was believed that the number of such doubtful cases might be quite large. The number of annual inspections suggested by the United States ranged from 21 to 12, which was subsequently revised downwards to from ten to eight and conditionally to seven. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. professed, in the period 1960-63, a willingness in principle to accept a quota of from two to three on-site inspections a year.

Unfortunately, instead of being narrowed through negotiations, this on-site inspection gap remained just as wide when in 1963 the U.S.S.R. in effect refused to discuss the question of on-site inspections any further. It has subse-

quently adhered to the argument that on-site inspections constitute a form of unacceptable intrusion and that they are unnecessary, since non-intrusive seismological means (what the U.S.S.R. usually calls "national means") are entirely adequate to monitor an underground test ban. Consequently, efforts to achieve an agreement prohibiting testing in all environments foundered and the best that could be achieved was the Partial Test Ban (PTB) Treaty banning testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water that was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. (A comprehensive regime prohibiting testing in all environments might be achieved either by a new comprehensive test ban (CTB) that subsumes the Moscow Partial Test Ban (PTB) Treaty of 1963 or by supplementing the PTB with an underground test ban agreement. For the purposes of this article, the terms "CTB" and "underground test ban" are used interchangeably.)

Unfortunately, the PTB is partial not only because the scope of its prohibition is limited primarily to three environments; it is partial also because France and the People's Republic of China have never adhered to it. Both continue to test nuclear explosive devices in the atmosphere in the face of international disapproval and despite the hazards of radioactive fallout which others have to suffer as a result.

Basic obligations

In addition to the prohibition on testing in the atmosphere, outer space and in the seas, the PTB does contain, however, certain basic obligations of great importance with regard to underground testing. First in the preamble the three original parties declare their object to be that of "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons for all time" and their determination "to continue negotiations to this end", and Article I reiterates that they "seek to achieve" the conclusion of a CTB. Secondly, Article



—Globe and Mail Photo

rying posters demanding cancellation
the planned U.S. nuclear test blast
Amchitka Island in the Aleutians,
00 people demonstrated in front of
U.S. consulate in Toronto. This was

one of a number of demonstrations
held in Canada urging the U.S.
Administration to "Stop Amchitka."
The test explosion was detonated
on Amchitka November 6.

des banning tests in the non-control
environments, prohibits those "in
other environment, if such explosion
ses radioactive debris to be present
side the territorial limits of the State
er whose jurisdiction or control such
osion is conducted".

Since the mid-1960s, in the ENDC
its successor body, the Conference of
Committee on Disarmament (CCD)
Geneva, and in the United Nations
eral Assembly, various suggestions
e been put forward to close the veri-
cation gap and to facilitate an under-
ground test ban to complete the PTB.
ong the most important have been: (a)
Swedish delegation's proposal of 1965
the creation of a "detection club" to
note international co-operation in the
ange of seismic data; (b) the U.A.R.
gestion for a "threshold treaty" ban-
g underground tests above a certain
l (in seismic magnitude), together
a moratorium on testing below this
l; (c) a system for "verification by
lenge", i.e. non-obligatory, on-site
ection on the option and at the invita-
of the "challenged" state to supple-
t seismological identification tech-
es, which was first put forward by the
dish delegation in 1966 and embodied
heir draft CTB tabled in 1969; and
the British suggestion of 1968 that
implementation of a CTB, once it was

agreed upon, might proceed progressively
through accepted annual quotas of under-
ground test explosions with the scale de-
scending to nil in a period of four or five
years.

For its part, Canada has made a
major effort over the last several years to
try to break the deadlock on verification
through the development of international
co-operation in the identification by seis-
mological means of underground tests —
that is, distinguishing them from natural
earthquakes. The resources of Canadian
diplomacy and seismic research have for
a considerable time been directed toward
the ending of nuclear testing in all en-
vironments. As far back as 1962, the then
Department of Mines and Resources set
up seismographic stations designed to im-
prove techniques for the detection and
identification of underground events, and
Dr. Kenneth Whitham, chief of the seis-
mology division of the present Department
of Energy, Mines and Resources, and his
associates have, with rather modest re-
sources, put Canada in the van of inter-
national seismological verification re-
search. The results of this research have
been tabled in the CCD and are being
made available in scholarly journals and
official publications.

In addition, Canada has taken the
initiative of urging the two major nuclear
powers — the United States and the

Canada wants a scaling down of testing plans

U.S.S.R. — to take some interim or transitional measures to reinforce the PTB and to prevent the situation from deteriorating further while efforts are carried on to end nuclear testing. In particular, the Canadian proposal to the CCD of April 6, 1971, called on the two major testing powers to undertake, either unilaterally or on the basis of a bilateral understanding, some or all of the following steps: (a) as an earnest of their good faith in working toward an underground test ban, to begin as soon as possible to scale down their underground testing programs, beginning with high-yield testing that can be readily identified; (b) to announce in advance data concerning underground nuclear explosions so that existing monitoring facilities could be more easily tested and improved; (c) to take special measures to guard against potential environmental risks connected with testing; and (d) to undertake to co-operate in the use, development and improvement of facilities for the monitoring of underground tests by seismological means.

U.S.S.R.'s position

The U.S.S.R. has tried to suggest — quite speciously, we believe — that the Canadian interim restraint proposals would somehow “legalize” continued underground testing. It also specifically rejected suggestion (b) above on the curious ground that it would facilitate the leak of military information and thus endanger Soviet security — a contention quite inconsistent with the Soviet claim that other countries’ “national means” are adequate to provide them with this same information. The United States has so far not offered any specific response to the Canadian proposals, but seems to be quite unenthusiastic.

Since the early 1960s, while the negotiations have remained deadlocked, ostensibly over the verification problem, there has, in fact, been an increase in the rate of underground nuclear-weapons testing by the United States and the U.S.S.R. (an unofficial total of 285 from October 1963 to July 1970, compared to 475 in 15 years up to October 1963), as well as continued testing in the atmosphere, with its greater risk of radioactive contamination, by France and China. Canada has, therefore, continued to press for consideration and acceptance of some or all of the transitional measures we have suggested, together with any other restraints on testing that may gain general acceptability, pending the resolution of the issues between the two major testing powers that have been allowed for all too

long to prevent serious negotiations and real efforts to reach a compromise solution.

In an attempt to break this deadlock of inactivity, Canada’s External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp appealed for action by the nuclear-testing powers which he said to the CCD on September 7, 1971. Until this (a comprehensive test ban) can be achieved, we believe that all members of the United Nations would wish to appeal to the governments that are conducting nuclear tests to put restraints on the size as well as the number of tests they are now carrying out, and to announce such restraints. This is a simple concept that does not involve any complication.

While the differing positions on verification procedures between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are frequently advanced as the main reason for the failure to conclude a CTB despite the avowed acceptance of this aim by both governments, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in fact, the nuclear-weapons states apparently continue to believe that their security interests are best served by continuing nuclear testing. It is significant, for instance, that overriding national security interests were adduced by U.S. authorities as reasons for proceeding with the high-yield Amchitka test on November 6, 1966, which followed by several weeks the major Soviet test explosion recorded on September 27 of between three to six megatons at Novaya Zemlya (according to U.S. published estimates).

Three conditions

Thus, regardless of whether current underground tests are intended to guarantee the continued reliability of existing nuclear weapons, as well as to develop more sophisticated weapons, it has to be carefully considered whether the future security interests of any nuclear state can be safeguarded more effectively through such testing than through an international agreement prohibiting tests in all environments, provided a reasonable deterrent against violations exists.

In answer to this question, I would suggest that three conditions — first, the attainment of approximate over-all strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union at very high force levels; secondly, the progress in the ability to monitor underground events by seismological means; and thirdly, the danger that will ensue if the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapons states should be allowed to gather momentum — all point to the urgent need for renewed efforts for the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear testing in all environments. These points are worth considering in more detail.

If the maintenance of the reliability of testing nuclear stockpiles is advanced as the rationale for continued testing, is it the case that, when nuclear arsenals are as large and as varied as those of the United States and the U.S.S.R., even the uncertainty regarding a portion of the weapons constituting the strategic deterrent would hardly jeopardize the condition of "assured destruction capacity" that is regarded as the key to mutual deterrence?

Reduction of suspicions

If both super-powers accept the state of mutual deterrence, the maintenance of which traditionally has been advanced as the reason for continuing testing of nuclear warheads, why would a CTB that served to impede efforts to upset the stability of the strategic balance not be preferable to continuing potentially destabilizing advances made possible by further nuclear testing? One main value of a CTB could be precisely a reduction of the suspicions and fears that some major, destabilizing progress was being made by the other side in an unrestrained testing situation.

The choice that confronts us all is between, on the one hand, the risks inherent in an underground test ban, compliance with which can only be verified up to a percentage bound to be something less than 100, and, on the other, the increasing dangers presented by a continued nuclear arms race, including the related risks of further additions to the "nuclear weapons club" if the existing nuclear powers fail to set an example of nuclear restraint.

Despite the advances that have been made in recent years, no seismological verification — and no on-site inspection system of itself, for that matter — can guarantee that all violations of a test ban could be detected. What is necessary is that the parties to the ban should have a higher degree of confidence in their abilities to detect violations than a potential violator has in his ability to evade detection. For the main deterrent against violation is obviously the sizable risk of being discovered (rather than a 100 per cent certainty of identifying all underground events), together with the knowledge that the violator, if detected, would face condemnation, the termination of the test ban and the resumption of the nuclear arms race.

There is an additional important consideration to be borne in mind: world peace and security may be further endangered if nuclear weapons are to proliferate beyond the existing level, which,

with the inclusion of China among the permanent members of the Security Council, provides a natural plateau from which to try to prevent the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Article VI of this treaty, which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, clearly places an obligation on the nuclear parties to accept effective restraints on the arms race and on the competition in the improvement of their own nuclear weapons as a necessary counterpart to the self-denying ordinance accepted by the non-nuclear parties to the treaty.

Article VI reads as follows:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures *relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date* and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. (author's italics)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs stressed the connection between nuclear testing and the NPT in his statement in the House of Commons on October 15, 1971, when he called upon the United States and the U.S.S.R. to fulfil the formal treaty obligations to which the NPT binds them in Article VI. The Minister declared:

Unless the two major nuclear powers are willing to accept effective restraints on their arms race and on the competition in the improvement of their own nuclear weapons — as they are committed to do under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — they cannot expect the two less highly developed nuclear powers, France and China, and the so-called 'near-nuclear powers' to accept or respect the restraints of the Non-Proliferation Agreement which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. sponsored.

If serious negotiations are not begun soon to seek a compromise solution to the CTB problem and if even the modest restraints on nuclear testing suggested by Canada cannot be accepted and implemented, how can the two super-powers party to the NPT claim to be fulfilling either the injunction concerning the "cessation" (and not just the curtailing) of the nuclear-arms race or their undertaking in the Moscow PTB Treaty which I noted earlier?

Disturbing the pattern

Moreover, if the NPT breaks down, the strategic pattern would be disturbed, and the effects of this are likely to come into play in the politically "hottest" international areas. Military and political destabilization and increasing world tensions will loom large if the NPT is not rendered viable.

Through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the United States and the


The dangers of a breakdown in nuclear pact

U.S.S.R. are currently seeking to carry out their part of the bargain by curbing their strategic arms race, but so far without much success. A prohibition of underground testing would, however, be a major step towards preserving strategic stability and curtailing the "vertical" proliferation of nuclear weapons through further sophistication and qualitative improvement. It could also facilitate decisions by some "near-nuclear" states that are hesitating to ratify the NPT to do their share in stopping the "horizontal" proliferation through the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. A CTB would also be an invaluable non-proliferation measure in its own right, since it would effectively prevent those non-nuclear-weapons states that adhere to it from developing nuclear weapons through testing. Conversely, if unrestrained underground testing by the two major nuclear powers continues, the future viability of the NPT will be jeopardized.

Time for restraint

Thus, weighing the risks and the benefits, it seems clear that the time has come for prompt restraint measures and for serious negotiations to begin immediately on a CTB. For is a solution not waiting to be taken up? Surely, in order to bridge the verification gap, an underground test ban agreement might combine seismological monitoring facilities and international seismic data exchange, perhaps with some variant of "verification by challenge" or inspection by invitation, supplemented possibly by a few obligatory on-site inspections. Surely such a system should constitute sufficient deterrence to any would-be violator.

If national security continues to be advanced as the main justification for the alternative course of continuing the nuclear arms race, it is legitimate to ask, how much national security is enough? So much "overkill" capacity is already available to both super-powers that restraints on qualitative improvements in their strategic systems through an underground



test ban could hardly detract from the respective deterrent capabilities. Now, and later, is the time to begin to call a halt to creating further nuclear "overkill" and to start the journey that is so much more promising for peace toward the fulfilment of the NPT and the PTB and toward the "discontinuation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

Mr. Ignatieff is Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The views expressed in this article are personal to the author, except where they are explicitly described as representing Canadian Government policy.

Canadian-Soviet bilateral ties: the record and the prospects

by Murray Goldblatt

Canadian-Soviet relations in 1971 developed at a pace that might suggest a whirlwind courtship on the part of one side or the other. But the undertakings set out in last year's bilateral accords were a product of relations fostered in a variety of ways during the past seven years.

Nevertheless, events of the last 12 months represented the culmination of these developments. In January 1971, Canada and the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement for Co-operation in the Industrial Application of Science and Technology — a channel for exchanges in the field of industrial technology and a spur to trade in this area. In May, during Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's visit to the Soviet Union, Mr. Trudeau and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin signed a Protocol on Consultations — a document designed

to place Canadian-Soviet intergovernmental contacts on a more systematic and structured basis. And in October, during Mr. Kosygin's reciprocal visit to Canada, a General Exchanges Agreement was signed to expand bilateral exchanges in scientific, technical, academic, cultural, athletic and other fields.

Disparity in power

Canadian-Soviet relations are obviously conditioned by a great disparity in power, differences in political and social systems and, in some cases, by conflicting external policies. But both sides have recognized the opportunities for mutual benefit in closer bilateral ties.

Until about 1965, Canadian-Soviet relations had been limited except for a brief period in 1955-56 when Lester B. Pearson, then Secretary of State for Ex-



during his Ottawa visit, Soviet Premier Kosygin was guest of honour at a Canadian Government state dinner. At the head table, left to right: Mr. Justice G  rard Fauteux, Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court of Canada; Margaret Trudeau, Mr. Kosygin, Prime Minister Trudeau, Mrs. Luidmila Guishiani, Mr. Kosygin's daughter; and former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson.

ternal Affairs, visited the U.S.S.R. and the first trade agreement between the two countries was concluded.

The present phase of relations dates from early in 1965, when the U.S.S.R. seems to have decided to follow up contacts that stemmed from the first large Canadian wheat sales to the U.S.S.R. about 18 months earlier. By 1965 the Soviet leadership was becoming increasingly concerned about the gap between the U.S.S.R. and Western industrialized states in technology — particularly in the application of computer science and in automated techniques. Outside help would enable the Russians to close and eventually eliminate this gap. Canada represented a key North American source of advanced technical, scientific and managerial information. Canada was well placed in other respects — its environment was similar to that of the Soviet Union and it had close links with the United States.

From the Canadian point of view, there was a desire to improve relations on the practical basis of co-operation in areas of mutual interest — northern development, trade, scientific exchanges, and Arctic questions, for example. There were, moreover, prospects for encouraging progress in East-West understanding, attempting to counter traditional Russian distrust of the West through increasing contacts and discussion.

Air-sea links

With this kind of motivation on both sides, a readiness to co-operate manifested itself in a number of ways: a rapid development of direct air and sea transportation links; growth in scientific, technological and cultural exchanges; a Soviet decision to participate in Expo 67; and visits in both directions. Soviet Deputy Premier Dmitri Polyansky visited Canada in 1966 and again in 1967, followed by a number of other Soviet ministers. Paul Martin, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, and a number of Canadian ministers visited the U.S.S.R.

With the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in mid-1968, there was a lull in the interchange, but in the post-1968 period there were fresh Soviet initiatives to resume the efforts aimed at closer relations. In a broad foreign policy statement of July 1969, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, noted a "widening of mutually beneficial links" in recent years between Canada and the U.S.S.R. These burgeoned in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields and a good basis had been laid for political contacts. "We are for a further development of

relations with Canada," Mr. Gromyko said.

The Canadian Government decided to invite Mr. Gromyko to pay an official visit to Canada. During his talks with Canadian leaders in October, 1969, the Soviet Foreign Minister invited Mr. Trudeau and External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp to visit the Soviet Union in the near future.

When Mr. Gromyko visited Ottawa the subject of a formal agreement for scientific, technological and industrial exchanges came up, but the question of such an agreement in a somewhat broader form had been initially raised in discussions between the two countries three years earlier. The Canadian Cabinet approved a recommendation in 1966 that Canada proceed toward negotiating a comprehensive agreement with the U.S.S.R. on cultural, scientific, technical and other exchanges. When Mr. Martin visited the U.S.S.R. at the end of the same year, it was agreed that negotiations on such an agreement would start soon.

Work on a draft was interrupted by other priorities and resumed again after Mr. Gromyko's 1969 visit. Canadian authorities then saw an agreement confined to industrial exchange as having more practical value after examining the experience of other countries such as Britain, Belgium and France in negotiating various forms of exchange agreements with the U.S.S.R.

The agreement was discussed with M. Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, during his visit to Canada in April 1970, and negotiations on the text were conducted through the summer and fall of that year. Prime Minister Trudeau was to have signed the accord on his scheduled visit to the U.S.S.R. in October 1970 but when that trip was postponed because of the Quebec terrorist crisis, the Industrial Exchanges Agreement was signed in January 1971, by Soviet leaders and visiting Canadian Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Jean-Luc Pepin.

With Mr. Pepin and Leonid Yefremov as co-chairmen, a Mixed Commission made up of Canadian and Soviet representatives from government and industry was set up and commission members conferred for several days in Moscow after the signing of the agreement. They mapped plans for working groups to operate in various areas under the commission's umbrella.

Such working groups, made up of eight to 12 representatives from each side, were set up on: architecture, building

*Soviet concerned
about the gap in
technology*

materials and construction; forest-based industries; non-ferrous metals; electrical power industry; oil and gas industries. Two other groups have been proposed since the commission sessions, one in transportation and the other in agriculture on "agri-business"; discussions are continuing on the feasibility of creating such groups.

Six groups meet

All six of the original working groups had met either in Canada or the U.S.S.R. by the end of last year — first to exchange information and then to tour projects and farms in their fields of interest. They examined potential areas for co-operation and looked into the possibility of the exchange of experts. The Mixed Commission set up under this agreement will meet again, this time in Ottawa about mid-May.

In the field of atomic energy, the two countries had had links long before conclusion of the Industrial Exchange Agreement. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. for Utilization of Atomic Energy worked out an agreement for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1964. The two agencies have established a satisfactory relation, with at least two exchange visits a year to nuclear establishments, universities and other research centres. The tendency is to emphasize scientific rather than nuclear-power subjects.

The Protocol on Consultations, signed in May of last year, had a shorter history than the Industrial Exchanges Agreement. The Soviet Union broached the subject of consultative machinery in 1970 and Canada said it was prepared to study any proposal. The subject was raised again in the spring of last year when Mr. Gromyko suggested a declaration or protocol about the desirability of regular consultations between the two countries should be worked out and endorsed during the Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union felt that such a document would provide a framework for consultation on bilateral questions and international affairs. The U.S.S.R. has an affinity for this kind of legal framework, setting out its relations with other countries in a more systematic way.

Canada agreed that such a protocol was in keeping with the kind of relations both countries wanted to encourage and a protocol much like the one approved by France and the U.S.S.R. six months earlier was drafted and signed in May during Mr. Trudeau's talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow.

In Mr. Trudeau's words during his speech in the Commons on his return from the U.S.S.R., the protocol would go "some distance" toward placing Canadian-Soviet consultations on the same basis as those in existence for a number of years with Britain, the United States and Japan. It would ensure continuing consultations at a variety of levels on international and bilateral issues.

By the time of the Kosygin-Trudeau meeting in Ottawa during October, both governments agreed that the protocol had been of value in strengthening "mutual confidence, friendship and good neighbourliness". They cited as examples the September meeting in New York of Canadian and Soviet foreign ministers, the consultations between the two countries' permanent representatives at the UN and between Canadian and Soviet spokesmen in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. The tempo of consultations has been maintained since then with an exchange of views on such international questions as the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

The negotiations leading to the Industrial Exchanges Agreement paved the way for another accord last year. At Canada's suggestion, the Soviet Union committed itself to discussion of a much broader General Exchanges Agreement, embracing exchanges, visits and contacts in cultural, scientific, technical, educational and other fields.

Even without such an intergovernmental agreement, there had been general exchanges in academic and scientific realms. For example, three Canadian agencies — the National Research Council, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources — had worked out exchange agreements with their Soviet counterparts. Two Canadian universities — Carleton University in Ottawa and the University of Toronto — had conducted exchanges with Soviet institutions. But Canadian authorities felt that a general agreement by the two governments would provide an incentive to much wider exchanges and would also ensure a better degree of balance and reciprocity.

Canada looked to incentive of general pact

The Canada-U.S.S.R. General Exchanges Agreement was finally approved during Mr. Kosygin's visit to Ottawa in October and signed by the two leaders. Under the pact, professional, technical and administrative contacts are to be encouraged and facilitated in a long list of categories ranging from atomic energy to opera. A Mixed Commission will be set up to implement the agreement.

Both countries will foster exchange of

visits by scientists and the pooling of scientific information. Other exchanges will cover such fields as agriculture, fisheries, wildlife, forestry, water, mining and energy, as well as development of natural resources, particularly in areas where geography and climate create similar conditions and problems. Special attention will be paid to facilitating contracts and exchanges in transport, communications, urban development, development in the North and in other regions where environmental conditions are similar.

The governments agreed on exchanges in such areas as management of the environment and control of pollution, social sciences, public health, medical services and medical science. They agreed to encourage exchange visits of professors, lecturers and students in the sciences and humanities; to promote contacts between publishers, libraries and museums; to arrange exchanges in radio, television and cinematography, in the performing arts and in athletics; and to encourage development of tourist travel.

Trade prospects

Although trade prospects have repeatedly been an element in discussions between the two countries, Canadian trade with the U.S.S.R. — apart from wheat sales — have been slow to develop. For example, in 1970 Canadian exports to the Soviet Union were valued at a total of \$101.5 million, with \$86.6 million of it in wheat sales. The balance was made up of items ranging from mining machinery and parts to cattle hides, wood pulp and sheet and strip steel. In the same year, Canadian imports from the Soviet Union were valued at a total of only \$9 million, with cotton cloth and fabrics and raw sugar leading the list.

The Canadian and Soviet economies are in many respects competitive, producing great quantities of raw materials and fuels of the same kind and growing substantial amounts of foodstuffs appropriate to northern climates. For Canada's part, technical experience has been developed in certain industries — the large-scale harvesting of forests, the design and construction of pulp-and-paper mills, the extraction and transportation of crude oil and gas in northern areas. A Calgary firm, for example, last year concluded an agreement with the U.S.S.R. involving the sale of 50 large, off-highway, tracked vehicles for use in pipeline construction.

Canadian authorities foresee the Industrial Exchanges Agreement leading to an expansion of Canadian exports to the U.S.S.R., particularly in more sophisti-

cated manufactured goods and capital equipment. On the Soviet side, a number of Russian-made tractors were imported by Canada in 1970, and the U.S.S.R. has indicated an interest in exporting helicopters.

Within the framework of maintaining an open market policy, the Government has expressed itself ready to assist Soviet officials in exploring Canadian markets, helping them to gain an understanding of the distribution process and to make contacts with prospective customers.

The first Canada-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement, which set the pattern of commercial relations between the two countries, was signed in February 1956. The agreement extended most-favoured-nation tariff treatment to Soviet goods exported to Canada. It was valid for three years and included a Soviet commitment to buy Canadian wheat.

This trade agreement was renewed in 1960, 1963 and 1966, and on each of these occasions the U.S.S.R. undertook to purchase additional quantities of Canadian wheat and Canada continued to extend most-favoured-nation treatment to Soviet products.

The 1966 protocol, however, did not provide for Soviet wheat purchases in a formal sense. Agreement took the form of a simple exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment, but at the same time a master contract was negotiated between the Canadian Wheat Board and Exportkhleb, the Soviet grain-purchasing agency, for the purchase by the U.S.S.R. of a specific quantity of Canadian wheat (nine million tons) during a three-year period ending in July 1969.

The Soviet Union had not taken up its full commitment by that date. In subsequent talks, arrangements were made for meeting that commitment and a protocol worked out by February 1970 provided for extension of the original agreement to mid-April 1972. The U.S.S.R., in discussions on a trade agreement renewal, requested a simple extension without a specific wheat purchase commitment but the Soviet side indicated, as Mr. Pepler explained in the Commons at the time, that the U.S.S.R. would "turn to Canada as a preferred source of supply of wheat when demand arises . . .". This Soviet intention was followed in early June of 1971 by completion of arrangements for the sale of 3.5 million tons of Canadian wheat (approximately 130 million bushels) to the U.S.S.R. by May 1972.

Talks aimed at a renewal of the overall trade agreement were scheduled

*Two economies
are competitive
in many respects*

open in late February or early March of this year. Canada has suggested that efforts to improve the trade flow in both directions would be enhanced if regular trade consultations could be established within the context of a renewed trade pact. For its part, the Soviet Union, during Mr. Trudeau's talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow in May 1971, put forward a draft treaty on development of economic co-operation between the two countries. This was not intended, according to Soviet officials, to replace or substitute for any existing agreements but to establish a comprehensive "economic umbrella" for future co-operation in the economic, scientific, technological and industrial spheres. The Soviet proposal, with its broad scope and implications for existing agreements, is at present being studied in depth.

Other elements in dialogue

There have been other elements in the Canadian-Soviet dialogue of the past seven years — co-operation in northern development, discussion of specific problems in the Arctic and concerning fisheries.

The Soviet Union and Canada are the two largest nations in the world with a sizable portion of their territories north of the Arctic Circle. Both have experienced similar problems in development of northern areas, although development in some senses has proceeded much further in the U.S.S.R. The first meaningful contact about the North between Canadian and Russian authorities came in 1965, when Arthur Laing, then Minister of Northern Affairs, accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union and travelled to several Siberian centres, including Norilsk. A year later, a Soviet delegation from Gosstroy (the State Committee on Construction) visited Northern Canada and an informal agreement on exchange visits was reached between Gosstroy and the Department.

Canadian authorities have pursued a policy of expanding northern exchanges with the U.S.S.R. in an effort to deepen knowledge of northern science and technology in such fields as design and construction of buildings on permafrost, management and development problems linked with conservation and anti-pollution measures, raising of living standards and assisting development of native populations and development of northern industrial and transportation networks.

In mid-summer of last year, Jean Chrétien, Minister of Northern Development, made a 17-day, 10,000-mile tour of Soviet northern regions. During that visit, the two countries agreed in principle that

a joint committee should be established to define areas of Arctic science in which co-operation would be possible and desirable. Mr. Chrétien said in Moscow at the end of the tour he hoped co-operation would develop in the fields of hydroelectric dam construction on permafrost, building construction, and gas-pipeline construction in the Far North. During a subsequent visit of Soviet officials to Canada in September, there was a further agreement to set up the committee on Arctic science on a temporary basis with a first meeting planned for Moscow by the end of the year. Canada designated committee members to deal with areas of particular interest such as atmospheric, biological, hydraulic and earth sciences, education, social and health sciences.

Canada's legislative initiative to combat pollution in Arctic waters was supported by the U.S.S.R. and prompted another set of consultations with Soviet authorities. These consultations established that Canada and the U.S.S.R. shared similar views as to the special status of Arctic waters and the special rights and responsibilities of Arctic coastal states to ensure safety of navigation and prevention of pollution. Various forms of co-operation in this field have been considered, but no agreement has been reached on Canada's proposal for an international legal framework for anti-pollution measures by states with Arctic coastlines.

Soviet fishing operations off Canada's west coast gave rise to problems in 1969-70, but these problems were resolved by the conclusion of two bilateral agreements signed in Moscow in January 1971.

Fishing limits

The first agreement provided that the Soviet fishing fleet would move off a designated area of the high seas off Vancouver Island, where incidents had occurred involving Canadian vessels. In return, the U.S.S.R. acquired certain port privileges and permission for Soviet vessels to fish and conduct loading and unloading operations in designated areas of Canadian waters. The second agreement established certain provisional rules of navigation, applicable to both countries. These were intended to avert collisions and damage to fishing gear off the Pacific coast of Canada.

In the fisheries field, Canada is also seeking to reach an accommodation in such international forums as the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference between the interests of such distant-water fishing states as the U.S.S.R. and the special interests

*U.S.S.R. supported
Canada's approach
in Arctic waters*

of coastal states in dealing with fisheries conservation and management.

As can be judged from the list of agreements and prospective meetings, prospects for strengthening Canadian-Soviet bilateral relations have grown in recent years. Canadian-Soviet scientific co-operation could be extended to broader environmental questions such as the effects on the ecosystem of major projects — particularly those which affect large watersheds in the Arctic such as hydro-electric power developments, gas and oil pipeline installations, industrial and municipal expansion. There already exist areas of scientific co-operation in air-sea interaction studies, as well as joint cruises for research in oceanography and geophysics.

Looking to the North

There is room for significant growth in trade. At his Ottawa press conference last October, Mr. Kosygin said that once more detailed studies had been completed "trade will grow and grow considerably". There is a possibility of joint ventures in commercial and industrial schemes such as those initiated by the U.S.S.R. with German, Italian and Japanese firms. The meetings of working groups set up to implement the Industrial Exchanges Agreement could define areas in which joint ventures with the U.S.S.R. would be mutually beneficial.

The general interest of both countries in developing economic, technical and cultural ties, as well as consultation on international questions, should increase in coming years because of a recognition on both sides that it would be valuable in a more fluid world situation.

Welcoming Mr. Kosygin at a Canadian Government dinner in Ottawa last October, Prime Minister Trudeau declared that "Canada and Canadians want very much to be able to look to the north, as they have looked to the south, and see friends in each direction".

The Prime Minister of Canada and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. . . . reaffirmed the attachment of Canada and the Soviet Union to peace and security and the development of international co-operation. They agreed that all states, regardless of their political and social systems, should in their relations with each other steadfastly abide by the principles of mutual confidence, reciprocity, respect for independence, national sover-

Speaking in the Commons nearly five months earlier, on the day of his return from a visit to the Soviet Union, the Prime Minister said: ". . . As we have looked traditionally south to the United States and east to Europe and, more recently, west to Asia, so should we not disregard our neighbour to the north . . .". Mr. Trudeau said he harboured no "naïve belief" that the achievement of a Protocol on Consultations with the U.S.S.R. would produce a relationship "which will reflect nothing but sweetness and tender feelings". There remained fundamental differences between the two countries relating to deep-seated concerns "springing from historic, geographic, ideological, economic, social and military factors". But, Mr. Trudeau added, "the only way to resolve these differences and eliminate these concerns is by increased contact and effort at understanding . . .".

Speaking in the same debate in the Commons, External Affairs Minister Sharp reminded Canadians that the U.S.S.R. and Canada shared some very basic concerns: "As the two principal circumpolar powers, we both have a special responsibility for the Arctic. We both have endless tracts of tundra, rich in mineral resources but presenting developmental and ecological problems of the greatest magnitude. In this area there is a great deal that we can learn from the Soviet Union. In the field of technology and secondary industry, there may be something they can learn from us."

Mr. Sharp saw the series of arrangements for consultation with other powers entered into by Canada in the last decade — including the Protocol with the Soviet Union — as part of a new diplomacy made possible by great strides in the means of communication. "It is my hope", he said "that in this new era of dynamic diplomacy, we can avoid the misunderstandings and miscalculations that in the past have led to global conflicts".

eighty, territorial integrity and equality of all states, non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the use or threat of force and the settlement of disputes through negotiation in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The sides declare that in their mutual relations as well as in solving international problems they will invariably be guided by these principles.—*Excerpt from Canadian-Soviet Communiqué, October 26, 1971.*

The painful birth of an agency to link French-speaking states

by Louis Sabourin

The Second General Conference of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation (AGECOOP), which took place in Ottawa and Quebec City from October 1 to 16, 1971, has once more revealed the paradoxical image of this new international organization. On the one hand, official statements testify that the Agency is now on its way and that "family quarrels" have been settled; on the other, the meetings have shown that with the limited budget allotted to it the Agency would not be able to play, as soon as was hoped, a major role in a French-speaking community organized in such a manner and that some nations, such as Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville), still refuse to join. Behind the scenes there was even talk of a need to change the Agency's name.

During the discussions on what was diplomatically called "the fiscal outlook for the next two years", as well as on the Agency's activities, particularly those of the Ecole internationale de Bordeaux (Bordeaux International School) and the educational television programs, there was always the fear that the conflict between Quebec and Ottawa would crop up again. No such thing happened. Only a few days before the conference, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, and the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs, François Cloutier, agreed on a formula which would allow Quebec to participate in the Agency. The very title of this agreement will take away the breath of any jurist: "Terms and conditions under which the Government of Quebec is admitted as a participating government to the institutions, activities and programs of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, agreed upon October 1, 1971, between the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec".

In my view, this is a text in which the political flavour outweighs the legal content. These terms and conditions prove that the governments of Messrs Trudeau

and Bourassa have given a very "liberal" interpretation to the Agency's Charter. But could we, in fact, have expected anything else? This text takes its place alongside the Convention and the Charter which brought the Agency into being. The negotiations which led to the concluding of this agreement between Quebec and Ottawa resemble, *mutatis mutandis*, the discussions held before and after Niamey: more or less public conversations during which each of the two large silent partners, France and Canada, made eyes at Quebec, sought to convince Belgium, "paid their respects" to the other members and tried to exert direct influence on a secretariat which wants to do big things with very limited means.

To understand fully the meaning and scope of the agreement between Canada and Quebec, one must first of all understand the atmosphere surrounding the creation of the Agency and its earliest activities.

Pioneers of agency

It is usually pointed out, and justifiably so, that the idea of a French-speaking community was first proposed by President Senghor; two other African leaders, Presidents Bourguiba and Houphouët-Boigny, soon gave their support to this project. On a visit to Paris in 1961, Paul Gérin-Lajoie also spoke of the need to "structure" the French-speaking community. History will undoubtedly record that the Agency was established mainly through the work of two men: President

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*The two men
who were key
to institution*

Hamani Diori of Niger and the Montreal journalist Jean-Marc Léger.

Amid political storms and diplomatic tensions, these two men succeeded in laying the foundations of a multilateral institution which they hoped to place at the service, not of a particular culture or language but of the peoples who use this language or share this culture. For President Diori and Jean-Marc Léger, the Agency was to be an instrument for cultural and technical co-operation — hence its name — which would be of benefit to all members, but particularly to the French-speaking countries of the Third World.

The First Conference of the French-speaking Community took place in Niamey in February 1969, exactly one year after the famous Libreville conference in which Quebec had taken part alone, without the federal presence, and which was to result in the suspension of diplomatic relations between Canada and Gabon. Ottawa and Quebec had both been invited to Niger. Quebec sought acceptance for the conception of “two delegations” (federal and Quebec) within “a representation from Canada”; Ottawa never acknowledged any such idea. The meetings were marked by various incidents of protocol, one of the most resounding being Pauline Julien’s cry of “Vive le Québec libre”.

The Niamey discussions have been described elsewhere. It need only be said that they ended in an agreement which provided, among other things, that President Diori would be responsible for setting up a provisional executive secretariat whose mandate for the following six months would be to prepare the constitution and define the purpose of the future organization. The provisional secretariat would be entrusted to Jean-Marc Léger, who, as Secretary-General of AUPELF, had already played a very important part in the French-speaking world. Lastly, the resolution stated that these proposals were to be designed in such a way that “co-operation shall be carried out with respect for the sovereignty of states, national languages . . .”. One can well imagine the discussions that such a resolution would give rise to.

Points of view

Between the months of April and November 1969, the provisional Secretary-General of the Agency travelled throughout “the French-speaking world” to learn the points of view of all these states as to the purpose and structures of the future organization. In November he submitted to President Diori the outline of the proposal

he intended to submit at the Second General Conference of the French-speaking Community. The President of Niger then sent out invitations to the countries which had participated in the first conference, except that this time Quebec was not directly invited but simply informed. The President explained his action by emphasizing that, since he himself was struggling for the strengthening of unity in his own country and against the secessionist tendencies in Nigeria, he could not play the game of those who would divide Canada.

Difficult discussions then ensued between Ottawa and Quebec. Several days before the conference began, when a decision was still being awaited on the composition of the Canadian delegation, the Quebec premier, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, announced that an election would be held in Quebec. This was to bring about the defeat of his National Union Party by the Liberal Party under the leadership of Robert Bourassa. Because of the election campaign, not a single Quebec minister was able to leave the country, and Quebec was represented in Niamey by Julien Chouinard, Secretary-General of the cabinet. As a public servant, he had to work discreetly within the terms of the agreement reached at the last minute between Mr. Bertrand and Mr. Trudeau. This agreement was of such major importance that the “terms and conditions” agreed upon by Quebec and Ottawa on October 1, 1971, reflect it quite accurately.

The delegates from the 25 countries represented at this Second General Conference of the French-speaking Community met on March 15, 1970, again in Niamey. They received more than 400 pages of texts prepared by the provisional secretariat. These documents dealt with all the questions requiring study on the occasion of the founding of the Agency. At the time Mr. Léger stated that:

the organization whose creation was accepted at the previous conference would offer four main characteristics: (1) a flexible and efficient instrument for co-operation; (2) multilateral co-operation; (3) co-operation achieved by means of the French language; (4) co-operation in the widest sense, that is, not reduced simply to the concept of technical assistance but seen at least equally as a permanent flow of exchanges between the civilizations represented . . .

The project proposed by Jean-Marc Léger was an ambitious one, but realistic. He insisted on the importance of the Agency’s getting off to a “real start” with rather large financial resources; the figure of \$10 million for 1971-1972 was mentioned. However, Mr. Léger was already aware of France’s reticence. This was undoubtedly his reason for adding:

goes without saying that this is strictly a proposal, I might even say a preliminary proposal, about which the final decision naturally rests solely with the governments concerned.

In reality, France at once opposed the proposal. Jacques Amalric wrote in *Le Monde* of March 19, 1970:

Today, relations between Mr. Léger and the French Government have broken down completely. The provisional secretary of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation has been accused of taking sides with Ottawa. The reason? If the proposed Agency constitution drafted by Mr. Léger were adopted, Quebec would not become a member of the Agency. It would have to act through Ottawa and submit to the goodwill of the Canadian federal authorities. This is a prospect which the French authorities frown upon. The possibility even surprised them, for only a few months ago Mr. Léger had considered drafting a constitution which would allow governments to join the new organization

The French delegation immediately circulated a counter-proposal, which provided that full membership in the Agency be open to ordinary cultural organizations, and, of course, to governments of any kind. Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier, chairman of the Canadian delegation, remarked bitterly, according to the *Le Monde* account, that:

Canada, which is supplying 32.4 per cent of the Agency's budget, is ready to use every means available to make the Agency a true instrument of co-operation, but we refuse to be placed on an equal footing with just any association on the pretext that such association is concerned with matters coming under the Agency's jurisdiction.

Stormy discussions took place behind closed doors. Most of the provisional secretary's proposals in the field of technical assistance were indefinitely postponed. Only a few proposals for seminars and exchanges were accepted. The Agency's budget was correspondingly cut; the budget agreed upon was less than one-third of that proposed by the provisional secretary.

Ennayed by duel

The Third World countries were embarrassed and annoyed by these quarrels between Canada and Quebec and the duel between Paris and Ottawa. The Senegalese Minister of Co-operation, Emile Bane, went so far as to say:

It is unthinkable that a federal government with an English-speaking majority should prevent us from creating a French-language agency for co-operation. If need be, we will do without them. (*Le Monde*, March 21, 1970).

A goodwill committee, created by the African countries, managed with difficulty to reach a compromise. Finally, after exchanges of telegrams and telephone calls between Messrs Pelletier and Trudeau, a draft was drafted which represented a com-

promise between the French and Canadian Government positions. This text, which became the famous Article 3.3 of the Agency's Charter, reads as follows:

With due respect for the sovereignty and international jurisdiction of member states, any government may be admitted to the institutions, activities and programs of the Agency as a participating government, subject to the approval of the member state representing the territory over which the participating government in question exercises its authority, and according to procedures agreed upon between the latter government and that of the member state.

Paris was still not satisfied with this proposal but accepted it when the Canadian Government indicated that it was not prepared to go any further. Gérard Pelletier emphasized that, "though this text does not give Quebec full membership in the future Agency, it allows Quebec to play an original and important role".

It only remained for the delegates to sign the Convention establishing the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation and giving recognition to the existence of member states and associate states. The Convention stipulates that the Agency's motto is "Egalité, complémentarité, solidarité". It also indicates the procedure for joining the Agency, and the privileges and immunity of the organization, and provides for registering and amending the Convention. The Charter was added as an appendix to the Convention; it is a sort of internal constitution, in which the "Quebec clause" mentioned above is found.

Signatures by twenty

Some 20 countries signed the document, most signatures being subject to ratification: Belgium, Burundi, Cameroun, Canada, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, France, Gabon, Upper Volta, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Monaco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Chad, Tunisia and the Republic of Viet-Nam (Saigon). Morocco, Laos and Cambodia did not sign the Convention, but indicated that they were interested in the Agency's work. The absence of Algeria, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Haiti, Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (Hanoi), Switzerland and Lebanon deserves to be noted. However, the Government of Haiti subsequently joined the Agency.

Quebec and the other Canadian provinces present in Niamey — Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba — participated in the signing by Canada, adding their signatures beneath that of the Federal Government.

The Assembly then became the First General Conference of the Agency. Jean-

Pelletier sees important role for Quebec

Marc Léger was elected Secretary-General and Messrs de Montera (France) and Kekeh (Togo) were elected Assistant Secretaries-General, for a period of four years renewable for two terms. In addition to the Secretariat, the Charter provides for a General Conference, a Board of Directors, a Programs Committee, an Advisory Council, and creation of other groups considered useful. A new group of experts in administrative and financial management has already been formed. It was then decided that the next general assembly of the Agency would meet in Canada in 1971.

The press did not spare its criticism of the participants when the conference ended. While *Le Canard enchaîné* spoke ironically of the "twilight of the franco-faunas", *Combat* spoke of the "franco-phone cacophony"; *Jeune Afrique* expressed the general feeling in its analysis of "the difficult birth of the French-speaking community"; Huguette Debaisieux wrote in *Le Figaro*:

All's well that ends well, but one cannot help thinking that the result has been very laboriously achieved. Will the dissension between France and Canada which overshadowed the discussions continue to hang over the future of the French-speaking community? One would hope not It is to be hoped that the next General Conference will take place in a calmer atmosphere than that of the past few days, and will show the French-speaking community to be a concrete and effective reality.

Difficulties overcome

The agreement reached between Quebec and Ottawa on the eve of the Agency's Second General Conference seems, at least at first sight, to have settled the many difficulties anticipated as a result of the Niamey meetings.

The agreement comprises 19 articles and a preamble which refers to Article 3.3 of the Agency's Charter. The preamble states that the agreement gives Quebec the status of a participating government. Must we, therefore, conclude that this status has been conferred on Quebec by the Government of Canada and not by the Agency's General Conference? In my opinion this is a very "elastic" interpretation of the Charter; here again it needs to be repeated that the political climate had a determining influence. On the one hand, the governments of Messrs Trudeau and Bourassa were determined at all costs to reach agreement before and during the conference; on the other hand, Paris and Ottawa clearly wished to show everyone that they had at last "normalized" their political relations.

The first 14 articles deal with Quebec's participation in the Agency's insti-

tutions, while the following four articles are devoted to Quebec's participation in the activities, programs and financing of the Agency. The final article states that the Government of Canada, alone, shall inform the Secretariat, and not the General Conference, of the "conditions" for participation by Quebec.

This document is a very interesting "file" not only because of the precedent it establishes and the very debatable aspects of some of its provisions but also because of the opportunities for positive action it gives to Quebec.

First, it is not a real agreement, but simply terms and conditions. I shall be told that this is just a question of semantics; but it would be a mistake to forget that in law words are of prime value and importance.

Second, as was previously emphasized, the Agency's General Assembly did not actually come to any conclusion about the conditions agreed upon by Quebec and Ottawa. Of course, the French delegate did perhaps express an opinion on the subject, but the General Conference did not do so, as is provided for in the Charter. Did it, in fact, wish to do so?

Third, it is quite clear that the conditions have not made Quebec a full member of the Agency. Only Canada enjoys this privilege. Quebec does not participate in the conferences as an independent delegation but as part of the Canadian delegation.

Fourth, it must be acknowledged that all objectivity that Article 16 gives Quebec rather exceptional opportunities to assert within the Agency and indirectly acknowledges its special status in the federation.

In short, these conditions will satisfy those who wish Quebec to "act in point of fact" within the Agency; there is no doubt that Article 16 gives it the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, this text will be rejected by those who wished to use the negotiations to give *de jure* recognition to the advantages Quebec did not *de facto* possess on the international scene. The agreement recognizes nothing of the kind.

These conditions raise immediate questions with regard to (1) Quebec's presence on the Board of Directors and (2) consultation between the Agency, Quebec and Ottawa.

The satisfaction expressed by Jean Cloutier the day after agreement was reached came as a result, among other things, of Article 2, which emphasizes that Quebec may "occupy one of the two positions allocated to Canada" on the Board of Directors. In my opinion, this is a v

*Political climate
had influence
on settlement*

debatable interpretation of the Charter. The Charter only provides for one "representative" from each country on the Board of Directors, adding that the representative "may be" (not "will be") accompanied by an alternate.

It seems to me that the consent of the other member states would have to be obtained before a second "position" is officially allocated to Canada. Naturally, it is very clever to have chosen the word "position", which is not the wording used in the Charter; that term could apply equally to the representative and the alternate, and even to the advisers. The same comments apply to Article 6, which grants Quebec "one of the two positions located to Canada in the group of experts in administrative and financial management". Moreover, consideration must also be given to the question of the voting rights to be enjoyed by this Quebec "position" on the Board of Directors. Will it be able to vote on all matters brought before the Board or only on the points which are under Quebec constitutional jurisdiction? Will the procedure adopted at the General Conferences apply to the Board of Directors? These are questions on which the Agency's practices, and not its regulations, will certainly provide the answer. Actually, a strict interpretation of the Charter would probably require Quebec to occupy a place as an alternate within the Canadian delegation, but still having a right of veto. Quebec has indicated, however, that it wanted more than that.

In the second place, it is hardly astonishing to note that the emphasis is placed on "consultation" (Articles 3, 4, 5, 12 and 16). One of the grievances most often voiced by the Canadian Government about Quebec's activities abroad concerned the lack of consultation between the two governments and the fact that Ottawa was often faced with a *fait accompli*. Since this agreement was reached, the situation has changed, at least so far as the Agency is concerned.

Limits for Ottawa

The government of Quebec must inform Ottawa about its activities within the Agency. Must we conclude that, if Ottawa were to disapprove of a particular Quebec action, the Federal Government could be able to demand that it be "re-formulated"? Has the Federal Government acquired a peremptory right to catch over Quebec's activities within the Agency? Of course, it was necessary to set up machinery for consultation and exchanges of information, but such machin-

ery will be effective and beneficial to everyone only in so far as the Government of Canada does not feel itself called upon to narrow-mindedly supervise and approve of Quebec's slightest actions.

Finally, it is important to note the very "special" nature of Article 14, which provides that the Agency's Secretariat "shall send directly and simultaneously to the Government of Quebec copies of the notices of official conferences and meetings of the Agency that are sent to the Canadian Government". No other document could show more clearly that Quebec is not a full member of the Agency. Quebec is entitled only to copies of the official invitations, the originals being sent to Ottawa. Another "simple matter of formality" I shall be told again . . .

Accepted by majority

These "terms and conditions" will undoubtedly be the subject of a number of masters' theses in Canada . . . Nevertheless it must be admitted that they have been accepted or tolerated by the great majority of member states, though some participants expressed the idea that the Charter had been interpreted in a "very loose" manner.

Relieved for the time being of the Canada-Quebec burden, the Agency must still face a number of problems relating to its role and its programs. Although Paris has agreed to increase its contribution to the Agency's budget (from 45 to 46 per cent), France and Belgium do not now wish the institution to operate on too great a scale. Moreover, it is significant that arrangements have been cleverly made for the only two permanent institutions so far created, the Secretariat and the Bordeaux International School, to be located in France. Simply a matter of geographical convenience and economy, it was said.

As a participating government, Quebec will be able to make a substantial contribution to the Agency in the fields over which it has jurisdiction, such as education and culture, in so far as the Quebec leaders will give real support to such "participation". For it is possible that, in the event of a very engrossing politico-economic situation, the Quebec leaders may be unable to give such participation all the attention necessary. Quebec's participation may be even more significant if the Agency's spheres of activity, as defined at the close of the General Conference in October 1971, coincide for the most part with those areas in which Quebec has jurisdiction. Moreover, this is one manifestation of the precise framework that has

*Burden relieved
but agency still
faces problems*

been imposed on the Agency's activities; it will not venture into the political sphere in the near future. The apprehension in that regard was increased by Jean-Marc Léger's remarks about Quebec; stating that he was satisfied with the results of the Second General Conference, in spite of the limited means at the Agency's disposal, he declared:

The Agency was established as an instrument by which peoples might meet and learn about each other, and to provide cultural dialogue. The French language is the Agency's eminently privileged and principal means in this. But the means are not the purpose of the Agency. The purpose is a unique form of co-operation between peoples of all continents who use a common basic tool, the French language. (*Le Devoir*, October 19, 1971).

To give effect to this unique co-operation of which the Secretary-General speaks, "development programs" that have a more social and economic content should be implemented; such projects should be long-lasting and job-creating in the Third World. Initiatives such as the Bordeaux International School, youth exchanges,

educational television, dissemination of books and films, and methods of introduction to French as a second language, are an interesting development but one which is still too much centred on the "cultural" aspect. This, however, might be a stage that must be passed before the above-mentioned programs can be more fully developed.

Be that as it may, two years after the founding conference in Niamey the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation has definitely been recognized as an institution. Setting it up has been slow and sometimes painful, but it is now clearly established. The Second General Conference in Ottawa and Quebec has shown that development and pursuit of the Agency's goals in the positive spirit desired by Hamani Diori and Jean-Marc Léger, provide hope and a challenge to Canada, Quebec and the entire French-speaking community — particularly to the member states of the Third World, which have the right to demand a great deal from this new international organization.

Behind the barricade of files inside a troubled West Bengal

By Clyde Sanger

Someone in our group who had seen Mr. Sengupta's desk a few months earlier remarked upon the change. It had always been an extraordinary desk. It lay in a bare room with a high ceiling on the second floor of the dour Writers Building in Calcutta. Walls bare except for a single calendar. The huge semi-circular desk dominated the room. Even months earlier, files were loaded high along its perimeter, our colleague told us. But now it was an encampment, and Mr. Sengupta seemed to be crouched down behind the manila files like an infantryman behind a sandbag barricade. There were seven telephones along the rim, ranging from a snazzy carmine-coloured instrument to an ancient field-telephone set.

Inevitably, military metaphors occurred to us. He looked like a soldier manning an outpost that was about to be overrun. Yet the job of the eight of us —

James George, Canada's High Commissioner in India, and the seven of us who had come from Canada to talk about refugee relief — was to fire questions at him. We pulled eight chairs up around the desk's perimeter and, as gently as possible, began to besiege the Chief Secretary of Bengal . . .

. . . It was calmer in the great saloon where Governor Dias received us. Lord Curzon hadn't actually occupied this place, we were told, but it had obviously been built to vice-regal proportions. Governor Dias had personal presence enough to complement the big room and its dozen wobbly ceiling-fans. His engagements for the day were typed out and mounted in a photo-frame at his elbow, a subtle reminder to visitors to put their business briefly. Yet he spoke in an old-fashioned leisurely style and a little majestically; he mentioned the continuing flow of refugee

cross the border and then added: "I don't trouble you with the exact statistics". And when he spoke of the floods that had swept through his state this summer, he referred to them biblically as "the visitation of the waters".

Leaving his room, one got a little glimpse for a moment of what went on behind the calmness: on one wall he had framed a cartoon from *Shankar's Weekly* of a fakir lying on a bed of nails and looking up at some officials who obviously constituted a search committee or civil service commissioners. The holy man was saying: "What makes you think I'd be any good Governor of West Bengal?"

Running the state of West Bengal, trying to improve the lot of its 60 million people, is not the job for anyone who could turn pale at a bed of nails. Politically it has lurched back and forth in recent years from an elected coalition government with some Communist members to "President's rule", which means direct rule by a governor responsible to Delhi. Governor Dias is a recent arrival from the territory of Tripura, which has its own troubles because it is almost completely enclosed by East Pakistan and has had its population doubled since March by the nearly 1,500,000 refugees flooding into it. The good organization by which Tripura has managed to cope with this influx made Governor Dias the obvious candidate for the much vaster job of dealing with the problems of West Bengal.

The refugees who have straggled across the long border from East Pakistan are only the latest of these problems. Mr. Sengupta pointed out that some 8,000,000 refugees had crossed from East Bengal during the last 20 years before the present disturbances. These people had been given land and had been absorbed

into the life of the state; they had become dominant in some electoral constituencies, and tended to support the most left-wing candidates.

What Governor Dias had called "the visitation of the waters" was a major problem, also. For two months the summer of '71 floods from the Ganges, the Hooghly and the Damodar rivers had turned 8,000,000 West Bengalis out of their homes; and the state and central governments had had to provide food for them, also. The rations for these Indian citizens in distress were, in fact, slightly smaller than the governments were supplying to the refugees from East Pakistan. There are an estimated 7,000,000 Pakistan refugees who have crossed into West Bengal between last March and mid-November, and the Indian authorities have been achieving the daily miracle of supplying each adult among them with 400 grams of grain and each child with 300 grams.

Little tension

It is a remarkable fact that there has been very little tension between the refugees and the local population of West Bengal. ("I shall keep my fingers crossed", said Governor Dias when we touched on this point.) The local population could so easily turn on the refugees and complain that they are gobbling up funds that should go for the development of West Bengal, that they threaten the state's job and wage structure by offering a huge source of very cheap labour.

So far they haven't done so. But the officials are wary. They are not keen that refugees should find jobs which would mean depriving a local person of employment. No more than a small proportion of the refugees were moved far from the border, because it would give them what was described as "a sense of permanency". In every policy statement, Indian politicians and officials are careful to refer to the refugees as "temporary" — and the motive is clearly to placate the local population.

How temporary is "temporary"? Coming from Canada, one could at once conclude that millions of the refugees are bound to be still in India for six months — maybe a year or longer — after a political settlement has been made that removes the fear which sent them fleeing. The Indian authorities, for reasons of domestic politics, do not feel able to talk in terms of planning over such a period. Each new requirement which is as predictable as the changing seasons since it is linked to them—blankets for the winter months, shelter materials for the monsoon next

Lyde Sanger, special assistant to Paul Gérin-Lajoie, president of the Canadian International Development Agency, was a member of the team of officials headed by Mr. Gérin-Lajoie that spent 12 days in India and Pakistan during late October and early November. The mission's aim was to conduct an on-the-spot study to determine the most pressing needs of Pakistan refugees in India and of displaced people still in East Pakistan. Mr. Sanger is a former correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Africa and at the United Nations and served on the editorial board and in the Ottawa bureau of the Toronto Globe and Mail. This article is based on the personal observations of the author.

summer — is tackled on an emergency, last-minute basis. A few months' forethought can mean that tarpaulins and woven polyethylene sheets can be shipped from Canada, and blankets can be shipped from Denmark. The last-minute rush has meant that many of these relief materials have had to be more expensively airlifted.

There is also the matter of the special nutrition programs, known as Lifeline Alpha and Lifeline Beta. Alpha is operated by the Indian Red Cross and other voluntary agencies and Beta is run by the Indian Ministry of Health. The biggest problem in the camps is the health of 2,000,000 children under eight years of age. If they begin to suffer from malnutrition, they become too weak to resist the infections that come from poor sanitation and other causes. Under Lifeline Alpha, the plan is to supply all these 2,000,000 children with high-protein supplements, which they eat at a feeding centre, while Lifeline Beta is a scheme for 100 sick-bays where children suffering from malnutrition may receive intensive

care. These schemes are difficult to organize in themselves; but they also had to face objections from some quarters that local Indian children had never been offered such care. Again it is a credit to the altruism of Indian authorities that these schemes are now under way.

To a visitor in early November, one of the greatest needs in the camps seemed to be people who could move out around the tents and the huts and persuade mothers to bring their children into feeding centres for special food, into clinics for special care, before they became dangerously sick. The death rate among children in hospitals we visited was said to be 1 per cent — a low one, considering how many children were brought there in extreme illness. We felt that if the circle of sickness could be broken earlier by people who needed only enough medical knowledge to see a child was sickening but who had personality enough to invigorate the mothers, a big step would be taken on behalf of those very vulnerable 2,000,000 child refugees.

Now so much more is uncertain, with war having enveloped the territory a few miles to the east of all these millions in West Bengal. I think anyone in our group will recall particularly two places we visited, one on either side of the border.

On the Indian side, was the railhead town of Hasnabad, where thousands of refugees were camping along the very station platform and hundreds more were bundled into a train which was not going to leave for a destination in the western part of the state for another day. On the East Pakistan side, was the reception centre Jwikeigacha, between the border and Jessore, where a few families who had crossed from India were staying a day or two before being sent on back to their home areas after being screened by the "peace committee". More vividly than any other groups, these families portrayed the flotsam flung back and forth by the tides of a great political current. Perhaps some of those going west are cousins of those returning east, or come from the same set of villages.

How can it all come together again? And what, in basic terms, can outsiders like us do beyond contribute towards refugee relief a dollar for every Canadian? What else can we do, beyond mourn?



—AP Cablephoto

An East Pakistani refugee girl cares for her brothers as her mother and father seek food in the Indian town of Barasat near Calcutta. Many of the refugees lived in pathetic rag shelters. At one point, refugees pushed the normal town population from 40,000 to 300,000. The CIDA team headed by Mr. Gérin-Lajoie visited Barasat as part of its tour.

A Stockholm call to challenge the peril to man's environment

by H. Dorothy Burwash

During the last few years, "environment", "pollution" and "ecology" have probably become three of the most frequently used words in the English language. There has been mounting concern not only at the loss of traditional amenities — clean beaches, clear streams and pure air — but at the threat to the total environment posed by the whole complex network of activities in which man is a part and upon which he depends for life. Particularly in the industrialized countries, where the problems are most acute, much action has been initiated at the national level.

In Canada, the federal Department of the Environment finally came into being during 1971 and several provinces have established governmental machinery for the purpose. At the federal level, water standards have been adopted with the passing of the Canada Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Air Pollution Control Act and others.

Action at the international level is necessarily less direct. There must first be developed among sovereign states a common view and will to act before international "legislation" is possible in the form of treaties and conventions by which the contracting countries agree to conduct their national activities in such a way as not to endanger an internationally-shared resource like the oceans or the atmosphere. The further outcome of international co-operation can and should be an improved use of the scientific and technical information basic to any effort to preserve or restore environmental quality.

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which is to meet in Stockholm from June 5 to 16 this year, is one among many conferences which have been or will soon be discussing environmental problems. Others include the General Assembly of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment which met in Canberra in August-September 1971, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organizations Conference on Marine Pollution from Shipping, scheduled

for 1973, and the Law of the Sea Conference to be held in 1973 or 1974.

The Stockholm Conference differs from all these in two important respects which, taken together, make it unique. It will take place at the intergovernmental (as distinct from private or expert) level and it will consider the entire range of threats to the quality of the human environment. Follow-up action in the form of binding treaties and conventions will in many cases have to be worked out in more specialized meetings such as the Law of the Sea Conference, but the Stockholm gathering is intended to give the essential impetus to an all-out effort to save the human environment from further and perhaps irreversible damage.

More than 130 nations are expected to send delegations to Stockholm next June and, when representatives of other international organizations plus the working staff of the Conference are added, there will probably be something close to 3,000 people in attendance. Preparations, under way for more than two years, are complex and extensive. Unless they are carried out with thoroughness, precision and imagination, the results of the Conference, given its short duration and the large number of participants, could be profoundly disappointing.

Maurice Strong, former president of the Canadian International Development Agency, assumed his duties as Secretary-General of the Conference in November 1970. His main staff or secretariat is in Geneva, with a branch in New York. He is constantly in direct consultation with governments and with co-operating organizations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions. In addition, he works with a 27-nation preparatory committee, of which Canada is a member. The committee has already held three sessions beginning in March 1970, and will hold its fourth and last meeting in New York in March 1972. As is usual in the United Nations, its membership has been carefully worked out to include representatives

*A combination
of precision
and imagination*

from all geographical areas and from countries in all stages of economic development. In this way, the proposals for action to be laid before the Conference are expected to reflect a degree of consensus which will speed their general acceptance.

Winning the support of the developing nations is a major concern, as many of them are fearful of new controls which might limit their rate of industrialization. But one of the aims of the Conference is precisely to help the developing nations to progress without stumbling into the environmental problems now afflicting the industrialized nations and, by pollution of the seas and the atmosphere, threatening the world environment as a whole.

Canada is contributing to the removal of this misunderstanding by giving assistance to some of the developing countries in their preparations for the Conference. Moreover, regional meetings held in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East have provided forums for discussion of the various subjects on the Conference agenda of particular concern to each region. An example is that of the African nations, which located along some of the main tanker routes of the world are particularly vulnerable to marine-based oil pollution.

Put very broadly, the aims of the Stockholm Conference are to reach agreement on the kind of environment we want and to formulate a general program for its achievement. Even though many elements of such a program may require further discussion and refinement in more specialized meetings before they can be translated into action, the development of valid proposals to put before the Conference is a problem which must be approached from a number of angles.

On the scientific side, we have to assess how much more information we need, how we can organize the international effort to collect it and how it can best be put to use. For example, the effects of different pollutants upon the various living organisms of the sea, and their consequent effects upon man, require further study; so too does the manner in which pollutants are distributed by the global ocean-currents. The oceans have always been one of the chief disposal areas for man's wastes. This is a necessary function and the fundamental problem is to find the correct balance, or in other words to determine what kinds of waste, and how much, the seas can absorb and dispose of without damage to the marine environment.

Another approach is to determine what matters are suitable for action at the international level, and what must be dealt

with primarily by nations acting individually. Marine and atmospheric pollution seem to fall into the first group, so reclamation and the management of human settlements for environmental quality fall into the second. To deal with these and other problems, the Conference preparations have proceeded in two ways.

First, Mr. Strong has requested a study which is receiving very large amounts of fact-finding information from governments and various consultants in the form of reports, assessments and scientific papers, of which Canada alone has submitted 54. One result of these efforts will be a *Report on the State of the Global Environment*, which will be distributed before the Conference opens and will serve as a bench-mark indicating where Earth now stands in matters of environmental quality.

Five working groups

Secondly, the preparatory committee has set up five intergovernmental Working Groups to develop action proposals and guidelines in five different areas: marine pollution, soil preservation and reclamation, monitoring and surveillance (of atmospheric and marine pollutants), conservation of areas of national or historical importance, and a Declaration on the Human Environment. Although it will not have the force of law, this declaration would be a statement of accepted principles and objectives. Canada has been active in all of these Groups. Indeed the Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution held its second session in Ottawa in November. The Group has reported on these questions: guiding principles on the preservation of the marine environment and the prevention of marine pollution; a comprehensive plan to protect and serve the marine environment; and a Convention to regulate ocean dumping, which it is thought may be ready to be opened for signing at Stockholm. Other conventions which have been discussed by the Intergovernmental Working Group on Conservation, dealing with measures to protect species of plants and animals in danger of extinction and the preservation of important natural and historic sites, may also be ready for signing at Stockholm.

The organization of the Canadian work on the Conference preparation generally parallels the international. The intergovernmental committee upon which the government departments interested in all 20 of them — are represented is the principal co-ordinating agency. It establishes task forces or working groups which up to the present time have been charged

Basic problem is finding correct balance

concerned with preparing the Canadian delegations to take part in the Intergovernmental Working Groups. They will be considering the proposals produced as a result of these Working Group meetings by the Conference secretariat in preparation for the Conference itself in June.

Another important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the set of arrangements which have been made — at the international level and in many of the participating countries — to facilitate the expression of views by interested members of the general public. A limited number of representatives from recognized international organizations concerned with the environment, such as the World Wildlife Federation and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, will be able to attend the Conference sessions and, in some circumstances to make statements, though not to participate generally in the debates.

In Canada, an extra dimension is added through the interest of provincial governments in environmental questions. To meet this need, a federal-provincial committee has been established by ministers to permit an exchange of views on the matters covered by the Conference agenda. A companion to it, a national

preparatory committee, which consists of the federal-provincial group plus representatives of about 20 nation-wide organizations, has been formed. It will devote itself, in the first place, to revising and expanding the report entitled *Canada and the World Environment*, which has been submitted to the Conference but is so far still in provisional form. Later, this committee will be given the opportunity to express its views on the final action proposals to go before the Conference and will thus contribute to the formulation of the Canadian position on them.

This account has been chiefly concerned with a description of the preparations for the Conference and indications of what it is hoped will be achieved. Perhaps a word of warning is in order as to what it will not do. There can be no thought of a world police force for the environment or even of a benevolent dictatorship. Increased understanding of the problems, a firm will to co-operate in their solution and improved co-ordination of international and national efforts to that end must be the aims of the Conference.

Dr. Burwash is Deputy Director, Scientific Relations and Environmental Problems Division, Department of External Affairs.

...The Accents of Global Crisis

Aurice Strong is a short, deceptively old-looking man who seems to be continually on the offensive. He speaks the language of crisis.

While he was head of Canada's foreign aid program for four years after a swift rise to the top in the realm of Canadian corporate business, he applied himself with unrelenting zeal to the question of narrowing the dangerous gap between the industrialized donor states and the large group of less-developed recipient nations. Narrowing that gap, he argued, is vital to the peace of the world — more important to global survival than the various political differences among rival blocs.

In his new role as secretary-general for next June's United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Strong is still talking — some say preaching — about global survival. Both industrialized and the less-developed

states, he says, need to realize that coping with the environmental crisis is a global battle.

Visiting Ottawa for a session of the Conference's Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, Mr. Strong warned the delegates: "... Degradation of our oceans and seas represents a threat to man's life and well-being ... Marine pollution fits into the larger picture of the over-all global environmental challenge — it is part of the urgent need to defend the integrity of the biosphere. The world cannot wait. We dare not permit the problem to grow worse — perhaps irreversibly...."

What about the attitude of the less-developed nations? What about the suspicion of the poorer nations that they will be saddled with environmental controls to the detriment of their economic growth by industrialized states which have gone comfortably far beyond the economic takeoff point?

*Resource base
still the key for
poorer states*

Mr. Strong concedes there is still a "climate of suspicion" in some of the less-developed states, but this is being overshadowed by other factors.

"More and more, the less-developed nations are seeing that action on environmental issues is in their own interest," he says. "The best answer I can give is that they are becoming deeply involved in the regional meetings leading up to the Stockholm Conference. These meetings have already involved more than 70 developing nations."

Mr. Strong believes these states have begun to recognize that the environment and economic growth are linked.

"Lack of proper environmental measures can actually impair their economic growth"

"These poorer countries are asking the question, 'how do we manage our natural resource base?' They must make the best of the resources they have. The resource base in these countries is very often their natural capital."

In his travels from his base in Geneva, Mr. Strong finds that the poorer countries are becoming urgently concerned about polluted water supplies, deterioration of agricultural land, depletion of wildlife and fisheries and the problem of cities growing at unprecedented rates.

"Take irrigation projects, for example — what happens? Without environmental controls, the land could be salinated. Or, in the case of fisheries, they could disappear through the indiscriminate use and dumping of certain chemicals"

Mr. Strong notes that the principal resource in many of the developing nations is still agriculture: "Their soil resources are precious, but soil desecration in these countries is proceeding at an alarming rate. This problem has to be explored and tackled to stop the trend and hence aid the economy of the less-developed states."

As for the cities in these nations, they face the prospect of water contamination and health hazards which could make some of them unfit for human habitation within the next decade.

The man at the helm of the planning mechanism for the Stockholm Conference suggests that the real problem in tackling the environmental crisis may lie in the industrialized nations rather than the less-developed ones, despite the fact that the issue of the environment has acquired a certain magic in the industrialized West.

After the Second World War, Mr. Strong recalls, the industrialized states went through a phase of "rampant internationalism", but in recent years this has

been replaced by a trend to inward-looking policies — disillusion with postwar international initiatives. Many of the states turned to concentration on domestic issues, applying or attempting to apply domestic solutions.

"Initially they took the same approach to environmental problems. They have been dealing with them as local problems Now they are beginning to understand that the problems go much deeper — that there is a very real linkage between local and global problems".

What kind of international action organization does Mr. Strong envisage as a result of the Stockholm deliberations? One thing to avoid, Mr. Strong says, is the establishment of another UN Specialized Agency. Environmental problems involve a complex set of issues and cannot be confined to one sector.

What is needed, he feels, is a compact, high-level "policy and control" unit at the centre of the UN system "able to inject itself into the whole set of international relationships". This small unit would have a secretariat and someone with the rank of commissioner or under-secretary-general in charge. The unit would control a special fund and be geared to dealing with all of the UN agencies concerned — among them, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN's regional economic commissions. The environmental unit would also deal with national governments which would have to implement international conventions and commitments.

Mr. Strong doesn't want to discourage national attempts to deal with pollution problems such as Canada's unilateral venture into Arctic anti-pollution legislation. "This is all right for the short term and should act as a spur to other countries to work at the international level on such questions". But, if the Canadian move is simply imitated by others acting unilaterally, that could lead to "international anarchy", he suggests.

With an enthusiasm that matches the pace of his world travels, Mr. Strong focuses on the environmental crisis as a fresh way of giving East and West a reason to co-operate. He notes that the Soviet Union has been fully involved in planning for the Stockholm Conference and he expects China to follow suit.

"The environment is the most promising route by which we can rediscover the need for a global perspective and forms of co-operation."

— Murray Goldblatt

Helmets for headquarters



...ning construction helmets, External
Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and
Under-Secretary of State A. E. Ritchie
...r a section of the new Department of
External Affairs headquarters building
...der construction on Sussex Drive in
Ottawa. They received a progress report
...the structure from William Rankin
...ght), project manager for the Depart-
...nt of Public Works. The headquarters
...nplex is made of four towers of varying
...ght, the highest of which, Block A,
...s ten stories. This main office tower
...l contain a conference centre and two

smaller conference rooms, an auditorium
and a ninth floor area for official enter-
taining with an unobstructed view of the
sweep of the Ottawa River. The four-
element complex will be ready to accom-
modate the entire 1,500 headquarters staff
by the end of 1972 or early 1973, but parts
of Blocks A and B are expected to be com-
pleted by July. The Departmental staff
will move into the completed sections in
phases, starting in mid-summer of 1972.
Pictures of the building, nearing its final
form, can be found on Page 38.



Two views of the four-block complex of the new Department of External Affairs headquarters building on Sussex Drive. Composed of four towers of varying height, the complex will house all 1,500 of the Department's headquarters staff.

At present, the heart of the Department is in the historic East Block of the Parliament Buildings, but staff and offices are scattered among six other buildings in the capital.



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- No. 71/26 The Changing World Viewed from Canada.
 A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Toronto on November 6, 1971.
- No. 71/27 Relief to Paskistani Refugees in India.
 Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on November 17, 1971.
- No. 71/28 A French Community in America.
 A speech by the Prime Minister in Ottawa on October 11, 1971.
- No. 71/29 Canada Assesses the British Settlement with Rhodesia. Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on December 1, 1971.

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- No. 69 The Department of External Affairs. December 1971 (revised).

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Canada-Poland Agreement on Claims. October 15, 1971.

Conclusion of Canada-U.S.S.R. General Exchanges Agreement. October 20, 1971.

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Text of an Aide-Mémoire, dated August 18, 1971 to the United States Government regarding the movement of oil tankers. November 17, 1971.

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Treaty Information

Bilateral

Colombia

Trade Agreement between Canada and Colombia
Signed at Ottawa November 17, 1971.

Hungary

Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic.
Signed at Ottawa October 6, 1971.

Jamaica

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Jamaica constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian investments in Jamaica insured by the Government of Canada through its agent, the Export Development Corporation.
Signed at Kingston November 2, 1971.
In force November 2, 1971.

Malaysia

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Malaysia constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian investments in Malaysia insured by the Government of Canada through its agent, the Export Development Corporation.
Signed at Kuala Lumpur July 30 and October 1, 1971.
In force November 1, 1971.

Netherlands

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands constituting an Agreement in connection with the ferrying

of Royal Netherlands Air Force NF-5 craft from Canada to the Netherlands.
Signed at Ottawa November 1, 1971.

In force November 1, 1971.

Poland

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic relating to the settlement of financial matters.

Signed at Ottawa October 15, 1971.

In force October 15, 1971.

Romania

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the settlement of outstanding financial problems.
Signed at Ottawa July 13, 1971.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification changed December 13, 1971.

In force December 13, 1971.

Trade Agreement between Canada and Socialist Republic of Romania.

Signed at Ottawa July 16, 1971.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification changed December 13, 1971.

In force definitively December 13, 1971.

U.S.S.R.

General Exchanges Agreement between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Signed at Ottawa October 20, 1971.

In force October 20, 1971.

United Kingdom

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom constituting an Agreement concerning a training scheme for air forces of the United Kingdom in Canada.
Signed at Ottawa August 20, 1971.

In force August 20, 1971.

Multilateral

Convention Establishing a Customs operation Council.

Signed at Brussels December 15, 1950
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited October 12, 1971.

In force for Canada October 12, 1971

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

Signed at The Hague December 16, 1970
In force October 14, 1971.

Not in force for Canada.

Agreement to Amend Article 56 of the 1959 Agreement of August 3, 1959, to Supplement the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the stationing of their forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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Signed by Canada October 21, 1971.

Protocol relating to an Amendment to Article 56 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Signed at Vienna July 7, 1971.

Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited November 30, 1971.

March/April 1972

International Perspectives

Journal of the Department of External Affairs



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

The Indo-Pakistan Conflict

The Rhodesian Settlement Plan

Canada, Britain and the EEC

Beyond the Berlin Agreement

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated.

Subscription rates: Canada, United States and Mexico, \$3.00 a year, single copies 75 cents; other countries \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00.

Remittances payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to:

Information Canada, 171 Slater Street, Ottawa, Canada.

Authorized as second class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.

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Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

International Perspectives replaces
the Department's monthly bulletin,
External Affairs.

The Indo-Pakistan conflict and emergence of Bangladesh

Since its formation in 1947, Pakistan has been described by many observers as a fragile coalition of diverse elements whose major claim to nationhood was the unifying force of Islam. In recent years, however, the unity evolving from this common thread was threatened by increased regional disparities and sentiments. This was particularly true of the province of East Bengal, where the Bengalis consider they have derived little benefit from their association, other than a limited sense of security, and where Bengali political and economic interests were, in their view, for many years systematically subordinated to those of West Pakistan.

Pakistan's first general elections with adult suffrage since independence, held on December 7, 1970, served to illustrate the serious problems facing the country when the results confirmed its political polarization into East and West wings. Two dominant political parties emerged, one to represent each wing — but neither could claim a significant political following in the other. Since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League had clear mandates to speak for the 60 million West Pakistanis and 75 million East Pakistanis respectively, the country faced the most serious political challenge to its future since 1947.

The political philosophies of the two leaders were at complete variance; Mr. Bhutto was a firm proponent of a strong central government, but the predominant position of the Awami League (which won 169 of the 169 Eastern seats) indicated an overwhelming majority of Bengalis demanded a fundamental and immediate change in the then-existing relations between East and West. President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Yahya Khan, who was pledged to restore democratic civilian rule to Pakistan but had determined not to allow the disintegration of the country, sought a *modus vivendi* between the two.

As part of Yahya Khan's program for

restoration of civil rule, a Constituent Assembly was scheduled to meet in Dacca on March 3, 1971, in order to draft a new constitution. However, Mr. Bhutto soon announced that the Pakistan People's Party would boycott the Assembly unless Mujib declared that his six-point program on increased autonomy was a matter for discussion. Mujib refused. At the time, it was suggested that this tactic was prompted by the desire of Mr. Bhutto to force his participation in any government and was strengthened by his growing belief that the Awami League alone might use its overwhelming majority to adopt a constitution that might provide almost complete autonomy for East Pakistan.

President Yahya, fearful of the deepening divisions and growing mistrust between the two wings, and no doubt influenced by the real possibility that the Awami League leadership might be pressured by rising militant Bengali nationalism into declaring independence, postponed the Assembly *sine die* on the eve of its session. Mujibur Rahman, apparently convinced that the Martial Law Authorities, in concert with West Pakistani politicians, had conspired to maintain their domination over the Eastern wing, and under increasing pressure from his followers, launched a *hartal*, or general strike, against the military regime and proclaimed local self-government under the Awami League.

The President responded by announcing a new Assembly date of March 25, but the League declared its spokesmen would attend only if martial law ended, troops returned to their barracks and power was transferred to the elected representatives. In the face of the resistance to established authority, developing unrest and growing violence against the minority Urdu-speaking communities, President Yahya flew to Dacca for discussions with the Awami League in the hope that some compromise might be found between his pledge to maintain the integrity of Pakistan and the Bengali demand for increased

*Motivated by fear
Awami League
would declare
independence*



Wide W

REFUGEES RETURNING TO BANGLADESH

Refugees from East Pakistan, who had streamed into India in their millions throughout much of 1971, started returning to their homes as soon as the Indo-Pakistan conflict had come to an end. Top photograph: Refugees en route to their homes in the newly-established state of Bangladesh hold on to all their possessions aboard a truck at a border-crossing point at Boyra, India.

Bottom photograph: More refugees throng

the station platform at Bongaon Ju a border stop on the railway line to Bangladesh cities of Jessore and Ki. The return of the refugees began as the leaders of Bangladesh arrived in Dacca from Calcutta to begin the enormous job of rebuilding their independent country. This task in the resettlement within the state of nearly 10 million refugees and about 20 million displaced persons.

provincial autonomy. Mr. Bhutto also travelled to Dacca and played a vital role in the talks.


While protracted discussions were under way in Dacca between President Yahya Khan, Mujibur Rahman and Mr. Bhutto, a parallel administration was being formed in East Pakistan by the Awami League and the fate of the nation was taken from the conference room into the streets. There was no meeting of minds between the political leaders and, on March 25, President Yahya returned to West Pakistan leaving instructions for the newly reinforced Army to "restore law and order".

The failure of these three persons to reach an agreement on the basis for a new constitution resulted in a civil war whose impact has been felt far beyond the borders of East Bengal. The ensuing campaign of terror and repression led to one of the largest movements of mankind in recorded history, a war between India and Pakistan and a fundamental change in the power structure within South Asia.

Civilian casualties

Because there was no resident Canadian diplomatic mission in the provincial capital of Dacca, because of severe press censorship and the expulsion of all foreign correspondents from East Bengal, much of the information reaching Canada concerning the initial events of the civil war at the time, either unclear or subject to gross exaggeration. Available information now indicates, however, that the Awami League was totally unprepared for the army clamp-down and Bengali resistance was disorganized and poorly equipped to withstand the onslaught. Reports have usually been confirmed that there were heavy casualties among civilians, especially students and others associated with the nationalist movement. Evidence has been forthcoming that the Hindu population was a particular target for repression. In all likelihood, the extent of casualties will never be determined.

The army terror tactics — dictated, it has been suggested, by the fact that there were only some 80,000 to 90,000 Hindus in a country of 75 million — resulted in the displacement of large numbers of East Bengalis, who soon began to seek sanctuary in the neighbouring states of India. Although the first flow of refugees was made up primarily of Muslims, they were soon joined by an increasing number of Hindus, whose proportion was initially estimated to have reached in excess of 80 per cent. Accompanying the refugees were members of the Awami



Wide World photo

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, released after nine months of custody in Pakistan, was flown to London, where he gave a press conference in early January. The leader of Bangladesh then travelled on to Dacca, where he received a tumultuous welcome from his Bengali countrymen.

League who had escaped arrest or execution. With the co-operation of the Indian authorities, they established a government-in-exile in Calcutta and declared the People's Republic of Bangladesh on April 17. In addition, many members of the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the police are reported to have sided with the Awami League and openly opposed the Pakistan Government; these were to form the core of the Bengali guerrilla movement — the Mukti Bahini.

By the onset of the monsoon period in May, the Pakistan Army appeared to have established control over the main centres of population and the principal lines of communication, although they were still subjected to harassment by Bengali guerrilla groups. In many respects, however, the Army was an army of occupation and the flow of refugees continued unabated. By June the numbers were estimated by Indian authorities to have reached approximately six million persons.

Plight of refugees

World attention to the events in East Pakistan focused on the plight of the Bengali refugees. Not only did this massive influx into India pose a severe strain on the limited resources of that country, it also threatened its political stability and communal structure and in so doing con-

tained the seeds of future military conflict. Efforts by the international community, including the United Nations, to resolve this conflict were considerably hampered by the reluctance of most nations to interfere in the internal affairs of another. Later they were made impossible by the difficult attitudes of the parties directly involved and their protectors, who had their own axes to grind. Nevertheless, it was recognized at an early date that, in spite of the extraordinary efforts made by the Indian Government, the care and maintenance of the refugees was an international responsibility and not one to be borne by India alone.

Canada's contribution

Appalled by the tragic plight of the refugees, Canada was one of the first countries to respond to a Red Cross appeal for assistance when, on May 4, 1971, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp announced that Canada was making a contribution of \$50,000 for initial relief. He also reiterated an earlier declaration that Canada was prepared to provide further assistance as soon as needs were identified. On May 28, after an appeal for assistance by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Government of India, Mr. Sharp said the Canadian Government understood that the financial burden of providing relief could not be borne by India alone. To meet urgent human needs in West Bengal and other border states, he announced the Government would provide \$2-million in relief supplies, including foodstuffs, medicines, medical supplies and cash contributions. Mr. Sharp made it clear the \$2-million allocation was a supplemental contribution and would not affect bilateral development assistance for India.

The Minister stressed, however, that it was "most important that relief be provided in as effectively co-ordinated a manner as possible", and expressed the hope of the Canadian Government that Pakistan would admit relief supplies under proper international supervision and control to assist the civilian population of East Bengal.

A further sum of \$2 million, intended to purchase rapeseed and to assist Canadian voluntary agencies in their relief efforts, was announced on July 26. At this time a number of Canadian voluntary agencies concerned with humanitarian assistance formed the Combined Appeal for Pakistani Relief and began a nationwide campaign to raise \$2.5 million. During the period from mid-June to mid-August, *Hercules* and Boeing aircraft of

the Canadian Armed Forces made 121 flights from Canada to Calcutta carrying Canadian and UN relief supplies, including tons of much-needed shelter material to assist the people of East Bengal directly. The Government of Canada also provided a \$7-million allocation for the purchase of food grains to be distributed by the World Food Program and a \$500,000 cash grant to help defray the administrative costs of the UN's East Pakistan Relief Operation.

Responding to international public opinion, representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other agencies were allowed to enter East Pakistan, charged with the task of supervising the return of refugees and co-ordinating relief and rehabilitation operations.

On September 5, in a belated effort to gain the confidence of the population of East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan replaced the military governor Tikka Khan by a distinguished Bengali civilian, A. M. Malik, appointed a civilian council of ministers to assist him drawn from various parties (including several elected representatives of the Awami League). He granted a general amnesty, accompanied by a release of prisoners, to all those who had committed offences during the disturbances beginning March 1.

To further his declared aim of turning all Pakistan to civilian rule as soon as possible, the President also announced by-elections to be held from September 7 to 10 to fill the 79 out of 100 seats in the Awami League National Assembly declared vacant because of the incidents' activities in the secessionist movement. The effects of these arrangements were later blunted by the fact that 50 of the candidates from a number of small East Pakistan parties — the Awami League being proscribed — reached no agreements and were declared ineligible for acclamation. Moreover, of the 88 members of the now officially dissolved Awami League, of whom approximately 40 remained in East Pakistan, few were prepared to attend the proposed meeting of the National Assembly. A panel of constitutional experts was established to write a new draft constitution, which was to be submitted to the Assembly on September 27 for consideration and possible amendment before being proclaimed.

The new constitution, which, because of the rapid course of events, was not published, is reported to have contained provisions for much greater provincial autonomy than had previously been acceptable to the military government. It also included separate political structures for East Pakistan and wide-ranging aut

*Relief supplies
cited as separate
from bilateral aid*

most areas except defence, foreign relations and monetary policy. This would have been a significant step toward meeting the six-point demands of the Awami League on which the election of December 1970 had been fought.

These moves thus seemed to be in the right direction and it was hoped, given time and goodwill, that a political settlement might be achieved by evolution and not revolution, that a framework could in this manner be provided within which popular leaders could come forward in the years ahead. However, the Army's reputation for brutality and terror, the firm position of the Awami League and its supporters to any political settlement short of complete independence and the simple running-out of time contributed to negating these encouraging developments altogether.

Guerrilla growth

At the end of the monsoon in October, the nature of the crisis unfortunately departed from what had been essentially a purely domestic problem to one of dangerous international proportions. Raids on Pakistani government installations, communication lines and shipping became more frequent. The numbers of Bengali guerrillas grew as more refugees were recruited, armed and trained on Indian soil. Increasingly, guerrilla operations became more widespread as units of the Mukti Bahini, following classic guerrilla patterns, controlled areas of the country—by night or operated against the Pakistan Army from their sanctuaries across the border. Even with this increased activity, however, it was doubtful whether the Mukti Bahini could, in the short term, maintain military control without outside assistance.

During the months of October and November tension on the subcontinent eased markedly as military activity subsided along the frontiers of India and Pakistan and across the cease-fire line in Kashmir. This was particularly true along the eastern border, where, according to observers, India was supporting the Mukti Bahini by providing arms and, more importantly, sanctuary and fire-cover for operations in East Bengal. To counter these activities, the Pakistan Army began withdrawing Mukti Bahini bases inside India as well as a number of strategic towns close to the border. The India Government reported that infiltrators were disrupting Indian lines of communication. The UN Secretary-General, concerned at the deteriorating situation, attempted to reduce tension in a number of

ways but his effectiveness was necessarily hampered by the lack of clear direction from the Security Council. His offer of good offices was not accepted by India, which claimed that the entire problem was one to be resolved by the Pakistanis themselves. Furthermore, efforts by the Secretary-General to work for a mutual pull-back of troops, proposed earlier by Yahya Khan, were accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. The New Delhi Government argued that this would prove detrimental to its own interests, since Indian cantonments were considerably further away from the border than Pakistan's. A suggestion was also made by the Secretary-General that representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees be placed on both sides of the border to facilitate and encourage the return of the refugees. The Government of Pakistan, which had again made similar proposals, agreed to accept these representatives. The Indian Government, on the other hand, refused, on the grounds that it was offering no impediment to any refugee who wished to return and therefore there was "nothing to observe".

China-U.S.S.R. split

With the emergence of China as the main supporter of Pakistan and the Soviet Union, which had signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in New Delhi in August, the key supporter of India, the possibility of a military conflict on the subcontinent developing into a major confrontation between two nuclear powers could not be overlooked. The United States, as spokesmen have indicated, was acutely aware of the significance of this development and worked actively to secure a political settlement which would maintain the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

The next step in the military confrontation came on November 21, when Indian troops entered East Pakistan in order to stop Pakistani shelling and to prevent Pakistan armed incursions across the border. This move came at a time when the Mukti Bahini were attempting to establish control over Pakistani territory contiguous to the Indian border. At first, the Indian forces were under orders to withdraw after successfully completing their objectives, but on November 27 units of the Indian Army remained inside East Pakistan. During this period both sides also reported a number of air violations by the other. On November 25, President Yahya Khan announced that the crisis with India had reached "the point of no return". Several days later, Prime Minis-

Mutual pull-back of border troops was opposed by New Delhi

ter Gandhi demanded the withdrawal of Pakistani troops on the grounds that their presence "is a threat to our security".

In retrospect, it might be said the Indian Government, which had up to then exercised remarkable restraint when confronted with the East Bengal crisis but whose sympathy for the Bengali people was clearly reflected in a unanimous Parliamentary resolution, at this point publicly opted for an independent Bangladesh. Whether this would result in a full-scale two-front war with Pakistan was left to the military regime in Islamabad.

As the flow of refugees continued unabated throughout the summer it soon became clear that the problem could only be resolved by a political settlement between Islamabad and the elected leaders of East Bengal which would create conditions of confidence and thus ensure the return of the refugees. It also became evident, as the crisis developed, that the actions and attitudes of India and Pakistan had placed both countries on a potential collision course, which, if unresolved, might lead to war. It became the attitude of the Government of Canada, therefore, not only to assist in humanitarian relief but also to try, in conjunction with other interested parties, to lessen tension on the subcontinent by working for a political solution to the problems in East Pakistan.

Canada's role

The ability of Canada to influence events on the subcontinent was, of course, extremely limited and had to be exercised with care. Furthermore, there were others who were in a far better position than Canada to influence the course of events. All permanent members of the Security Council and many members of the international community sought, in various degrees and in a variety of ways, to resolve the situation on the subcontinent. All efforts were singularly unsuccessful.

Canada was one of the few countries to comment publicly on the East Pakistan situation when, on June 15, 1971, Mr. Sharp announced "it is the purpose of the Canadian Government to try to end the conditions which led to the movement of refugees from East Pakistan to India". "We are doing everything in our power", he said "to persuade the Pakistan Government to establish the kind of confidence necessary for their return." Again, on June 16, Mr. Sharp explained to the House that there was only one possible way of resolving the situation through a political solution and "unless there is a political settlement in Pakistan the refugees are going to remain in India and

continue to be a thorn in the side of peace" "Therefore," he continued "all of us are working with everything at our command and using every possible means of impressing on the Pakistan Government the need for a settlement, that is democratic and made under civil control." The preferred settlement "would be one in which those individuals who have been elected pursuant to the recent election in Pakistan should be given the responsibility of governing Pakistan, particularly East Pakistan". He made it quite clear, however, that "the Government of Canada is not supporting any movement for the separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan".

On November 17, against a background of increasing tension and in response to a new appeal by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the External Affairs Minister announced a further allocation of \$18 million to assist in East Pakistan refugee relief. This amount brought to approximately \$30 million the Government allocation for humanitarian relief to the subcontinent.

Speaking in the House of Commons Mr. Sharp explained: "Continued, increased and effective aid is a question of the greatest urgency. It will help to alleviate the suffering of those caught up in this human tragedy. Dealing with one aspect of the problem can also help to reduce tension, but it does not offer a solution to the underlying problem. A political solution must be found which will allow the refugees to return to a secure and democratic society in East Pakistan. I regret, Mr. Speaker, that at the moment I see little hope of an early resolution of the problem. Canada once again joins other nations in urging upon the Governments of India and Pakistan restraint and forbearance in the face of the grave difficulties that must be overcome before a lasting settlement can be achieved. A similar statement was made by the Canadian representative in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly the following day, where it was emphasized that although Canada would play an important role in alleviating human suffering, the countries of the subcontinent must not expect that their economies, if damaged by war, would be automatically rebuilt by major aid donors.

Exchanges with leaders

Privately, Canada had also attempted to contribute to a satisfactory resolution of the problem by means of a number of exchanges with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Yahya Khan.

'Actions of India and Pakistan placed both . . . on a potential collision course'

August 13, in a message to Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister Trudeau explained in some detail the Canadian attitude toward East Pakistan, as well as steps Canada had taken to try to reduce tension. He expressed support for U Thant's proposals for the stationing of United Nations representatives on both sides of the border. The same day, the Prime Minister also wrote to President Yahya Khan expressing his deep concern over the trend of events on the subcontinent, and stated that it was quite clear in his view that the flow of refugees from East Pakistan must be stopped and reversed if the threatening trend of events was to be arrested. Mr. Trudeau noted that it was equally clear that steps must be taken, both internationally and within Pakistan itself, to facilitate the return home of the millions of displaced persons in India. While the Prime Minister was not willing to suggest the nature of any political settlement, he expressed his conviction that if any efforts were to be successful it was essential that they be accompanied by measures in East Pakistan to create a climate of confidence for all Bengalis. In a previous message on August 11, concerning the trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Prime Minister drew the Pakistani President's attention to the Canadian view that, without commenting on the merits of the case against Mujib, it was a fact that Sheikh Mujib was regarded in many places in the world as the elected spokesman for a large part of the Bengali population. He therefore asked President Yahya to consider the significance a humane and magnanimous decision would have for Pakistan.

ence on aid

Although there were requests to stop economic assistance to Pakistan, the Canadian Government took the view that there was no useful purpose could be served by suspending development assistance, since this would only have a detrimental effect on the people of the country. This attitude was shared by most members of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium. Thus the Canadian development program in East and West Pakistan continued so far as possible under the circumstances. However, no new aid commitments were made during this period, since it was recognized that priorities would need to be reassessed when a return to normalcy had been achieved. Steps were also taken to ensure that no Canadian military equipment was sent to the subcontinent and that Canadian aid, particularly commodities, could not be diverted to war needs. As the situation deteriorated, arrangements were made

to remove Canadian citizens in exposed areas. Subsequently, during a period of extreme tension, the Canadian Armed Forces airlifted Canadians and other foreign nationals from Karachi and Islamabad.

Discussions on East Bengal were also held between the Prime Minister and a number of heads of foreign governments, including Yugoslav President Tito, Soviet Premier Kosygin, British Prime Minister Heath and President Nixon, during visits to Ottawa and abroad and between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his counterparts, including Sardar Swaran Singh of India and Sultan Khan of Pakistan. Since the crisis first emerged there was a constant dialogue between interested governments and the parties involved as to how this potentially dangerous situation might be peacefully resolved.

It was a matter of deep regret that war could not be prevented. Already, on September 29, when addressing the UN General Assembly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs had outlined his great concern about the inadequacy of the tools available to the world community to prevent such an outcome.

Lack of trust

One reason why the international community was unable to respond effectively to the political, as opposed to the humanitarian, needs of the situation was that India and Pakistan were fated to a collision course by the irreconcilable conflict between their respective interests. Although the leaders on both sides professed to have no desire for war, there were those holding positions of high responsibility in both countries whose bellicose public statements only served to exacerbate the situation.

Above all, there was no trust between the leaders in both countries and no disposition to modify what had almost become sanctified national objectives. Unfortunately, these objectives appeared to be at complete variance.

On his side, President Yahya Khan was attempting to preserve the unity of his country while believing that all his efforts were being thwarted by India, whose primary objective seemed to him to be the dismemberment of Pakistan. On her side, Prime Minister Gandhi became convinced that the only way to enable the refugees to return home and thus to ease the crushing burden they represented was to facilitate the political solution the Bengalis themselves wanted. It was noticeable that, after Mrs. Gandhi's tour to world capitals in November, from which

No disposition to modify national goals



Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the time, bitterly criticized the tenor of UN Security Council deliberations on the Indo-Pakistan conflict. At

the close of the conflict, Mr. Bhutto succeeded General Yahya Khan as President of Pakistan.

she seemed to conclude that the international community was unable or unwilling to respond as quickly as India might wish, New Delhi gave increased and open support to the operations of the Mukti Bahini inside East Pakistan.

Pakistan air strikes

War erupted between India and Pakistan on December 3, when the Pakistan Air Force struck deep at Indian air-bases in Northwest India, an action which may have been decided upon as a riposte to the escalation of Indian activity which began around November 21 in the Eastern theatre. The Indian Army responded with a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. Indian air superiority in the East was established within a matter of days. In the West there was activity on the ground and in the air, but at an intensity much lower than during the 1965 conflict. In its advance toward Dacca and other major centres in East Bengal, the Indian Army, which eventually numbered about 132,000 on the ground, met fairly strong Pakistani resistance, but India's overwhelming military superiority, aided by the Mukti Bahini and other guerrilla groups, who

fielded some 80,000 men, and an effective seaward blockade, soon began to assert itself and on December 16 the Pakistani Army in East Bengal surrendered. It then declared a unilateral cease-fire at the Western frontier effective December 17. This was accepted by Pakistan. December 22, Bangladesh leaders returned to Dacca from exile in Calcutta to begin the massive task of rebuilding their new independent country and resettling nearly ten million refugees from outside the country and approximately 20 million displaced persons within.

Security Council bid

After the outbreak of war, intense efforts were made in the Security Council to end the hostilities. Canada is not a member of the Council. Because of the Soviet veto of a resolution which had majority support and the lack of support for a Soviet-sponsored resolution, the Council remained deadlocked and the issue was referred to the General Assembly. On December 17 the Assembly passed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to their own territory. This resolution was rejected

India, and the India-Pakistan question returned to the Security Council. Canada voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution but, in explaining its vote, the Canadian delegation expressed the belief that it did not go far enough and that the Assembly should not only face the immediate need of a cease-fire but should also recognize the requirement for specific protective supervision. It was also hoped that the Security Council would rise to the occasion in order to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it under the Charter, which would have included an examination of the underlying political issues.

Unfortunately, the Council could not reach agreement until after war had, in effect, ceased. The resolution agreed on called on both India and Pakistan to observe strictly the cease-fire and to withdraw their forces to their respective territories as soon as practicable and to observe the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It also instructed the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative to lend his good offices for the solution of humanitarian problems and called upon the international community to provide humanitarian assistance.

India recognized the People's Republic of Bangladesh as an independent state the day after war broke out. Although the Lhasa Kingdom of Bhutan followed almost immediately, the majority of the international community was somewhat hesitant. The Canadian attitude toward recognition of Bangladesh was expressed on December 6, when the External Affairs Minister said that "we have not formally requested to give recognition to Bangladesh, but in any event it is our intention to do so". After the surrender in East Pakistan, Mr. Sharp expressed on December 20: "The Government does not intend to recognize Bangladesh as yet, since we are not satisfied there is a government in that area responsible for administration. As far as we can see, the principal control now rests with the Indian Army itself."

The Canadian attitude toward the recognition of Bangladesh was determined largely by legal considerations. Although there was no doubt that the break-up of Pakistan was an established fact, it was unclear who actually controlled the area. However, the statesmanlike act of Pres-

ident Bhutto, who had by then succeeded General Yahya Khan as head of the Pakistan Government, in releasing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from detention in West Pakistan and the Bengali leader's subsequent return to Dacca on January 10 gave a new dimension to the matter. His presence and the firmness with which he took charge enabled the new government to begin asserting its authority throughout most of the country, even though the new administration was still heavily dependent upon the Indian Army to maintain law and order, especially with regard to the settling of accounts between various groups.

While the Canadian Government was reluctant to extend immediate recognition to the state of Bangladesh, this did not prevent it from announcing humanitarian assistance.

Recognition criteria

In February, after discussions with a number of like-minded governments, and with the full knowledge of the Government of Pakistan, Canada decided that the criteria for an independent government in effective control of a defined territory had been substantially met and accordingly extended recognition to the new state of Bangladesh and its government headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on February 14.

As the Government had delayed in part in extending recognition to Bangladesh in order to give the Pakistan civil authorities sufficient time to reconcile the people and Government of Pakistan to the loss of East Pakistan and the changed circumstances on the subcontinent following the war with India, it was with considerable regret that the news was received on January 31 that President Bhutto had decided that Pakistan should leave the Commonwealth. In a subsequent message to him, Prime Minister Trudeau expressed his hope that in the weeks ahead he might re-examine the question of membership and assured him that Canada would be happy to see Pakistan once again a member of the Commonwealth.

*This article was prepared in the
Department of External Affairs,
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The disintegrative forces in the Indian subcontinent

By Milton Israel

There have always been regions in the Indian subcontinent which have commanded a sense of loyalty among their peoples at the expense of any national identity. Geographical, historical, linguistic, and cultural differences among the vast population set this primary problem for those who held imperial power here in the past. For those who hold power today, the essential question remains the same: to what extent are regional identity and differentiation acceptable within the context of a viable central authority?

The issue has been joined in generation after generation throughout the millenia of India's history. While the ancient Aryan built his empire in the north, his legends and scripture described an empire and culture which encompassed all the land to the southern sea. The Mughal emperors who ruled in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries controlled what they considered to be a subcontinental empire, but their hold was dependent on the strategic placement of their armies, always too few to possess all the land at one time. The British inherited both the power and the problem of empire in India. Far more than any of their predecessors, they achieved success. By a combination of indirect control and direct administration, their empire did, in fact, spread from the Himalayas in the north to Cape Comorin at the southern tip of the subcontinent. Their policy regarding the whole of India and its various regions remained, however, full of inconsistency.

The British argued against the reality of a unitary India, but created a common

administrative and educational system to bind the parts closer together. They declared a united and free India to be the goal, but supported those elements in the country that resisted this conclusion. Having stimulated the growth of an all-Indian nationalist movement which looked forward to inheriting power throughout the subcontinent, they supported and were in turn supported by conservative interests whose sense of "nationality" had far more limited bounds. They supported unity. They stimulated division.

Opportunities for implementation of ideas that challenged central authority were precisely defined and limited. British authorities during the days of their rule. Similarly, there was little room for such deviation within the mainstream of the nationalist movement as the anticipated goal appeared imminent in the decade before the Second World War. The goal was the attainment of freedom and a unitary national state in which differences would be blended and melted to the degree necessary to achieve a single Indian identity and nationality. Western political theory, classical Indian myth, and centuries of imperial dreaming and achievement had combined to underwrite the commitment. Wholeness had been achieved in an imperial context and wholeness in a national context was to be the successor.

Problem transferred

The result, however, was not to fulfil the dream — ancient or modern. Power was transferred to two successor states. The problem of national *versus* regional loyalty was transferred as well, on both sides of the partition line. In both India and Pakistan, the new governments moved quickly to declare their national boundaries, forced backsliders into line among the princes and tribesmen and, where the problem resisted peaceful solution, their respective armies to the task, as in Kashmir. The arrival of two new in-

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endent states was announced to the world. More important, the Indian and Pakistani people had to know, or at least begin the process of enlightenment, that they had become the Indian and Pakistani people.

On September 12, 1947, less than a month after the transfer of power, Jawaharlal Nehru addressed the diplomatic corps in New Delhi and tried to explain the causes of the communal rioting and bloodshed which had accompanied the partition of the subcontinent into two successor states. "The history of India has been one of assimilation and synthesis of the various elements that have come in," he declared, and it was "perhaps because we tried to go against the trend of the country's history" that the current tradition was taking place.

In this context, the creation of the Pakistani state 25 years ago can be seen as the major failure to accommodate one significant element of the Indian mosaic, the Muslim minority. The partition, in effect, gave nation status to two regions of the country in which the primary identity factor was Islam. The leaders of the Indian National Congress were far too concerned with their "national" ideal to indicate the regional bias of the Pakistan movement in the Punjab and East Bengal.

On the other side, fears of a repressive Hindu Raj stimulated political development on a regional-religious level, finally causing the rejection of all-Indian nationality in favour of Pakistan. The composite state had been rejected as untrustworthy.

History may never repeat itself exactly, but there are lessons to learn from past events, and to ignore. The events of the last ten months and the successful emergence of Bangladesh as a new state carved out of Pakistan suggest one obvious conclusion. Here again, as in the case of the whole of Pakistan 25 years ago, regional identity has gone far beyond the limitations meant to protect national integrity, and the nation was dismembered. Here again, a variety of factors — the old, some new — converged to create a moment of opportunity and commitment to break from the old order and set out on a new path.

Three themes

Three major themes dominated the brief history of united Pakistan — both supporting the national ideal and eventually stimulating its denial: (a) the Islamic state; (b) Indo-Pakistani confrontation; (c) Punjabi-Bengali incompatibility. Islam was the regional force which

prevented the establishment of a subcontinental state in 1947. It was also the key factor in establishing national identity in the fragment which broke away. All the obvious difficulties of geographical separation and historical and cultural difference were ignored by the Pakistani leaders in Muslim majority areas, just as they had been ignored by the Hindu élite in the Congress. Whether the cry was a conservative "back to the Koran" and "Islam in danger" or a progressive "revival of Muslim culture", the thrust of the campaigns was the same — separation. If nothing else could claim a common loyalty from these Punjabis, Baluchis, Biharis, and Bengalis, Islam could. Recent events suggest that religion was not a strong enough tie to hold together peoples who shared virtually nothing else.

Communal animosity

The entrenched animosity between India and Pakistan is the well from which many of the major troubles of the region have risen in the last 25 years. It has exaggerated communal animosity, which had already a long and unhappy history.

India's commitment to a secular state as an accommodation to the 50 million Muslims who remained in India after partition was officially ignored by the Pakistani leadership. Even 50 million were overwhelmed by 400 million Hindus. Since Muslim numbers were too small to allow them control of their own destiny, they lived under a Hindu Raj, Islam's ancient enemy in the subcontinent.

Indo-Pakistani rivalry has continually reinjected communal bias into the affairs of the area and has been the primary reason for the failure of responsible attempts to deal with it in India. This rivalry has also diverted the attention of both governments from internal development to grossly-inflated military expenditure. It has also provided the key to big-power involvement. It was perhaps inevitable that both India and Pakistan should become dependent to some degree on those nations able and willing to provide development support. The degree of dependence, however, was vastly exaggerated in the context of their unfriendly relations. Finally, this antagonism has caused the Pakistani leadership to overemphasize and overvalue the significance of Islam as a national unifier. Although some may have believed that Islam was still in danger from a Hindu threat to the south, many Pakistanis were too taken up with internal issues to accept the old war cry uncritically. They had lived in an Islamic state for 24 years and those problems which

'Religion not a strong enough tie to hold peoples together who shared virtually nothing else'

seemed most important to them remained unsolved. By 1971, the old communal rhetoric would no longer suffice, at least for East Pakistan.

Little sense of identity

There is little, if any, sense of fellowship and shared national identity between Punjabis and Bengalis in either India or Pakistan. Their regional history, language, and culture have been largely distinctive and at times antagonistic. In India, a central government, sensitive to regional pressures, has managed to maintain requisite national authority while accommodating recurring demands for regionalization. In the process, India has partitioned and re-partitioned itself to meet local demands and achieved practical unity based on a sense of multinational association. In some measure, Pakistan was at a disadvantage from the beginning, with only two major regions rather than many and with 1,000 miles of Indian territory separating the two parts. Rather than any accommodation, the differences were magnified.

The Islamic bond could not eliminate the negative aspects of the stereotype image which the Bengali and Punjabi held of each other. The years of British occupation in India entrenched these views, especially among the educated classes. In the lexicon of Anglo-India, the Bengali was the effeminate, vocal, political troublemaker, who could rock the ship of state with his rhetoric but never defend it with his muscle. The Punjabi was the quiet, simple, apolitical fellow who could defend the right cause but did not have the mental agility to deal with policy. The myth-images of the lazy, unreliable Bengali and the boorish, irresponsible Punjabi were carried across the borders of the new country and settled in.

When the Punjabi Muslim left India in 1947, he retained few ties with his former homeland. After the carnage that accompanied the transfer of population — Muslims moving into Pakistan and Hindus into India —, only those Muslim relatives and friends who chose to remain in India secured a continued association. All others, especially the Sikh and the Punjabi Hindu, were the enemy. The establishment of Pakistan was the triumph of Punjabi Muslim nationalism. The Bengali Muslim left India amidst similar chaos and bloodshed. Communal rioting in undivided Bengal had taken countless lives in the past, and especially during the transfer. But in significant measure there was a shared Bengali culture with the Hindu. Through the Bengali language and

its well-developed literary tradition, they retained a tie that could not be broken even amidst temporary carnage and seemingly permanent partition. The Bengali in Pakistan — for all his fear and reticence concerning Hindu domination — was tied to Indian Bengal in a manner that could never be undone by his Punjabi countrymen in the west. The Punjabi response to Bengali estrangement was the ingathering of all political and military power under their control in both wings of the country. Economic development in Pakistan reflected this power imbalance. The combination of all these factors challenged the single bond of Islam and finally destroyed its practical impact.

Flow of refugees

The immediate reasons for India's commitment to military action in the East and to the dismemberment of Pakistan reflect both the new situation created by West Pakistani action in the east wing and problems of long standing between the two countries. The inpouring of refugees from East Bengal into West Bengal created a new and dangerous situation for India and could not be accepted for long. The new burden was obviously beyond India's economic capacity and help from outside the area was extraordinarily inadequate. Equally significant, these millions of additional people flowed into an area that was already burdened with major political and economic problems.

Since the beginning of the year (1971), there had been a significant commitment of military personnel in Bengal to safeguard the national elections (February) and to bring under control the anarchistic activities of the Naxalites. The large increase in the number of West Pakistani troops in the East, their proximity to the Indian border (as well as the proximity of Indian troops to the border of East Bengal), and the subsequent brutal repression carried out by these Pakistani troops set the stage for military confrontation. Finally, there was the opportunity to fight the old enemy on the best possible terms for India and to destroy, perhaps permanently, Pakistan's ability to threaten India in the future.

The internal Pakistani struggle and the Indo-Pakistani confrontation may also be placed in the larger vessel of border power intrusion into the area. Unlike similar conflicts between India and Pakistan in the past, this one saw the three powers committing themselves to one side or the other. The old even-handed approach of the British to such situations, which was adopted in the past, at least on the s

*'Myth-images of
lazy Bengali,
boorish Punjabi'*

ce, by the United States, was completely set aside. China and the United States announced their support for the Government of Yahya Khan and Pakistani unity. The Soviet Union sent its Premier to New Delhi to sign an Indo-Soviet pact and to support India's Bangladesh commitment.

The choreography of big-power movements suggested other changes in their attitudes and in the nature of their commitment to the area. The primacy of the United States as the major source for development funds, grain products, and technological assistance in India has yielded to increasingly selective and reduced support in recent years. This change has been further stimulated by the extraordinary U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia and a variety of economic and political pressures at home. The result has been a reduced American profile in India and a subsequent reduction of American influence in the area.

The Soviet Union has been very successful in moving into the area with enormous political benefit, without attempting to match past levels of American aid. The extraordinary ineptitude of American policy in the area in recent months has further damaged relations with India and stimulated Indo-Soviet association. China's position on the situation in the subcontinent remains unclear. China supported Pakistan in its confrontation with the East Bengalis and with India, but with no tactical benefit to Islamabad. The propaganda flowed; the arms and troops did not. India crushed the Pakistani army and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. China has done little more than provide large cheering crowds for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when he arrived in Peking, the new president of a vastly-reduced state.

Pattern set

The pattern of interrelations, exclusive of China, appears to be set for the immediate future. West Pakistan, with United States support, will engage in a program of economic and political development with greater optimism than such a major defeat would suggest as reasonable.

The critical factor will be Mr. Bhutto's ability to convince himself and his people that the east wing is permanently severed from the rest of the country and that it is probably just as well. Having turned all attention to the West, he must establish a co-operative relation with those who control the wealth of the country — spreading that wealth, especially in the east, to a largely-increased percentage of the population without unduly limiting the ability of the big businessman to build

up the industrial base and sell Pakistani products in the world market. Mr. Bhutto will get as much help as he can from China and the United States. It is also quite possible for him to establish a decent working relation with the Soviet Union. For the present, his relations with India and Bangladesh will probably remain in limbo. He must succeed within Pakistan first, before a responsible agreement on future relations among these three states can be worked out.

India won the war, but must suffer the burdens of big-power success without a big-power bank account. A military foe has been displaced, but an economic dependency has been added. In the only balance that will count six months from now, India will be in a far more difficult position *vis-à-vis* the fulfillment of the campaign promises of Mrs. Gandhi and the solution of even the most pressing internal problems than it was before the crisis began. Economic and political stability will continue to be elusive goals for India as well as Pakistan, and now Bangladesh.

There is no question of Bangladesh dependence. The major question will be who will take up the major responsibility and whether political as well as economic subservience will be involved. India and the U.S.S.R. will carry the primary burden — in part by choice, in part because of strategic necessity.

The world community can also be expected to respond, especially through the United Nations, but such contributions are likely to be inadequate, with no relation to ability to give. The United States will also help and will eventually recognize the new state. But as long as the present administration is in power such help is unlikely to reflect the extraordinary need. Again, the United States is not likely to allow India and the Soviet Union to carry away the spoils of war without paying for them. Power politics and humanitarian instinct — both fundamental strains in American foreign policy — will vie with each other for prominence in this area as a new evaluation of the situation takes place in the next few months.

China retains the widest array of options and has apparently not as yet recognized either a need or an opportunity to move into the area with significant effect. The commitment to Pakistan remains vague and the opposition to India and Bangladesh lacks any sense of finality. China-watchers can now turn their attention again to South Asia and prognosticate or await the next move.

*'A military foe
displaced . . .
an economic
dependency added'*

Rhodesian settlement plan as an 'essay in gradualism'

By Lord Garner

Through the last ten years, no single problem has been more baffling, continuous and intractable than Rhodesia. There is no easy solution because in present conditions it is impossible to devise any arrangement which will be welcomed by all concerned. There is now little room for manoeuvre since attitudes adopted in the contemporary drama have been fixed in advance by circumstances often beyond the control of the participants — by history, by geography, by events in other lands, by conflicting ideologies.

The events of the past have indeed cast a long shadow. Cecil Rhodes first beheld in 1888 the land that was to bear his name and, after his dealings with Lobengula (questionable no doubt by the more exacting standards of today), the British South Africa Company was in the following year granted a charter. For over 30 years, until 1923, the chartered company administered the territory; it was not commercially profitable and in the early days there were unhappy clashes with the Matabele tribesmen. But the land was painstakingly developed and the numbers of European settlers grew.

After the First World War, company rule was no longer appropriate and in 1922 the electorate was given the chance to decide between union with South Africa and self-government; they opted for the latter. The future of Rhodesia was thus decided by an electorate that was overwhelmingly white. This seemed right in 1922; except in Southern Africa, it would no longer have seemed right in the eyes of the world in 1972.

Southern Rhodesia thus became self-governing, though not independent, 50 years ago. Eventually the sole restriction in domestic matters was the need to reserve any discriminatory legislation for approval in London. Southern Rhodesia played a full part in the war against Hitler and its Prime Minister invariably attended meetings of Commonwealth prime ministers.

There followed after the Second World War the brave attempt to form a Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, in the hope of engendering spirit of partnership between the races, expanding the economy of all three territories and of containing the advance of *apartheid* into Central Africa. The Federation brought many benefits for Africa — in the franchise, in education and economic progress; but it failed to win their hearts. It fell apart and was quietly buried in 1963. The Federation is relevant to the present theme because, for the crucial decade when Africa was on the march, all interest was focused on the Federation. Southern Rhodesia virtually stood still. It was not until 1961 that, under pressure from the British Government, a new constitution was introduced which guaranteed a minimum number of seats for African voters.

Shortly after the dissolution of the Federation, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were both granted independence and the Government of Southern Rhodesia pressed for independence to be granted to it. This posed the question that in essence still confronts us today.

Rival claims

The attitudes adopted by the two rival claims are understandable. The Europeans claimed with justice that they alone had been responsible for developing the country and bringing it to its state of prosperity and that for 50 years they had proved their capacity to govern the country. They could not understand why independence, accorded so readily to



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w countries of Malawi and Zambia, was withheld from them. The Africans, not naturally, took the opposite standpoint — they could not understand why, if freedom was granted to their brothers in the north (and indeed elsewhere in Africa), it should be withheld from them.

The grant of independence was — and still remains — a matter for decision by the British Parliament exclusively. But the Rhodesian situation was unprecedented. The normal pattern had been to accede to demands for independence from self-governing colonies. The stage had long been set with the white Dominions, and, within a decade of the transfer of power in the Indian subcontinent, the process of de-colonization went on apace. But Rhodesia was unusual in two respects. First, because the electorate represented only the white minority and took little account of the four million Africans (now five million) who outnumbered the Europeans by some 20 to one. Secondly, because, throughout the history of Rhodesia, the British Government had never itself been in control on the spot. During the years of company rule and the by now years of self-government, the British Government had no one under its authorisation stationed in the country with powers to act on its behalf — whether officials, armed services or police.

These factors governed the response of the British Government. It could not in equity agree to an independence constitution which did not make fair provision for the Africans. But it had no power to impose a solution of its own. It sought to take account of the needs of all the peoples in the territory and made its views clear in terms later known as the Five Principles.

Negotiations between the two Governments in the early 1960s failed to reach agreement. Indeed, at successive elections the European electorate moved to the right, as did a rapidly changing succession of Prime Ministers. Eventually on November 11, 1965, the Government of Ian Smith made a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This was rejected by the British Government as illegal. Britain exerted financial pressures, secured diplomatic isolation and imposed economic sanctions. On British initiative sanctions were endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations and, in December 1966, made mandatory.

Threat of holocaust

Leaders in other African countries have vigorously demanded — at the United Nations and at Commonwealth meetings,

and, indeed, with some support — that Britain should assert its power by the use of armed force. But the case against the use of force is strong; some of the reasons are severely practical, some psychological. The overriding consideration, however, is that, once what would in effect be a war between white and black had been started in Southern Africa, who could tell where the blood bath would end? The South African Republic would not have stood idly by and terrorist organizations, aided perhaps by the Communist powers, might well have intervened. The first shot could have started a holocaust.

Aim of sanctions

Sanctions were originally imposed in the hope that international action would act as a shock to the European community, would rally the moderates and would lead to the formation of a new administration with which a reasonable accommodation could be found. This hope was shown over the years to be without substance and elections demonstrated that, far from losing support, the regime gained strength with the European electorate. Nevertheless sanctions have taken their toll and have corroded the progress of the Rhodesian economy. They have also made Rhodesia dependent on South Africa to an extent that probably neither side wants — because Rhodesia, whatever can be claimed against its treatment of Africans, does not adhere to the full doctrine of *apartheid* and South Africa, however strong its sympathies, does not wish to add to its area of responsibility a vast territory containing more than five million Africans.

There is a further factor. In South Africa, the proportion of blacks to white is four and a half to one; in Rhodesia it is over 20 to one. No small minority can hope in the long run to dominate an overwhelming majority of this order. The European must recognize, at least in his own mind, that ultimately his survival depends on the acquiescence of the majority; if the Africans are driven into the hostility of despair, there will be no future for the European.

Harold Wilson, when Prime Minister, sought to achieve a settlement in discussions on board HMS *Tiger* (December 1966) and HMS *Fearless* (October 1968), but, in spite of Mr. Smith's willingness to consider the terms proposed, these were rejected by his Cabinet. As the years passed, the economic — and particularly foreign-exchange — difficulties of Rhodesia increased and further contacts with the regime were established by the new Con-

servative Government in Britain during 1971. Lord Goodman's visits to Salisbury revealed that there was sufficient "give" in the attitude of the Smith regime to justify a further attempt at negotiation. Sir Alec Douglas-Home accordingly flew to Salisbury in November last and agreed with Mr. Smith on proposals for the settlement of the dispute.

The terms of the proposals are detailed and complicated and are at times expressed in legal jargon. Moreover, there is much fine print which requires to be studied. There is no substitute for the full text, but, in summary form, the proposals contain the following:

Franchise

The present House of Assembly consists of 50 Europeans and 16 African Members (eight directly elected and eight elected by tribal authorities). Under the proposals more Africans will be eligible to vote on the existing roll; in addition a new African higher roll will be created with the same qualifications as those for the roll of European voters. Two additional African seats will be created when the number of voters on the African higher roll equals 6 per cent of the number of those on the European roll and two further seats will be added for each additional 6 percent increase until 34 additional African seats have been created, when the number of African and European Members will be equal. Provision is made for the position when parity is reached, including the creation of ten common-roll seats for which the two races will vote together. As the number of African voters increases, they will be able to secure a majority of these seats.

Comment — These provisions are designed to meet the requirement in the Third Principle for an immediate improvement in the political status of the African population and in the First Principle for guaranteeing unimpeded progress to majority rule. The fact that no one can authoritatively forecast what the rate of progress is likely to be shows that parity is not likely to come about speedily and its attainment must be measured in decades rather than years. Moreover, on the percentage formula, an increase of African seats would be delayed if there were to be large-scale European immigration. In any case, nearly half the African seats will be held by Africans indirectly elected by the tribal authorities (24 out of 50 when parity is reached, though at that point the Africans can decide in a referendum that all the African seats should be filled by direct election).

The provisions in the constitution which affect African political advance will be specially entrenched. Any change will require a two-thirds majority of all Members both in the House of Assembly and in the Senate and also, until parity, a simple majority of the African Members and of the European Members in the Assembly voting separately.

Comment — This meets the requirement in the Second Principle that there shall be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution and indeed provides that the blocking mechanism will rest in the hands of the directly elected African Members. But it can be argued that the safeguard is a paper one and there is no external safeguard to prevent a breach of the constitution, as had been previously contemplated. This is an obvious weakness; on the other hand, it is understandable that a country, after independence, would resent any external limitation on its sovereignty; indeed any external safeguard (except force) must rely on co-operation.

Declaration of rights: land

A new Declaration of Rights will protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and give a right of access to the High Court. There will also be special protection against discrimination in new legislation. An independent commission will be set up to examine racial discrimination in existing legislation with special duty to consider problems involved in land tenure. An African will be one of the three members of the commission.

Comment — These provisions meet the requirement in the Fourth Principle for progress towards ending racial discrimination. But the Declaration of Rights itself does not cover existing laws. As regards land, everything will depend on how things work out in practice — particularly the recommendations by the commission and the interpretation by the Rhodesian Government of the qualification in its undertaking to carry out the commission's findings "subject only to consideration that any Government would be obliged to regard as an overriding character".

Development

The British Government will provide £5 million a year for a period of ten years to be matched by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for a development program, aimed in particular at increasing African educational and employment opportunities and stimulating economic growth in the Tribal Trust Lands.



Wide World photo

the Pearce Commission, sent to Rhodesia to test the public views on the proposed Rhodesian settlement, listens to evidence from representatives of the Centre Party

at a public hearing in Salisbury. Commission members, from left: Sir Glyn Jones, Sir Maurice Dorman, Lord Pearce, Commission Chairman, and Lord Harlech.

Comment — If this succeeds, it will speed up the pace at which Africans qualify for the higher roll.

There can be no serious questioning of the British Government's right, and indeed duty, to see whether a solution to this tragic problem of Rhodesia could be found. The question is whether the settlement reached is fair and just.

The summary given above has not dealt in detail with the mechanics of the proposals, since, important though they are, the essence of the matter lies in the spirit in which they are worked. The proposals have been hailed as the dawn of a new and brighter future and derided as betrayal and a "sell-out". Either could prove to be right — for ultimately everything will depend on whether there is or is not mutual trust between the races.

On the one hand, it is true that the settlement is not an ideal one — indeed, no claim has not been made in any quarter. On the other hand it is clear that the Smith regime has made notable concessions from its previous standpoint and that, if the settlement is implemented, Rhodesia would be set on a different and more promising road than it is now taking under the (illegal) constitution of the country in 1969.

The settlement is inevitably a compromise and, by its nature, cannot be expected to give complete satisfaction in any quarter; only too obviously, it does not

satisfy the full African demands — but neither does it meet the claims of the European extremists, and it is to Mr. Smith's credit that he has so far kept his right wing under control. Being a compromise, the settlement may contain the seeds for later conflict; indeed, there are already doubts whether words have the same meaning for all. But also, being a compromise, it may be realistic and may contain enough to satisfy both sides so that each will be willing to accept it as tolerable and as a basis from which to make progress. Everything therefore turns on the good faith of the Government of Rhodesia — not only Mr. Smith but his unknown successors in years to come and the response of the Africans. The Africans are being asked to make an act of faith — faith in the word of a Government in which hitherto they have not felt able to place great confidence. It is one of the tragedies that, in the last ten years, the situation has polarized, the sense of moderation and toleration (which did to some extent exist at the time of the Federation) has gone and effective dialogue between the races has been absent.

In effect, the proposals are an essay in gradualism; they will not produce any revolutionary change, but they do keep the door open for African advance. They could set them on the road (though it may be a long one) to achieving parity with the Europeans in Parliament and even-

tual majority rule. But only if the Africans accept the settlement and co-operate in working it will it bring this about. If they refuse to register, as they have done in the past, they will lose the prospect of additional seats and run the risk of turning the Europeans irrevocably against them. The vital questions are: Will the Africans be able to place confidence in the Government? Will they have the patience to refrain from pressing immediate demands and to wait for a future reward? Will they be willing to co-operate in carrying out the changes proposed?

Barren path of apartheid

There is one further important question: If the settlement is not accepted, what is the alternative? Immediately, there are only two courses ahead: either to accept the settlement, with its admitted disadvantages but nonetheless clear, if meagre, gains, or to reject it. Rejection would involve a return to the *status quo* with no prospect of improvement, but rather to a Rhodesia treading the barren path of *apartheid*, with no hope of redress for the Africans unless and until at some distant date they are sufficiently strong to rise in revolt. Which way lies greater hope?

These are some of the questions that the Pearce Commission is putting during the course of its inquiry in Rhodesia. The Commission was appointed by the British Government in accordance with the Fifth Principle — that they would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The Commission is entirely independent and will report to the British Government. The chairman, Lord Pearce, is an eminent judge; his fellow members are Lord Harlech, who has

had wide experience as Minister, Ambassador in Washington and chairman of the Film Censors Board, Sir Maurice Dorman and Sir Glyn Jones, both distinguished former Governors General of independent African Commonwealth countries. They will be assisted by a team of British experts all familiar with African peoples.

He would be a rash man who would venture to prophesy how the Commission is likely to report. At the time of writing in January, some of the first local reactions to the inquiry — both by African demonstrations and by the Rhodesian authorities' counter-measures — seem deeply disturbing. But a Commission of this standing and expertise should have little difficulty in sifting what genuine opinions are held, discounting intimidation, propaganda and pressure by either side, or in reaching a judgment that is both accurate and unambiguous. This does not rule out the possibility that the Commission might find itself compelled to report that circumstances, which could take a variety of forms, did not make it possible to record a verdict.

If the Commission finds that the settlement is acceptable, then the problems will not vanish overnight, but at least this unhappy land will obtain formal recognition of its independence and can look forward to its future with some measure of hope. But if the Commission is not able to find that the settlement is acceptable, then the vital Fifth Principle will not be fulfilled and it would scarcely be possible for the British Parliament to give effect to the proposals. This result would mark a breakdown in confidence between the races (for which the Africans could not be blamed) and might set them on collision course. It would be a sad day for Rhodesia.

Views from Westminster . . .

Lord Goodman, who undertook the negotiations for the British Government, argued in the House of Lords that to reject the proposed settlement would be "an act of consummate folly". There were shortcomings in the settlement and there was no occasion to "go dancing a jig through the lobby" in support of it. But the settlement proposals warranted support because they were "good enough to give Africans and white Rhodesians . . . an opportunity of majority rule overtaking massacre", Lord Goodman said. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, introducing the motion in the Commons calling for approval of the Government's proposals, said it was his conviction that if the proposals were

accepted, all races in Rhodesia had the chance to build a new and non-racial country.

Denis Healey, speaking for the Labour Party in the Commons, described the Government's approach as a "shabby charade". He charged the proposed settlement in Rhodesia was regarded by the majority of people as a "hypocritical sell-out of African interests". If the Government went through with it, they would carry responsibility for the next half century in Rhodesia "around their neck like an albatross, with immense damage to Britain's influence and interests throughout the world".

Making the case for rejection of the agreement on Rhodesia

Cranford Pratt

The Government of Canada has assessed the basic characteristics of the Rhodesian regime in unequivocal terms. In *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, it has said of Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, that:

It is governed by a white minority whose prosperity and power are based on command of the resources of the country and the subordination of a black majority, and each recognizes that the application of the concepts of political and racial equality would be ruinous to the existing way of life and is therefore to be rejected to the bitter end.

This is undoubtedly a correct assessment. It is, therefore, perhaps most fruitful in an article in this publication to move swiftly from this widely-shared appreciation of the racist and authoritarian character of the Rhodesian regime to a discussion of Canada's policy towards the proposed settlement.

In Rhodesia, the dominant community has long recognized that a genuinely representative legislature would overturn the discriminatory laws that protect its high standards of living and its ruling-class status. As Africans developed politically, they came to recognize the same truth. By the late 1950s several outstanding white Rhodesian leaders realized that a major change in the direction of Rhodesian politics was necessary if African resentments were not, understandably, to develop to very serious proportions. First Garfield Todd, Prime Minister from 1956 to 1958, and then Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister from 1958 to 1962, attempted a variety of modest reforms. Their efforts failed. The patterns of racial domination were too entrenched, the changes that would eventually be needed were too unpalatable, and, in any case, the European minority seemed able to defy African opposition without serious challenge. As the electorate was almost entirely white, Garfield Todd and Whitehead were easily re-elected. The Rhodesian Front then took power, led by men with a total commitment to European hegemony.

Inevitably, they resented the fact that Rhodesia was still a British colony and that the British Parliament was the final constitutional authority for Rhodesia. From 1962 on, their major preoccupation was to win independence for a European-controlled Rhodesia. They could achieve this constitutionally only if Britain could be persuaded to abandon one of the most central of its colonial policies, the policy that independence is granted only after majority rule has been achieved.

Change by Britain

By the early 1960s, Britain was ready to abandon this principle in Rhodesia. At first it sought to negotiate a constitutional settlement with both European and African leaders. However, when Ian Smith became Prime Minister in 1964, he vetoed the participation of African leaders in the constitutional talks. When he accepted this, Sir Alec Douglas-Home added the condition that the British Government would have to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

In the extended negotiations that followed, Sir Alec, and later Harold Wilson, sought to exchange independence now for Rhodesia for guarantees that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority rule and toward an ending of racial discrimination. It was, however, precisely to be free of pressure for such objectives that Mr. Smith wanted independence. A deadlock was, therefore, inevitable and led to the illegal unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in 1965.

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With UDI, the British position had also to provide for a return to legality in Rhodesia. Its policy was outlined to the Commonwealth Conference in 1966 as follows:

After the illegal regime comes to an end, a legal government will be appointed by the Governor, who will form a broadly-based representative administration and have authority over the police and the army. Britain will negotiate with this administration a constitution directed to achieving majority rule. Britain will not consent to independence before majority rule unless the people of Rhodesia as a whole are shown to be in favour of it. The settlement will be submitted for acceptance to the people of Rhodesia by appropriate democratic means.

After the Smith regime failed to endorse the results of the further negotiations held between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith, Britain agreed, in February 1967, to honour its commitment to the Commonwealth that "the British Government will withdraw previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and will not submit to Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule".

However, in 1968 and again in 1971, there were further negotiations and, in November 1971, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith reached an accord. This agreement is presented by Sir Alec as "fair and honourable". It is rejected by many African leaders, Rhodesian and non-Rhodesian alike, as a "sell-out". "Sell-out" is an aggressive and emotional word, but "fair and honourable" is no less a euphemism. In fairness to this African opinion, consider how much the British are now willing to concede, in contrast to their 1966 position:

- (1) Independence would be granted many decades before there would be any chance of majority rule.
- (2) No interim, broadly-based administration has been or would be established.
- (3) Independence would be on the basis of the 1969 constitution, an illegal and racist constitution which is entirely the product of the planning of the Smith regime.
- (4) Mr. Smith and the other leaders of the rebellion would remain in power; the leaders of the African resistance to it would face terrorist and sedition charges if they returned to Rhodesia.
- (5) No meaningful safeguard is possible against retrogressive legislation under this agreement. A public affirmation of good intentions, which is all that much of the agreement involves for Mr. Smith, might check a retrogressive use of government power for a

brief period. It is nonsense to imagine that these undertakings will be regarded as in any way binding over the next 50 years, which is the length of time they need to be of real worth.

- (6) Majority rule will never be achieved under the agreement. An African majority is theoretically conceivable in the distant future, but, given the income qualifications for the franchise, the majority of Africans are bound to remain totally without any elected representation.
- (7) It is not reasonable to expect an African majority in the legislature in any foreseeable future under the agreement. By using the most favourable assumptions, Dr. Claire Palley's meticulous analysis in the *Sunday Times* produced the year 2035 as the earliest possible date for an African majority. These assumptions included no rise in the rate of increase of the European population, an unbiased enforcement of the requirement that a higher-roll voters must speak, read and understand English, and a 50 per cent *per annum* expansion in African secondary-school places for each of the first five years, followed by very high rates of continued expansion thereafter. These are all favourable rather than realistic assumptions. Moreover, to be able to predict majority rule by 2035, Dr. Palley has also to assume that all secondary school graduates would earn an annual income of at least £600, there being also a higher-roll requirement. This is enormously unrealistic. In 1968 the four highest earning categories of African wage-earners were those in commerce, banking, education and health. These categories included most educated Africans. The average salaries in 1968 were, respectively, £318, £310, £271 and £266. In the same year the average earnings of all employed Europeans was £1,400.

It is understandable that no white Members of Parliament have rejected the agreement. They understand, as do politically aware Africans, that the settlement ensures that the European minority will be able with ease to control and, if it wishes, to halt the rate of African advancement.

These are forceful reasons for Canada to decide that it does not regard the agreement as a reasonable basis for settlement in Rhodesia. However, the most fundamental reason for such a decision is that the leaders of the African majority, which constitutes 95 per cent

Changes in position since British policy of 1966 outlined

the total population, took no part in the negotiations and are not a party to the agreement. This is not an acceptable way to seek to determine the future of a people.

The Canadian position on the Rhodesian agreement has not yet been adequately stated. Mr. Sharp's statement in the House of Commons on December 1 was markedly critical of the agreement. However, he conceded to the British the one point that was just then essential to their efforts to win international acceptance of the agreement — that the agreement might conceivably be the basis of an acceptable settlement. The rationale behind this concession to the British merits close scrutiny.

Mr. Sharp has said that we ought not to substitute our judgment for that of the Rhodesian people. This is, of course, a totally acceptable proposition, but its meaning must be made more explicit. In 1969, Canada was, I believe, one of the majority of Commonwealth members that, during the London Commonwealth Conference, urged that "the test of acceptability . . . could only be carried out through the normal democratic process of election or referendum" and doubted "whether adequate safeguards for free political expression could be safeguarded as long as the rebel government remained in power". Mr. Sharp has, for the moment and to the great convenience of the British, retreated from that position. He has

Canada's position . . .

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, in a statement made in the House of Commons, set out the Canadian Government's position on the proposals for settlement of the constitutional dispute over the status of Rhodesia.

Mr. Sharp noted in his statement of December 1 that the constitutional arrangements announced as part of the proposed settlement between Britain and Rhodesia fell short of the long-sought objective of full rights for Rhodesia's black majority.

"From the beginning," Mr. Sharp said, "Canada has held that the solution in Rhodesia should be a constitution providing for the rapid election of a government broadly representative of the Rhodesian people, of whom the overwhelming majority are black. The constitutional arrangements which have been announced fall short of this objective.

"The period for the transition to majority rule is not specified and the means for achieving it are highly complicated. Given the past experience with complicated constitutional provisions in Rhodesia and in various other parts of the world, there is inevitably concern as to how these arrangements will be implemented. Much will depend on the goodwill and co-operation of all concerned — qualities not always evident in recent years in the conduct of the Rhodesian regime . . ."

Mr. Sharp said there would be strong misgivings on the part of many African governments over the proposals. It was entirely understandable that they should

wish all Africans in Rhodesia to have the same advantages which they themselves have obtained through independence on the basis of majority rule".

The External Affairs Minister said the provision for a commission appointed by Britain to determine whether the settlement was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole represented a serious attempt to test the opinion of Rhodesian Africans. But there were inherent complications in the commission plan.

The vast majority of Rhodesian Africans had been given little opportunity in the past to express their political will, certainly not on complicated constitutional questions. There were physical limitations on how large a survey the commission could make. Moreover, the state of emergency prevailing in Rhodesia left African nationalist parties unable to operate, with their leaders barred from influencing public opinion during the consultations.

Mr. Sharp said he hoped that in spite of the limitations the commission would be able to ascertain the views of the Rhodesian people and, in particular, the African population, as to the acceptability of the proposed agreement.

"As Canadians, we may view the proposals as falling short of what is desirable, but we cannot substitute our judgment for the judgment of the Rhodesian people themselves as to whether they prefer to go on as at present or to accept the settlement that has been proposed. Whatever happens, Canada will not cease to be concerned with the attainment of full democracy and social justice in Rhodesia."

agreed that an all-white, all-British Commission may be a legitimate alternative way to discover the views of the Rhodesians as a whole. He has expressed his confidence that "men of the integrity of those nominated to be chairman and vice-chairmen will report not only the views they hear but also on the adequacy of the procedures for ascertaining those views". This is a skilful sentence. It no doubt reassured the British. However, it did not say that Canada would accept the judgment of the Commission.

This caution was well advised. Other men of integrity, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, for example, and Garfield Todd, have said that the procedures for testing the acceptability of the agreement are profoundly biased against its opponents. Faith in the integrity of British peers cannot excuse us from the obligation to exercise our own judgment.

The conditions under which the Commission operated had these features:

- (1) The two most prominent African political leaders and some 60 of their most active supporters remained in detention or prison, almost all of them without trial.
- (2) Access to the media was denied to the new leaders who emerged in the present crisis.
- (3) The chiefs, as paid employees of the state, were required to follow the regime's line.
- (4) Prominent opponents of the agreement, including Garfield Todd and his daughter, were detained.
- (5) Police and special branch members have attended the meetings at which the Commission solicits African opinion. Without, of course, so intending, the Commission thus assisted the Smith regime in identifying the next generation of African leaders who are replacing within Rhodesia those in detention or in the liberation movements outside the country.
- (6) The agreement provides that normal political activity will be permitted before and during the test of acceptability. However, on the ground that it is not normal in Rhodesia to permit political activity in the tribal areas, the opponents of the agreement have not been permitted to hold political meetings in the tribal areas where 60 per cent of the Africans live! (There can hardly be a blunter warning than this of what will be the value of the other commitments made by Mr. Smith if the agreement is accepted.)

Canada was right in 1969. The way

to test the acceptability of an agreement is by a referendum held under conditions of political freedom. Certainly the Pearce Commission, whatever its final judgment, is not an acceptable alternative. Canada ought to have said this immediately. We ought, in any case, to say it now.

An influential argument in favour of the settlement has been made in these terms by the British Prime Minister:

If the 1969 constitution was continued, nothing in the future, as far as anyone could foresee, would change that situation except for the worse. . . . the African would be left with the 1969 constitution, he would be saddled with it as far as anybody can see in the future and by his own hand. There would be nothing else.

The *Sunday Times* has called this "mere propaganda". An African before the Pearce Commission described it as "intimidation from the highest source". A lack of settlement is not a settlement. The Africans' main hope lies in the issue being left alive internationally, with the pressures on the white minority being sustained and increased until the 250,000 whites come to realize that their prosperity and the stability of their country will both be permanently threatened unless they abandon their oligarchic rule over five million Africans and seek to come to terms with their leaders.

A just Canadian policy towards the Home-Smith agreement would have the following features:

- (1) A reaffirmation that a settlement cannot be regarded as acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole unless it is endorsed in a referendum, held under conditions of genuine political freedom.
- (2) An early statement that the Canadian Government cannot accept the proposed settlement and that, whatever the Pearce Commission reports, Canada will advocate the maintenance of international sanctions against Rhodesia and their more effective enforcement.
- (3) An affirmation that honest negotiations between African and white leaders of a constitution transition to majority rule is a first prerequisite to a just settlement and that we expect that such a negotiated settlement would provide for a British international presence until majority rule is achieved.
- (4) A commitment that, as a consequence of such a settlement, we should join with other states to support such projects as a major program of land purchase and assisted emigration to facilitate the departure of Europeans.

Claim procedures for testing pact biased against its opponents

who did not wish to remain in Rhodesia; a major training program for Rhodesian Africans; and a technical-assistance program to replace those Europeans in the public service who left but who could not immediately be replaced by Rhodesians.

A policy statement along these lines would be entirely consistent with present Canadian policies, though it would articulate them more forthrightly. It would involve no contradiction of the Prime Minister's pragmatic comment to his African Commonwealth colleagues in 1969 that they might have to settle for something second or third best. A willingness to accept a second- or a third-best settlement would certainly be needed if negotiations were to be successful. I do not believe that the Prime Minister intended that a second- or third-best settlement could legitimately be imposed without negotiations. Indeed, the more genuine the compromises in a settlement the more essential that African leaders participate in its negotiation.

But what of the whispered advice for prudence that so often seems to have a deciding influence? Why ought Canada to take such a forthright position on this issue?

First, race is likely to become a major factor in international politics, compounding the difficulties of achieving positive and harmonious relations between rich and poor countries. It is important that some white middle powers continue

to bridge these chasms. We need to demonstrate our willingness to adhere to a basic principle even though we should thereby irritate a major white power with whom we have close historical links.

Secondly, we have already played an important role in regard to Rhodesia, particularly at the Commonwealth conferences at London in 1964, at Lagos in 1966 and at London again in 1969. By supporting the same long-term objectives for Rhodesia as were supported by the non-white members, we gained an influence that we employed to win African, Asian and Caribbean acquiescence in the British attempts to negotiate with Mr. Smith. This was perfectly proper and honourable as long as we now remain faithful to these principles and as articulate when they require that we oppose the immediate objectives of the British Government.

There is a final point to make. The Canadian Government is properly reluctant to make gratuitous and moralistic comments on issues in which it plays no role. The Government also claims that social justice is one of the main objectives of its foreign policy. If these two stances are to be compatible, Canada must be ready to play a positive role in those few international issues in which it has a special status because of historical associations, earlier involvements and the trust of the major participants. Rhodesia is one of these few issues.

Message from Lord Pearce . . .

The Pearce Commission returned to Britain in mid-March to begin work on its report — a task Lord Pearce described as without precedent. Following are excerpts from a broadcast he gave in Salisbury before his departure:

" . . . The response to our invitation has been overwhelming and most impressive — not only the politically minded, whose views we expected to hear, but all sections of Rhodesian society have willingly presented their views. We are particularly grateful to the so-called 'silent majority' who have not let their views go by default. Many thousands of ordinary Rhodesians have taken the trouble to attend meetings, send delegations or write to us direct Not only has the level of response been impressive, but also the obvious sincerity and the cogency with which so much has been expressed. I regret that we have been unable to interview

absolutely all those who offered to supplement their written statements, but their views will, of course, be taken into account.

" . . . Those who have spoken or written in confidence can rest assured that their confidence will be respected. All papers are being taken back to London with us. There we shall consider the mass of evidence we have obtained. We are completely independent. I hope there are no lingering doubts about this. Our analysis will be entirely impartial Working with this commission has been a unique experience and quite a hard one but my colleagues and I have found it rewarding too"

Lord Pearce undertook to produce a report as speedily as possible and said he hoped to submit it to Sir Alec Douglas-Home during the second half of April.

The quest for counterweight: Canada, Britain and the EEC

By Peyton V. Lyon

Canada's response to the current expansion of the European Economic Community contrasts sharply with its official posture during the abortive Brussels negotiations of 1961-63. The Diefenbaker Government at that time had drawn pessimistic conclusions about both the economic and political consequences of British membership. It feared that Canadian exports would suffer drastically and that Britain's role as Commonwealth *primus inter pares* would be terminated and its special ties with Canada abandoned.

Canadian ministers rallied the opposition to Britain's plans at the Commonwealth economic conference in Accra in October 1961, and Canada's High Commissioner in London delivered a series of public addresses designed to keep the British British. Canadian ministers made thinly-veiled accusations of bad faith, and Mr. Diefenbaker's emotional speech to the prime ministers' conference in September 1962 was specially resented by the British. Anglo-Canadian relations reached their lowest ebb in decades.

In the recent negotiations, Britain encountered little difficulty from Canada. Once again, Ottawa's official position was that "accession to the EEC is for Britain and the Community to decide". This time it was meant. The Government anticipated that "some Canadian exporters, particularly in the agricultural sector, are likely to have difficulties"; they have taken every opportunity to ensure that the British and the Europeans are fully informed "of the interests that stand to be adversely affected", and have asked that they be

taken account of in the transitional arrangements. On the other hand, ministerial statements have consistently expressed optimism that the expanded EEC will be outward-looking and good for the world.

In part, Ottawa's attitude reflects a less pessimistic estimate of the economic costs to Canada. The Kennedy Round has intervened, lessening the significance of tariff structures. In spite of the Commonwealth preference, Canada's exports to Britain have been growing only one-fourth as rapidly as its exports to the EEC, and the exports to the two markets are now comparable in volume (\$1.2 billion to the EEC and \$1.5 billion to Britain). Already the sales to the EEC include substantially more manufactured goods (\$160 million, compared to \$107 million), and it is these, rather than raw materials, that Canadians are eager to export; they find the thought repellent that they might become mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water". If, as is hoped, membership in the EEC brings Britain an EEC rate of economic growth, the total British demand for imports should increase in time, thus tending to offset the deterioration in access conditions for Canadian goods.

Welcomed by Pearson

During the earlier negotiations, hints were heard from Ottawa of Commonwealth alternatives that would ease Britain's difficulties if it remained outside the EEC. No such alternative ever materialized. In 1961-63, moreover, Lester Pearson, then leader of the Liberal Opposition, warmly endorsed the British bid for EEC membership and roasted the Conservatives for "anti-British" activity. Although Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Mr. Pearson's Liberal successor, has played down Pearsonian internationalism, he has maintained the party's sympathetic understanding for Britain's European aspirations.

Not all the reasons for this commendable attitude are comforting to Commonwealth enthusiasts. However faulty Mr

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Defenbaker's judgment, and deplorable manners, he and his ministers were strongly motivated by devotion to the British connection, and convinced that Britain was confronted with a stark choice between Common Market and Commonwealth. Mr. Trudeau's initial scepticism toward the Commonwealth has diminished. He has come to appreciate the relative ease of communication between leaders of polities in which British Parliamentary traditions retain some vitality. Most of his Prime Ministerial visits have been to Commonwealth capitals, and one of his rare personal involvements in international diplomacy — certainly the most energetic — was his attempt to rescue the Commonwealth from the consequences of Mr. Heath's stubborn resolve to supply arms to South Africa. Support for the Commonwealth, especially as a multiracial community, is probably stronger in Canada than in any other country, and Mr. Trudeau shares this enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, part of his Government's benevolent attitude towards British entry into the EEC must be attributed to a decline in emotional attachment to Britain and Commonwealth. A majority of Canadians are inclined to regard the monarchy as an anachronism destined to fade away in time. Key ministers hint that they are reluctant to tackle the issue head-on only because they regard it as of insufficient moment to warrant the divisive debate that would certainly ensue. Although not antagonistic to the Commonwealth, French-speaking Canadians are understandably determined that comparable support be given to La Francophonie and its institutions such as L'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique. Indeed, because this institutionalization is relatively recent and because Quebec might, under a different administration, seek to displace Canada in the French-speaking community, Ottawa is not properly paying more immediate attention to the *francophone* "Commonwealth" than to the British original.

The institutionalization of La Francophonie has made it easier for French-speaking Canadians to support Canada's activity in the English-speaking world. Nevertheless, Ottawa's response to the decline of the Commonwealth can best be described as regret rather than acute concern. Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, occasioned the controversy when he commented earlier this year that the Commonwealth had degenerated to the point that it can no longer be a cornerstone of policy although it remains a useful institution, particularly

for its smaller members". Almost a year earlier, responsibility for Britain within Mr. Sharp's department had been transferred from the Commonwealth to the Northwest Europe Division. "We are now treating Britain," a senior official has said privately, "as a country instead of a concept." This is not to say that Britain is being treated less seriously. Indeed, the contrary is closer to the truth.

Heath's stance

The Commonwealth, and Britain's central role, need not be further weakened by the merger with the EEC. Although the Commonwealth's military and economic substance has largely dissipated, the consultative and cultural features can be maintained if the will is adequate. That will is now more evident in Ottawa than London. From across the Atlantic, it often appears as if Prime Minister Heath, and many of his countrymen, increasingly regard the Commonwealth as a burden and a bore. The inclination is clearly very strong to let the opening to Europe monopolize British energy and attention. Although Mr. Heath should be grateful for Canadian forbearance during the recent negotiations with the European Community, he is less enthusiastic about other Canadian attitudes and actions — such as opposition to arms sales to South Africa, unilateral cuts in troop strength to Europe and benign interpretation of current Soviet intentions. If Ottawa and London are drifting apart, however, the explanation lies less in any particular dispute than in preoccupation with different problems and opportunities.

Of the two, Canada may well be the first to so regret the trend that it takes energetic steps to reverse it. This action would be conceived as part of a campaign for national survival. While London labours to integrate its economy with that of the adjacent continent, Ottawa is belatedly responding to the widespread Canadian worry about the consequences of economic integration in North America. Canadians might take some comfort from the disappointing European experience, where economic integration was *intended* to foster political unity and has failed as yet to do so. Instead, they appear to subscribe to the Marxist proposition that "as goes the economy, so goes the polity", even when political unification is consciously *rejected* as a goal.

Experience elsewhere suggests that nations can survive even though integrated in significant respects with larger entities. The high degree of economic integration between Ireland and Britain, for example, or the cultural similarity of

'Strong inclination to let Europe monopolize British energy and attention'

Austria and Germany, has not led to total integration or homogenization. Nevertheless, Canadians fear that, unless American ownership of Canadian industry can be reduced and alternative markets found, Canada will be inexorably absorbed into the United States.

This apprehension is resulting in measures to control the entry of foreign capital. More constructively, it has re-awakened interest in the "counterweight" approach to Canada's "American problem". Policymakers in Ottawa have traditionally striven for balance between Canada's relations with Britain and those with the United States. Counterweight imagery, however, is misleading in so far as it evokes the balance-of-power model. In the Canadian context, it has almost no military significance, and it never prescribed the promotion of tension between London and Washington; indeed, strife between them has always been perceived by Ottawa as a deadly threat. The counterweight metaphor is also subject to criticism in so far as it mistakenly suggests that any set of Canadian external relations could now approach in significance those with the United States. The expression "countervailing influence" is less vulnerable on this score, while some officials prefer the still blander "diversification".

Alternative markets

Whatever the term, the approach has both material and psychic dimensions. The most obvious, and substantial, rests on the proposition that a nation is better able to withstand pressure, or pull, from a powerful neighbour if it has alternative markets for its exports and alternative sources of capital and technology. Uneasiness about the high concentration of Canadian eggs in the American basket was intensified by Washington's aggressive economic measures of August 15, 1971. Although Canada has emerged relatively unscathed from the immediate crisis, it exposed starkly its vulnerability, and tough negotiations with Washington have followed on a wide range of sticky issues. These have not been made easier for Ottawa by indications that the world may be entering a GATT-less era, one dominated by economic blocs from which Canada is excluded. Many Canadians, moreover, are now persuaded that the price tag on American investment is excessive in terms of the scientific and industrial base needed to shape its own destiny. Servan-Schreiber's warning to Europe, if valid, applies *a fortiori* to Canada.

In spite of the presence within Cana-

da of a substantial French-speaking community, the cultural differences between the majority of Canadians and their southern neighbours are diminishing. This trend calls into question the cost, indeed the possibility, of separate national existence. Increased cultural and technological exchange with nations other than the United States is now recognized as the obvious and positive means to counteract it.

Expectations may be of critical importance. If Canadians become convinced that they are losing control over their destiny, and their identity, they may adopt extreme, counter-productive measures. They are just as likely to become defeatist and to cease resisting full continental integration.

The degree of integration in North America — economic, military and cultural — is probably too substantial to be decisively altered at acceptable cost or fully counterbalanced by interaction with third countries. Nevertheless, if change in tendency can be effected, especially in ways that penetrate the Canadian consciousness, the confidence necessary to national survival may be secured. Canadians, therefore, need not be anti-American in order to attach overriding importance to intensifying ties with third countries.

Relations with Britain, though still extremely close in the cultural realm and nourished by visits and fresh immigration, have clearly become inadequate to provide all the necessary countervailing influence. Trade between the two has declined sharply in relative importance, and the symbolic links are weakening. Especially since the early 1960s, when Canadians became fully aware of the relevance of Paris-Ottawa relations in the maintenance of harmony within Canada, France has been perceived as a vital source of countervailing influence, but putting substance into these relations has not been easy. Even before Charles de Gaulle set out in 1967 to disrupt Canada, co-operation with Paris had proved difficult, and France had disappointed as an alternative market and provider of immigrants and capital. Since de Gaulle's exit, Franco-Canadian relations have improved.

Western Europe as a whole is obviously a more adequate source of countervailing influence. The expanded community will be by far the world's largest importer, and Canadians possess family and cultural ties with all of its national components. A strong secondary argument for Canadian participation in NATO has been, from the beginning, that it offered a means to meet Canada's security needs.

*Moves by U.S.
exposed Canada's
vulnerability*



British Prime Minister Heath (left), French President Georges Pompidou and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann share a moment of banter in the Elysee

Palace garden before resuming their official talks. These discussions in Paris last year helped pave the way for admission of Britain to the EEC.

UPI cablephoto

While mitigating dependence on the United States. De Gaulle's treatment of Canada has 'cast doubt on the familiar proposition that "there is less risk of rape if 15 are in the bed", but most Ottawa officials continue to believe that the West European allies provide the only serious counterweight to Canada's involvement with the United States, and also that an active role in NATO is essential if these relations are to be sufficiently close. An increasing minority, however, contest the need to keep troops in Europe. They doubt that West European governments ever grant Canada economic favours as a result of its co-operative participation in NATO. Some critics go further and assert that NATO, far from being a means to offset American influence, is itself so completely dominated by the United States that to recover independence Canada must sever all alliance connections.

Shared by Trudeau

Prime Minister Trudeau appeared initially to share some of these views, but not the obsessive fear of U.S. domination. He combined in 1969 that NATO had dictated much of Canada's external policies, advocated greater attention to domestic problems and less to European security, and generally appeared rather bored with the

Western half of that continent. Mr. Trudeau's timely initiative in seeking diplomatic relations with Peking, well-publicized visits by his ministers to Latin America, and his own travels to New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, underlined his conviction that Canada should give priority to generating relations well away from the North Atlantic.

This was also the message of the first booklet in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (1970), the Government's most considered statement of intentions: "The predominance of transatlantic ties — with Britain, France and Western Europe generally (and new links with the Common Market) — will be adjusted to reflect a more evenly distributed policy emphasis, which envisages expanding activities in the Pacific basin and Latin America" (P. 38).

With longer experience, Mr. Trudeau's Government has displayed increasing awareness of Canada's need for countervailing relations, and decreasing confidence that they can be established — on the necessary scale — beyond the Atlantic community. Relations with developing nations, although growing, are too one-sided to ease greatly Canada's overwhelming involvement with its super-power

neighbour. Trade with Japan is expanding rapidly, but its interest in Canada extends little further than its need for raw materials, and there are as yet relatively few of the personal, historical and cultural bonds that link Canada to Europe. Until 1971, Mr. Trudeau had said almost nothing to suggest that he personally attached importance to counterweights in foreign relations. Ironically, he made good this deficiency when in Moscow; while stressing that Canada would remain closely allied to the United States, he advocated intensified ties with the Soviet Union to counteract the danger posed by the "overwhelming presence of the United States . . . to our identity from a cultural, economic, and perhaps even military, point of view".

Although most Canadians approved the sensible new agreements with the Kremlin, a large number objected so strenuously to the notion of exploiting the Soviet Union as a counterweight to the United States that Mr. Trudeau has since felt constrained to deny repeatedly that his Government is anti-American or imagines that trans-polar relations could ever approach in intimacy or weight those that cross the 49th Parallel.

Courting Western Europe

So, after an extensive *tour d'horizon* in search of non-Atlantic sources of significant counterweight, Canada's leaders have returned to Mother Europe. Mr. Trudeau has yet to acknowledge this explicitly, and he has made no Prime Ministerial visits to Western Europe in any way comparable to those already paid other continents and the U.S.S.R. His ministers, however, have been courting the West European governments and trying to make amends for Canada's earlier, inexcusable, neglect of the European Community. In 1970, Messrs Pepin and Sharp became the first Canadian ministers to call at the headquarters of the European Commission. The next year, the Governor General paid official visits to Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Canada is now seeking an agreement with the Community that will provide a more institutionalized means of consultation. Ottawa officials are increasingly inclined to disregard the first booklet in the *Foreign Policy for Canadians* packet, the one upon which the ministers concentrated their efforts, and to take their cues from the more sensible booklet entitled *Europe*. In this, Europe is recognized as:

the only area outside North America where the major themes of Canadian policy converge . . .

(P. 38). The maintenance of an adequate measure of economic and political independence in the face of American power and influence is a problem Canada shares with the European nations . . . (P. 14). The more the European countries combine their efforts, the more opportunities there will be for Canada to find rewarding forms of co-operation with them. It is not realistic to imagine that the present trends could be changed 90 degrees in direction . . . but there would be much merit in seeking to develop at least some measure of countervailing influence . . . (P. 27).

Ottawa is energetically engaged in identifying activities which allow scope for expanded collaboration with the Europeans, and in negotiating new agreements.

In 1968, during the debate over membership in NATO, a frequent question was: "Must we go on helping the affluent Europeans?" Now the most prevalent query is: "How can we persuade the Europeans that it is in their interests to increase interaction with Canada?" Is it too late, one wonders, to convince the Europeans that Claude Julien, a leading French editor, was right when he wrote in 1965: Outside Europe, Canada is the only Western power able to maintain the delicate equilibrium that sways from one side of the Atlantic to the other. If Canada's weight falls on the American side of the scale, the balance will be forever lost. If it falls on the European side, then a chance of maintaining this balance will remain.

Must Canada continue to be active in European security in order to generate the other relations that it needs with the West Europeans? Probably yes. Ministers of foreign affairs, finance and defence are concerned about Canada's military contribution to the common defence, and in a position to give consideration to Canadian interests. If Canada had no troops in Europe, it might not now be necessary to dispatch a contingent. However, the task of convincing the West European governments that Canada wants closer ties was hardly facilitated by the spectacle of Canadian troops hurrying home. It may well be significant that Bonn, the most security-conscious of the European capitals, is also the most responsive to Canadian requests.

Inside the Club

What help can Canada expect of Britain from inside the European club? Appeals based on sentiment or tradition are of limited value, and Britain will be hard pressed to gain the concessions needed by its own economy. Britain will be reluctant to give the slightest appearance of entering as anyone's "Trojan Horse". On the other hand, Canada can at least expect the consideration due any developed nation with a gross national

*'Canada's leaders
have returned
to Mother Europe'*

product approaching \$100 billion and Britain, with the largest stake in the Canadian market, will be the EEC member with the greatest interest in negotiating reductions in Canada's tariff structure.

The task of generating substantial relations with third countries without prejudicing Canada's position with the United States should be less difficult in Western Europe than anywhere else. On

balance, it will probably be facilitated by the enlargement of the European Community from six to ten. Intensified efforts to strengthen ties with Britain are in order, but no longer because it is a country (in Canadian eyes) unlike all the others. Rather it is because Britain is soon to be one of the three leading members of the European Community, Canada's best hope for countervailing influence.

Berlin negotiations: the path to easing East-West tensions

The signature of the inter-German agreements on Berlin in December marked the end of the Berlin negotiations. It only remains now for the four powers concerned to sign the final protocol, which has already been negotiated, to bring the inter-German agreements as well as the four-power agreement of last September into force. Although the U.S.S.R. has tied its signature of the final protocol to the ratification by the Federal Republic of Germany of its non-aggression treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland, there is reason to hope that the treaties will be ratified and the final protocol signed in the next few months. If the Berlin agreement is to be fully effective, it should, however, be complemented by the negotiation of a *modus vivendi* between the F.R.G. and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The conclusion of both the agreement and a *modus vivendi* would provide an impetus to the relaxation of tensions in East-West relations.

The history of the last 25 years indicates how closely the Berlin question and the German question as a whole are entwined and how central both are to East-West relations. The Berlin blockade of 1948 arose directly out of the growing division of Germany. This attempt to force Western allies out of West Berlin was the first major test of strength of the Cold War. It contributed considerably to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the integration of West and East Germany in their respective camps.

The failure of the blockade left a gap in the Iron Curtain which the Soviet Union found disturbing from a strategic,

political and ideological point of view. Berlin became a major and continuous source of friction between the two Germanies, and between the Communist bloc and NATO for the next 13 years. Through West Berlin flowed Western publications and broadcasts in one direction and East Germans in the other. From 1949 to 1958, 2,188,000 East Germans left for West Berlin out of a total population of 17,500,000. The city was, as Khrushchov put it, a bone in the Soviet Union's throat. His attempt to remove the bone produced the second Berlin crisis. In the four years between 1958 and 1962, at least three major efforts were made to force the West out of Berlin by means of threats and intimidations of various kinds.

The confrontation with the United States over the Cuban missiles led the U.S.S.R. to revise its policy on Berlin. The need, from the Soviet point of view, to see the West removed from Berlin had, in any case, been diminished by the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, which stopped the flow of refugees.

Even though the U.S.S.R. abandoned any active attempt to expel the West, it did not give up its claim, which had brought on the crisis, that occupation rights of the Western powers should cease and that West Berlin should become a special political unit without any special political, economic and financial links with West Germany (F.R.G.). Both the U.S.S.R. and East Germany continued within limits to promote this aim. The East Germans prohibited the West Berliners from visiting the G.D.R. and first restricted and then stopped, except in emergency cases, visits by West Berliners



Wide World photo

After signing the four-power agreement on Berlin, the four ambassadors step outside the former Allied Control Council Building in West Berlin. From the left:

Britain's Sir Roger Jackling, Pyotr Abrassimov of the Soviet Union, Kenneth Rush of the United States and Jean Sauvagnargues of France.

to East Berlin. Both the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. harassed the access routes when political events not to their liking took place in West Berlin. The other Communist countries, by not accepting the right of the F.R.G. to represent the West Berliners abroad, effectively denied the West Berliners consular protection in Eastern Europe and made it difficult for West Berlin products to be sold there. As a result of all these factors, Berlin remained a continuous source of tensions in East-West relations, although at a lower level than previously.

Berlin key position

As both East and West started to explore the possibilities of reducing tensions in the second half of the 1960s, Berlin came to resume its central position in East-West negotiations. During the latter part of the 60s, the F.R.G. began to move toward a policy of accepting the existence of the G.D.R. and Germany's postwar border with Poland. It hoped in this way to establish closer relations with Eastern Europe as a whole and thus to reduce the

growing division between the two German states. It, and the three Western powers, recognized, however, that a general international recognition of the sovereignty of the G.D.R. could affect the four-power occupation rights on the access-routes to Berlin because of the G.D.R. claim to sovereignty over them. Furthermore, it was considered that no genuine relaxation of tensions could be achieved between East and West unless there were an end to the continuing harassment of West Berlin and an acceptance of its links with the F.R.G. The Soviet willingness to see that this was done in exchange for the acceptance by the F.R.G. of the territorial *status quo* in Eastern Europe was regarded as a test of the U.S.S.R.'s desire for *détente*.

During this period, signs began to multiply that the Soviet Union was indeed interested in *détente*. Relations with China had deteriorated. The Soviet arms expenditure was heavy and the Soviet economy and technology were slipping further behind those of the West. The U.S.S.R. seemed to hope that a *détente* would strengthen the position of the War

saw Pact in Eastern Europe, lead to greater economic and technological co-operation with the West and perhaps encourage the withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. In March 1969, in Budapest, a conference of the Warsaw Pact powers renewed a long-standing proposal for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). A month later, the foreign ministers of NATO, meeting in Washington, replied by indicating that any such conference would have to be preceded by a removal of sources of tension, especially in and around Berlin. One year later, after various exchanges on the subject, the first meeting of the ambassadors of the four powers was held, on March 26, 1970, to consider the situation in and around Berlin. At approximately the same time, negotiations on other aspects of the German question began. On March 19, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt had met the East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph; while, in December 1969, representatives of the F.R.G. and the U.S.S.R. had begun discussions on a non-aggression treaty.

At the beginning of the Berlin talks, few observers were willing to express anything more than cautious optimism about their outcome. The positions of the two sides were too far apart. The Western allies were seeking: (a) a four-power guarantee of unhindered and preferential civilian access to West Berlin; (b) a similarly guaranteed restoration of inner Berlin travel and communications; and (c) an acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the financial, economic and political ties between West Berlin and the F.R.G., including the right of the latter to represent West Berlin abroad. In exchange, the allies, after consultation with the F.R.G., were willing to credit the performance by the F.R.G. of certain political *actes de présence* in West Berlin. The Western allies based their demands on the four-power status of all of Berlin established in the war and postwar agreements.

The Russians, on the other hand, were only willing to admit that: (a) quadripartite status applied to West Berlin and not to the whole of the city; (b) West Berlin constituted a distinct political entity which was not part of the F.R.G., whose political activities there constituted a violation of the city's status; and (c) that the access routes to Berlin were under the full sovereignty of the G.D.R.

The possibility of the success of the talks was further diminished by the opposition of the G.D.R. to the Western demands since they would vitiate its claims

to sovereignty over the access routes, undermine its pretension that West Berlin lay on its territory, and threaten its ability to apply pressure on both the F.R.G. and West Berlin through harassment of the access routes. In addition, the G.D.R. seemed to be worried that a reduction of tensions between East and West might threaten the internal stability that it had built up since the erection of the wall. For this reason, the G.D.R. ended the inter-German negotiations in May 1970, when the F.R.G. proposed the establishment of special relations and closer co-operation between the two German states, to be followed by the admission of both to the United Nations and the international recognition, but without any special relations or substantial co-operation with the F.R.G.

Accommodation with West

The signature of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty on August 17, 1970, however, gave a strong indication that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to reach an accommodation with the West. The treaty and its associated documents amounted to a settlement by West Germany and the U.S.S.R. of their outstanding differences in Eastern Europe. Major concessions were made by the F.R.G. It agreed to accept the Oder-Neisse boundary, the Czech boundary and the G.D.R. as a fully sovereign and equal state. It also agreed to conclude similar treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the G.D.R. The U.S.S.R., however, made some significant concessions, too. It renounced the right, given to it as one of the victors of the Second World War by Articles 53 and 137 of the United Nations Charter, to intervene in the internal affairs of the F.R.G. It did not insist on the F.R.G. recognizing the G.D.R. as a foreign state, which would have excluded the special relations the F.R.G. was seeking, and it did not exclude the possibility of reunification.

The non-aggression treaty also gave the three Western powers an additional lever in the Berlin negotiations since the F.R.G. indicated that it would not submit the treaty for ratification until there had been a satisfactory conclusion to the Berlin negotiations.

In spite of the expectations raised by the non-aggression treaty, however, progress remained slow for the next eight months. Although part of this slowness was due to the extraordinary difficulty of the subject matter, a good deal seems to have been due to the continuing opposition of the G.D.R. During this period, the G.D.R. tried to bring the F.R.G. to ne-

gotiate a transit agreement that would have recognized the G.D.R.'s sovereignty over the access routes at the expense of four-power rights. The F.R.G., while willing to negotiate an agreement covering transit between the two states, refused to have it cover the Berlin access routes. It was only after the replacement of the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, by Erich Honecker at the beginning of May that rapid and substantial progress was made in the negotiations.

Allied aims met

The negotiations were completed on September 3 with the signature of the four-power agreement. The agreement is in many ways a diplomatic *tour de force*. It manages to set out several practical improvements for Berlin while remaining neutral on the mainly contradictory legal positions of East and West on the city's status. The improvements thus achieved largely correspond to the allied aims at the beginning of the negotiations. It is doubtful that the allies would have been able to achieve so much in the face of the strong East German opposition without the allied refusal to move forward in areas of interest to the U.S.S.R. until the Berlin agreement was satisfactorily concluded. The F.R.G. had postponed its ratification of its non-aggression treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland while the NATO countries had refused to engage in multilateral preparations for a European security conference.

The agreement reaffirms the final responsibility of the U.S.S.R. for civilian access to Berlin and provides that it should be unhindered. It allows the West Berliners to visit East Berlin and the F.R.G., including the right of the F.R.G. to represent West Berlin interests abroad.

In return for these substantial improvements, the agreement allows the Soviets to open a consulate and certain trade offices in West Berlin, and prohibits the F.R.G. from performing certain constitutional and official acts that might be interpreted as an exercise of direct state authority over West Berlin.

The agreement provided that the sections on access and communications were to be implemented by agreements between the competent German authorities, after which the four powers would sign a final protocol bringing all agreements into force. In the inter-German negotiations, which began immediately after the signature of the four-power agreement, the opposition of the G.D.R. to the Berlin agreement once again became apparent. The G.D.R. rejected the German transla-

tion of the agreement, which it had helped prepare, and spent several weeks trying to force the F.R.G. to accept significant changes that would have altered the meaning of the agreement.

Even after the G.D.R. abandoned this attempt, progress in the talks remained slow and uneven. Finally, First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, during his visit to East Berlin at the end of October, publicly emphasized the need for speed in concluding the talks. From that moment on, the talks proceeded much more smoothly. The agreement between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. on access to West Berlin was concluded on December 17, while that between West Berlin and the G.D.R. on communications between West Berlin and the surrounding territory, which also provided for minor border rectifications, was signed on December 20.

Protocol next

The signature of the inter-German agreements marked the end of the Berlin negotiations. It only remains now for the four powers to sign the final protocol for the whole agreement to come into force. Although the Western powers are willing to sign at any time, the U.S.S.R. has indicated that it will not sign before the ratification by the F.R.G. of its non-aggression treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland. The F.R.G. presented these treaties to the *Bundestag* after the conclusion of the negotiations. It is likely that they will obtain the necessary parliamentary approval sometime late in the spring.

Even though the Berlin negotiations may be considered a success, it is still too early to say to what extent the resultant agreement, assuming it enters into force, will succeed in accomplishing the aim of the negotiations, that of reducing tensions in and around Berlin. No matter how airtight the wording of the agreement — and it does inevitably contain ambiguities and unclarity — there is, in fact, nothing that can prevent tensions in and around Berlin except the political will of the parties concerned to avoid them. Because of the close connection between the Berlin problem and inter-German relations, and the central position both occupy in East-West relations, the success of the Berlin agreement will depend to a considerable extent on the progress that can be made in accommodating differences between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. and then on the degree to which tensions can be reduced in other areas of East-West relations.

The next aim in the F.R.G.'s *politik* is to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with the G.D.R. that will provide a stable

Agreement provides unhindered civilian access

framework for the resolution of many of their existing differences and for the development of closer relations. These negotiations are bound to be difficult, however, because of the differing aims of the two sides. The F.R.G. wishes to postpone acceptance of the international sovereignty of the G.D.R. until after the *modus vivendi* is concluded. The G.D.R., is, however, disinclined to negotiate on substantive matters with the F.R.G. Instead, it is seeking immediate international recognition in order to strengthen its internal unity and to consolidate its position in preparation for any adjustments that the process of *détente* in Central Europe may bring.

A powerful incentive for the G.D.R. to negotiate with the F.R.G. on substantive matters is the opportunity of thereby gaining international recognition. The fact that the great majority of countries has refrained from recognizing the G.D.R. is therefore an important contribution to the prospects for an accommodation between the two German states. If an inter-German *modus vivendi* can be reached to complement the Berlin Agreement, a significant obstacle to the improvement of East-West relations will have been removed.

This article was prepared in the Department of External Affairs' Bureau of European Affairs.

Along the uncertain road to achievement of MBFR

by Albert Legault

Observers of the international scene are both troubled and reassured by the nature and diversity of the problems which have been the subject of East-West negotiations in recent years. At the strategic level, first of all, the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) continue to occupy diplomatic experts and embassies. On a more strictly European level, it is clear that Chancellor Brandt's *ostpolitik*—supported, of course, by his allies and also encouraged by the opening of Soviet diplomatic channels to the West — has met with considerable success, as evidenced by the German-Soviet and German-Polish treaties. At the same time, after a great deal of secret multilateral negotiation at the diplomatic level, two-thirds of the Berlin agreement has been realized, and there is every indication that the third step is well on the way to completion.¹

Background of the MBFR

These achievements, therefore, constitute many milestones on the road to *rapprochement* between the two Europes. Above all, they have made it possible partially to overcome the obstacle² which has so far delayed the calling of a European conference

on security and co-operation (CESC), as well as the opening of negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR). It is not our intention to retrace the development of the proposal for a conference on European security.³ However, it should be remembered that the first time the Warsaw Pact countries officially conceived the idea of calling a conference on European security was in July 1966, i.e. at the time of the Bucharest statement regarding methods of reinforcing European peace and security.⁴ The origins of MBFR lie in the work which led to the presentation in December 1967 of the Harmel report on the future role of the alliance. Paragraph 13 of the report states that "the allies are currently studying disarmament meas-

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ures and the practical control of arms, and specifically the possibility of *balanced force reductions*".⁵ The principle of MBFR was officially approved by NATO, France abstaining, during the meeting of foreign affairs ministers in Reykjavik in June 1968.⁶

It was not until two years after the Reykjavik appeal that the socialist-bloc countries began to show some interest in the MBFR question.⁷ This is especially understandable in view of the fact that, directly following the "Czechoslovakian Affair", the Warsaw Pact countries had plenty of other things to concern themselves about, that the Sino-Soviet conflict was soon to flare up again, and that the Soviet policy of *rapprochement* with the West did not appear to have the unanimous support of the Government.⁸

At the beginning of 1972, there seemed to be no fundamental differences between the countries of the East and West blocs. Both sides insisted on the necessity of carrying out preliminary studies and initiating exploratory discussions in order to assure the success of the conference. One thing was certain, Helsinki seemed to be the most likely choice for a preparatory conference in 1972. Nor, strictly speaking, were there any prerequisites as far as the West was concerned, except that the latter repeated to anyone who would listen that a true security conference could not take place without a thorough discussion of MBFR.

Since it is still not known whether the Russians will give the green light to an "exploratory" trip by Mr. Brosio, it is difficult to see how — in the event of a Soviet refusal — the allies will ensure that there will, in fact, be preliminary contacts on MBFR prior to the opening of a dialogue on the question. No doubt that is a procedural detail which will take care of itself in time. This does not eliminate the possibility of other formulas being advanced, or of the proposed ambassadorial meetings in Helsinki being put to good use solving this problem.

Let us now turn to the main problems raised by the MBFR question, beginning with an examination of the military balance report.

The military balance

(a) Land forces

Most of the data in this section were supplied by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, an authority in the field. According to *The Military Balance 1971-72*, the NATO countries have 15 armoured divisions at their disposal against 37 (22 of which are Soviet)

for the Warsaw Pact countries. The latter have 58 infantry divisions at their command (26 of which are Soviet) against 46 for NATO. In short, a total of 95 socialist-bloc divisions opposes 61 divisions for the NATO countries, i.e. a ratio of three to two in favour of the former.

If the figure for the divisions stationed in the southern sections of NATO (Italy, Greece, Turkey) and of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania) are excluded, leaving the armed forces located in Central Europe (central and northern sector), i.e. the most exposed regions, the imbalance still remains; the advantage is again with the socialist countries, which have a total of 65 divisions against 30⁹ for NATO. According to SIPRI,¹⁰ 75 divisions for the socialist countries, as against 35 for NATO, could be put on a war footing in three or four days after the opening of hostilities. In the month following the commencement of hostilities, the socialist countries could mobilize 118 additional divisions against 42 for NATO.¹¹

Larger NATO divisions

However, this situation of absolute imbalance must be viewed in the light of other factors, which, in fact, lessen the import of the above figures. With regard to armoured divisions, for example, an American division would comprise almost twice as many men as its Soviet counterpart (16,500 against 8,400). And according to a statement of the former Under-Secretary for Defence, Alain C. Enthoven, "a standard NATO division would comprise approximately 23,600 men as opposed to 13,500 for a standard division of the Warsaw Pact".¹² This means that, in principle, a NATO division enjoys a better logistical support and greater endurance capacity than its equivalent formation in a Warsaw Pact country.

As far as tanks are concerned, the Warsaw Pact has the upper hand, but NATO enjoys 50 percent superiority in anti-tank weapons. However, these weapons are probably widely scattered, which would enable the U.S.S.R. to concentrate its attack in the areas of its choice. NATO troops, on the other hand, would be assured of better mobility, and the firepower of its conventional artillery would be much higher and much more accurate than that of the Warsaw Pact countries. The latter, however, seem to have considerably improved their fire-power in certain units,¹³ as well as the number of their armoured troop-carriers.

In short, there is no doubt that the Warsaw Pact countries have superiority in

*Both sides
see need for
initial studies*

members, although the imbalance may not be as pronounced as the figures would indicate.

b) Air forces

A comparison of air strengths is even more uncertain, as everything depends on the range of the aircraft and the theatres of operation to which they are assigned. It is also difficult to ignore carrier-based planes, counting only those committed to the Central European theatre.

NATO planes which would be in a position to carry out an attack on or around Soviet territory number several hundred for carrier-based aircraft and approximately 1,750 for land-based aircraft¹⁴ according to Secretary Laird, 600 American pursuit and fighter planes are normally deployed in Europe. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, is equipped with 700 medium-range bombers¹⁵ capable of reaching the European territories of NATO members, and 1,820 others of shorter range. Thus, there does not appear to be a fundamental imbalance between the offensive air forces of the two alliances.¹⁶

Nevertheless, comparisons are very difficult to make owing to differences in disposition between the forces. Thus, NATO possesses a large number of multi-purpose aircraft (31 per cent) capable of both offensive and defensive action. Forty-four per cent of the Warsaw Pact force, in contrast, is composed of interceptors, totalling 3,000. To this solid core of defence may be added approximately 10,000 ground-to-air missiles, which, moreover, the socialist countries have supplemented with thousands of radar installations. NATO, on the other hand, has only 600 to 750 interceptors at its disposal. Like the socialist countries, it is well-equipped with anti-aircraft weapons and its air-detection network (ADGE), forming an arc from Norway to Turkey, is said to be an electronic marvel. Despite the quality of its anti-aircraft defence, it does not appear likely that NATO can even consider altering the situation to its advantage, in view of the obvious superiority of the Warsaw Pact in regard to interceptors.

Effect of the negotiations

It will be remembered that in June 1970 the foreign affairs ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries showed some interest in a reduction "of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of European countries". Since the problem was formulated in such general terms, some clarification was obviously required. The NATO members therefore decided in December 1970 to take the initiative of proposing an ex-

amination of various force reduction possibilities "in Central Europe, including a possible mutual balanced reduction of stationed forces, as part of an integral reduction program for both stationed and local forces".¹⁷

All this statement did, in effect, was to reintroduce an aspect of the question previously developed by the ministers of the allied countries involved in the integrated defence program. During their Rome session in May 1970, the ministers had expressed a desire to see both "stationed" (that is, foreign) and "native" forces reduced. The Rome communiqué also invited interested states to discuss MBFR, and to give particular attention to "the central region".¹⁸ Specific reference to "Central Europe" thus constituted a new element in the Brussels statement of December 1970.

This approach seems to have received the approval of the Soviets, since the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, stated on March 30, 1971: "We insist on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in those areas where a military confrontation would be particularly dangerous — above all, in Central Europe . . .".¹⁹ On June 11, 1971, Mr. Brezhnev remarked, regarding the direction of Western proposals: "They continue (the Western countries) to ask us the following questions: 'Do your proposals only apply to foreign forces, or do they also include national armed forces?' Our answer is this: 'We are prepared to discuss both'."

Finally, it remains to be seen whether discussions would deal with the reduction of tactical atomic weapons as well as conventional ones. In this regard, all NATO communiqués have been silent. The Soviets, on the other hand, seem to be ready to discuss the question, if Mr. Brezhnev's statement in Tbilisi is anything to go by. The latter, after referring to the direction of Western speculation, added: "In this regard, we also have a question to ask: do not all these wondering minds resemble the man who tries to judge a wine by its appearance alone, without tasting it? . . . Translated into diplomatic language, this means: start negotiating this question".²⁰

In any case, the problem of tactical atomic weapons reductions might complicate the MBFR debate unduly. It should be noted here that the work group established by NATO on this question has only one mandate, at least for the moment, and that is to study plans for mutual balanced reductions of conventional weapons. In addition, it is important to remember that if the problem is to be included on

*Silence on cut
in tactical
atomic weapons*



Canada's External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp with Ross Campbell, Canadian Ambassador to NATO, as they prepare for a session of the

NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels in December 1971. Concept of a NATO "explorer" was reviewed at this meeting.

the agenda for the proposed European conference on security and co-operation — in which neutral countries will probably participate — this assembly will undoubtedly not provide an ideal forum for negotiation on so complicated and important a problem.

Some authors have recommended the opening of bilateral negotiations, similar to the SALT talks, in order to discuss the question of tactical atomic weapons reduction. The TALT (Tactical Arms Limitations Talks) would thus be the counterpart of the SALT. Such a formula would obviously not be welcomed by the allies, who, no doubt with cause, believe they should have the opportunity to speak on questions which — as a result of the fact that NATO is estimated to have 7,200 tactical nuclear warheads at its disposal — are of direct concern to them. Thus, although it is too soon to determine what the exact object of these negotiations will be, it appears at this stage that it will con-

cern foreign and native forces and arm reductions in Central Europe.²¹

Reduction criteria

The Reykjavik communiqué published in June 1968 outlined a number of principles which were to govern the reduction of forces. It stressed the necessity for reciprocal reductions, on the one hand, and for balanced reductions in both time and space, on the other. All reductions should be compatible with the vital national interests of the parties and must not affect the balance of power.

Countries participating in the integrated defence program subsequently undertook a thorough study of the problem and came up with the more specific principles presented at their Rome meeting in May 1970, otherwise known as the "Rome criteria". The following is a list of the criteria:

(a) Mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the alliance and should not r

ult in military disadvantage on either side, consideration having been given to geographical or other differences.

(b) Reductions should be based on a reciprocal arrangement and should be scheduled and balanced in terms of both size and rate.

(c) Reductions should include both stationed and native forces, as well as their weapon systems in a given area.

(d) Adequate supervision and controls are necessary to assure that agreements regarding mutual balanced force reductions are respected.²²

The first criterion is easily explained by the major structural differences between the opposing military forces of the alliances, which we saw in our examination of the latter. The geographical characteristics of the theatres of operations unquestionably favour the Warsaw Pact countries, which can operate along an internal line and, as a result, rapidly dispatch troops to an uninterrupted front. The NATO countries, on the other hand, do not have depth of field²³ and, even assuming that the United States had sufficient logistical means to provide Europe rapidly with supplies, there is no guarantee that in wartime European ports would be open to them or that their planes could land on airfields which would undoubtedly be destroyed during the first hours of battle. It is difficult to say whether the Soviets are sensitive to this kind of argument or not. However, it is interesting to note that the latest communiqué from Moscow stresses the fact that possible force reductions should not be carried out "to the detriment of any of the parties", which may indicate that there is no fundamental divergence of opinion in this area.

It should also be noted that this was the first time the Warsaw Pact had ever officially agreed to extend the debate to both "foreign and national" forces. Thus, there is reason to believe that the notion of reciprocal balanced reductions has taken root. As for the supervision and control criterion, the question which has always raised the greatest reaction in the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the U.S.S.R., it may be more the result of overbidding on the part of the West — a standard bargaining tactic — than an uncompromising attitude. In any case, there are not many aspects of a mutual reduction which could not be obtained by NATO members through "national means", a well-known euphemism for the feared system of photography by satellite with which the United States is equipped.

Several hundred pages of analysis could be devoted to a discussion of this problem alone. It is true, for example, that a whole range of plans could be applied to the MBFR problem. We shall therefore limit ourselves to recalling the American position in this regard. In his report to Congress on foreign policy, President Nixon outlined two main methods of approaching this problem:

(1) proportional reductions, each side reducing its strength by the same percentage;

(2) asymmetrical reductions, involving different ratios in the various weapon categories, such that one party would carry out a greater reduction in one area in return for a larger reduction on the part of the other party in another.

The first approach would have the obvious advantage of simplicity, but presents the disadvantage of once more underscoring the nature of the military imbalance between the forces of the two alliances. The second might eventually contribute to the maintenance of the balance of power at reduced strength, but, on the other hand, may further complicate analysis of the problems and be difficult to negotiate.

Principles underlying MBFR

The philosophy behind the Harmel report and the origins of MBFR can be summed up very briefly as follows: *détente* and security represent the two sides of a single coin and thus, in this sense, are complementary. The main objective of MBFR, therefore, is to assure maintenance of the balance of power, but at reduced strength and cost. Under the circumstances, it is doubtful whether the former plans for "de-atomizing" or denuclearizing Europe will figure again in negotiations. Rather, consideration is being given to the perpetuation of the present deterrent system of stability in Europe and, as the latter is assured only as a result of a variety of systems which go to make up the deterrent pyramid, it seems unlikely that there will gradually be either a total withdrawal of tactical atomic weapons or a complete disappearance of conventional forces. At most, it is hoped that equitable but significant reductions may be carried out which might eventually transform the European security climate, so that the military threat is no longer in the foreground of the political scene.

The real paradox of the MBFR is that it is difficult to carry out a reduction in forces without inviting an attack. Military authorities tend, therefore, to emphasize the qualitative reinforcement of

*Chief objective
to maintain
balance of power*

defence forces, if only to compensate for possible reductions in numbers. Even excluding the possibility of improving defence forces, it is quite apparent that force reductions should, at the very least, attempt not to create a new situation in which the inducement to attack would be greater. On the other hand, any reduction will encourage an attack, as the opponent will always be able to concentrate his troops before attacking, while the country attacked — since the length of its borders has not changed — will have been obliged to dilute its military strength, if only to ensure some kind of protection at all points.

These considerations perhaps indicate two general trends: on the one hand, the military authorities are not prepared to relinquish nuclear tactical armament, and, on the other, they will probably insist on the necessity of guarantees, so that in the event of mutual force or armament reductions being carried out in a given geographical theatre, troops or weapons will not

suddenly be reintroduced into that theatre except under strictly-defined conditions negotiated in advance.

Despite the number of difficulties and complexity of the problems, it now appears that, three years after the Reykjavik communiqué, the Warsaw Pact countries have finally begun to respond to the appeals of the Atlantic alliance. This is a welcome development, as the hopes entertained by certain countries with regard to MBFR represent more than just wishful thinking. Canada, for its part, has never missed an opportunity to defend the alliance thesis despite the hesitations of certain allied countries.

If the road to MBFR is still uncertain, at least some progress has been made and NATO and Warsaw Pact positions currently seem to have converged. The groundwork and exploratory talks are far from over, but perhaps, like the SALT talks, the most important thing about these negotiations is the fact that they took place at all.

¹First step: signing of a quadripartite general agreement. Second step: inter-German negotiations with a view to implementing and completing the general agreement. Third step: signing of a quadripartite protocol under which the provisions and arrangements concluded between the appropriate German authorities come into effect at the same time as the quadripartite agreement.

²The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had made progress in the SALT talks and the conclusion of a Berlin agreement prerequisite to the convocation of a conference on European security.

³In this regard, the reader is referred to the invaluable work by Michael Palmer. *The Prospects for a European Security Conference*. (London, Chatham House/PEP European Series No. 18, June 1971.) See also the outstanding work of Karl E. Birnbaum, *Peace in Europe: East-West Relations 1966-1968 and the Prospects for a European Settlement*. (London, Oxford University Press, 1970.)

⁴Some authors trace the idea for his proposal back to 1955. See Philip Windsor, *Germany and the Management of Détente*. (London, Chatto & Windus [published for the Institute for Strategic Studies], Studies in International Security: 15, 1971 P. 194.) Robin Alison Remington, for his part, gives an account of a proposal for "a pan-European conference" presented by the Soviets in the fall of 1954. See *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*. (Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1971, P. 10.)

⁵NATO: Documentation, Brussels. Information Service (NATO), 1969, Appendix 14, P. 364.

⁶*Ibid.* Appendix 15, Pp. 365-366. The occupation of Czechoslovakia was to delay the response of Warsaw Pact countries to this appeal. It was successively repeated by the Atlantic alliance in Washington in April 1969, in Brussels in December 1969, in Rome in May 1970, in Brussels in December 1970, and in Lisbon in June 1971, where it was decided, at Canada's suggestion it seems, that the time had come to appoint "one or more representatives to the council for exploratory talks with the Soviet and other interested governments" (see Paragraph 16 of *The Lisbon Press Release*, dated June 4, 1971). It is known that Mr. Manlio Brosio was appointed by the alliance as an envoy responsible for pursuing exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and it was decided that he "should only speak on behalf of the countries which appointed him, and not on behalf of the Alliance itself" (see statement by the Secretary-General of NATO October 6, 1971). At the time of writing, February 1972, Mr. Brosio had still not been received by the Soviets.

⁷At a meeting in Budapest on June 21 and 22, 1970, foreign affairs ministers of the Warsaw Pact requested that consideration be given to the problem of reducing "foreign armed troops stationed on European territory", which question, moreover, could be discussed "by the body proposed for the establishment of a pan-European conference, or dealt with in any other form acceptable to the States concerned" (see *Budapest Memorandum*, Paragraph 7). Subsequent communiqués failed to mention the MBFR problem, concentrating instead on the calling of a European security conference. It was not until the spring of 1971 that new indications of Soviet interest were revealed, notably in a speech delivered on March 30, 1971, by the Secretary-General of the Communist

Party, Leonid Brezhnev, before the twenty-fourth Party Congress, and during Mr. Brezhnev's statement in Tbilisi, May 14, 1971. In May, on the occasion of the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's visit to Moscow, and in June of the same year, the Soviets announced that they were ready to consider the problem and to enter into negotiations. It should be noted that the Warsaw communiqué, published on December 1, 1971, upon conclusion of the meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign affairs ministers, made no mention of the MBFR question. The Atlantic alliance, however, reopened the question some ten days later (see *Brussels Communiqué*, Paragraphs 14 to 18) and ultimately obtained the first signs of a positive response from the Warsaw Pact foreign affairs ministers when, at the January 1972 meeting in Prague, the latter recommended the opening of discussions on the reduction of "foreign" and "national" forces (see *New York Times*, January 27, 1972).

⁸It is now known that the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Mr. Chelest, has been the spearhead of the opposition to the Soviet policy of *rapprochement* with West Germany.

⁹Including the six French motorized divisions, two of which are stationed in Germany.

¹⁰*SIPRI Yearbook of World Armament and Disarmament, 1969-70* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970, P. 72).

¹¹*Ibid.*, P. 70. If, on the other hand, the total number of mobilizable men on either side is taken into consideration, the advantage would go to the NATO countries, which have a mobilization capacity of 3.5 million men against

2.8 million for the Warsaw Pact countries.

¹²*Ibid.*, P. 75. In total, the distribution of military forces in Northern and Central Europe is assessed at 580,000 men for the West against 960,000 for the East.

¹³In a ratio of one-third, according to General A. J. Goodpaster. See *Nouvelles de l'OTAN*, March-April 1971, XIX/3-4, P. 11. See also SIPRI, 1969-70, *op. cit.*, P. 72.

¹⁴SIPRI, 1969-70, *op. cit.*, Pp. 46 and 71.

¹⁵*Ibid.* P. 47.

¹⁶However, NATO air forces would have a number of advantages owing to the longer range and greater carrying capacity of their aircraft in relation to those of the East.

¹⁷See *Brussels Communiqué* of December 1970, Paragraph 16. The italics are the author's.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹See *Nouvelles de l'OTAN*, July-August 1971, XIX/7, P. 29.

²⁰*Ibid.* Which amounted to telling Western observers that Mr. Brosio's mandate consisted of tasting the Soviet wine without drinking it.

²¹Moreover, the Warsaw Pact countries have accepted the formula, since the latest communiqué from Prague, dated January 1972, refers to the reduction of both "national" and "foreign" troops.

²²Rome statement, Paragraph 3.

²³The problem has become even more crucial since France's withdrawal from NATO.

A plus-and-minus checklist of UN Assembly's 26th session

by Murray Goldblatt

The twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly fell well short of epoch-making stature. The seating of the People's Republic of China was the single major event. But apart from this historic change in membership makeup, the session was, in fact, dominated by events outside the UN framework.

The Assembly and its key committees had to adjust to the impact of the potential Sino-American *rapprochement*, the international monetary crisis, the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the proposed Anglo-Rhodesian agreement, the public clamour over nuclear testing by the superpowers.

This set of circumstances, in which the UN may have seemed marginal to world events, hardly comes as a surprise to those who long ago stopped expecting miracles from the world organization. They recognize that the UN is simply a reflection of the forces at work in a turbulent world.

Reviewing the General Assembly session of the autumn of 1971, Yvon Beaulne, Canada's Ambassador to the UN, reminded an interviewer that the UN at its present stage could be no more than a permanent diplomatic conference — at least in the political realm: "That's all it is — and in a way I think it is a good thing that it should be no more than that. I wouldn't want countries like Canada to become a mere pawn in the power politics of the permanent members of the Security Council"

Mr. Beaulne, who has headed Canadian missions at the UN since 1969, said, "since the first political function of the organization was to be a kind of round-the-calendar diplomatic conference, it could serve in this way only with the presence of the main participants. The entry of China, therefore, was a vitally important development.

If the UN was to be more than a built-in conference reflecting the conflicting elements of today's world, member states must have to be ready to surrender some

of their sovereignty to an international regime. Mr. Beaulne said that in economic fields, where vital national interests might seem less involved, UN members indicated a readiness to give up a little of their freedom. For example, he noted, there had been a consensus in the UN on the economic strategy to be employed in implementing the Second Development Decade. But, in the political arena, progress in the direction of shedding the armour of national sovereignty had been minimal.

Mr. Beaulne, however, did see signs of change in the approach of UN members to many issues. There was less rigid adherence to groups — geographical, historical or ideological, which had dominated the Assembly in the past. "There is more fluidity now — changing patterns as a growing sophistication of states enables them to perceive concrete individual interests transcending often artificial alignments," he said.

In a sense, the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly suffered from the handicap of the fanfare surrounding its predecessor — the 1970 session that marked the first quarter-century of UN existence. That was the session when the consensus was reached on strategy for the Second Development Decade — a fresh initiative in dealing with the problems of the less-developed nations. A number of other economic and environmental programs were launched to mark what was hoped would be a new era in the world organization.

"Now, in 1971 and 1972, we have to implement all of this," Mr. Beaulne said. "This is the beginning of the implementation period, and that cannot be as dramatic or glamorous Now we have to start doing these things, and that is more difficult, of course."

The UN wound up its twenty-sixth session with a specific achievement — the selection of a new Secretary-General to succeed U Thant, retiring after ten years in the arduous post.

The new Secretary-General, Kurt

*Waldheim warns
future of UN
keyed to ensuring
financial solvency*

Waldheim, a career diplomat and former Foreign Minister of Austria, was recommended for the office by the Security Council after two veto-ridden sessions in which the Council was unable to agree on a candidate. The General Assembly approved the appointment of the Austrian diplomat for a five-year term, and Mr. Waldheim, who observed his fifty-third birthday on the day before the appointment, pledged to continue "in the direction indicated by my distinguished predecessor".

Mr. Waldheim saluted the entry of the People's Republic of China to the UN as a major step and said it should be followed by the early admission of what he described as "the divided countries" — East and West Germany and others.

He warned the Assembly that the future of the organization depended on restoration of its financial solvency so that it could carry out the decisions endorsed by member states. At the Assembly session earlier, the factors contributing to the impending financial crisis were reviewed in the Fifth Committee, which deals with administrative and budgetary questions. The key factors are the cumulative effects of the failure of such powers as the U.S.S.R. and France to help finance past peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East, and the arrears in regular contributions to the UN budget, which have affected the organization's cash position. The session ended with the establishment of an *ad hoc* Committee of 15, including Canada, to consider all aspects of the financial crisis and report back to the twenty-seventh Assembly session next fall.

The General Assembly approved a gross operating budget for 1972 of \$213.1 million. Although this figure represented a 9.5 percent increase over the revised amount of \$194.6 million made available for 1971, it was a reduced rate of increase

compared to the budgetary rise between 1970 and 1971. Of the 9.5 percent increase, about 1.5 per cent was attributable to variations in rates of exchange which occurred before December 10, 1971.

Secretary-General Waldheim addressed himself promptly to the UN's financial problems. He outlined his financial strategy in a memorandum sent to UN department heads on January 11 and in his statement to the initial meeting of the Committee of 15 nine days later.

Mr. Waldheim issued instructions to UN department heads aimed at achieving a saving of \$6 million in 1971 through more rigid controls on expenditures. In the memorandum, he emphasized that, in preparing estimates for 1973 spending, there could be no increase in staff resources beyond the level authorized for 1972. This would *not* rule out new programs or activities, but the policy laid stress on making better use of existing staff capacity.

Two distinctly separate financial problems confront the UN. One has been created through late payment of contributions by most members, including such major contributors as the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France. Late payments by member states result in cash shortages in the first half of the year for the UN.

The second major financial problem stems from the deficit incurred in past peacekeeping operations. To deal with this question may require a revised approach to peacekeeping in the Security Council, and this in turn involves a political solution rather than a merely financial one.

Improving procedure

The UN Assembly made more progress at its twenty-sixth session on rationalizing its procedures and organization than it did in the sphere of budgetary lags. Canada has spearheaded the drive for progress in this field at the 1970 session and the result was the creation of a 31-member Special Committee on the Rationalization of Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly. Canada participated actively in the work of this Committee and in the drafting of its report, which was approved by the Assembly.

Far-reaching proposals such as dividing or reducing the length of Assembly sessions or altering the responsibilities of the main committees did not garner sufficient support for adoption. But the final committee report as adopted should mean an improvement in the functioning of the Assembly and its committees.



Franklin, Globe and Mail

The rule changes include, for example, a much more nearly complete definition of points of order; lack of a precise definition has caused the UN a good deal of procedural grief in the past. Improvements have been made in arranging the UN Assembly agenda and in organizing the workload of the main committees. Steps have been taken aimed at shortening general debates in committees and at combining discussion of related items. The number of congratulatory speeches to be permitted has been cut and closer control instituted on explanation of votes and the right of reply. Moves were also approved to cut down on the flood of UN documentation. Distribution of such documents will also be curtailed and the documents themselves will be trimmed.

Political issues

In the crucial political realm, the Indo-Pakistan question was injected into the Security Council and General Assembly deliberations, overshadowing other questions such as the Middle East debate and discussion of the perennial issues concerning Southern Africa.

The Indo-Pakistan conflict was debated initially in the Security Council in December as it struggled to deal with a series of resolutions in an atmosphere where newly-admitted China and the Soviet Union took opposing positions. The Soviet Union lined up with India, insisting on formulations that would have placed the blame for hostilities on Pakistan. China swung behind Pakistan in assessing responsibility for the crisis.

A United States draft resolution called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and immediate withdrawal of armed forces. It authorized the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to report on implementation of the cease-fire and troop withdrawals. This resolution had the support of 11 Security Council members, but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union; Britain and France abstained in the vote.

A U.S.S.R. resolution calling for a peaceful settlement in East Pakistan and urging the Government of Pakistan to end all acts of violence in East Pakistan was rejected by the Council. The Soviet initiative won only the support of the Chinese delegate; 12 Council members abstained and China voted against it.

Several other resolutions were circulated and then withdrawn before the introduction of another resolution (S/10423), drafted by an eight-nation

group including Argentina, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi and Nicaragua. This resolution attempted to deal with elements of previous resolutions emanating from both sides of the dispute. In a preliminary paragraph, it recognized the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage — within the bounds of the UN Charter — with the issues that had given rise to hostilities, the necessity of an early political solution, the need to restore conditions of normalcy in the conflict zones and to enable the refugees to return. In its operative section, the resolution called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides, urged that efforts be intensified to create conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees and requested the full cooperation of all states with the Secretary-General for giving assistance to the refugees. This resolution was similarly vetoed by the Soviet Union. Eleven Security Council members voted for the resolution; Britain and France again abstained and Poland again was the only member state to endorse the Soviet position.

Referred to Assembly

With a stalemate in the Security Council, member states approved a resolution sponsored by Argentina, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Nicaragua to refer the Indo-Pakistan question to the General Assembly.

The entire issue was considered by the Assembly on December 7 and a resolution similar to the eight-nation proposal in the Security Council (S/10423) was approved by a vote of 104 (including Canada) to 11 opposed, with ten abstentions. The resolution specifically called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan and urged intensification of efforts to bring about conditions necessary for the voluntary return of East Pakistani refugees to their homes.

Canada voted for the resolution in the Assembly on the grounds that it called for a cease-fire and incorporated a humanitarian appeal on behalf of the refugees. But the Canadian delegation suggested the resolution did not go far enough. Canada maintained the call for a cease-fire should have been accompanied by specific UN arrangements to supervise it and that the Security Council should be in a position to address itself to the underlying political issues.

The question was again considered by the Security Council on December 21, but this was at a time when India had

Canada maintained resolution failed to go far enough

issued a unilateral declaration of a cease-fire in the Western theatre of conflict and Pakistan had agreed to a cease-fire in the same area effective from December 17. The Security Council simply approved a resolution calling for strict observance of a durable cease-fire and cessation of hostilities in all areas of conflict, urged international assistance in the relief of suffering and rehabilitation of refugees and their return in safety to their homes and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on developments relating to implementation of the resolution.

The debate on the Indo-Pakistan question demonstrated again the restrictive effects of the venerable institution of the veto on Security Council operations and the inability of the General Assembly to get action on its resolutions in the political sphere when individual member states were determined to pursue a different course.

Middle East resolution

On the Middle East question the debate was climaxed by General Assembly approval of an Egyptian draft resolution urging that Israel withdraw from Arab territories it occupied in the six-day war in June 1967. The resolution affirmed that establishment of a "just and lasting peace" in the Middle East should include Israeli withdrawal of its forces and "respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

The resolution, sponsored by 22 nations, also urged reactivation of the Middle East peace mission talks under the guidance of Sweden's Gunnar Jarring, the UN's special representative designated for this task at an earlier stage. The resolution noted the "positive" reply given by Egypt to Mr. Jarring's initiative of February 1971, and called on Israel to respond favourably to this initiative.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 79 to seven, with 36 nations abstaining, including Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian states. Israel and six Latin American nations voted against the resolution. The Canadian decision to abstain on all of the competing drafts before the Assembly, including the Egyptian one that was adopted, was explained in a statement delivered in advance of the voting. In Canada's judgment, none of the formulations was likely to lead to early resumption of the Jarring mission in pursuit of

full implementation of the original Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. That resolution called for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war, urged affirmation of the right of every state in the area to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force" and asserted the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem and guaranteeing the "territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones . . .".

The Canadian statement said Canada had hoped that the debate on the Middle East would produce recommendations broadly acceptable to both parties which could have provided "new and positive impetus to Ambassador Jarring's efforts". In Canada's view, none of the texts before the Assembly provided "a realistic and forward-looking basis for renewed peace talks". The Canadian statement stressed, however, that the framework for a peaceful settlement and ample machinery for elaborating its terms remained intact and the disposal of the parties in the form of Resolution 242 and the Jarring mission.

There were other resolutions on Middle East questions dealt with in the Special Political Committee and in plenary session. The most controversial of these sponsored by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Somalia, was sharply critical of Israel's decision to move thousands of Palestinian refugees out of their accommodation in Gaza refugee camps. In the Special Political Committee, this resolution was adopted by a vote of 66 to four with 32 nations abstaining; in plenary the vote was 79 in favour to four opposed with 35 abstaining. Canada abstained in both cases.

Southern Africa

Three questions affecting Southern Africa were again before the UN at its twentieth sixth session — issues concerning Rhodesia, Namibia and the Portuguese territories in Africa. These are hard-core colonial questions in territories where political power has remained in the hands of a white minority and Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, are still deprived of many basic political rights.

On the Rhodesian question, British negotiations with the Rhodesian Government on a possible constitutional settlement reached a climax just as the Rh



UPI photo

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim (left) attends his first session of the Security Council. He listens as

greeting to him is read by Abdulrahim Abby Farah of Somali, Council president for January.

ian item came up for debate in the General Assembly's Fourth Committee. Though many delegates spoke against the principle of negotiating Rhodesia's future with the minority regime of Ian Smith, the Canadian delegation made it clear that Canada was *not* opposed to the principle of negotiations and wanted to judge any proposed solution on its merits.

A resolution condemning any settlement that was not based on the principle of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) was adopted by the Fourth Committee shortly before the British settlement proposals were announced. Canada abstained in the vote. The Canadian delegation said the Government could not believe that NIBMAR would be the best solution for Rhodesia, but Canada did not want to prejudge whether the talks negotiated between the Heath Government and the Smith regime would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

Canada also abstained on a later resolution condemning the British settlement proposals which was approved by the Assembly. The resolution adopted by the

Assembly branded the settlement plan a "flagrant violation" of the right of the African people to self-determination. Canada said its abstention was based both on procedural grounds and on the fact that the Rhodesian people had not yet had a chance to express themselves on the settlement terms. A similar resolution before the Security Council was subsequently vetoed by Britain.

Attention was once more focused on Namibia, formerly South West Africa, as a result of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in June 1971, which declared the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal and considered South Africa under obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory. Canada supported withdrawal by the UN of South Africa's mandate over the territory, but urged that measures taken by the UN to implement its decision — now confirmed by the World Court — must be practical and take into account South Africa's present *de facto* control of the territory.

The Security Council adopted a resolution reaffirming that the territory was

the direct responsibility of the UN. The General Assembly also debated the question and adopted several resolutions similar to those approved in earlier years. These welcomed the ICJ advisory opinion and condemned the Government of South Africa for its continued refusal to put an end to its "illegal occupation" and administration of the territory of Namibia. South Africa was urged to comply with the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. The main resolution reaffirmed the "inalienable right of the people of Namibia" to self-determination and independence and endorsed the legitimacy of the struggle "by all means".

Canada abstained on the general resolution because of its implications regarding coercive measures, but supported an appeal for contributions to a fund providing assistance to Namibian refugees. Canada continues to believe that the UN should pursue efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute and feels that offers by South Africa to allow a referendum in Namibia may provide a point of departure for these efforts.

Dealing with the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, which Portugal has traditionally regarded as integral parts of a unitary Portuguese state, the twenty-sixth Assembly again called on the Lisbon Government to accept the principle of self-determination of these territories. The resolution adopted by the Assembly in this case, on recommendation of the Fourth Committee, omitted references to the use of "all necessary means" for attaining independence, distinguished between NATO members that supported Portugal and those that did not, and used language less likely to be construed as assuming the prerogatives of the Security Council. For these reasons, the Canadian delegation voted in favour of the resolution despite a number of reservations about certain other provisions.

In general, on Portuguese issues, the Canadian delegation reiterated Canada's disapproval of Portugal's continued colonial role, denied any NATO responsibility for Portugal's African policies, opposed expulsion of Portugal from international bodies and stressed the advantages of peaceful means in the attainment of independence for the Portuguese colonies.

Commissioner for Human Rights

In the broader area of human rights considered in the Third Committee, the creation of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights — a subject first raised in 1965 — was debated again, but discussion

was adjourned for a further year. Creation of this office was recommended by the Economic and Social Council to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly in 1967 and again put to the Assembly in three successive years. Realization of the proposal has been hindered in part by the heavy agenda of the Committee, but even more by strong opposition to the creation of the office from Soviet bloc nations and some of the Arab states.

Canada and a number of other countries have been strong proponents of the idea, believing the proposed office would provide an important instrument for protection of human rights. Opponents of the idea see it as an avenue for external interference in what should properly be internal matters. Others are opposed on grounds of cost at a time when the UN is caught up in an atmosphere of financial pressure. Still others, aware of the vigorous opposition to the scheme, do not feel prepared to support the initiative at this time.

Arms control

In the field of disarmament and arms control, the twenty-sixth General Assembly recorded an encouraging development with the endorsement by an almost unanimous vote of the draft convention on biological weapons. The convention, worked out after two years of negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, provides for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and their means of delivery. Moreover, it provides for the destruction within nine months of existing stocks of such weapons held by any of the parties to the convention. This is the first international agreement to *disarm* — in the sense of doing away with a class of weapons rather than merely limiting their use.

The new convention on biological weapons will come into force when 25 states, including the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, have ratified it. In line with Canada's unilateral renunciation of biological weapons, announced in March 1970, Canadian delegations gave full support to this convention both in Geneva and at the UN.

The biological weapons convention stipulates that the states involved continue their efforts to seek agreement on prohibition of chemical weapons — an agreement that has so far eluded the negotiators at Geneva because of significant differences on issues of verification. In an effort to underline this effort, George Ianatieff, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Geneva Conference

*Assembly cites
South Africa's
refusal to end
'illegal occupation'*

Committee, announced in his statement on disarmament at the UN a modification in Canada's policy. The Canadian Government, he said, would no longer exclude nuclear gas from Canada's commitment neither to use chemical weapons in warfare nor to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile them for this purpose, unless these weapons should be used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada and its allies.

Nuclear testing

In the sphere of nuclear testing, the twenty-sixth Assembly session adopted on December 16, by a substantial majority, a resolution proposed by Canada and co-sponsored by 15 other nations. The Canadian draft sought to lay a realistic basis for progress in efforts to extend the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to a ban on underground testing. The 1963 treaty prohibits testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the seas. Pending achievement of a comprehensive test ban, the Canadian resolution called for reduction in testing as well and, in particular, focused on three objectives:

1) Making the nuclear-testing problems a top priority task in the next round of negotiations in the CCD, the UN's negotiating instrument for arms control and disarmament agreements; inducing the two major nuclear powers — the United States and the U.S.S.R. — to put forward specific proposals for negotiations directed toward a solution of their long-standing differences on the verification issue; urging the nuclear super-powers to adopt immediately reciprocal measures of restraint to cut back the size and number of underground tests pending achievement of a full ban.

Ninety-one nations voted to endorse the Canadian resolution in the Assembly, with two — China and Albania — opposed; the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and 17 other states abstained. The fact that all five nuclear powers either abstained or, in the case of China, voted against the Canadian proposal, was regarded as a disappointing development. But Canada and a majority of member states are on record as pressing for immediate action by the major nuclear powers to introduce specific negotiating proposals and, as an interim measure, to cut back on the size and number of their underground tests.

Apart from disarmament questions, the First Committee considered a draft convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects drawn up

by a legal subcommittee in June 1971. With Sweden and Japan, Canada had opposed the original draft because, in their view, it was not sufficiently "victim-oriented". The super-powers had agreed that, where debris from space vehicles landed on each other's soil or that of others, they were willing to compensate "on the basis of justice and equity". Canada felt this fell short of what should be done. Canada's position, in the words of a UN mission member, was that "if a space object hits an Alberta cow, compensation should be made on the basis of Alberta law". Canada failed to achieve the principle inherent in this statement, but succeeded in getting a reference inserted in the resolution commending the liability convention for signature giving states the option of accepting the binding award of a special claims commission. But a similar provision could not be included in the convention itself. As a result, Canada abstained on the overall resolution.

The twenty-fifth UN Assembly session approved the expansion of the membership of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and decided to convene a Law of the Sea Conference. The conference was tentatively set for 1973, but no final decision was made and the conference date may yet be put back to 1974. At the Assembly's twenty-sixth session, the First Committee decided to confine debate on the seabed and the law of the sea to procedural questions. The only substantive decision was to again expand the Seabed Committee by five to a total of 91, including China.

Expansion of ECOSOC

Increasing attention is being given within the UN to economic, aid and environmental questions and, in particular, to the problems of economic development of the less-developed nations that make up the bulk of the organization's membership. This emphasis was reflected in the decision to expand the Economic and Social Council. ECOSOC, which meets semi-annually in Geneva and New York, has the role of co-ordinating the broad range of UN economic and social activities under the General Assembly's authority.

At the twenty-sixth session, the UN's Second Committee, and subsequently the Assembly, approved the expansion of ECOSOC from 27 to 54 nations and the similar enlargement of its sessional committees. This enlargement, approved earlier at the fifty-first session of ECOSOC, is designed to help revitalize the Council and permit it to exercise its charter re-

*Increasing focus
on environmental
and aid issues*

sponsibilities more fully. The less-developed states will be more fully represented on the expanded Council. There has been a feeling among these states that ECOSOC was unrepresentative of the UN membership as a whole. They felt that ECOSOC was in a sense a club from which they were excluded.

The Assembly also endorsed another part of the ECOSOC "package" — a decision to establish two standing committees of 54 members: one to deal with the application of science and technology to development and the second with the review and appraisal of the objectives and policies of the Second Development Decade strategy.

Canada has become a member of the three sessional committees of ECOSOC at which all substantive issues will be discussed, and will become a member of the expanded Council itself when the UN Charter is amended to permit the enlargement approved by the Assembly.

In the field of economic assistance, Canada pledged an increase of \$2 million in its contribution to the UN Development Program, which is responsible for most of the UN's technical assistance and pre-investment activities — making a total Canadian contribution of \$18 million. The UN's Second Committee, which deals with economic questions, reviewed the report of the 1971 conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) held in Vienna in June and reviewed preparations for the third UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to be held in Santiago, Chile, from April 13 to May 10. During a two-week break in Committee sessions, 95 of the less-developed nations met in Lima, Peru, to draw up a general document setting out their position in advance of UNCTAD III in Santiago, much as these nations did at an Algiers meeting which preceded UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968.

The Second Committee also discussed arrangements for the UN Conference on the Human Environment set for June in Stockholm. (See *International Perspectives*, January/February 1972 issue.) Canada has been serving as a member of the conference's preparatory committee, and Maurice Strong, former head of Canada's external aid program, is secretary-general for the conference.

Canada took the lead in mapping strategy for dealing with the current crisis in edible protein resources in the less-developed states and gained unopposed passage of a resolution on the subject.

Within the Sixth Committee, which handles legal issues, the protection and se-

curity of diplomats in missions accredited to the UN prompted lively discussion during the twenty-sixth session. Debate on the subject was spurred by recent violent acts, directed mainly against Arab and Soviet missions. The Committee agreed to establish a special 15-member body, including Canada, to deal with the problem as well as other issues previously considered by an informal joint committee on the protection of diplomats generally. The International Law Commission was requested to prepare a draft convention on the protection of diplomats.

Despite a growing scepticism about the feasibility and utility of defining aggression, the mandate of a special 35-country committee created to study the subject was renewed for a further year. In 1969, Canada had co-sponsored a draft definition of aggression aimed at ensuring that UN Charter principles would be upheld and that the Security Council's special responsibility would be recognized. Definitions have also been submitted by the U.S.S.R. and a group of Latin American delegations.

The Sixth Committee heard a number of suggestions as to how greater use might be made of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, but efforts supported by Canada to launch a study by an *ad hoc* committee of experts was again deferred. Canada has taken the position that the initial attempts should be directed to improving the ICJ's procedures, with the eventual goal to win greater readiness by member states to accept ICJ decisions as binding. In response to requests from the Secretary-General for submissions, Canada has suggested a plan for what amounts to an international legal aid system. This would be aimed — much as legal aid in a domestic setting — at eliminating situations in which a nation would feel inhibited from going to the Court because of a feeling that the process was too time-consuming or expensive.

The catalogue of issues discussed in this review — from budgetary balances to outer space objects — by no means represents an exhaustive list of the subjects under consideration at the UN Assembly twenty-sixth session. But enough of the decisions, deferments, defeats and deliberation have been recorded to indicate the soundness of Ambassador Beaulne's appraisal: The UN is not a private world sealed off against the impact of realities that shape the real world. The world organization, in fact, is a reflection of the imperfect world beyond the soaring walls of UN headquarters overlooking New York's East River.

*UNCTAD session
to get document
from Lima's 95*

Canada signs nuclear accord



Canada has signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency providing for the application of safeguards to Canada's nuclear programs. The picture shows Norman F. H. Berlis, Canadian Ambassador to Austria and one of the Governors of the IAEA board (left) with Dr. Trygve Ekland, IAEA Director-General, after signing of the agreement in Vienna. The agreement fulfills Canada's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty requires adherents to accept safeguards set out in a pact with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.

More than 60 non-nuclear-weapon

states have ratified the NPT, and those with nuclear programs have either concluded or are expected to conclude similar safeguards agreements with the atomic energy agency. Another 30 countries have signed the NPT and are expected to ratify it later this year — among them Japan and member states of the European Economic Community.

As nuclear-weapon states, Britain and the United States are not required to accept safeguards under the NPT terms. But both have offered to open their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA inspection. Inspectors from the IAEA will carry out safeguards inspections in Canada later this year in co-operation with officers of the Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board.

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May/June 1972

International Perspectives

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Dilemma of Canadian-U.S. Relations

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Subscription rates: Canada, United States and Mexico, \$3.00 a year, single copies 75 cents; other countries \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00. Remittances payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to:

Information Canada, 171 Slater Street, Ottawa, Canada.
Authorized as second class mail,
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Focus on the constant dilemma of U.S.-Canadian relationships

By John W. Holmes

Shortly after the last war, the *Manchester Guardian*, commenting on British foreign policy, suggested that it seemed simply to be a matter of finding out what the Russians were doing and telling them not to. Americans must sometimes wonder whether not only their professed antagonists but also their assumed friends work on a similar principle applied to the United States. The assumption that whatever the United States does is bound to be wrong seems also to be shared by many articulate Americans. A stubborn persistence in the past decade in courses which have proved wrong has offered some justification for these assumptions.

Unless one accepts, however, a deterministic interpretation by which all action of a great power is by nature malevolent, such simplistic assumptions about the foreign policy of any country are irrational and unprofitable. Never having accepted the view prevalent in Washington 20 years ago that all the ill in the world could be traced to a switchboard in the Kremlin, I find the fashionable contemporary view that the CIA is the source of all evil even less convincing. . . .

We suggest often enough what we do not want the United States to be and do. We give too little thought to the more difficult question of what kind of role we do want the United States to play in the world.

We give the impression in Washington that we should just like the United States to go away and stop bothering us at all, to end the cold war by abandoning one side of it, to shut down its arms factories, demobilize its armed forces and get all its troops off other people's soil. One principle that seems agreed upon for the United States is that of non-intervention. However, no sooner have we banished the Americans from isolation and military impotence than some of the same voices insist that they intervene promptly and forcefully in East Bengal or Rhodesia or Haiti or Czechoslovakia. We can't make up our minds whether we cast the United States in the role of bogey-man or fairy godmother. It

must on no account intervene in the internal affairs of other countries but somehow or other it must support peoples' movements against local autocrats. Of course, these contradictions are not all found in the same individual critics, but I am thinking of the impressions given by a chorus.

We cannot expect utter consistency in the policies of any great power — or smaller power for that matter. Utter consistency would be dangerous anyway, as it would be incompatible with the minimum flexibility necessary for the world to survive. Nevertheless, it is necessary for non-American critics to construct some rough positive image of the role we see for the United States, not only with respect to our own countries but in the world at large. This means thinking about what the United States should do and what it can do, given the present state of world and national politics. If, as it likely, we assign to the United States a positive and active role in maintaining world security and promoting prosperity, then we must accept the fact that the United States must maintain armed forces, cultivate its own economic capacity, favour countries it considers to be its partners and expect that some sacrifices should be shared. In a world as complex as ours it is bound, furthermore, to determine its policies without necessarily taking into consideration the conflicting wishes of 100 or more countries. It certainly isn't going to allow Ottawa or any other capital a veto. . . .

. . . Nervousness has been expressed of late in Canada that, if the United States finds itself rebuffed militarily in

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Asia and faced with powerful economic blocs abroad, it will pursue a new twentieth century version of "Manifest Destiny", some signs of which are detectable. What concerns Canadians is that the United States, more and more worried about the sources of power to maintain its industry and standard of living at its current high level, will take a ruthless attitude toward resources existing on this continent. The President himself has suggested that he would like talks with Canada about a continental resources policy, and Canadians have shuddered for reasons that are hard for Americans to understand. They feared that the Nixon economic measures of August 1971 indicated an intention to force them into acquiescence. If we are to avoid serious clashes, Americans outside as well as inside Washington will have to understand Canadian fears of continentalism.

It is not surprising that Americans are confused because a great debate rages in Canada on the subject and there are contradictory points of view. There are Canadians only too happy to exploit the American need for Canadian oil, gas or water-

power to make a "quick buck". They ask their American friends that economic nationalism in Canada is just the "yack" of a bunch of feckless professors — and they are only partly right. Increasingly, the Federal Government is responsive to the voices that argue that Canada, if it is to remain a hewer of wood and draw water for a wealthy, populous American industrial state, must conserve the resources to develop its own industry and population.

Americans may find it difficult to understand why Canadians would not be interested in continental planning based on a concept of fair shares. The Canadian argument is that, if the Americans have digressively used up their share of resources, they ought not to consider Canadian resources, and in particular Canadian water-power, as continental. If fair shares implies an acceptance of the *status quo*, it does not appeal to Canadians, as they believe they have the wherewithal to increase considerably their ratio of industry and population to that of the United States. Canadians have learned, furthermore, that it is unwise to have American industry



Representatives of the Group of Ten highly-industrialized nations met in Washington in mid-December 1971 to deal with the international monetary crisis. The Washington meeting produced an accord on realignment of currencies and an undertaking by the United States to devalue its dollar in

terms of gold. The U.S. Government agreed to remove its import surcharge imposed earlier in the year. In the foreground of the picture are U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally (left) and Italy's Rinaldo Ossola, chairman of the conference's deputy ministers.

tlement become dependent on Canadian resources of energy, even if the United States agrees that this will be for a limited period. They know that, if, for example, a large industry and new cities grow up in the American Northwest on power and irrigation from Canada, cutting off the source when the time comes would be virtually *casus belli*.

If Canadians want to preserve their resources while at the same time selling a profit what they can spare, it is obviously up to them to take the necessary steps. There is little the United States can do to help, except refrain from using high-pressure methods to secure Canadian supplies. It may take a good deal of understanding on the part of Americans if heating and lighting and air-conditioning, as well as other industries in the United States, should come down while Canadians enjoy the advantages of a larger ratio of resources to population. The United States has been a good neighbour of Canada during most of two centuries when Americans had no strong reason to envy the Canadian standard of living. How would they adjust to a situation in which, even if the Canadian *per capita* income remained lower, its standard of life was apparently higher?

Living rough

There will be opportunities for Americans to play rough. They will note, for example, that there is a considerable difference of view between many of the Canadian provincial governments, including the government of Quebec, and the Federal Government on the question of selling resources to the United States and importing U.S. investment. The opportunity for American private as well as public interests to exploit this difference are obvious. A Canadian can only plead that Americans bear in mind their long-range interest in a healthy and reasonably united Canada on their northern borders. Americans might bear in mind that Canada was created and has on several occasions been united by a threat from the south. One is almost tempted to suggest that what we want from Americans most is some highly unreasonable blustering for the sake of Canadian unity; perhaps we should erect a statue to Treasury Secretary McNally.

A Canadian trying to decide what he would like the United States to do or not do is constantly confronted with the amorphousness and intangibility of "the United States" or "the Americans". How can one persuade or even bargain with Americans as a whole?

On questions of foreign and defence policy there is the Government in Washington which makes decisions; but even here the

way to the decision-making process is exceedingly difficult. The State Department, through which Canadian diplomats deal, is not the decisive organ. To secure attention for its opinions and its interests, a foreign government has to campaign on many fronts. It has to get involved in the political side of government but avoid involvement with opposition elements in such a way as to turn the powers-that-be sour. The problems of Canadian "input" are staggering, but what can we ask the United States to do to help, short of altering its basic form of government to something closer to our own system of Cabinet responsibility?

We can plead for a wider and deeper understanding of Canada or we can make American legislators more conscious of the strength of our own bargaining hand. We shall probably do both. Well-meaning Americans from time to time suggest that Canada might have observer status in the Senate or some formal right to a part in the decision-making process. However generous in intention, this is for Canadians the wrong kind of solution. If the ten provinces of Canada are going to have a legitimate place in the American policy-making process, they should go the whole hog and become states. These other clever schemes simply commit Canada in advance — morally if not constitutionally — to share responsibility for policies in the making of which it might have had some more assured position than at present, but on which, because of the balance of forces, its influence would rarely be decisive. We learned in the evolution of the Commonwealth that no major power can determine its foreign policy other than unilaterally, and pretences to the contrary only breed friction.

Somewhat more interesting might be the acceptance of a special Canadian right to point out before important American foreign and defence policy decisions are made in what respect they might have a harmful effect on Canada. In the case of the decision to establish ABMs, for example, a Canadian opportunity to explain the possible consequences on Canadian territory was reasonable to expect. As American policy affects many countries, Canada would have to justify this special position on a basis of continentalism. It would be a kind of right of complaint, not intended to imply that policy made in Washington should be considered joint policy and automatically supported by Canada. Here, however, we are dealing not with legal obligations but with political assumptions. Favouritism based on a continental association would diminish Canadian independence because it would encourage the

Getting attention from Washington means a campaign on many fronts

'What we are concerned about is what a country can get away with'

assumption of partnership and make a Canadian decision to go its own way look like ingratitude or disloyalty.

In this whole cloudy and emotional issue of independence, the constitutional issue is clear. Canadians talk too often as if it was their sovereignty which is at issue rather than their freedom of movement. Canada's sovereignty and its legal right to do anything it likes is limited only by international agreements to which it has freely subscribed. What we are concerned about is what a country can get away with in a world in which its interests drive it in contrary directions. Rivers across the Canadian border flow in both directions. We have learned that sometimes it is in our interest to maintain downstream benefits and sometimes it is in the interests of the United States to do so. That is what foreign relations across a long continental dividing-line are largely about. There is nothing the United States need do to assure us of our sovereignty in general, although there are questions of encroachment on our sovereignty in the North and in the extraterritorial application of U.S. economic legislation.

These are all parts of the manoeuvring for advantage that is endemic in a divided continent. The United States has the power to get away with what it wants. Canadians can appeal to its better instincts, take it to court, or retaliate. The threat of retaliation varies in effectiveness depending on the issue but, as the recent controversy over the U.S. import surcharge revealed, there is a healthy realization on both sides that it would be bad for both to be dragged into the escalation of retaliation.

Economic challenge

Dealing with the United States Government is relatively simple compared with the problems posed by the economic and cultural challenge of the American people. Our major problems result from the exuberant operations of American private enterprises of all kinds, industrial and cultural, particularly in the field of communications, over which Washington has limited control. The United States Government can be, and often is, the ally of Canada in seeking to restrain operations by American enterprises that do harm abroad. Not only in the State Department but in the other policy-making establishments in Washington, there are people concerned with the overall relationship with Canada and disturbed at Americans who upset this. Appeals on the part of the Canadian Government to the President and the Secretary of State have in the past alleviated the impact of American legislation governing, in accordance with American foreign policy,

the commercial policies of American subsidiaries in Canada — notably in connection with trade with the People's Republic of China. It is, of course, the responsibility of any government to support the interests of its citizens and it is under strong pressure to do so. United States diplomacy pleaded the case of the Mercantile Bank and *Time Magazine* just as Canadian diplomats support the interests of Carling beer or Bata shoes. What is not apparent to us is the extent to which Washington bureaucrats with a broader perspective on these interests in Canada have used their influence on industrialists or Senators to encourage compromise. Some Canadians complain that their diplomats who deal with Americans turn soft. They forget the importance for Canada of the softening-up process of their opposite numbers.

Mistaken rhetoric

Most Canadians are aware that when they talk about the American economic threat to Canada they are talking about a hydra-headed creature. Nevertheless we should watch our language more carefully because much political rhetoric on the subject conveys the impression that we are faced with a single well-controlled monster, rather like Mr. Dulles's vision of the Kremlin, which is engaged in a conspiracy against our independence and prosperity. The trouble with that assumption isn't so much that it is unfair as that it is a wrong diagnosis and gets us nowhere. *Le défi américain* is the product of the enormous vitality of the American economy and the American culture. It is based not in Washington but in New York and Houston and Hollywood and Cambridge, Mass., and is anything but monolithic. The United States Government couldn't bottle it up even if it wanted to. What is more, most of us would want it to do so. This "threat" is regarded by most Canadians as a mixed blessing. If it is a subversive movement, then it is a large fifth column. Before we know what, if anything, we want the United States Government to try to do about the challenge, we have to decide what restrictions 22 million Canadians can agree to. And in most cases it is up to the Canadian rather than the United States Government to do something. Canadians too often think their problems are unique but *le défi américain*, a term coined in Europe, is universal and must be seen in that context. We resist the way Americans have regarded progress and modernization as synonyms for Americanization, but we make the same mistake in reverse by identifying the evils of it

ialization and pollution with one country rather than recognizing that American corruption is just an advanced case of universal disease. We certainly want to profit from American mistakes, but we can't escape the disease just by quarantining the United States.

Operation of subsidiaries

Consider, for example, the problems posed by the operations in Canada of subsidiaries of large foreign, especially American, corporations. The question of how to bring multinational corporations under national and international control is a large and complex issue which has been thoroughly discussed by specialists in many countries. There is a growing consensus that these corporations must be brought under some control and that it is in the interests of the United States as well as other governments that this be done.

However, the imposition of controls raises almost as many problems as it solves. The paradoxes are evident, for example, in the perverse question of arms sales. The most obvious solution to the horrible trade in arms to developing countries is a ban on exports by the producing countries. The result, of course, is that one has either created a consortium of rich countries that control international armaments and thereby acquire a decisive hand in international strategy and politics or one has encouraged poverty-stricken countries to set up their own arms industries. I am arguing against international controls on multinational corporations, including, of course, Canadian-based corporations. Indeed, they are essential if we are to avoid international anarchy. I am merely suggesting that, because of their ramifications, we are not likely to get at the issues in a bilateral approach. In the unique case of the automobile industry we have experimented with a continental arrangement, but it is doubtful for any reasons if this is a precedent to be followed. If we are to press the United States into action on multinational corporations, we should be wise to widen the discussion. There are plenty of Americans concerned with this problem in and out of Washington, and we are more likely to make progress if we regard this as a cooperative enterprise rather than an anti-American campaign.

In the meantime there are advantages in the fact that the American "threat" is disciplined. It would be hard to argue that any one of the great corporations is controlled solely by the national interests of the United States — and, from a Canadian point of view, that is a good thing. The pressures and the interests that guide their

policies have become international, even if special. Far be it from me to argue, like some romantic apologists of the multinational corporation, that they ought to be left entirely unchecked because in the process of the market they inevitably reflect the interests of all the peoples of the world, although there may be a more controlled argument to be made along these lines. Nevertheless, there are advantages for host countries in their competing against each other and their competitive stake in a country such as Canada obliges them to show concern for the interests of Canadians. (Whether they do or do not serve our best national interests is a subject much debated but not necessarily relevant to this argument.) I would be much more worried if Washington had totalitarian control over its industry.

A good Marxist would, of course, argue that the socialist ethic would take the sting out of this kind of international commerce. Perhaps it would do so if we could produce a state able or prepared, in a naughty world, to abide by classical principles of socialism. Examples we have had so far have not been encouraging. Americans have had messianic visions of their service to the world through the medium of free enterprise. Messianism can have capitalist or socialist labels to justify national advantage. What we need is more pragmatism on the right and on the left. So, aside from the fact that a socialist United States still seems quite a way off, it is doubtful whether this slogan is a precise solution for our problems.

Curbs on capital

We are constantly driven back to recognizing that there isn't a great deal the United States can do for us; we have to do things ourselves. What we have to do to preserve a healthy national life includes the imposition of some restrictions on the free entry of American industry or capital or culture. This cannot be an end in itself. We prefer to act more positively by developing our own resources, but such is the power of American industry and the American media that tender plants are strangled or bought out before they acquire roots. Our Government has the power to do anything we want, although, of course, we are answerable to international agreements like GATT and in our own interest we must avoid provoking retaliation. As far as the United States Government and Americans in general are concerned, all we can do is ask them to be understanding and not be cowed by their own special interests.

In particular, we must ask Americans to recognize that we are not two equal states on this continent. We are one overdeveloped and one underdeveloped country,

*Need restrictions
on free entry
of U.S. industry*

and it is not fair to expect in all things reciprocity. The anxiety to establish as much control as possible over our own resources is not to be dismissed as emotionalism or anti-Americanism. It is an assertion of the same responsible civic ethic of self-reliance as that in which little Americans were indoctrinated. History might have made us a single continental community but it didn't. This is not an error to be corrected but a blessing to be counted, for North America is too vast to be governed from a single centre in the twentieth century.

Like the United States we have over two centuries of a separate tradition. If we want to preserve those social, political and constitutional habits and institutions which we have nourished, there is no reason to confuse this instinct with the kind of nationalism which created wars in the past century. Americans have an infuriating tendency to call Canadian resistance nationalism, the assumption being that the case of the American bank or publication which wants entry into Canada is internationalism. Resistance to cultural and economic forces from the United States should not be confused with anti-Americanism. Genuine anti-Americanism is a world-wide phenomenon found in Canada, though to a lesser extent than in the United States. It can be either an irrational neurosis akin to anti-Semitism or other racial phobias or it can be an honest ideological conviction about the inherent weaknesses of capitalism and imperialism. Genuine anti-Americans are a small but shrill minority in Canada. If Americans do not want to swell their ranks, they must learn to distinguish between the predominant forms of nationalism in Canada and malevolent anti-Americanism.

What we want Americans to understand is that, because we are unequal, we in Canada are obliged to do things the United States is not obliged to do. We must, for example, go in for more state enterprise. If there are to be Canadian airlines and railways and a Canadian broadcasting and television service, we have to fall back on the resources of the state because our own private interests find it impossible to compete against the magnitude of U.S. interests. Of course, this is sometimes an excuse for inefficiency, but that is by no means the whole answer. We can admire the good work done by CBS or NBC on American public affairs, but we don't dare let them into the country because we are not confident that Canadian television in their hands would pay the amount of attention to our own problems and policies that is essential for the nourishment of a healthy state. There is no question of banning

American television because the vast majority of Canadians live close enough to the border to receive it directly or by cable permitted by the federal authorities.

Alarm sounded

Licensing of air-waves is, however, simpler than control over other mass media. The maintenance of a healthy Canadian periodical industry has been a losing game. Alarm has been sounded about the publishing industry, much of which is being taken over by wealthy and resourceful American companies. It was a Conservative government in Ontario that stepped in recently to prevent the sale to Americans of an established Canadian publisher notable for its encouragement of Canadian authors.

It is easy for Americans to identify their reaction to this process with book-burning but wrongheaded. Canada is still one of the most liberal countries in the world in welcoming foreigners and foreign culture. We have welcomed them so liberally into our universities that we are now concerned about the amount of Canadian content in our education. Canadian anxiety to have textbooks in Canadian schools that are related to Canadian history and society is no affront to culture as an international phenomenon. Canadians themselves often argue the case badly. They talk too much about preserving Canadian culture rather than preserving culture in Canada against the metropolitanization of the arts that is a universal problem. Because of the tremendous radiation of American culture, Canada could become a zombie nation.

If, for example, we do not want to encourage young citizens to apply the standards of the American political system to our own, it is not because we consider the American system bad but just that its principles are usually inapplicable. You cannot run a healthy machine with parts that belong to a different kind of motor. Here again, I do not see anything we can ask the United States to do. Steps which seem necessary to protect Canadian education and communication have to be taken by Canadian governments or by Canadian institutions and organizations. What we require from Americans is forbearance and understanding. We require also the magnanimity and conscience of a great and powerful people who are much more likely to undermine their neighbour heedlessly or benevolently than consciously or malevolently. . . .

Many Canadians, if asked what they would like the United States to do, would be inclined to put it negatively. The United States should stop pushing us around; it should allow us more freedom in our foreign policy and our inter-

'Genuine anti-Americans are a small but shrill minority'



Wide World Photo

Canadian delegates to the Group of Ten conference in Washington prepare for an important windup session on December 18. They are Defence Minister Edgar Benson, on the left, and Canada's Finance Minister, on the right.

Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the Bank of Canada. There was agreement at the conference that the Canadian dollar, alone among the major currencies in this respect, would continue to float.

nal relations. The American would like to properly ask the Canadian to be more specific about the particular constraints the United States has placed on Canadian independence. The Canadian would be hard put to it to document his complaint because there is little available evidence of what might be called United States dictation to Canada. The extent of U.S. "control" of Canadian industry is often produced as evidence, but the conclusion that foreign-controlled enterprises somehow or other intervene to determine Canadian foreign policy is unproved. The United States (Government and citizens) has acted consistently, and often forcefully, to press its views about policies it would like Canada to follow, but this is no more than happens in normal diplomatic intercourse, and particularly among allies and their associates. It might, in fact, be better to list awards meted out to Canada by an American administration grateful for Canadian co-operation in international enterprises. There is some evidence that Canadian initiative in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 gained President Johnson's support on the auto pact issue. One would have to search hard for concrete examples of retaliations and sanctions meted out as punishment to Canada for misbehaving.

I am not suggesting that our close links with and dependence on the United States economy are of no consequence in our foreign policy, but that they ought not to be thought of in these concrete terms. I would be more concerned, as a Canadian nationalist, with the effect of these links on the attitudes of Canadian industrialists towards foreign policy. The Canadian Old Right seem to me to have identified themselves with the American community almost as much as the Canadian New Left. It might be argued, of course, that Canada has never sufficiently "misbehaved" to bring down upon itself such a reaction. The Canadian recognition of Peking was delayed until the American attitude had grown soft. The continuation of Canadian economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba was passive enough not to provoke retaliation even though it certainly soured the attitude of some Congressmen on issues that would have benefited Canada.

The fact is that this kind of argument is unreal. The restraints upon Canadian diplomatic freedom by the United States operate like the system of deterrence. It is not that the United States pursues a calculated policy of deterrence by threat of retaliation or future displeasure. It is doubtful if the United States has ever cal-

culated a conscious Canadian policy of any kind — until recently at least. The strength of deterrence, however, is in the mind of the beholder. It is the restraints Canadians place upon themselves out of consideration for American attitudes or possible American attitudes which are the determining factor. These restraints are by no means inspired only by fear of the hope of favour. For the most part they are a natural consequence of the alliance diplomacy in which Canada has freely participated and the conviction that maintenance of the strength and prestige of the United States is in the interest of the alliance in general and of Canada in particular. This conviction is by no means as universally accepted as it was 20 years ago. Criticism of and dissociation from

U.S. foreign and defence policies advocated and practised to a greater extent than in the early days of alliance but the assumption of basic common interest still seems to guide official and majority opinion.

What I am concerned with here, however, are the restraints imposed by world over the consequences to the vulnerable Canadian economy of action displeasing Americans. We have to judge on a basis of speculation, because the United States has never really shown what it would do and undoubtedly Americans do not know themselves what they would do, if Canada provoked them seriously. Many Canadians like to speculate that the United States would be certain to move troops into Canada if a socialist or neutralist government took

The Nixon concept . . .

The mid-April meeting between U.S. President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau in Ottawa produced a wide-ranging discussion of bilateral issues and an undertaking by both leaders to review their respective positions in the trade dispute between the two countries as a first step toward resumption of negotiations that came to a halt earlier in the year.

The two leaders also reviewed a number of international questions and rounded out the meeting with the signature of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement — an accord designed to foster a clean-up of the Great Lakes, the world's largest reservoir of fresh water.

The meeting also produced a declaration by President Nixon on his conception of Canadian-American relations within a framework that would permit each nation to realize and maintain its separate identity. Mr. Nixon set out his concept — the "Nixon Doctrine" applied to Canadian-U.S. relations — in an address to a joint session of Canada's Houses of Parliament on April 14. The section dealing with this question read in part:

" . . . It is time for Canadians and Americans to move beyond the sentimental rhetoric of the past. It is time for us to recognize:

- That we have very separate identities;
- that we have significant differences; and
- that nobody's interests are further-

ed when these realities are obscured. . . .

"Our policy toward Canada reflects the new approach we are taking in all of our foreign relations — an approach which has been called the 'Nixon Doctrine'. That doctrine rests on the premise that mature partners must have autonomous independent policies:

- Each nation must define the nature of its own interests;
- each nation must decide the requirements of its own security;
- each nation must determine the path of its own progress.

"What we seek is a policy which enables us to share international responsibilities in a spirit of international partnership.

"We believe that the spirit of partnership is strongest when partners are self-reliant. For among nations — as within nations — the soundest unity is that which respects diversity — and the strongest cohesion is that which rejects coercion. . . ."

President Nixon noted that Canada was the largest trading partner of the United States and that the economies of the two countries had become highly interdependent. But, he continued: "The fact of our mutual interdependence and our mutual desire for independence need not be inconsistent traits. No self-respecting nation can or should accept the proposition that it should always be

control. In fact, it is the Canadians who advocate most strongly that Canada defy the great neighbour who inspire timidity by their exaggerated picture of American ruthlessness. Now if Canada were to join the Warsaw Pact or offer the People's Republic of China bases on Vancouver Island, then drastic military action by the United States might be contemplated. But the most any substantial body of Canadians advocate is disengagement from military association with the United States, and the chances of Canada actually wanting to join a hostile coalition are simply not worth thinking about unless one wants to be mischievous.

Ten or fifteen years ago, there might have been some grounds to expect drastic action, and possibly even military interven-

tion, if Canada had rudely broken off its military relations with the United States. In the present international atmosphere, and with the diminished importance of Canadian real estate to the defence of the United States, the worst Canadians could expect would be a cancellation of the special considerations accorded to an ally and a conviction in Washington that a ruthless defence of American interests was justified in all relations, economic or political, with its northern neighbour. Some Canadians would argue that that is the way Americans act anyway, but I suggest that they think hard for a while of what the United States could do if its actions were restrained by no good will at all. It is a frightening enough prospect to cause thoughtful Canadians to shudder, because their country has always

economically dependent upon another nation. Let us recognize once and for all that the only basis for a sound and healthy relationship between our two proud peoples is to find a pattern of economic interaction which is beneficial to both our countries — and which respects Canada's right to chart its own economic course. . . ."

Introducing Mr. Nixon to the joint session of the Commons and Senate, Prime Minister Trudeau said the two countries and the two peoples had much in common "but they are not identical in their moods or in their interests, and I suggest that it is a disservice to a proper understanding of one another if we overlook these distinctions. Our friendship is more dynamic because of our differences and our relationship deeper and wider. . . ."

"Our relationship with you is too complex to be described, too involved to be understood fully, too deeply entrenched to be disregarded. We are no more capable of living in isolation from you than we are desirous of doing so.

"For those reasons, the basic friendship of Canada in the past several decades has been taken for granted by the U.S.A., as we have accepted yours. I assure you that that friendship will continue for it is a permanent feature of our relationship with you. It will adjust to circumstances and be made more articulate in the process, but it is not regarded by us as negotiable. . . ."



Canadian Press Photo

Applause for President Nixon at the conclusion of his address to Parliament

depended on at least a modicum of good will and tolerance from a neighbour which could crush them at will.

No real test

So Canadian policy toward the United States has been cautious. Its "independence" has never seriously been put to the test because the basic community of thinking on world problems between Canadians and Americans has not as yet disposed Canada to want to take steps which would mortally offend the United States. If Canada wants to disregard entirely the interests of the United States, the only way it could feel safe is to build its own resources and reduce its present dependence on the United States economy to such an extent that it could worry less about the consequences of American displeasure. There is a good argument to be made that Canada is in fact stronger than Canadians have assumed and that its foreign policies have often been too timid. We cure this, however, by acting less timidly or more recklessly, not by telling the United States to stop doing what they are not in fact doing. An increasing number of Canadians argue that we ought to make greater use of the cards we hold — in particular the growing dependence of the United States on Canadian resources and the stake of Americans in Canadian industry. The Canadian Government is likely to do so and Americans, who believe in free competition, ought not to mistake bargaining for hostility. For Canadians, however, a difficulty is that it may not be in the interests of the weaker party to start playing poker. Washington might be tempted to pile all its cards together, and, with the use of computers, come up with a Canadian policy.

My point is that this kind of constraint on Canadian freedom is not something which can be abolished or ended by unilateral American action. Like the economic and cultural threat from the United States, it is a product of the sheer existence of this enormous power. Such power is by nature intimidating. A continuing dilemma for Canadians, among others, is to determine whether the United States and its inhabitants will become less intimidating if one deals toughly with them or if one makes certain sacrifices to maintain their good will. There are strong arguments for standing firm — not allowing super-powers to trample on one's rights, because they so often tend to do so without even noticing. On the other hand there is a strong argument that super-power people are more understanding and accommodating when they feel secure rather than when they feel threatened.

In the Canadian case, there is a particularly strong argument for combining a

policy of firm defence of Canadian rights with constant reassurance that no threat to the security and prosperity of the United States can come through Canada. The argument for remaining in some form of military alliance with the United States at the present time is not so much that the military infrastructure is required but that a rupture of the relationship would encourage or provide a good excuse for Americans to refuse consideration of Canadian interests. The cynical Canadian is fond of saying that that is the situation anyway, but he does his country no good by saying so. His imagination does not contemplate a situation in which relations between these two North American countries would be determined solely on the basis of a struggle for power.

Avoiding provocation

There is no such thing as solving the problems of the Canada-U.S. relationship. The border of this extent goes on generating problems all the time. If Canadians want to gain as many points as possible, they have to keep their wits about them. One of the things I suggest that they should avoid is provoking the United States into having a Canadian policy. One of the best ways of doing so would be to give the impression that Canada is not a friendly power. We get nowhere, of course, if we are an automatic satellite, which is quite different. Canadian survival has depended to a considerable extent on the fact that Canadian-American relations consist of an enormous number of different strands and that we negotiate sometimes from strength and sometimes from weakness, but our total weakness would be considerable if the United States were a phenomenon in itself, singular.

So my admonition to the United States is: Don't have a Canadian policy. Don't have one even if Canadians have to have something which purports to be an American policy because their existence depends on a rationalization of their position *vis-à-vis* the elephant. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Government is confronted with many of the same problems of diversity when it tries to determine an American policy. That it has not yet done so to its own satisfaction is illustrated by the omission of this important subject from the 1970 review *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. North America is only two sovereign states; it is a system of agglomeration and its relations are a web over which no government can have unlimited control. One way Americans can help is to join Canadians in trying to understand the nature of this system and to improve it. If American political economists could take their eyes off the Western European system or the politics of even rem-

*Canada stronger
than Canadians
have assumed*

continents to look more intensely at their own, Canadians would not have to consider Canadian-American relations in such a suffocatingly unilateral way. There is a danger, of course, that too much American intellectual attention to the relationship could lead some American administration to want a Canadian policy, but I suspect that study would prove how unmanageable that would be.

This paper is supposed to tell Americans what to do about the displeasure they inspire in this hemisphere, and my conclusion, in the case of Canada, is that there is very little the United States as such can do because most of the necessary steps to protect Canadian interests have to be taken by Canadians. We would like Americans — some at least — to change some of their attitudes and their habits, but these can't be legislated. I could be faulted for not pointing out to Americans how much they would improve their relations if they could get out of Vietnam, establish racial equality and control the rapacity of their economic thrust. That I did not harp on these themes does not mean I consider them important. . . .

I have emphasized the importance of American understanding of Canadian

problems, not only so that United States policies will be just and aware but also so that Americans in and out of office will exercise forbearance when Canadians have to do things that may look hostile. This is a very old theme for Canadians. Personally, I have tended to be more patient than most Canadians on this subject, because I realize that the United States involvement is worldwide and Americans have to concentrate their attention on countries which cause them more trouble. I have even seen advantages in American ignorance of Canada because it has saved us from too benevolent an intervention. (I am more afraid of Americans doing good than Americans pursuing their national interest.) However, when the President of the United States can say publicly in 1971 that Japan is his country's largest trading partner, apparently unaware that American commerce with Canada is larger than that with Japan and the EEC put together, I am tempted to shrillness and reminded of the danger to my country of such ignorance. When I read the news in American papers or look at the curricula of American universities, I wonder if Americans ever look at a map of the



Information Canada Photo

President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau signed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement during the President's Ottawa visit. The treaty, subject of two years of negotiation, commits the two nations to a program of combating pollution in the Great Lakes through aggressive reduction of pollutant discharges, provision of waste treatment

facilities and a strengthening of the powers of the International Joint Commission to monitor pollution on the Lakes. Pictured with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Trudeau at the treaty signing are Russell Train, chairman of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, and Jack Davis, Canada's Minister of the Environment.

world. What in God's name do they make of that great pink blob which is all over them and larger? When I find books on American foreign policy, even a recent book on American "imperialism", in which Canada does not appear in the index except in some historic references marked "See Great Britain". I wonder how Americans can understand anything of the history of their own country. It is curious and perverse that these histories talk much about Mexico, where the American record is infamous, and ignore Canada, the existence of which, it seems to me, inspires grave doubts about the proposition that imperialism is as American as apple-pie. Or maybe Americans still haven't noticed that a small band of Canadians outwitted them and copped more than half of their continent.

What we need is a more adult relation-

ship on both sides. We have to recognize that we are friends and foreigners and that foreigner is not a pejorative word. We have to recognize that our relations cannot be based upon or solved by the simple-minded slogans of service clubs — although the simple-minded good will is helpful if it is not based on mistaken notions about a totality of common interests. Our basic common interests in a peaceful and prosperous world must be assumed, but we are also national competitors. Americans who believe in a competitive system must — and for the most part do — accept competition as a normal aspect of relations between friendly powers. The relations are complex and we have to work at them. They can go smooth or roughly, but they will never go away. Perhaps Americans are misled by the sentimental romantic notions about alliance that they are said to have about marriage.

... Taking the American pulse

Concern over Canada-U.S. relations has become almost an obsession for Canadians in recent months in the wake of the U.S. economic measures of mid-1971 and the difficult trade negotiations that followed. Canadian attitudes to American policies and the American presence have been examined and analyzed with the kind of ardour that baseball partisans normally reserve for players' batting averages.

But what about American attitudes to Canada? What about the feelings and thoughts of U.S. citizens beyond those reflected in official exchanges with U.S. authorities? The Canadian Embassy in Washington set out to measure current public attitudes toward Canada, commissioning a study by the American Institute of Public Opinion. Canadian authorities felt it would be useful to test Canadian presumptions about American public opinion. The poll was conducted in late November and early December of 1971 among more than 1,500 civilian adults, 18 years of age and older.

The results of the Gallup survey, contained in a 40-page report submitted by the Institute, indicate that, although the U.S. public's "image" of Canada remains a little fuzzy, Americans generally still display a benevolent attitude toward Canada. In fact, Canada is held in high esteem by most Americans, according to the survey.

Using a rating scale for countries, the survey put Canada at the head of the list: 65 per cent of the Americans polled placed

Canada in the "extremely favourable" category as a country they liked. Another 28 per cent had a "mildly favourable" reaction, only 4 per cent gave Canada a negative rating. Of those with a negative impression, many cited Canada's acceptance of U.S. draft-dodgers as the key to their attitude.

Would Canada be a good place to live? Seventy-three per cent of those polled answered in the affirmative; only 13 per cent said no. Of those who approved the idea, one in five said it was because Canada "is much like the U.S.". Others suggested Canada was a cleaner nation than the United States and that Canada is "freer" of many of the social and political problems we have here.

Americans are evenly divided on the current state of relations between the two countries. Thirty per cent of the total sample said these relations were "improving"; another 30 per cent said they were "getting worse", while 27 per cent thought they had not changed. Among those with college training, the weight of opinion was that relations between the two nations were, in fact, getting worse; the opposite was the case among persons who did not get more than a grade-school education.

Each respondent was asked to think of himself as the president of a large company and indicate the degree of confidence he would have in locating his company in Canada. The responses were largely favourable, with 71 per cent of the sam-

saying they would have either a "great deal" or "some" confidence in Canada as a place for business. Only 7 per cent said "hardly any", while 4.5 per cent indicated they would have "no confidence" in locating business in Canada. The chief reason cited by those who said they would have a great deal of confidence in Canada was: "I trust Canada — they are a fair and honest people". Others mentioned Canada's natural resources and some said they would make such a move because they viewed Canada as a stable nation, politically and economically.

The survey raised a series of questions about American economic relationships with Canada and the extent of American investment in Canada. The responses tended to underrate the U.S. role in Canadian economic life. Respondents were asked, for example, to provide their best guess as to what percentage of industry in Canada is owned by American investors. The median average response was 29 per cent — well below the actual level. Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Jeanne Pepin noted in a recent speech (March 1972) that at last count Americans controlled the majority of shares in Canadian-owned companies accounting for 43 per cent of all assets in manufacturing, 51 per cent of all assets in mining and 67 per cent of all assets in mineral fuels production; the proportion was much higher in specific sectors of manufacturing, ranging from 73 per cent in transportation equipment to 76 per cent in petroleum refining and 84 per cent in rubber products.

Respondents in the survey were also asked to guess what share of every \$100 invested by the United States in other nations of the world was invested in Canada. The typical American guessed less than \$10 of every \$100 was invested in Canada — again below the actual level.

Import surcharge

On the question of the U.S. Government's much-debated import surcharge and other economic measures introduced last August, the weight of opinion among Americans was by a ratio of 46 to 34 per cent — was that the new U.S. economic policies would affect Canada to a greater extent than it did other countries. Among persons with a college background, the ratio was even more pronounced — 56 per cent in this category felt Canada would be no worse off than others affected by the surcharge. On a regional basis, only two areas — New England and Rocky Mountain — ran counter to this trend; respondents in those regions indicated Canada would be more severely affected.

Would it be a good idea to eliminate



'Americans generally still display a benevolent attitude toward Canada'

trade tariffs or duties between the two countries altogether? Forty-eight per cent of those polled favoured erasing the tariffs as opposed to 37 per cent who thought it would be a poor idea. The ratio in favour was much greater among college-trained adults — 64 to 28 per cent. In the overall poll on this issue, more than 15 per cent said they didn't know if it was a good idea or not.

One of the largest "blanks" or "don't know" replies in the survey was registered in response to the question of whether Canada manufactured any products which are purchased in large quantities by the United States. More than 53 per cent said they didn't know and 20 per cent said flatly there were no Canadian goods which the United States purchased in large quantities. Of the 26 per cent who said that Canada did manufacture products bought in large amounts by the United States, the majority cited autos, wood products and such natural resources as oil, gas and copper; a sizable number also mentioned whisky.

Canada's present trade with Communist-bloc nations might have been expected to draw adverse reaction in a survey of this type. But a majority of Americans (53 per

cent) said they believed such trading relationships were not damaging to the best interests of the United States. Almost 25 per cent believed they were damaging and 22.8 per cent had no opinion on this subject.

Of those who found no objection to Canada's trading links with Communist states, most based their reply on a feeling that countries should be free to trade with any nation. About 13 per cent felt such trade had no effect on the U.S. economy and another 11 per cent made the point that if the United States traded with the Communist bloc, why shouldn't Canada. Among those who balked at Canada's trading relationships with Communist nations, the largest number said they took this position because Canada was "giving aid and comfort to our enemy".

Independent role

The survey examined American attitudes to the broader issue of whether Canada works out its foreign and domestic policies in an independent fashion or whether it is inclined to follow, to some extent, the wishes of other nations. Forty-one per cent of those polled believed Canada does, in part at least, follow the wishes of other countries; 31 per cent thought Canada acts independently in formulating its policies. A total of 28 per cent had no opinion. Among college-trained respondents, only 36 per cent thought Canada develops its policies independently, while 59 per cent thought Canada shapes its policies to suit the wishes of others.

Of those who pictured Canada bowing to the wishes of others, the largest number — 26 per cent — placed England at the top of the list; this was obviously a reflection of the deeply-rooted feeling among some Americans that Canada remains merely an



'Majority see Canada as a supplier of lumber, oil, autos - and whisky'

appendage of Britain, an outpost "Empire" ruled from the "motherland". Second on the list of countries which respondents felt moulded Canadian policies was the United States itself. The only other countries mentioned in any significant statistical way were France and the Soviet Union — and these were far below Britain and the United States on the scale.

The survey dealt briefly with inter-Canadian questions. For example, it posed the question of whether there were groups in Canada whom Americans thought were being unfairly treated. Only a tiny proportion of those polled (4 per cent) believed there were groups in Canada who were not being fairly treated. The group most frequently mentioned among those who answered affirmatively was French Canadians, with Indians second. Nearly 95 per cent said they didn't know whether any groups were being mistreated.

On the question of whether the United States should offer encouragement if French Canadians voted for separation, the survey reflected a similar American determination. A total of 96.3 per cent of those surveyed said they didn't know; 3.3 per cent said no and a minuscule fraction — 0.4 per cent — said they would endorse U.S. encouragement in the event of a majority vote for separation among French Canadians.

On the sensitive question of military draft-dodgers, Americans were evenly divided between those who believed Canada should refuse to accept them and those who felt Canada was acting within its rights in accepting them. The survey was roughly 44 per cent each way, with nearly 11 per cent expressing no opinion.



'Among some Americans, Canada remains an appendage of Britain'

Sharp differences of opinion on this question were noted by age and education. A majority (59 per cent) of those under 30 years of age had no objection to Canada accepting draft-dodgers; the opposite view was held by persons over 50. A majority of college-trained respondents (59 per cent again) had no objection to Canada accepting draft-dodgers, while 56 per cent with only grade-school education held the opposite point of view.

The Gallup survey did not, of course, omit the perennial question: what comes to mind first when you think of Canada?

The replies were moderately heartening to Canadians who have wearied of the stereotyped image of Canada abroad as the land of ice and snow with only a sprinkling of Mounties and Eskimos to festoon the landscape. The first image called to mind by the largest number replying to this ques-

tion in the survey was Canada as a neighbour — "Canada is a good neighbour". The next most popular image was beauty — "a beautiful and scenic country" — and third, an image of nice people — "a very friendly population".

But the next-largest categories (12 and 10 per cent) were still made up of those who, predictably enough, thought first of Canada as "open country — a wilderness" or "extremely cold in the winter". Hunting and fishing came next ("a great nation for sportsmen"), with sports generally and hockey, in particular, cited by 3 per cent. The mounties, not to be forgotten, were mentioned by another 3 per cent as the image that surfaced first when they thought of Canada.

— Murray Goldblatt

— Drawings by James Power

Our goals as neighbours are broadly parallel . . .

Governor-General Roland Michener and Prime Minister Trudeau welcomed President Nixon to Ottawa for his mid-April visit. Following are excerpts from the remarks by the Governor-General:

"... You know, as we do, that the visible line which has been drawn across our continent by the vagaries of history divides us as sovereign nations but does not separate us as people with countless interrelations of family, friendship and personal interests.

"We are all North Americans, with origins which touch at many points. Though our systems of representative government have developed somewhat differently and our relative positions in the community of nations, in terms of numbers and power, are on a rather different scale, nevertheless our purposes and our goals as neighbours and in the world at large are broadly parallel.

"This is not to say that we are always in agreement, or that our perspectives and approaches to problems must necessarily converge at all points. But our relationship has generally been characterized by sympathy and by efforts to understand and respect each others' viewpoint. . . ."

In reply, President Nixon noted that Canada and the United States have differences in forms of government; they compete economically and have their own

separate identities. He continued:

"... We respect the separate identity, the right to pursue its own way that the people of Canada desire for their own destiny.

"What we are really saying very simply is this: That while we do not have a wall between us, while we do have this great unguarded boundary, this does not mean that we do not have differences, but it does mean that we have found a way to discuss our differences in a friendly way, and without war, and this is the great lesson for all the world to see. . . ."



**'What makes you think
the lakes are polluted?'**

Ben Wicks
The Toronto Sun Syndicate

The year that put an end to the old bipolar world

By Alastair Buchan

For some years past scholars and analysts, official or academic, have been predicting the end of the postwar structure of international politics. In this system there were really only two primary centres of power and responsibility, Washington and Moscow, which, through a mixture of their strategic and their economic strength, have exercised so high a degree of influence over the policy of almost every other developed country, virtually all of which were allied to one or the other, as to make the word "imperial" applicable to their role. By contrast, the historic areas of European imperialism, the countries of what we now call "the developing world", have remained largely non-aligned in this bipolar struggle or relation.

But this apparent similarity in the function of the two super-powers has concealed an essential difference in their conception of their long-term interests. The Soviet Union believed 20 years ago, and still believes, in the validity of its imperial function, not simply for ideological reasons but because its leaders have been educated to think primarily in terms of power. The United States has never regarded its own hegemonic position as more than transitory. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been a source of deep anxiety in Moscow for a decade. The United States, by contrast, has been encouraging the development of European unity and Japanese economic growth for much longer than that. A bipolar world has always suited the Soviet Union, given the opportunity it has provided — on the one hand, to erode the influence of the other super-powers in Europe, in Asia or in

Africa, and, on the other, to limit the risk of major conflict by having only one adversary partner in the control of crisis.

But far-sighted Americans have always doubted their own countrymen's readiness to sustain a hegemonic role indefinitely — given the dynamic and experimental nature of American society. This distaste for dominance is not something that has been forced on the United States by recent events, but was evident in the thinking of American planners in the immediate postwar — indeed the war time — years. It is only in the limited field of strategic nuclear deterrence that the United States has had doubts about its readiness to accept the principle of polycentricity or about its ability to share its responsibilities with its major allies.

For ten years the old bipolar world under which we have all grown up has been gradually eroding: the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, General de Gaulle's defiance of the United States, the growing autonomy of Romania, the accelerating drain on the American balance of payments, the "Nixon Doctrine", the economic growth of Japan. But it was not until 1971 that the two super-powers, and the rest of the world with them, came face to face with the logic of their own aspirations, through a series of dramatic events, some of which were only indirectly related to each other.

The most sensational of these was, of course, the opening of direct relations between Washington and Peking, starting with the ping-pong diplomacy of April, moving through the lifting of American embargoes on trade with China in July to Henry Kissinger's melodramatic appearance in Peking on July 15 and Secretary of State Rogers's statement of August 2 that the United States would no longer under all circumstances oppose China's entry to the United Nations. What did the American policy of 20 years stand for? What change so secretly and rapidly?

Perhaps it was because Washington saw an increasing number of countries



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which it had close relations — Canada, Italy, Ethiopia, Austria and others — entering into normal diplomatic intercourse with Peking so that it ran the risk of itself becoming isolated rather than continuing to isolate; perhaps it was from a recognition that, if the Western world was becoming more polycentric, there was everything to be gained from encouraging polycentrism in the Eastern world. Whatever the true explanation, the beginnings of Sino-American normalization unleashed emotions elsewhere in the world which it was beyond the power of the United States administration to control, so that in late October China was admitted to the United Nations by an overwhelming majority vote without any concession on the Taiwan question. A quarter of a century of debate and doubt in the chanceries of the world was ended as if a candle had been snuffed out.

President Nixon has said on several occasions that Washington has no intention of making trouble between Moscow and Peking, but it is not easy for the Russians, even the popular fear of China that exists here, to take such professions on trust. The Western postwar grand strategy of "containing" the Soviet Union ceased to have validity some years ago when Moscow began to establish strong positions of influence in Southwestern and Southern Asia and in North Vietnam. In my view, its objectives there are only partly aimed at the circumscription of Western influence in Asia and Africa and are equally aspects of the U.S.S.R.'s own grand strategy of containing China. The possibility of Sino-American détente made it essential for it to consolidate its position, and so it came about that it negotiated the first genuine treaties of alliance with non-Communist states since the 1940s — with Egypt in May of 1971 and India in August. The countries of the two of the great architects of non-alignment, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pandit Nehru, are now part of the super-power system of alliances.

Heirs of Empire

When it happens, it is the Russians, not, as many people supposed for 20 years after the war, the Americans, who are the heirs of the old British Empire, because the Russians have an imperial conception of foreign policy and the Americans do not. And, as the British discovered a century ago, whoever is the prime mover in the affairs of the subcontinent must have a dominant position in Egypt. But I personally do not attribute the recent tragic conflict in the subcontinent to Russian manipulation. The process of events which led to a breakdown of civil order in East Pakistan started some time before the overt change in great power

relations and it has not been a Russian interest to disturb the delicate balance of power within the subcontinent itself. But, since the balance has been destroyed, the Soviet Union, is, for the time being, the principal beneficiary among the external powers, though in the longer run one must expect China to have few scruples in exploiting the unrest to which an area as poor, proud and crowded as Bengal, both East and West, is always prone.

Berlin agreement

It would be wrong to suggest that there is a necessary connection between the increasing Soviet preoccupation with Asia and its more reasonable attitude on certain European questions. We must record as one of the significant events of a crowded year the Soviet initialling in September of the first Berlin agreement in 24 years, and Mr. Brezhnev's readiness to put pressure on East Germany to accede to the inter-German aspects of it. More likely this was an outcome of the skilful *ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt over the last two years, for, in general, developments last year in Western Europe have been antithetical to Soviet ambitions, moving as they apparently did towards greater unity and coherence when its interests have been to Balkanize and "Finlandize" the area.

I say "apparently" because it is too early to state with finality that Western Europe is acquiring this coherence, and if it is, just why it should be so. Is it because the American dollar ceased, with dramatic finality, on August 15 to be the linchpin of the Western monetary system? Or is it from a more general sense that European and American interests in the world at large may be beginning to diverge, as the United States defines its national interests more carefully and more sharply?

We shall not know until the archives of many governments are opened a generation hence, but, whatever the cause, one of the central developments of world politics in 1971 was the decision to enlarge the European Economic Community. The decision in principle was, of course, taken over two years ago at the summit meeting in The Hague of The Six. But it was accelerated last year, first by the Heath-Pompidou conversations in May, when those two pragmatists found that their conceptions of the future organization of Europe were broadly similar; by the negotiation of terms that satisfy the British Government's essential requirements, notably the safeguarding of New Zealand and Caribbean markets in Europe; and by an overwhelming vote in favour of adherence in the House of Commons late in October, a vote which crossed party boundaries. It

*Central event
was the decision
to enlarge EEC*

also appears probable that both Denmark and Norway will decide to adhere to the Community, although the answer will not be known for certain until their referenda in the fall. The question is politically and strategically significant because, if the one stays out, the other may; and, if either remains economically divorced from Western Europe, it is likely to drift into a form of Nordic neutralism.

Opportunity for the weak

Finally, I think one cannot appreciate the nature of the change in our political and strategic environment without noting last year's evidence of a growing phenomenon of our time, namely the ability of the weak to resist the strong. Just a year ago, at the Singapore Conference, the smaller Commonwealth countries, some of them with fewer resources than an English county, successfully thwarted Mr. Heath's expressed determination to protect the oil-routes of Western Europe by selling frigates to South Africa. In February, the oil-producing states of the free world, many of them rich but none of them strong, forced a 25 percent increase in oil royalties upon the great Western multinational oil companies. Throughout the whole year, Israel, which has made itself almost totally dependent on the United States for armaments, successfully resisted the strongest possible American diplomatic pressure to modify its negotiating position with the Arab states. In March, a number of external powers which are hostile to each other — the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, India and Pakistan — found themselves giving military assistance to the Government of Ceylon in suppressing a revolt which had been largely inspired by its new Prime Minister. Throughout the year Malta conducted a tough negotiation with Britain and its allies, which has led to an eventual settlement that triples the subsidy it receives. Last, but sadly not least, the UN Security Council has had virtually no influence upon the Indo-Pakistan conflict or its settlement.

The dividing-line between a polycentric world that provides increasing freedom of action for the middle and small powers and a disorderly world in which the standard of international behaviour deteriorates is not easy to draw. Peace, unfortunately, has become divisible; it is a sad fact that the conception of the UN as a keeper of the peace, as the expression of a common standard of world order, is for the time being moribund.

But, if last year registered a significant change in the nature of the international system, the salient features of the world

that developed after 1945 are not going to disappear overnight. There will continue to be only two super-powers in the true sense; there will continue to be a high degree of common aspirations and values as between North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia, than between any of them and the Soviet Union or China; the developing countries will continue to have quite different problems from the developed. What we are witnessing is not a transformation scene but something more like the jerky rotation of a kaleidoscope. And, in this situation, a major but not as yet fundamental change, one should first ask what is occurring in the central balance of power. Is it shifting against the West, or is its focus moving from Europe to East Asia?

Balance of power

The first point to make, I think, is that the balance of power is a very difficult thing to measure; its reality does not derive from comparative statistics of strategic hardware and is only clearly revealed when a crisis like Cuba or Suez throws a flash of illumination upon the relative strength, determination and will-power of the contestants. It is true that the Soviet Union has in the past five years achieved a position of numerical superiority in land-based ICBMs over the United States of the order of three to two, even though it remains inferior in missile-firing submarines and long-range bombers. It is true that it has a modern fleet of oceanic range, something quite new in Soviet, though not in Russian history. It is true that it has 20 more divisions, 160 as against 140, than it had five years ago. It is true that Western governments are finding considerable difficulty in sustaining their existing levels of deployed military strength in the face of competing demands for public resources and the increasing domestic preoccupation of their electorates.

The consequence is that the ordinary man, including the ordinary politician, is beginning to carry at the back of his mind a stereotype of a West that is retreating, however dynamic and creative its component societies may continue to be, and a Soviet Union that is steadily gaining power and influence. The sense of a growing disparity between Soviet assurance and Western disarray has been accentuated first by the monetary difficulties of 1971 and second by a sense in Western Europe and in Japan that the United States is pursuing a form of national *realpolitik* rather than continuing to underpin the security and interests of the free world as a whole.

Such generalizations need, in

*Israel resisted
pressure from U.S.
to modify position*

view, very considerable qualification. For one thing, the Soviet Union has in no real sense acquired a position of strategic superiority over the United States, in the sense of a capability to disarm it in a nuclear exchange. The U.S. still has a larger armoury of deliverable nuclear warheads, launched by land, sea or air, than its rival, and has a much broader technological base than the Soviet Union. Moreover, what provides stability in a crisis is the existence of an assured destruction capability on each side and this the Soviet Union has had for some time. Parity in the effective sense of the word has existed throughout most of the 1960s. Despite the existence of the SS-9, which might be able to knock out large sections of the American *Minuteman* force, the existence of *Polaris* and *Poseidon* makes a first-strike strategy a suicidal option for the U.S.S.R. and this the Soviet leaders know.

It may well be that the large Soviet investment in land-based missiles is a very poor use of its limited resources, like its investment during the 1950s in a large fleet of diesel submarines. It might also be the case that this build-up is not directly concerned with Soviet confrontation of the United States, but is related to the fact that, with the gradual development of Chinese strategic power, it now has more than one potential adversary to deter, as well as new allies over whom it must cast a nuclear umbrella of deterrence.

to universal retreat

In the second place, the United States is by no means in a situation of universal retreat. The Nixon policy of disengagement has been applied only to the Pacific littoral, and I have no doubt whatever — and I speak as one who happened to know the present incumbent of the White House and his staff quite well — that the present Administration will fight a stiff rearguard action against a weakening of the American military position in Europe and the Atlantic area, even though some adjustments may be inevitable in the middle of this decade. For one thing, many of the social difficulties that have weakened the international position of the United States have begun to ameliorate in the last year.

The policy or strategy of containment is not dead; the United States has simply become more specific about the places where Communist power can and must be contained, and Europe is certainly still one of them. It is not, however, correct, and never was, to speak of an American “guarantee”, nuclear or otherwise, of Western Europe: there is no such thing as a cast-iron guarantee in international relations; but

the likelihood of effective American action in a European crisis remains high because its own survival is involved with that of Western Europe.

Nevertheless, there is a new degree of assurance in Soviet policy. It may be simply the outward reflex of an internally decadent society, as Richard Lowenthal has asserted. It may be that there is a streak of adventurism in the Russian temperament, particularly exemplified in the personality of Leonid Brezhnev. It may be that there is a growing conflict between the desire of the republics for 20 years of peace in which to put their economic and social affairs in order and the enjoyment of the technocrats, the bureaucrats and the politicians at the centre of their new position of global acceptance and influence. One thing is certain. This new note of ambition has little to do with ideology or with any desire to expand the frontiers of Communism, except so far as Marxism provides an assurance that history is on their side.

I shall return shortly to the implications of this for Britain and continental Europe. But first it is necessary to examine the other half of my question. The fulcrum of the old bipolar balance was Europe; as it ceases to be bipolar, as China begins to exert increasing ideological and political influence in the world, as Japanese economic power grows, will the new centre of political rivalry, the new focus of world politics, be in the eastern rather than the western half of the northern hemisphere?

There has been a great deal of speculation on this subject, but I think it is too early to return a clear answer. On the one hand, it is true that the four powers which consider that they have vital or important interests in East Asia — the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the United States — are powerful, independent countries and have no great trust or affection for each other. The way in which the United States handled the recent change in Sino-American relations and the Western monetary problems has seriously diminished Japan's confidence in the United States and has undone much of the good achieved by the agreement, negotiated last June, to return Okinawa to Japan.

In theory there are a number of possibilities: a Russo-Japanese *entente* to exploit Siberia and contain China; a super-power agreement emerging from SALT to contain conflict in the area; a Sino-Japanese *entente* based on cultural sympathy and economic interdependence; a Sino-Japanese-American *entente* to resist Soviet pretensions in Asia; or a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, perhaps after

Four great powers have little trust in each other

Mao's death, to resist the capitalist powers.

Clearly, President Nixon visited Peking partly in order to clear his own mind upon this question. But before basing any serious planning for the near future on such a range of hypothesis, I think it is important to enter a number of caveats. First, the question of Vietnam is by no means disposed of, even if the possibility that there may be another major main-force battle there should prove unjustified; and while American military installations remain near China's vulnerable southern border, the degree of Sino-American *rapprochement* can be only limited. Second, the future of Taiwan, which has acquired a quite disproportionate importance in great-power politics, is still not fully resolved and limits the prospects both of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese understanding. Third, China, which, except for a brief membership in the League of Nations, has never really been part of the modern system of multiple sovereign states, will, in my judgment, be somewhat reluctant to play the politics of balance of power. If a fluid balance does develop in East Asia, it is likely to be of a more subtle kind than that in Europe, which, as a result of Stalin, has been dominated by considerations of military force. Fourth, Japan is still deeply uncertain about its role in the world, about the political direction in which to channel its steadily expanding economic power. I think it will be very reluctant to break its treaty relationship with the United States. I fear it may acquire some neo-imperialist interests of its own in Southeast Asia as it becomes reliant on cheap labour in the countries of that area to compensate for its own inflation and labour shortage; that it will wish to get deeply involved with either the Soviet Union or China in the near future still seems to be problematical.

Finally, one must recall that those who actually run the Soviet Union — the party bureaucrats, the technocrats, the soldiers — are still European, not Asians, and, however dynamic the politics of East Asia may become, however deep the fear of China may run, Moscow is not going to turn its back on Western Europe or reach a final accommodation with it by reason of its proximity, its potential power and its association with the United States. I detect in some of my friends in Germany a tendency to think that East Asia and Europe offer alternative areas of concentration for the Soviet Union (indeed, I remember Chancellor Adenauer saying just this to me ten years ago), whereas the whole theory of the Heartland, which the Russians imbibed from Hal-

ford Mackinder, even if we ourselves do not give it much credence in the nuclear age, suggests a belief that they can play a central role in both areas. . . .

So, let us turn to Europe, where 50 per cent of the defence resources and many of the political hopes of my own country are now concentrated. Before discussing what we have learnt about the organization of Europe or the Western alliance, I should like to develop a point that I made earlier about the Soviet Union as a European power. It is the strongest one and will remain so throughout our lifetime because Western Europe is too vulnerable and will remain too preoccupied with its own organization to acquire the characteristics of a superpower in our lifetime. Nothing has occurred that alters the Soviet long-term objective of dominating Western Europe in traditional diplomatic terms, and in splitting it off from the United States. However, I personally believe that in the last situation the Soviet Union has on its priority list is a Western Europe Communized by force, though, if the French and Italian Communist parties were to come to power, especially by legitimate means, this might provide a situation to its taste. Moreover, for the time being it is more concerned with its position in Eastern Europe than with making trouble in Western Europe.

Military intentions

If I may make a brief digression, this is where the familiar dichotomy between capabilities and intentions often seems to me misleading. Nations have military capabilities which grow out of long-term policies, very often dictated by fear, and they have national goals or interests, and instinctive reactions. They rarely have military intentions in time of peace. Mahatma Gandhi did not "intend" to eliminate England; Pakistan; she reacted in a particular way to a particular set of circumstances in the light of her knowledge of India's military capabilities. The United States did not "intend" to get involved in Vietnam with a larger military force than it sent overseas in the First World War. July-August 1914 is perhaps the classic case where the actions of the major powers bore little relation to their real interests. Similarly, the Soviet Union has, I think, no military intentions toward Western Europe, though no doubt it has a drawerful of contingency plans and might react belligerently in a European crisis.

This said, it remains of the first importance to maintain a degree of military strength in Western and Southern Europe as well as a framework of collective security

*Sino-American
rapprochement
remains limited*

that embraces Northern Europe, of a kind that will deter a belligerent reaction in a crisis. I fear that the Atlantic alliance will be in travail throughout most of this decade, caught between the requirements of a flexible strategy and the genuine political difficulty of maintaining adequate ground and air forces to enable NATO and its military commands to react calmly, intelligently and effectively in a European crisis without itself giving an impression of belligerence, as, for example, a premature threat or use of tactical nuclear weapons might do.

The problem is going to be different in different countries because all have different manpower systems and different structures of public finance, but I hope the objective requirement can be sustained. The difficulty will almost certainly be to absorb a certain reduction in American forces in Europe before a European organization that can get better value out of the \$25 billion Europe spends on defence is even agreed upon. I do not think that American force reductions will necessarily be drastic, but they will almost certainly take place, except in a situation which none of us desire, namely a marked heightening of tension in Europe.

This will not happen because the American interest in European security is diminishing but simply because, if the United States turns to a system of voluntary enlistment at a time of competing pressure for public resources, it will not be able to maintain 4½ divisions, 25 air squadrons and a two-carrier fleet in Europe. Moreover, as all sensible Europeans recognize, the present balance of resources in an inequitable one by any standard. The present structure of forces in NATO could probably absorb a reduction of one American division without a radical reorganization of its strategy, but anything further would necessitate a complete rethinking of the whole force structure, at least in Central Europe.

Nor do I think there will be any easy alternative to a solution whereby Europe contributes a greater share of the over-all resources required for deterrence and *detente* in Europe. I am a firm believer in the principle of arms control, namely that two adversaries or groups of adversaries can identify and control certain common interests or dangers without changing their political relations. So far it has proved the most effective way of educating the Soviet leadership from its crude perception of the use of power to more civilized attitudes. But force levels in Europe have never been a promising field for such negotiations, by reason of the geographical asymmetry of the two super-powers and for other reasons. I do not

hold out much hope for MBFR, though the two governments that have the most direct interest in the question, the American and the German, may come up with more successful formulas than it has been possible to work out so far.

By the same token a European conference on co-operation and security holds for me very little promise. For one thing, a conference of 30 states varying in size and interests from Malta and Cyprus to the Soviet Union and the United States seems to me a hopeless forum for serious negotiation. For another, the conference is clearly going to have three elements: a Soviet-inspired initiative to get formal recognition of the *status quo* in Europe, which the West may be ready to concede but which will excite the strong opposition of Romania and Yugoslavia, which want the formal abrogation of the Brezhnev Doctrine; a Western initiative to liberalize contacts between East and West, which the Soviet Union will resist; and a negotiation on technological co-operation, which Eastern Europe badly needs. The difficulty is that the three questions are so dissimilar that there are no necessary trade-offs between them. And, though I have sympathy with the view that the Western governments cannot appear merely to be sitting on their bottoms, simply in terms of credibility with their own electorates, if the first major European conference in more than 40 years were to produce no concrete result, the last effect might be worse than the first.

Western Europe's framework

This gives a new urgency to the political construction of Western Europe, which has hardly started, for today, despite its size and wealth, it has the institutions not of a super-power but of a supermarket. History has in a sense caught Europe unawares, its leaders assuming until last year that they had a longer time ahead of them in which to create a monetary and economic union on the one hand and on the other to expand the Rome Treaty to facilitate a common exercise of sovereignty in foreign and defence policy than is in effect proving to be the case. The difficulty will be to generate the political will-power to tackle these two immensely complicated fields simultaneously — particularly in an atmosphere where the younger generation, nearly half the voting population, never knew what George Steiner has called Europe's "season in hell", at a time when central bureaucracies are increasingly distrusted, and when industrial integration is complicated by the otherwise quite proper emphasis on social objectives.

These factors emphasize the importance not of the central bureaucracy, the

Europe's institutions those of supermarket rather than super-power

Commission, but the Council of Ministers, men who come out of the political process in their own countries, as well as the rapid development of an effective European parliament. But, even in the most favourable circumstances, it will be some time before Marseilles, Manchester and Munich, Sicily, Scotland and Sein-Inferieur develop a real and permanent sense of community. I think it will take most of the decade to achieve a monetary and a true economic union.

I am inclined to doubt whether we shall have got much beyond co-operation by 1980, more effective than today one hopes, in the field of European defence. For one thing, military power lies nearer to the heart of what the man in the street calls sovereignty than economic power or money; the European central bankers have been co-operating closely since the 1920s, their chiefs of staff have not. However, at some point in the near future the road forks — toward achieving the best form of European co-operation that is possible without France and within NATO or toward the development of more specifically European forms of defence and political co-operation. It will be a very difficult choice despite the greater flexibility in French policy.

Moreover, despite Mr. Brezhnev's recent public acceptance of the EEC, one must reckon on continuous Soviet opposition to a European political and defence union. In addition, every step will have to be taken in a fashion that does not alienate American interests in Europe, for I hold firmly to the view that there is no substitute, nothing that the British and French can do jointly or separately, to replace American strategic power in such a way that it is fully credible in Soviet eyes.

To this difficult process I believe that Britain, which I judge to be just emerging from a period of low morale, has much to contribute. Britain, I think, will feel less than odd-man-out in the developed world in the 1970s than in the 1960s; industrial growth rates elsewhere are likely to be more comparable to its own; the problems of both decolonization and of the reorientation of its interests are substantially completed; it is no longer dogged by balance-of-payments deficits; its military force structure is likely to give less trouble than that of other countries.

Internal changes

The change in the relations of the major powers is complicated by an equally rapid pace of change in the internal preoccupations of their societies, including the erosion in the developed world of our faith in the traditional idea of progress through

economic growth and scientific innovation.

Not only are we wrestling with a new type of inflation, which is not amenable to Keynesian techniques of control; not only are we concerned about spiritual, social and ecological effects of the prosperity we have achieved; we cannot even be sure that the political and material foundations of our civilization are secure. It is at best arguable that it will remain possible to govern and organize societies by the liberal and democratic techniques evolved in recent centuries, as, on the one hand, the control of increasingly complex societies requires larger bureaucracies but, on the other, communications make people more sceptical of politics and politicians. At the galloping rate at which we are consuming natural resources, our own grandchildren could emerge into a world as impoverished as there had been a third world war.

The OECD report *Science, Growth and Society*, states bluntly: "We are less than two generations away from the time when the human population must reach a new equilibrium in the distribution of its members and in relation to its environment. This will modify the age composition of populations and call for profound changes in lifestyle, in values and in the structure of institutions."

There is an old cowboy song — one of the genuine ones from the last century — describing the pioneer leaving the upward slope of the Sierras for the perilous descent of the Continental Divide, which contains the haunting phrase:

"From here on up the hills don't get
any higher
But the valleys get deeper
and deeper."

The great prizes that technology and organization have won for us, the peak of our progress, may lie behind us; but a false step, a series of careless decisions, may take us plunging down into the valleys. I am the last person to belittle scientific progress but, as the OECD report states:

"Science has received social support over the last 15 years, primarily because of its role as a source of technology, but in the future it will be equally important in providing a wider intellectual base for the control and orientation of technology — a more subtle and more complicated role."

Very possibly a future historian of our civilization — a Gibbon, a Macaulay or a Sainte-Beuve — may ignore all the political developments of 1971 on which I have concentrated and mention just one occurrence of that year: the fact that the legislature of the most technologically-advanced nation the world has ever known refused to vote funds to build a supersonic transport

*'Britain will
feel less
odd-man-out
in the Seventies'*

Canada and Latin America: ending a historic isolation

by John D. Harbron

The geographical fact of a common hemispheric existence has never been enough to dispel a hazy, inaccurate, and even irreverent, view that most Canadians hold of Latin America, its cultures and its peoples.

The larger republics of Latin America may have common economic and social problems of development and identity with us. But these are rarely if ever described with any sense of community in Canadian media or by Canadian commentators.

The idea that Brazil's huge developmental needs in the tropical Amazon and Canada's equally large requirements in the Arctic might require similar definition of national interests and similar public dialogues is discussed only among scholars, and therefore articulated in a relatively small circle of specialists.

What national governments in the Americas are doing to modernize their indigenous peoples — the Canadian, Mexican and Peruvian, to name three with major state activities on behalf of Indian populations — are rarely assessed in a comparative light.

The historic reasons for our relative isolation from Latin America, compared to our long and close ties with Europe and the Pacific countries, relate to our British, French and other cultural heritages. A hemispheric nation like Canada, founded and colonized by France and England, later settled by immigrants from most of the major nations of Western Europe, would have little *rapprochement* with other hemispheric societies, where the colonial powers were principally Spain and Portugal.

Our colonial ties with Britain were the antecedents of our twentieth century associations with Britain in war and peace, first in the two global wars and since 1945 in associations, both political and economic, with the postwar Commonwealth. These connections made Canada a major participant in the Colombo Plan for Asian development and

modernization from the year it was formed in 1951 — 13 years before Canada would participate in a similar context to aid the economic growth of Latin America through the Inter-American Development Bank.

The "British connection" has made it difficult for us to associate some of our problems of development with, say, Spanish-speaking Venezuela. Like Canada, this is a big, empty country, underpopulated, with an urgency to open up its underdeveloped regions and with an economy dominated by foreign-owned subsidiary companies.

Caribbean ties

But our associations with small, Caribbean island societies, where the British settled and created political and judicial institutions like our own, have been close and persistent. Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana on the South American mainland, are not only newly-independent English-speaking countries of the western hemisphere but fellow members with Canada in the Commonwealth.

The Dominican Republic, Spanish-speaking neighbour of Jamaica, with many social and economic problems much in common with Commonwealth Caribbean countries, does not hold the same priority in our thinking, in spite of the fact that two major Canadian business institutions — our banks and one of our largest mining corporations — play a dominant role in its economy.

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In the wake of the decision of the Organization of American States to grant permanent observer status to Canada, a Canadian delegation made its official appearance at a meeting of the OAS General Assembly in Washington in April. Paul St. Pierre (left), Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, said Canada viewed

its new link with OAS as an opportunity to participate more fully in the affairs of the hemisphere. With Mr. St. Pierre at the OAS session is Galo Plaza, OAS Secretary-General. Alfred J. Pick, Canadian Ambassador in the Netherlands, has been named as Ambassador and Permanent Observer to the OAS.

A similar historic pattern has been true of Canadian associations with former French places in the world. There are not too many of them in the western hemisphere — only one independent republic, Haiti, and several colonial and dependent territories still under French rule.

But one of our new thrusts in the post-1945 developing world has been in French-speaking Africa, where a host of newly-born French-speaking republics are receiving Canadian economic, social services and educational assistance and diplomatic missions newly-established during the 1960s.

This pattern of disassociation from our own hemisphere is, fortunately, only part of the picture. In fact, Canada has more diplomatic missions in Latin America than it has in new French-speaking and English-speaking African nations. In Latin America, Canada is represented directly or indirectly through its embassies and the broad assignments of trade commissioners in countries where Canada has no embassies, including Cuba, with which Canada has had

unbroken diplomatic and trade relations since Castro came to power in 1959.

Cautious and, on occasion, non-committal statements over the years from our national leaders about full Canadian membership, sometime, some day, in the Organization of American States belie the fact that our national governments since the war have slowly but surely moved close to Latin America through decisions to enter agencies of the OAS, to seek full membership in the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and, more recently, to request permanent observer status in the Organization of American States, an application which the OAS has approved.

OAS observer

Alfred J. Pick, Ambassador to the Netherlands, has been named Canada's first permanent observer to the OAS, with rank of ambassador. He will serve as head of a small ambassadorial mission at the OAS headquarters in Washington, acting separately from the Canadian Embassy to the United States.

Paradoxically, and in spite of the historic associations with Britain and France and postwar alliances concentrating on our common interests in the Atlantic region, Canadian Federal Governments since the war have taken the view that we are an hemispheric power and have a role to play in the hemisphere that could best relate our interests in international development to the needs of the less-developed republics of Latin America and the Caribbean.

This has meant that Canada would move closer to international associations concerned with economic and social development than to those concerned with diplomacy — presumably the rationale for becoming a full member of the IADB — before Canada becomes, if ever, a full member of the more politically-oriented OAS.

On July 29, 1971, in a letter to Antonio Ortiz Mena, the distinguished Mexican banker and financier who is President of the IADB, Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp wrote:

Within the context of our review of foreign policy, the Canadian Government, as you know, has been examining various ways of developing and strengthening our relations with other countries in this hemisphere. One of the avenues which we would very much like to widen is our development assistance program for Latin America. Since the Inter-American Development Bank plays such a key role in the promotion of economic and social development of the area, we have obviously been paying close attention to means whereby we might further our co-operation with you and members of the Bank.

The foreign policy review of 1970 recommended these kinds of Canadian move toward the two leading international institutions of the Americas, full Canadian membership in the IADB, which at present administers \$74-million in Canadian dollars, from which the Bank has made 18 loans for a total of \$68.8-million, and a permanent observer at the OAS.

The foreign policy review documents, in turn, were preceded by two foreign policy seminars conducted jointly by the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Institute of International Relations early in 1969. These discussed our NATO relations and our relations on the broadest scale, cultural and academic, as well as governmental, with Latin America.

In April 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the new priorities for Canadian foreign policy, the first of which was sovereignty and national development. The statements made later by him during 1970, relative to the extension of our territorial waters and anti-pollution zones

around our Arctic islands, were made in the context of this enlarged concern with our sovereignty in the hemisphere.

These are policies — and expressions of policies — that Latin American nations readily understand. Their unilateral declarations on control over territorial waters and firm implementation measures, though much more severe than Canada is ever likely to announce or employ, also relate to the protection of sovereignty and to those resources of the sea that they claim are part of their national economies.

Equally important, the conception of national development, funds for which in the 1940s and early 1950s could have come from a future hemispheric development bank, is vital to all hemispheric republics. That bank, which some of the major Latin American republics called for during OAS meetings as far back as 1954, is the present IADB, in which Canada became a full member in May.

'Wait and see'

All this is a very long way indeed from classic "wait-and-see" statements of the kind made by former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in Mexico City, April 23, 1960, on a state visit to the late President Adolfo Lopez Mateos:

... We are a member of a number of organizations, we are a member of the Commonwealth of Nations; we are members of NATO... any announcement of a decision in this regard (to send a permanent observer to the OAS) would be made in Parliament... I would not at the moment, even before a full consideration of all the pros and cons, deny the possibility that Canada's presence as an observer might some time be contemplated at any event.

If we were to rely solely on historic patterns of political party foreign policy, such a response would have been anticipated from a Conservative Prime Minister whose ties were strongly British, monarchist and European, compared to a later Liberal Prime Minister like former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, who said publicly several times that Canada should some day join the OAS, and whose party was traditionally more continentalist than the Conservatives.

But history would play us false if we did not keep our eyes on that slow but unbroken pattern, which all Federal Governments since the war have maintained, of drawing nearer officially to the Americas. It was a Conservative Government, not a Liberal one, that established the Latin American Division of the Department of External Affairs in May 1960. And that Government's External Affairs Minister, Howard Green, gave the impression during his major tour of South American states early in 1960 that he

*Postwar pattern
of drawing nearer
to the Americans*

would do his part in moving Canada to full entry into the OAS.

"Canada going Pan-American," said the English-language *Buenos Aires Herald* in its lead editorial of June 24, 1960. "I myself have fewer reservations than many Canadians about joining the OAS," said Mr. Green in May 1960, after his return from South America. The immediate result was a Canadian delegate in attendance at the OAS meetings in Quito, Ecuador, in February 1961 and an "official observer mission" headed by a minister at the special meeting of the Inter-American ECOSC at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961. This was the very important inter-American meeting that adopted President Kennedy's program of the Alliance for Progress.

Action against Cuba

We did not have observers at the two crucial inter-American meetings that would affect Latin American international relations through much of the 1960s. These were the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962, which decided to expel Cuba from the inter-American system, and the OAS meeting suddenly called in Washington October 23, 1962, which supported the U.S. "quarantine" against Cuba at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

The main criticism of Canadian OAS membership has been related to crises

such as these. As a member state, we might have been approached to choose between supporting the United States or a very controversial unilateral action that appeared to be in contravention of the Charter of the OAS or supporting influential Latin American republics, chiefly Mexico, that abstained on juridical grounds from voting on the January 1962 resolution to expel Cuba.

Would defiance of the United States in a hemisphere where its interests are much more direct than ours result in some unnecessary tensions in smoothly flowing Canadian-American relations? This view has lost a good deal of its validity, not only because Canadian-American relations have entered rough waters without any intrusion of hemispheric differences but because Canada, under the OAS Charter, like other member states, could abstain from decisions on crises in other member states, in which it could not officially become involved.

For example, if Canada had been a full member of the OAS at the time of the unilateral U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in April 1965, and the later formation of the OAS Peace Force in Santo Domingo, it would have conceivably abstained from the OAS Peace Force resolution, and certainly any troop participation in it. As that matter developed, Brazil sent a major peacekeeping contingent to the Dominican Republic with a Brazilian general in command of a mixed

'No geographic monolith'

Senator Paul Martin, Government Leader in the Upper Chamber, outlined the Canadian Government's current approach to Latin America in a paper delivered at a conference on Canada, Latin America and United States foreign policy held at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, in February. Senator Martin reviewed the developing links between Canada and Latin America and suggested that Canadian thinking on relations with Latin American countries was undergoing a basic change:

"... Canadians have been very unsure of themselves in the Latin American environment. We thought of this area as a comparatively impenetrable jungle of political problems, economic conundrums, social malaise and military booby-traps. We thought about Latin America as an enormous underdeveloped area toward

which we would eventually turn our attention . . . but not now.

"Today such a lethargic North American outlook on Latin America as a geographic and economic monolith is not only obsolete, it is absurd. Latin America is changing almost beyond recognition. Indeed, . . . Latin America as a convenient monolithic conception has, in fact, ceased to exist. In its place are some two dozen countries of our hemispheric community, each nation with a very different and distinct political structure; each with its own experiment in economic nationalism; each with its own peculiar preoccupations and problems.

"Of course, Latin American countries may still find common ground on some fundamental international issues, but Latin America as a political, economic, social or cultural collectivity is no more — if, indeed, it ever was. . . ."

Brazilian - American - Paraguayan - Ecuadorian force. Chile and Mexico, on the other hand, abstained from the Dominican peacekeeping action.

Public opinion has often been used by Canadian prime ministers as a gauge for their action on behalf of OAS entry or not. If this had been their only gauge, we could not have moved as far as we have toward the Americas — even though it has taken us many years to do so. A Gallup poll published in *The Toronto Star*, January 12, 1944, indicated "72 per cent of Canadians haven't heard of the Pan-American Union" (the predecessor body before 1948 to the Organization of American States).

Martin's forecast

Strong OAS enthusiasts like Senator Paul Martin, the former Secretary of State for External Affairs, in many speeches in Parliament and to interested private groups, were making predictions like this one he offered on May 31, 1967, at the former Canadian Inter-American Association meeting in Ottawa: "For my part, I have no doubt whatsoever that membership in the OAS is part of the ultimate destiny of Canada as a country of the western hemisphere."

On that occasion and others, as recently as in his speech to a Canadian-American relations conference at Northwestern University in February, Senator Martin reminded his audience that Canada had long been a member of several of the OAS agencies and might be joining another one of them soon.

Since 1970, that old uninterest of Canadians and Canadian opinion-makers in Latin America has changed substantially because of new developments outside government. In the summer of 1970, two new associations — CALA (Canadian Association for Latin America) and CALAS (Canadian Association for Latin American Studies) — were formed in Toronto.

CALA, which represents Canadian corporations and private enterprise doing business in Latin America, replaces the former Canadian Inter-American Association and has already held many important meetings bringing together senior officials of federal and provincial governments, Canadian industry, the OAS and IADB in selected Canadian industrial areas.

CALAS has held three annual meetings and represents most of the approx-

imately 300 Latin American scholars currently teaching and studying on Canadian campuses. Many of these are former American academics who have immigrated permanently to Canada. Many are Canadians who studied in Latin America and returned to accept posts in Latin American studies that did not exist in Canadian universities as recently as five years ago.

By the end of 1972, Canada will be a full member of the IADB and a Canadian team will have joined it both to serve in its general administration and to help administer the \$74 million of its Canadian loans.

These funds, the first instalment of which was made available to IADB in 1964, have been dispersed widely throughout the hemisphere in projects that required Canadian approval. Such diverse needs as teaching supplies for a Chilean university, port development in El Salvador, enlarged hydro-electric facilities in the Dominican Republic and a highway-feasibility study in Paraguay have all been paid for from our IADB loans.

By the end of this year, the first Canadian permanent observer to the OAS and his small mission will have settled in to watch and report on its activities.

In Canada, outside government, the recipients of the Canada Council's new and generous scholarships for graduate studies in Latin America will be at work in the hemisphere and the ambitious plan of CALAS for Canada's first Latin American scholarly journal may result in publication of the first issue early in 1973.

At the same time, Canadian industries and institutions in Latin American and Caribbean countries facing rapid change and its concomitant, social upheaval, must be prepared to cope with attacks, intellectual but now occasionally physical, against their local facilities. The latter have already taken place in the Commonwealth Caribbean, where we always thought our common interests were to be found.

Nothing is certain in the hemisphere today except social change, violent as well as peaceful. At the same time, the hour has probably come when Canadians will finally understand the remarks of the President of the OAS Council in 1960 about the contribution to it "of the synthesis of Anglo-Saxon and Latin political genius in Canada," and see a new vision of our country as a leader in the hemisphere we have too long ignored.

'Nothing is certain in the hemisphere except social changes, violent as well as peaceful'

Planning policy to reflect the new reality of Japan

By D. Gordon Longmuir

The first recorded Canadians to reach the shores of Japan in the nineteenth century were Christian missionaries, intent on converting the heathen and bringing educational and social reforms to what must have appeared to them to be a singularly alien feudal society. Many Canadians tend still to think of Japan in somewhat bizarre terms, although their missionary zeal is now directed to more secular pursuits. Japan is looked upon as a market for raw materials (and a few manufactures) and as a source of hardware and (lately) technology. There is a large cultural and linguistic barrier between these two Pacific neighbours, a fact which becomes increasingly vexing as the bilateral relation grows. Japan and Canada have trade agreements, cooperate in a large number of international forums, exchange visits of cabinet ministers and senior officials at regular intervals, send tourists back and forth and exchange students, journalists and businessmen — and yet the barrier remains. A major task facing Canadians in the Seventies is to find a means of communicating better across this barrier.

Nevertheless, the impression still abounds that Japan is one of those far-away countries — rather exotic and mysterious — a mixture of oriental tradition and economic magic. The simple and pragmatic fact is that Japan is not only the third most-important industrial nation in the world but is well on its way to becoming one of the two or three most important political powers in the Pacific.

As the Government has taken pains to emphasize, Canada too is a Pacific nation. While trade and economic interests provide the most tangible ties between Canada and Japan, it is vital that Canadians begin to think in terms of the political, social, and cultural aspects of the relation. What Prime Minister Trudeau has referred to as the "Near West" has much to offer Canada in an era when both countries are seeking to diversify their external ties and to promote

new policies that will serve primarily their own national interests.

Relationship with U.S.

An important factor Japan and Canada have in common is the special relationship each with the United States. In Japan's case, the connection is of relatively recent vintage, having grown out of the paternalism of the occupation, a willingness on the part of successive Japanese Governments to go along with U.S. foreign policy and the all-important question of security in the Western Pacific. To a considerable extent Japan has avoided the symbiotic economic ties that characterize United States-Canadian relations, but it is the largest overseas trading partner of the U.S., and economic difficulties between these two powers can be earth-shaking.

In the past year, a dramatic series of events has served to accelerate a transitional trend in Japan's foreign policy, and the exclusivity that has marked its relations with the United States over the last 25 years has begun to be eroded. Among the events that have led to this change the most important have been President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China in February, the United States' "new economic policy" (and the subsequent revaluation of the *yen*), the controversial settlement of the textile restraints question with the United States, the agreement for the return of Japanese rule of the Ryukyu Islands and, finally, the entry of China into the United Nations. In response to growing internal pressures, the Japanese Government has made its own decision to normalize its relations with the People's Republic of China, but this is an agonizing, and so far unrequited, process. Initiatives have taken place as well for better relations with the Soviet Union, including first steps in the negotiation of a long-delayed peace treaty. Japan has very recently taken measures to diversify its diplomatic relations in Asia by recognizing Bangladesh, establishing diplomatic



Alastair Gillespie (centre), Minister of State for Science and Technology, led a Canadian mission to Japan in March to explore the possibilities for increased co-operation in scientific fields. Both governments pledged to

work toward further exchange in this area. With Mr. Gillespie at a reception for the mission are Koji Kobayashi, president of Nippon Electric Company, Limited (left), and Dr. D. A. Chisholm, president of Bell-Northern Research.

es with Mongolia and promoting informal exchanges with other Communist Asian countries such as North Vietnam.

The particular importance and urgency of the question of relations with China has led Japan to consult closely with those Western countries that have already established diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China. In this respect, Japan tends to look on Canada as the country that took the major initiative in bringing China back into the world community, and thus as a country of some political distinction in the Pacific area.

Evidence of the mutual desire for closer and more productive consultative ties may be drawn from the variety and general success of high-level negotiations and visits that have taken place during the past year. In September 1971, the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee held its sixth meeting in Toronto. This committee was established in 1961 during the visit to Canada of the then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda. It was designed to enable informal contacts to take place between senior Canadian and Japanese

ministers at regular intervals, and was originally envisaged mainly as a forum for the discussion of trade and economic questions. Its agenda has expanded over the years to cover all aspects of Canada-Japan bilateral relations, as well as many multilateral questions of mutual interest. The most recent meeting took place in the wake of what the Japanese have referred to as the two "Nixon shocks", i.e. the decision of President Nixon to visit China and the "new economic policy". The meeting was a splendid opportunity for two of the countries most profoundly affected by the U.S. economic measures to discuss their respective problems and to suggest possible solutions to the subsequent economic crisis. At the same time, the committee did not lose sight of the bilateral economic problems that still exist between Canada and Japan, particularly in the field of trade. The frankness of the joint communiqué is indicative of the close *rapprochement* that has been established at these meetings; this latest was regarded as one of the most candid and productive

high-level exchanges ever held between the two countries.

Trade is key

By far the most important aspect of Canada-Japan relations today is trade. Japan is Canada's third-largest trading partner; total trade between the two countries in 1971 exceeded \$1.5 billion. For the first time in many years the balance of trade last year was in Japan's favour. In an effort to promote Canadian exports to Japan and to emphasize the need to improve their quality (i.e., to increase the percentage of manufactured goods), Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Jean-Luc Pepin led a trade mission to Japan in January. As Mr. Pepin pointed out, this was the largest trade mission Canada has ever sent to any foreign country; it included 31 senior Canadian businessmen, as well as a large number of Canadian Government officials. The benefits of the mission can only be assessed over the long term, but its impact was undoubtedly felt in a number of areas of Japanese business and industry that had previously thought of Canada as a supplier only of raw materials or as a northern adjunct of the United States.

Another important aspect of Canada's economic relations with Japan is in the field of energy and resources. In 1971, a special sub-committee of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee was established to study this area. Japan is a major importer of Canadian resources, especially minerals, and has begun in recent years to invest heavily in this sector. Japan is also vitally interested in finding new sources of energy to power its vast industrial heart. The Japanese search for fossil fuels and possibly joint ventures in nuclear enrichment will be of immense importance to Canada in years to come.

In March 1972, a mission led by Alastair Gillespie, Minister of State for Science and Technology, visited Japan to explore the possibilities for increased co-operation in these spheres. This initiative was received with great interest by the Japanese; the joint communiqué issued at the end of Mr. Gillespie's visit pledged that both governments would work toward further exchanges in all aspects of this important field.

In the continuing effort to present a favourable and accurate image of Canada in Japan, a travelling exhibit called (in Japanese) "Canada-Ten" opened in Tokyo in April 1972. This exhibit is scheduled to visit every major centre in Japan over the

next year. Although it is meant to have a broad public appeal, it will be aimed chiefly at bringing the image of Canada to a rather select audience of Japanese opinion leaders. The exhibit's objective is to erase some of the stereotypes that distort conceptions of Canada abroad and to present this country as a modern industrial state with an innovative technology. It is the largest effort of its kind in Japan since the successful Canadian participation in Expo 70.

Cultural exchanges

Cultural exchanges of all kinds have been encouraged between Canada and Japan on both a private and a government-to-government basis. Each year a number of postdoctoral fellowships are offered to Japanese scientists by the National Research Council. In addition, scores of students are exchanged annually under inter-university programs. During the past three years, both the Toronto and Montreal Symphony Orchestras have visited Japan, as well as a large number of popular entertainment groups. During Expo 70, Les Feux Follets, the National Ballet and the Charlottetown cast of *Anne of Green Gables*, among others, represented a cross-section of Canada's cultural assets. Japan has reciprocated with visits of outstanding Japanese artists and a tour by the *noh* theatre in 1971. Contacts between sports teams are frequent and have proved valuable in opening up people-to-people communication. Canadians, for example, participate annually in the world *kendo* (Japanese fencing) championships. Canada, of course, participated in the Winter Olympics in Sapporo in February.

The importance of improving communications between Canada and Japan must not be underestimated. Although there is a growing awareness in Canadian universities of the need for expanding facilities for Asian studies, the pace of change is not nearly fast enough; there are far too few students of Japanese language and culture and it is essential that these programs be accelerated over the next few years. Japanese studies in Canada, to be sure, have not been profound or far-reaching, but most Japanese students at least study English and an increasing number travel to Canada and other Western countries each year. Educational exchanges should be stimulated and strengthened so that more young Canadians will have an awareness of Japan and its society.

In the immediate future, we shall see a much stronger and more apparent

Japan is seeking new energy sources for 'industrial heart'

Japanese presence on the international stage. It is important to avoid misapprehensions about that country's intentions. Japan can be expected to take an increasingly stronger and more constructive role in international economic relations, development assistance, disarmament, law-of-the-sea matters and a myriad other international issues. It is essential to Canadian interests to adjust the conduct of our bilateral arrangements, both private and official, to reflect

the new reality of Japan by broadening and deepening both the quality and quantity of exchanges and consultations. The clearest possible understanding of Japanese policies is of prime importance as our bilateral relations grow both in scope and intimacy.

Mr. Longmuir is a member of the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of External Affairs.

...Pattern for the Pacific

Broader Canadian interest and involvement in the Pacific region have been recommended by a special report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs as an essential part of Canada's developing foreign policy.

The report said the Committee's evidence indicated clearly that Pacific Asia was the least familiar to Canadians of all the world's great zones of civilization. As the Committee put it: "Canada lags behind other developed countries of the region, and some of the less-developed, in generating a regional consciousness of the Pacific Rim and in acquiring the necessary knowledge and expertise." The Committee concluded that a large-scale and concerted national effort to improve Canadian understanding of the Pacific region was a vital prerequisite to broader and more fruitful Canadian involvement.

The Senate Committee study was an outgrowth of the Federal Government's foreign policy review and, in particular, the policy paper on the Pacific region. The Committee's report, a 54-page document, was a product of 18 months of hearings and inquiry by the Committee under the chairmanship of Senator John B. Aird.

The report noted that the Pacific area, as defined in the Government's policy paper, embraced more than 20 countries and territories with more than one-third of the world's population. Canada's Pacific trade has grown spectacularly in the past six years, but rapid expansion of profitable economic relations has sometimes obscured a number of other vital concerns for Canada, the Committee feels.

"It is probable that Canada cannot long sustain relations with its Pacific

neighbours solely on the basis of trade, particularly trade which is in its own favour. Commercial considerations alone require a concern for reciprocal advantage and a widening knowledge and understanding of the partner countries involved. The emergence of any broader sense of community involves the acceptance of wider responsibilities for the general well-being of the region. . .".

The Senate Committee report examined Canada's relations with the countries of the Pacific region under four general headings: the basis for involvement; Canada's economic interests; Canada's interest in development aid, and Canada's political and security interests.

The Committee made a number of proposals aimed at deepening awareness and understanding of the region. For example, the report urged the Government to make special grants available to expand the teaching of Chinese, Japanese and perhaps one additional Pacific language in existing centres of Asian studies. The Committee also recommended that the Government establish regular intensive language-training arrangements in the Pacific area and offer a number of places in these facilities to business representatives and provincial officials.

Coupled with training in Pacific languages is a need for more study of all aspects of Asian civilizations. Greater efforts should be made to make use of existing resources in the field of Asian studies at Canadian universities and steps should be taken to strengthen those resources where deficiencies exist, the report suggests. The Government could provide stimulus to Pacific area studies

by endowing a number of research fellowships at Canadian universities; an initial six fellowships could be established at an approximate annual cost of \$60,000. For non-Commonwealth countries, there should be the equivalent of the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan to permit scholars to move between Canada and these countries.

The report advocated a wider range of sports and cultural exchanges as an effective means of increasing public interest and awareness of the region. The Committee also endorsed closer ties with Pacific countries in terms of scientific and technological co-operation.

Economic sphere

In the economic sphere, the report reviewed the phenomenal expansion in Canadian trade with Pacific countries — a doubling in volume between 1965 and 1970 — and the steady growth in two-way flows of investment. All indications are that the Pacific will continue to be an increasingly important focus for Canadian economic interests.

Within this sphere, Japan is undoubtedly the dominant factor, accounting for 60 per cent of Canada's exports to the Pacific and almost the same proportion of imports. Japan could become Canada's second-largest market in the next few years.

The Committee said, however, that it was deeply concerned with the need for upgrading and diversifying Canadian exports to Japan. The great bulk of Canadian exports to Japan are in a few large commodity groups such as copper, lumber and lumber products, grains and other agricultural products, aluminum and primary aluminum products. Only about 3 per cent of the total flow is made up of finished products. In contrast, more than 96 per cent of Japanese sales to Canada are accounted for by a diversified range of processed and manufactured goods.

"There is no longer any justification," the Committee stated, "for the great bulk of Canadian exports to be shipped to Japan, as the policy paper says, 'in their rawest transportable and least profitable form'. The time has come for Canada to begin redressing this imbalance The Committee considers this an urgent priority for action by industries concerned and by governments at all levels."

The report said the Canadian Government was justified in pressing for further tariff liberalization by Japan and for elimination of Japan's many non-tariff barriers. But there were other factors, the report emphasized, such as the lack of familiarity, imagination and aggressive-

ness on the part of Canadian businessmen in the area and the general problem of lagging scientific and technical innovation in Canadian industry.

The Committee cited the development of Canada's trade with the People's Republic of China and said there was considerable potential for further growth. But the present large imbalance of trade in Canada's favour could not be sustained indefinitely. The Committee predicted that China would press Canada to accept more of its exports in return for a continuing and growing place in the Chinese market.

To improve co-ordination of Canadian economic relations in the Pacific, the Committee recommended further action be taken on the Government policy paper proposal for establishment of a joint Pacific economic advisory council and indicated that this might be accomplished by broadening the representation of the present Pacific Basin Economic Council.

The report urged establishment and enforcement of uniform national requirements for processing of resource exports and a national approach to scientific and technological innovation. The Government, it said, should also study the type of trading corporation structure being used by other nations, such as Japan, with the eventual aim of encouraging creation of an appropriate Canadian counterpart.

Development aid

Turning to development aid for countries on the Pacific Rim, the Senate report endorsed the Government's view that such aid should be one of the main elements in Canadian policy in the area. But it said it must be recognized that Canadian aid at present would be limited by the scarcity of Canadian resources in relation to the size of regional needs and by continuing aid commitments elsewhere. It was clear, for example, that at the existing areas of emphasis — India and Pakistan, the Commonwealth Caribbean and *francophone* and Commonwealth Africa — will continue to require intensive Canadian assistance. As a result, the Senate Committee foresaw gradual growth in Canadian aid programs in the Pacific region and suggested that selectivity would be essential both as to countries and fields of operation. On a regional scale, Canada is already active in the Pacific programs of the World Bank group and the Asian Development Bank.

The Committee recommended a vigorous expansion of Canadian assistance

Report advocates increased exchanges, closer scientific ties

countries and territories of the South Pacific in co-operation with other nations, it warned it was important for Canada to avoid creating paternalistic relations.

The Committee underlined the central role of providing expanding trade opportunities in the economic growth of the Pacific's developing countries. "Their achievement of economic growth and long-term stability," it stated, "will depend to a vital degree on their ability to find markets for their products of all kinds, especially labour-intensive manufactured goods." The Committee called for early implementation by Canada of a generalized preference system (GPS) for manufactured and semi-manufactured products of developing states. Both Canada and the United States had fallen behind the European Economic Community and Japan in putting GPS schemes into effect.

Security interests

Dealing with Canada's political and security interests in the region, the Senate report supported the Canadian Government's position against participation in military alliances with Pacific countries. Priority should be given to co-operative political and economic action to alleviate the root causes of social and international tensions. The Committee did endorse, however, Canada's limited programs of military co-operation and training assistance with a number of Pacific countries such as Malaysia and Singapore.

The major element in Pacific activity involving Canada's direct security interests is in jurisdictional, coastal and territorial protection on Canada's West Coast. The Committee noted that these activities had been assigned high priority in the Government's revised defence policy and said that it considered this an important step in the "effective utilization of the Federal Government's overall capabilities to promote important national interests in the Pacific coastal region".

With respect to truce supervisory functions in Indochina, the Committee said that it understood the reasons for the Government's current reservations, but added that it was important for Canada to indicate its continued willingness to accept a role in helping bring an end to the war in Vietnam.

According to the report, Pacific countries are anxious to see what part Canada will play in the achievement of peace and security and in co-operative action to share the benefits of economic development with the disadvantaged countries. "The fact that Canada is a Pacific nation has long been viewed (in Canada) simply as a kind of geographical accident, with the world's largest ocean serving more as a barrier than a bond," it said. The Senate Committee put forward its proposals with the aim of banishing that image.

— Murray Goldblatt

To most Canadians, a kind of 'Terra Incognita'

A national policy of fuller and more active participation in Pacific affairs is unrealistic unless Canada is prepared to assert a unified national presence and pursue consistent and coherent national policies.

"... The Pacific remains to most Canadians a kind of 'Terra Incognita'. When venturing out into what the Prime Minister has called 'the New West', it tends to reason that Canadian explorers — official, commercial or academic — could share the benefits of their particular knowledge and experience. It is also a simple fact ... that, in dealing with the two giants of the region, China and Japan (and increasingly with other countries), political, commercial and other relationships are inseparably mingled.

"Clearly such an environment demands re-thinking and new approaches on the part of Canadians. The trade mis-

sion was cited as an example of the kind of technique required for successful collaboration between government and industry, and it is notable that the mission to Japan in January 1972 was the largest economic mission that Canada has ever sent anywhere in the world.

"As Mr. Robert Bonner pointed out, however, the trade mission 'is only the first thrust of the effort'. Continued collaboration is required in the 'follow-up' stages.

"... Patterns of co-operation between industry and government are still hampered by mutual lack of knowledge and often suspicion. A related problem is the lack of communication and co-operation among Canadian businessmen themselves. ..." (Excerpt from *Report on Canadian Relations with the Countries of the Pacific Region*, Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs).

How should Canada approach the many faces of Maghreb?

By Antoine Ayoub

In the field of social science, there are very few points of view that win the approval of a majority of experts. Nevertheless, very curiously, a single point of view appears to achieve unanimity: we are told that once their political independence is proclaimed, formerly colonized countries always find themselves facing problems and serious and urgent economic priorities. But nothing is easier than to cause this "nice" unanimity to crumble, to start the controversy again and to re-establish the traditions of the "trade." In general, it is sufficient to ask a single and unique question: why is it precisely like this? Why have years — sometimes centuries — of colonialism only aggravated the economic situation of colonized countries? Exploitation and economic imperialism, reply some; clinging to tradition and difficulties of adapting to the modern world and to changes on the part of the inhabitants, retort others — and here the discussion resumes with renewed vigour.

The fact is that, in the three countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), the economic situation immediately after political independence was no exception either to the generally-accepted rule or to the controversy that generally follows it.

These three countries responded to the challenge of economic development by different strategies: Algeria is adopting a socialistic state capitalism, Tunisia wavers between a loose co-operativism and a hesitant liberalism, and Morocco is settling down to a newborn capitalism

back to back with a strong rural feudalism.

However, the three regimes do not reject planning as a means of state intervention in economic activities. But it goes without saying that this planning, as well as the meaning given to it, differs according to the countries involved and reflects serious differences of opinion from theoretical doctrinal and political points of view.

These three regimes also have in common their refusal to practise a despoiling economic policy and to cut for good the bridges with the former mother country. But, in this case also, the position in principle is not given the same interpretation in Algiers, Tunis and Rabat.

Toward this Maghreb of many faces and various riches and different regimes, Canada appears to want to bring a renewed and continuous interest in its new policy of opening-up toward the countries of the Third World in general and the *francophone* countries in particular.

Actually, the opening-up is not new, recent, at least for Tunisia. This country has been designated for a few years by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as a "concentration" country. But the desire of this body, which reflects in certain respects the development of the great trends of Canadian foreign policy, to change the list of the countries, the recent contacts at the ministerial level between Algeria and Canada and the desire to open itself more and more to *francophone* countries lead us to ask the following questions:

(1) What is the balance-sheet of economic relations between Canada and the Maghreb?

(2) What is the situation of the economies of the Maghreb countries in the face of the challenge of economic development and what are their respective needs and priorities?

Wager on Algeria

Apart from the United States, the economic relations of Canada with the

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est of the world" can be summarized in a few sentences and two or three figures. The further away the partner country, the more the sentences and the figures will tend to shrink. Moreover, the Maghreb is very far from Canada geographically and has been politically remote until recent times.

This reality can be read clearly from the figures: for the three years 1968, 1969 and 1970, the total value of the exports of the three countries to Canada did not exceed \$8,260,000; on the other hand, the total value of their imports for the same period amounts to \$51,800,000, resulting in a cumulative deficit of the balance of trade in favour of Canada of the order of \$3,540,000. It is Algeria that has achieved the lion's share of this last figure (\$29,300,000) and this is a first indication; the persistent desire of this country to industrialize rapidly necessarily pushes it to increase its purchases of equipment goods from the industrialized countries. The 1971 figures confirm this tendency more clearly; Algerian imports amount to some \$30 million, whereas its exports amount to a few thousand — hence a deficit for the year 1971 alone equivalent to the cumulative deficit of the three preceding years. This also creates a problem to be resolved, as much for Algeria as for Canada. The latter country cannot allow this situation, which is "apparently" favourable to it, to last forever. Similarly, Algeria cannot allow itself the luxury of a chronic deficit in its balance of trade at a time when it wishes to practise a healthy policy of currency management. The recent negotiations between the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pepin, and his Algerian counterpart, Layachi Yaker, for the export by Canada of Algerian wine and such took place in this context.

Relations with the two other countries (Morocco and Tunisia) are less important in absolute figures, in percentage and in rates of growth. Tunisia has nearly evened its balance for 1970 (\$3,900,000 in imports for \$5,900,000 in exports). Morocco, although it registered a deficit of some \$5 million for the same year, does not appear to practise a coherent export policy, since its purchases in Canada in 1969 amounted to \$1,500,000, having been \$4,600,000 in 1968. An initial conclusion appears to emerge from this quick analysis — namely, that a certain "centralization" stands out from the exterior of the "concentration". Canada appears to wish to bet on Algeria first, on Tunisia next, and finally on Morocco.

At first glance, this conclusion can appear debatable when we analyse the

second aspect of the economic relations between Canada and this group of countries — the "assistance" policy. In effect, according to the 1970 report of the OECD, on a net capital "contribution" on a *per capita* basis, Tunisia receives \$21.48 (of which \$1.44 comes from Canada) and Algeria \$8.10 (of which \$0.28 comes from Canada). In absolute figures and by way of allowances for food aid, Tunisia leads for 1970-71 with \$4 million, followed by Algeria and Morocco, each of which receives \$3 million. With regard to public bilateral development assistance in 1970-1971, the hierarchy is the following: Tunisia \$5.49 million; Morocco \$4.77 million, and, in last place, Algeria \$4.01 million.

Tunisia in lead

In the field of technical and professional co-operation calculated according to the number of advisers, education co-operators sent, students and trainees received, Tunisia leads, followed by Algeria and Morocco (for all these figures, see the annual report for 1970-71 of CIDA). The privileged position of Tunisia is explained by the relative seniority of its independence, on the one hand, and the priority of its diplomatic relations with Canada, on the other. But when we consider that the first ambassadors were exchanged between Algeria and Canada only a few months ago, and when we take the trouble to follow recent events concerning the relations between the two countries, we shall notice very quickly that the conclusion we have just drawn is certainly not unfounded.

The latest indication that serves to confirm our impression is the reaction of businessmen after their recent visit to Algeria with Mr. Pepin. The same reasons that a few years ago provoked the enthusiasm of American financiers and engineering firms for Algeria have operated to make their Canadian colleagues think about the tremendous possibilities contained in the industrialization programs of the young state. Already, and by way of example, the Bank of Montreal, in March 1971, granted a credit of \$10 million to SONATRACH (Société nationale de Transport et de commercialisation des hydrocarbures) repayable in eight years with a deferral of 18 months for the financing of the Mesdar-Skikda pipeline. Already Canadian economic consulting firms have taken an interest in the formulation of models with regard to the improvement of inter-industrial tables of the Algerian economy.

These are indications that are not deceiving. In effect, if private enterprise

*Algeria's programs
for industrialization offer
a vast scope*

is becoming involved, it is because the Algerian context is considered to be favourable enough. Without neglecting the tremendous potential of the Moroccan and Tunisian tourist industries, it appears to us, however, that Canadian private enterprise considers itself more competitive in the field of several well-defined industrial branches. And it is toward these branches that it intends to direct its efforts with Algeria.

It goes without saying that public enterprise can have other priorities and other concerns. Even though one of the criteria for the granting of assistance according to the foreign policy declaration of June 1970 is "the manner in which the country has effectively used development assistance in the past and its *future prospects* in this field". Everything allows us to believe that Algeria has brilliantly passed the obstacle of this criterion. But four other criteria (see the report of CIDA) must be met that together lead to our second question.

Economic development

In a certain sense, the strategy of development is the most effective, the fastest and the least costly manner of combining economic, natural and human factors with a view to a sustained increase and self-maintenance of national product, on the one hand, and a structural change in the environment (institutions, mentalities, etc.), on the other. At a given moment, the socio-economic system reflects this strategy and embraces it. The adequacy of this strategy and of the regime that supports it for the realities characteristic of each country measures, in a general manner, the degree of success of this country on the road to economic development.

Using the jargon of the development "experts", we can summarize the *actual* economic situation of the three Maghreb countries in the following manner: Algeria appears to have "taken off" rapidly in the industrial field, but it will remain weak if its agricultural problems are not quickly solved; Tunisia is undergoing a difficult period following the failure of the Ben Salah experiment, the increase of its external debt and the instability of its internal political situation; Morocco is more or less "marking time", except in the field of tourism and tertiary activities.

It must be recognized, however, that these situations are the result, on the one hand, of the after-effects of colonization and of the independence that followed it and, on the other hand, of the degree of



Industry, Trade and Commerce Minister Jean-Luc Pepin led a trade mission of Canadian businessmen and officials to Algeria last November. Mr. Pepin is pictured with Algeria's Trade Minister Layachi Yaker (right) during sessions in Algiers.

effectiveness of the strategy that was adopted.

In effect, the discovery and exploitation of Algerian oil and gas by the French a short time before independence brought out the desire of the national leaders to stake this sector and to "sow", as we say, their oil to industrialize their economy. On the other hand, the massive departure of the French from Algeria, the abandonment of agricultural farms and the troubles of the national policy of rural self-management made the agricultural sector the Achilles' heel of Algerian economic construction. Following that, the continual exodus from the country to the cities and the employment of "capital using" methods in the new-born industrial sector (petrochemistry, metallurgy, mechanics) had a negative effect on the rate of employment. In last place, the policy of purchasing factories, "key in hand," in order to obviate the deficiency of national engineering, while appearing to be the only practical policy at the present time, must not conceal its medium and long-term disadvantages from the point of view of the establishment of

cal and qualified labour force. The very brilliant and dynamic small elite that has undertaken the management of state companies runs the risk of encountering serious difficulties without a qualified labour force to support its deserving efforts.

With regard to Tunisia, the principal problem at the present time appears to be the reform of the state sector in industry and of the co-operative sector in agriculture. Put another way, it is the express desire of certain leaders to see private enterprise resume its preponderant place in economic life in order to repair the damage they say that the centralized planning policy inflicted on the whole economy. This "new internal policy" is the result of a concern with appeasement of foreign capital. In effect, in the absence of an abundant internal source of currency (oil, for example), and facing the ambitious industrialization policy adopted at the beginning, the growth model of the Tunisian planners runs the risk of favouring itself as long as 50 per cent and more of internal investment comes from external financial sources. If Tunisia receives more external financial contributions for each inhabitant than any country in the world, it is only normal to expect that the ratio of its indebtedness is also the highest. The reabsorption of the external debt and the increase in the standard of living of the population can occur only if internal production increases at a high enough rate to compensate for these two combined needs. Moreover, this increase in production depends in turn on a development strategy that concentrates on projects that are well-selected according to the criterion of their contribution to added value. But to go from that to condemn the very idea of a plan and to wish to initiate a return to an economy centred on services and tourism is a step that it would perhaps be risky to take quickly without reflecting upon the very idea of development. It must not be forgotten here that the "Destourian Socialists", during the battle for independence and shortly after its proclamation, had made repeated promises to the Tunisian population concerning a radical change of the economic structures inherited from the colonial era. One must ask whether the implementation of these promises is on an equal footing with the new economic strategy.

Morocco more precarious

The situation of Morocco is still more precarious. Shortly after independence, this country did not have at its disposal either the natural advantages of Algeria (oil and

gas) or the human advantage of Tunisia (a technocratic and intellectual élite) — in such a manner that the changes in the economic and social structures had very little significance and were sometimes clearly negative. The "Moroccanization" of the administration and a part of the economy only transferred in favour of nationals a part of the national revenue and of the capital previously held by foreigners. But it rapidly became evident that this transfer cannot be the sufficient condition for economic development, even if it is a necessary one. In effect, the former feudal class in the country and the new bourgeoisie in the cities have shown only a very weak inclination toward productive investment. The enormous needs of job creation, education and the training of management personnel, and the improvement of the standard of living of the mass of the population, remain and increase with population growth.

Problems for Morocco

The major problems encountered by the Moroccan economy on the road to development are: the reorganization of the agricultural sector to make cultivation more productive (the Code of Agricultural Investments of 1969 is one step in this direction); the accelerated formation of capital that remains mortgaged by the weight of all types of transfer toward foreign countries; the revision of the tourist policy, which, in the actual state of affairs, cannot be considered as "the motor of economic development"; the institution, although certainly difficult in regard to religious traditions but nevertheless necessary, of a policy of family planning that would reduce one of the highest population growth rates in the world; finally, the limitation, if not the suppression, of the wasting of public funds and the more rational use of the savings of the propertied class.

What can Canada do in the face of this very rapid balance-sheet of Canada-Maghreb relations and this very summary table of the Maghrebian economic context?

The first reply to this question is that it would be illusory to believe that Canada can — even if it wanted to (and this is certainly not the case) — substitute itself purely and simply for the former partners of the Maghreb. At the very most, it can offer in a few well-defined fields an alternative that would reduce and not replace the dependence of these countries on one or two traditional partners.

*'Illusory to believe
Canada can
substitute itself
for former
partners of
Maghreb'*

The second reply is that, despite its high level of development, Canada is an average economic power, which, being aware of its rank, does not intend at all to act as a great power.

This being said, it remains true nonetheless that the Canadian contribution to the solution of problems of the Third World (to which the Maghreb evidently belongs) appears to us to be capable of becoming a very appreciable contribution. This is why.

The increasing interest actually manifested by Canada in the problems of development and international co-operation is part, it seems to us, of a total policy intended to project a "specific" image of this country on the international scene.

This image is drawn from two objectives: 1) to show, as much as possible, that Canada is not — or rather, does not intend to be — an appendage of the United States and 2) to demonstrate to the developing countries that a Western industrialized country can propose a doctrine of definite co-operation to them without too much of a political ulterior motive. These countries are ultra-sensitive to such an argument, especially when they place their political independence at the level of a

principal that takes precedence over everything (the case of Algeria, for example).

In effect, Canada holds the true cards for the implementation of this last objective: absence of a colonial history; bilingualism that permits overtures much to the *francophone* countries as to the *anglophone* countries; the presence in the bosom of active ethnic groups, although minorities, coming from the countries of the Third World; a high technological level in well-defined fields; relative abundance of human and financial capital; and, finally — a basic point above all — a profound humanitarian perceptiveness (which must not be confused with hypocritical charity) of the impact that the future of the Third World can have on world peace.

It is in taking account of these limits of these two objectives and of its true cards, that Canada can formulate a coherent economic policy of long duration in close relation with the Maghreb countries. Even if it will not help to solve all the problems of the Maghreb economies, this policy has a great chance of reducing the social tensions these problems spawn in the three countries.

"Three essential elements underlie the unique urban pattern of North Africa, foreshadowing as well as illuminating its current and future problems. These are: a history of 5,000 years of uninterrupted experience with urban settlement; a series of cultural invasions which introduced new urban forms that only gradually have displaced earlier ones; and a present high rate of urban population increase that can be expected to reach unprecedented levels in the next generation.

"Throughout North Africa, embracing . . . Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the United Arab Republic (Egypt), are cities of great antiquity, which are now undergoing radical transformation. They present a paradox, since they combine externally-stimulated urban forms with indigenous impulses, needs and problems. North African urban life . . . constitutes a testing-ground to investigate the relative impacts of environmental continuity and cultural change. . . .

"North Africa will create its future cities through integration of older and newer patterns, as it has in the past through periods of transition and eventual synthesis to blend what appeared to some as incompatible urban patterns and influences. . . .

"In the short run, however, the lack of integration offers advantages both to students of urban life and to urban dwellers. The student of urbanism can find a variety of distinctive types of cities existing in North Africa, each primarily derivative from one or another tradition. For instance, Marrakesh in Morocco combines the Islamic heritage with that of sub-Saharan Africa. . . . Other cities of religious significance, such as Moulay Idriss (Morocco), Tlemcen (Algeria) and Kairouan (Tunisia), are chiefly Islamic. . . . Casablanca and, increasingly, Tunis are examples of French cities not taking on an indigenous character. . . .

" . . . The two most pressing problems of North African cities today . . . are to integrate the older and newer forms of urbanism and to expand to absorb the next generation of anticipated urbanization.

"Traditional Western precedents and standard planning solutions may not be very relevant. A different kind of planning will be needed which will focus on social as well as physical goals. It will have to aim less at 'neatness' and symmetry and more at laying down the guidelines within which the cities may evolve — adapting modern cultural change to North Africa's geographic, climatic and social continuities." (Janet Abu-Lugh writing in *Africa Report*, June 1971.)

IDRC: Pioneering a new style of international aid agency

by David Spurgeon

Next November, the Commission of the Andean Common Market will consider proposals for a regional science and technology policy for the Market area, which includes Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. The aim is to decide on a regional strategy for technology imports and to link this strategy to national science policies in such a way as to promote domestic industrial development. Science policy experts believe it is the first such regional approach to be undertaken anywhere.

In order to make possible the necessary research to formulate these policies, Canada's new International Development Research Centre last June approved funds of \$146,500. It was a swift response to a pressing need, because it was only in 1969 that the Andean Common Market was formed, and it was 1970 when the Commission made known its intention to stimulate indigenous scientific and technological capacity related to development goals. The November 1972 deadline for policy decisions was set without regard to IDRC participation. Without the project, then, decisions would have had to be made on the basis of far less knowledge than will now be available, and in what would necessarily have been a less systematic way.

The project is typical of the kind IDRC is set up to support: it is a research project; it is aimed at promoting growth and well-being of less-developed nations; it is regional in scope and international in its implications; it is a response to a priority set by a less-developed nation; and it is being carried out by personnel from the developing countries involved.

The Andean Pact project also is oriented toward science policy in a way IDRC sees as essential for developing countries. Mrs. Ruth K. Zagorin, director of the Centre's Division of Social Sciences and Human Resources, says:

"To be looking at science policy as simply policy for science doesn't make any sense for a developing country at this point. We must ask, science policy for what? We must look at it in relation, not to creation

of a scientific establishment — which is often already there — but instead in relation to technology policy and economic growth."

The member countries of the Andean Common Market are not attempting to close out foreign technology; on the contrary, they recognize that the region will long be dependent for much of its technology on foreigners. "They may find it to their advantage to import a particular kind of technology rather than to create it," Mrs. Zagorin says.

Geared to need

At the same time, they do want to build up a regional science and technology system geared to their own needs. Thus the IDRC-sponsored study is expected to identify the types of technology most appropriate to the needs of the region (with particular attention to creation of employment, an issue of great concern to the Andean countries) and the ways in which the region can bargain for importation of appropriate technologies at least cost. It is also aimed at identifying the institutional framework most suitable for the formulation of national and regional science policies, for conducting research and for feeding research results into technological production.

In order to meet the Commission's November 1972 deadline, much of the research will have to be completed by July of this year. From then until November, efforts will be devoted to interpreting the data and preparing policy proposals.

The project is based at the headquar-

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ters of the Junta in Lima, but also involves field work by national teams in each of the Andean countries, the teams consisting mainly of Latin Americans from the countries of the region. International experts will be brought in to review the work and help in preparation of policy proposals. When the project is finished, a series of studies will be financed by the national governments, so as to make continuing use of training received during the project.

The Andean Pact project is one of 30 approved by the IDRC by December 31, 1971. Ten of these are in the Social Sciences and Human Resources Division. Established in May 1970 with the passage of an Act of Parliament, the IDRC is a Crown corporation that reports to Parliament through External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp. Its funds come from Parliament, but it is unusual — and perhaps unique — among nationally-funded international development organizations in having an international Board of Governors. The Board's chairman is Lester Pearson. Ten others are Canadians, but another ten are from other countries, including six from less-developed regions.

The Centre's purpose, as set out in the Act creating it, is "to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions . . .".

Four program areas

The Centre's operations are divided into four program areas: agriculture, food and nutrition sciences; population and health sciences; information sciences; and social sciences and human resources.

Special attention is given to the problems of rural peoples, who often are the last to benefit from technology and who, in developing countries, make up the mass of the population. Emphasis is given to projects that embody the priorities of the developing countries rather than those of the donor, and to those that employ scientists from the developing countries.

An example of this approach is found in the Population and Health Sciences Division's pilot program for family-planning research in Mali. This is the first such activity to be undertaken in black *francophone* Africa — an area that includes 20 countries with a combined population of some 80 millions, where governmental family-planning programs have simply never existed.

"There has been particular sensitivity to family planning in black *francophone*

Africa," says Dr. George Brown, director of the Population and Health Sciences Division. "We have been looking to this area as one where we might have a particular input in future because of its singular traditions and because not much has been done there in this field."

The project arose through the Malians' own interest. The Centre for Family Planning, a private organization in Montreal, held two summer workshops for interested African nations, which led to contacts with IDRC. "They approached us," Dr. Brown said. "This is their project."

The program will be administered by the Government of Mali through the Malian Association for the Protection and the Promotion of the Family. All the clinic and research staff are Malian, except for one IDRC research adviser, André Laplante. Their pioneering experience will provide a base on which to build future policy and action through sub-Saharan *francophone* Africa. Regular contact is being made with professionals in other countries of the region through seminars, conferences and travel.

Under the project, one central and five satellite family-planning clinics are to be established and equipped and personnel trained. A research unit will provide continuous evaluation and operational research.

The objectives are to determine the best practical approaches to establishing a national family-planning program and to provide the Government with the information necessary to organize such a program in the future. Improvement of the health and well-being of Malian families is also an objective.

Response of population

The response of the population to the program will be studied as part of the research and future policy implications of this reaction will be examined. Mali's Ministry of Social Affairs has become interested in family planning because of the difficulties in providing adequate social and health services in the face of the continuing high rate of maternal and infant mortality and the problems posed by inadequate spacing of children. Mali's population is approximately 4.8 million, and is estimated, on the basis of incomplete demographic data, to be growing at the rate of approximately 2.5 per cent a year.

The Malian program has, of course, important regional implications. Although a few other countries, including Senegal and Dahomey, have limited governmental activities in family planning, and there has been some official

Special attention given to problems of rural peoples

interest in the field, cultural, religious and legal factors supporting high birth rates have made governments reluctant to initiate or support family-planning activities. And mortality rates in the region — although declining — are higher than in any other part of the world.

Yet it is now clear that the question of population growth rates — not just in Africa but throughout the developing world — is vital to the future of these countries. Without a stabilization of the growth rate, progress in standards of living will be impossible. The developing nations' populations are growing at a rate of 2.2 per cent a year, which means a doubling of population in 32 years. And, as death rates continue to decline as a result of better medical care and other factors, this growth rate will increase, and less fertility also declines.

Equally important is the relation of family planning to health. It has been clearly demonstrated that, with adequate spacing of children, both maternal and infant mortality can be reduced. This is of particular interest to African states, where these mortality rates are high.

Urban squatters

One of the problems many developing countries face in common is the migration to urban centres of large numbers of rural people who become squatters and slum-dwellers, making up as much as one-quarter to one-third of the total population of a city. A study undertaken by the International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (INTERMET), in Toronto, has been sponsored by IDRC to examine this problem in eight metropolitan areas: Bandung, Indonesia; Lima, Peru; Caracas, Venezuela; Seoul, Korea; Istanbul, Turkey; Ibadan, Nigeria; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Manila, the Philippines. Individuals and institutions in the countries involved are taking part in the study.

This project, which falls under the Social Sciences and Human Resources Division, is to formulate policy proposals and programs to cope with the migrant problem in each of these countries and to conduct a comparative study generalizing from their collective experience. Factors such as the paths, rates and tempos of migration will be studied; the economic and social factors that influence the migrants either to stay or to move; the governmental and other activities that affect life in both rural and urban areas; and the personal and group motivations of those involved.

This project demonstrates another principle espoused by IDRC. "It is gener-

ally believed the developing countries have a lot to learn from each other, and the foreign aid process generally has not encouraged this," Dr. Zagorin says. "It is this the Centre is trying to encourage." Dr. Zagorin refers to this as the "network principle", which simply means establishing networks through which developing countries can communicate with each other about their mutual problems, and providing studies with a common design that allows comparison of results that will permit development of general principles.

A major turning-point in the orientation of foreign aid programs was the development in the Philippines and Mexico of new strains of rice and wheat that greatly eased the threat of famine in Asia by increasing crop production. This triumph of applied science showed how developing countries could benefit from the application of science and technology. Yet the so-called Green Revolution has also had side effects, and a social and economic impact that has not yet been fully measured.

Assessment of that impact is the aim of another study in the Social Sciences and Human Resources Division of IDRC. One of the agencies responsible for the new crop-strains — the International Rice Research Institute in Los Banos, the Philippines — together with universities and other agencies in India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and South Vietnam, is carrying out the study, called "Impact of Rice Farming Changes (Asia)", which will provide information on the changes taking place on farms as a result of the new rice technology.

The project is expected to shed some light on such questions as: Who benefits from the new technology? How have improved rice yields affected landlord-tenant relationships, the employment structure in rural areas, land costs and the capital structure in villages? What has been the extent of acceptance of the high-yielding rice varieties? And what changes have occurred in farm practices as a result of the new technology?

The Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences Division has 11 projects under way, ranging from a study of rural development in Caqueza, Colombia, which is designed to help small farmers to improve their productivity and incomes, to a multiple cropping project in the Philippines, to support research in the growing of crops other than the staple, rice.

The Information Sciences Division is attempting to promote development of world-wide information systems on international development. One way it has done this is by providing support to the Organiza-

*Triumph mirrored
by new strains
of rice, wheat*

tion for Economic Co-operation and Development in preparation of a multilingual thesaurus.

Puzzled reaction

The stress laid by the IDRC on the need for projects that conform to priorities of the developing countries sometimes produces a certain puzzlement among its potential clients. Their natural reaction is to wonder, if only to themselves: "What's in it for you?" Recently, the first meeting between an IDRC representative and Kenyans who had a proposal to discuss was cool and formal, and faintly suspicious. The second meeting, by which time it was clear that nobody was trying to impose anything on them, was totally different — open and friendly.

The Centre's President, David Hopper, contends that this hands-off attitude is essential once the decision has been made to finance a project. "I hold that it must

be founded on a confidence that they, and we, are the best judge of what is relevant to their circumstances," he says. "Until that confidence is proven misplaced, I will be content to leave the direct management of our support in the hands of our partners, reserving to ourselves only the rights of audit and periodic substantive review."

He says he expects collaborators in a particular project to meet frequently to review their work, and to work out their own techniques for self-monitoring, so that a minimum of overall supervision will be required from IDRC.

This is an approach that has been adopted only infrequently among donor countries and agencies, Dr. Hopper says. He speaks from a background of long experience in the field of foreign aid.

"If this is successful," he says, "we will have pioneered a new style of international operation that can remove the stigma of charity and donor control from the support of research in development."

Impact of the arms race and a plea for its reversal

The armaments race, which threatens mankind with destruction, also exacts its price by diverting urgently-needed resources away from economic and social development. In spite of pressing needs in the fields of education, health, housing, transportation, and the protection of the environment, world military expenditure is now running at about two-and-a-half times the estimated total of publicly financed health expenditure, one-and-a-half times the expenditure on education, and 30 times the total of all official economic aid granted to developing countries. Never in history has such a large proportion of the world's resources been devoted to military uses.

If the arms race were halted and reversed, not only would progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament be more readily achieved but the social and economic development of all countries would benefit and the possibilities of developed nations providing additional aid to developing countries would be increased. From these conclusions, the recent report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, entitled

Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, declared that all countries shared the responsibility of taking steps to achieve significant reductions in military expenditures and concrete measures of disarmament.

The report, which originated in an item included in the agenda of the twenty-fifth United Nations General Assembly at the initiative of Romania, was prepared in 1971 by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified consultant experts and came under consideration in the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly last fall. The 15 consultant experts — among whom was Professor Doug LePan of the University of Toronto — considered their study a successor to the 1962 report of the Secretary-General entitled *The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*. Each of the experts served in a personal capacity.

The 1962 report had examined the scale of resources then being devoted to military purposes and the peaceful uses to which they might otherwise be put. It

1962 report somewhat optimistically dealt with the conversion problems which many countries would face in restructuring their economies in the event of general disarmament, and also discussed the impact of disarmament on international economic relations. It concluded that the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could best be met by appropriate national and international measures, and that the diversion to peace-purposes of the resources now in military use should be used to improve world economic and social conditions.

The 1971 report approached the same general problems from the point of view of the opportunities for economic and social development which were lost as a consequence of the arms race and of military expenditures. The consultant experts are convinced that there could be no assurance of international peace and no solution to the pressing economic and social needs of the world until the arms race is halted and reversed. The report, reflecting the experts' sense of urgency, is not only an examination of the arms race but also a call for its reversal.

In its analysis of the nature and dynamics of the arms race, the report points out that it had already resulted in the stockpiling of more destructive power than had any conceivable purpose. Despite this, the arms race not only continues but is escalated by its own momentum as a result of the emphasis on research and development among the major powers. Although the outlay for research and development is only about 1 per cent of total military expenditure, it is this outlay which determines the main feature of the modern arms race — the dynamic momentum which causes the effort to improve the quality of armaments (or to defend against them) constantly to escalate in urgency.

On the surface, it would seem that qualitative improvement in weaponry could progress through a logical series of steps in which first a new weapon is developed, then a counter-weapon to neutralize the new weapon is produced, and then a counter-counter-weapon. In fact, the report says:

These steps neither usually nor necessarily occur in a rational time sequence. The people who design improvements in weapons are themselves the ones who as a rule envisage the further steps they feel should be taken. They do not wait for a potential enemy to react before they react against their own creation.

This chain of new weapon, counter-weapon, and counter-counter-weapon is amplified by the nuclear weaponry developed during the 1960s. After the devel-

opment of ballistic missiles, special radar networks and anti-ballistic missiles were designed which in turn resulted in the devising of missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) capable of being aimed at a number of targets from a single launcher, and so, theoretically, being capable of overwhelming anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences. A parallel phenomenon has characterized the technological development of conventional weapons systems. In all fields, the arms race has in fact become essentially a technological race, with constant striving for improvements in quality.

Rapid obsolescence

One of the results of the constant search for qualitative improvements in weaponry has been the increasing variety and extensive technological elaboration of armaments which characterized the decade of the 1960s. A second and related result of the highly competitive nature of the arms race during this period was the rapid obsolescence of such weaponry. Because of the technical complexity and rapid obsolescence of weapons, the cost of military armaments tended to skyrocket:

In the sphere of defence, research and development projects are limited only by the extremes to which scientific and technical knowledge can be mobilized and pushed, and by the extent to which nations are capable of, and are willing to divert resources from, other social, economic and political ends.

Whether measured in direct expenditure or in terms of the number of men involved, the arms race exacts its price by diverting resources away from such urgently required social services as education, health, housing, transportation and protection of the environment. Although there have been, as the experts and the Secretary-General point out, relatively few statistical studies of world military expenditures, the report estimated that during the decade 1961-70 world military expenditures totalled about \$1,870 billion and that by 1970 world annual military expenditures exceeded \$200 billion. The latter figure represents between 6 and 6.5 per cent of the total world national product.

It is instructive to compare the military expenditures of the developing countries with those of the developed countries. At the present time, military expenditure is highly concentrated in a few large and highly industrialized countries which devote to military spending a large percentage of their resources, and which are the pace-setters in the technological arms race. Developing nations account for only 6 per cent of world military expenditure, devote a smaller share of their resources

Diverting resources from urgent needs of social services

to military purposes than do the industrialized countries, and have a minimal influence on the technological arms race. However, the rate of growth of military expenditures on the part of developing countries is accelerating.

In its analysis of what the resources absorbed for military purposes imply in terms of the sacrifice of other opportunities, the UN report considered several means of measurement other than direct expenditure. Measuring the "manpower absorption of military expenditure", the report estimated that about 50 million people are employed directly or indirectly for military purposes throughout the world. The personnel in the world's armed forces as a whole rose at a rate of about 2 per cent a year during the decade of the 1960s to a total of 23 to 24 million by 1970, with almost all of the increase in military manpower occurring in the developing countries.

\$25-billion allocation

From the viewpoint of overall research and development, military research and development probably absorb some \$25 billion of an estimated world total research and development expenditure of some \$60 billion. Probably at least a quarter of the world total of scientists and engineers who are engaged in research and development are employed on military work. Qualitative changes in armaments also generate quantitative and qualitative changes in manpower within the armed services, with the result that the constant updating of scientific, engineering, managerial and technical talent becomes very costly.

Two other possible measures of the arms race were also considered by the report: first, a "depreciated capital stock" estimate for measuring changes in the world's stock of weapons and, second, an estimate of the world's stock of lethal power. Both these measures, however, have a greater relevance to a military analysis of the arms race whereas measures of expenditure and of manpower absorption have a greater relevance to an economic and social analysis of the arms race because they are measures of the alternative uses to which the resources, had they not been claimed for military expenditures, might have been put.

The "opportunity costs" of military expenditures (by which are meant the alternatives of spending which the latter pre-empt) become apparent when one considers the enormous social problems of all countries and of the world as a whole. Public services, health, education, housing,

and the protection of the environment need the resources which the arms race consumes. Military expenditures are also in direct competition with private consumption and thus with the effort to raise standards of living.

The economic growth of nations is hindered by the arms race absorbing resources which might otherwise be invested in projects such as industry, agriculture and transportation — projects which many countries are unable to start through lack of resources. Economic growth also suffers from the diversion into military uses of resources which might otherwise be used for the training of the labour force and in raising the literacy rate of the society. Moreover, because the arms race has absorbed a high proportion of the total professional manpower and the limited resources which the countries involved have available for all research and development, a reduction in arms spending and concentration of research and development outlays on production exclusively for civil purposes would lead to an improvement in the efficiency with which capital and other resources are utilized and hence would accelerate the rate of economic growth.

By diverting resources from other uses, the report points out, military expenditure tends to produce distortions in the social and economic development of nations. Notably, the traditional relationship between the civil and military sectors of the economy tends to be altered. In nations with high military expenditures one observes the institutionalization of a military-industrial complex embracing, besides the military forces themselves, the firms and industries serving military forces, the scientific research institutions associated with defence and the authorities in regions where the military complex is situated. As a result, the disturbing effects of the fluctuations which so often characterize military expenditure tend to be concentrated in particular regions and industries. The result is local disruption, a great waste of capital and high regional unemployment.

Disrupting economic pattern

On a national as well as a regional level, the sharp changes in expenditure characteristic of military programs cause disruption in national economics which can result in inflationary spirals or in balance-of-payments problems which are difficult and costly to correct. The size of defence appropriations is decided primarily on political and military grounds and the role of the economy has often to be adjusted

*Military research
absorbs quarter
of scientific corps*

fit in with military exigencies and with the time cycle of military developments. Increased military expenditure, if inflation is to be avoided, requires increased taxation or reduced social expenditure, thus allocating long-term social policies. In budgetary terms, developing countries which wish to acquire sophisticated weapons can incur considerable balance-of-payments problems.

Although the social consequences of the arms race can only be considered qualitatively, the arms race, with its threat of the annihilation of mankind by accident, if not design, exacts a toll in anxiety and resulting psychological problems. Besides contributing to the disaffection of millions of people, the fear and tension of living in a world which is everywhere vulnerable to nuclear attack serves to intensify conflicts between groups and between nations.

In terms of international relations, periods of tension are usually associated with an acceleration in the arms race and, in turn, a speeding-up of the arms race exacerbates international tensions. In the words of the report:

...the massing of armaments and the continued development of new weapon systems cannot but generate more suspicion and greater tension than exists at the start and by so doing provoke hostile reactions — ranging from a stepping-up of military expenditures to talk of war — on the part of those who feel threatened.

The accumulation of weapons also increases the possibility that nations might resort to a military solution of international problems. Moreover, the rate of obsolescence in modern armaments, which provides considerable quantities of surplus material every year, results in the sale of these armaments by arms-producing powers to developing nations. The result is often the exacerbation of regional conflicts and the risk that these conflicts might spread to neighbouring countries and even involve the military interests of the major powers.

International suspicions resulting from the arms race also inhibit trade and the exchange of knowledge and technological know-how. The hoarding of strategic commodities and of advances in technology, the stockpiling of raw materials, and the instituting of protectionist policies to prevent dependence on foreign trade for vital supplies in time of war are all at least partially consequences of the arms race.

Distortions resulting from the arms race also occur in relations between developed and developing nations. Since many developing countries must import arms from more industrialized nations, foreign exchange needed for the import of invest-

ment goods for economic development is diverted into military expenditure. Whether a developing country pays for imported armaments in cash or through the export of primary products, its growth potential is adversely affected through this pre-empting of scarce foreign-exchange resources. In addition, not only does military expenditure reduce the priority given to aid in the policies of donor countries but, because of international tension associated with the arms race, aid tends to become viewed not primarily in terms of a solution of the problems of the Third World but as a means of increasing the donor country's influence.

Even if military expenditures were sharply decreased, resources would not automatically be channelled to economic and social development of the countries most in need of this development. The aid problem is complicated by the fact that developed countries account for the bulk of world military expenditures. Even if their military expenditures were reduced, there would be many other claimants besides aid for the resources freed.

Transfer of Resources

Nevertheless, the report of the Secretary-General expresses the hope that as large a proportion as possible of the "disarmament dividend" resulting from reduced military expenditure would be directed towards relieving the urgent problems of the developing nations. Total world military expenditures are about 30 times the level of official development assistance, which now adds up to some \$7 billion and which in 1970 was equivalent to only one-third of 1 per cent of the combined gross national products of the donor countries. A substantial curtailment of the arms race would permit a massive transfer of resources, which could make a fundamental change in the prospects for social and economic development in the developing countries. The resources released in the developed countries could also make possible increases in the volume of investment in the developing countries through private investment.

Besides examining the harmful effects of the arms race and military expenditures, the report also considered the so-called benefits, direct and indirect, which the arms race is said to have produced. With respect to the purpose of military forces, to serve the interests of national security, the experts claim that the quantity and technological sophistication of armaments today make the threat of ultimate disaster far outweigh whatever short-term advantages armaments may

Developing states' growth potential adversely affected

achieve in providing peoples with a sense of national security. Another benefit of the arms race which has been claimed is the spur given to technological progress. During the Second World War a number of scientific and technological advances were accelerated: for example, the development of atomic power, of computers, of air-transport and radar, and of electronics in general. Vast research and development organizations were set up to implement precise technological programs and this new organizational approach has left its mark on all advanced technologically-based industry today.

The report claimed, however, that the Second World War occurred at a time when new scientific knowledge was available and readily exploited, especially at a time of mobilization of national talents in the competitive challenge of war. The specialized military and space technology of today is less adaptable to civilian use and to solving the world's present social and economic problems. Moreover, military secrecy always retards the pace at which civil benefits can be extracted from military developments. Whatever "spill-over" effects there may have been from military technology, the cost of war in human lives and misery has been far too high a price to pay for them. Indeed, if countries were to allocate to a frontal attack on some of the main economic and social problems of the world even a fraction of the resources which have been devoted to military research and development, mankind ought to be able to achieve even more rapid technological progress without war or an arms race.

Waste of capital

It has also been claimed that disarmament, even though desirable, could result in major instabilities. In the past, the fluctuations which often characterize military expenditure have resulted in considerable local disruption, great waste of capital, and, at least in some countries, high regional unemployment. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that those developing countries which sell strategic materials would suffer if there were substantial reductions in military expenditures by the industrialized powers.

The report maintained, however, that no major instability need result from disarmament. Because of the many claimants for the world's scarce resources, those resources released from military expenditure would be absorbed in private consumption and social services. The report cited calculations to show that for a selected group

of strategic materials sold by developing to industrialized countries there was commodity except perhaps bauxite where the impact on sales would have been significant were total military demand transferred proportionately to the various categories of civil demand.

Recognizing that the world's problems would neither automatically nor immediately be solved even if the arms race were to halt, the experts maintained that arms control itself and the diverting of released resources to economic and social development would both serve the cause of world peace and human betterment. Although the arms race was intended to serve the interests of national security and although it has contributed to progress in scientific and technological fields, its extremely harmful effects far outweigh any short-term advantages. In addition to the threat of annihilation of the human species through all-out nuclear war, the arms race consumes resources, material and human, which could otherwise contribute to economic and social development. Military expenditures produce distortions in national economies and social policies, exacerbating international tensions and the arms race endangers world peace and security, raises barriers to international trade and both distorts and hinders the flow of aid from developed to developing countries.

The sooner concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, are achieved, and the arms race thereby halted and reversed, the faster will be the progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. Moreover, a halt in the arms race and significant reduction in military expenditure would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibility of providing additional aid to developing countries.

From these contentions, the Secretary-General's report recommends that a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly those whose military expenditures are highest, should be brought about as soon as possible. The report maintains that all countries, regardless of their size or stage of development, share the responsibility for taking steps to achieve this goal.

This digest of the UN report on the impact of the arms race was prepared by an officer of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

'The cost of war . . . too high a price for spill-over gains through technology'

Canada's stake in the EEC

an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp put the case for development of closer ties by Canada with the enlarged European Economic Community. Mr. Sharp's statement on March 21 marked the start of a series of hearings by the Senate Committee to examine Canada's relations with the EEC. The Minister described the impact of an enlarged EEC:

"In political terms, the entire Atlantic world is going to be affected by this new dynamic Europe which is taking shape before our eyes. Adjustments are going to have to be made in recognition of the new balance which will come about in the Western world. For its part, the United States has long wanted the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden of ensuring their own security. These two tendencies have a cumulative effect on the way the Atlantic Alliance... will work in future. European unity is by no means incompatible with stronger ties with Europe's major partners. Thus, there are problems of adjusting relations as between the Western countries. These require solutions not only for their own sake but also because solidarity in the West is as important as ever in an era of rapidly evolving relations with Eastern Europe.

"As Western relations evolve, it is natural for Canadians to worry over the possibility that tension may develop between Europe and the United States. There is an interaction among relations between the United States and Europe, our own relations with the United States and our relations with Europe. The government's review of foreign policy ought to demonstrate that a policy that attempts to diversify Canada's relations inevitably draws Canada closer to Europe. Equally — as the monetary and trade crisis of last year made us aware — a breakdown in the mechanisms governing relations between the United States and Europe can result in the isolation of Canada in North America..."

Economic impact

The Secretary of State for External Affairs noted that, from the economic point

of view, the new Europe raised equally far-reaching considerations. By 1980, imports of the enlarged EEC from the outside world could climb to \$130 billion. As the world's fourth-largest exporter, Canada must take the Common Market very seriously.

"The ten countries already form what is by far the world's largest trading unit; they imported over \$70-billion worth of goods from the outside world last year. Of these \$70-billion worth, over \$2.7-billion worth came from Canada. This represented 17 per cent of our total exports and about half of our exports outside North America, making the EEC our second-largest trading partner by a considerable margin..."

But Mr. Sharp suggested Canada could do much better:

"We shall have to do much better. Since 1958, Canadian exports to the EEC have increased greatly. They have not, however, kept pace with the increase in total EEC imports from the outside world.

"Our share of those markets has declined. Just as important, our exports to the EEC have not followed the trend in EEC imports toward manufactures and processed goods and away from primary materials and commodities. It is here, particularly in sectors of intensive technology, that we shall have to improve greatly..."

Relations with U.S.

Mr. Sharp emphasized that the prospect of closer economic relations with Europe would not mean any weakening of Canadian ties with the United States:

"... There is nothing in what I've said which could be seen as being in any way 'anti-American'. Nothing I have said is intended to suggest that the closeness of our relations with the United States needs revaluation in the light of possibilities for closer economic relations with Europe..."

"... The EEC, with Great Britain and Ireland, Norway and Denmark, is a developing economic power of great strength and wide-ranging political significance. Canada has much at stake in the Community. Canada has much in common with the Community. And I am convinced both our stake and our common interests will grow."

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July/August 1972

International Perspectives

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Subscription rates: Canada, United States and Mexico, \$3.00 a year, single copies 75 cents; other countries \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Information Canada, 171 Slater Street, Ottawa, Canada. Authorized as second class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.



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Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The dangers of remodelling the UN's security function

Peter Dobell

Now peoples have a stronger faith in the United Nations as a practical instrument for preserving peace than we Canadians. In spite of the expulsion of the Canadian peacekeeping contingent from Gaza, according to a 1970 poll, 64 per cent of our population still favoured the establishment of a permanent United Nations force — admittedly a falling-off from the 80 per cent figure recorded just prior to the expulsion of the United Nations Expeditionary Force (UNEF). The same instinct was affirmed in high rhetoric in the report on United Nations peacekeeping tabled by the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and Defence in June 1970:

"Supporting for peacekeeping has been a principal element in Canada's post-war foreign policy. The need for our continuing and active support for it has not diminished with the passage of time. For Canada now to lose heart, and reduce its interests in peacekeeping would be an abdication of responsibility. No other country could fill the gap thus opened — and the development of effective peacekeeping would be set back with incalculable, but certainly disastrous, effect."

Having twice within a generation been involved in European conflicts they had nothing to provoke, Canadians were ready in 1945 to put their trust in the United Nations. Parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution on March 28 offering support for "the establishment of an effective international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security". A few years later, with the collapse of wartime collaboration between the Soviet Union and the West, Canadians realistically faced up to the need to establish NATO. Even so, that decision was presented as a consequence of the failure of the UN — that is, as an unavoidable alternative, to be jettisoned as soon as the United Nations began successfully to function as a guarantor of security. In April 1948, Louis St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed his historic proposal for a mutual defence system in such terms:

"... Pending the strengthening of the United Nations, we (Canada) should be willing to associate ourselves with other free states in any appropriate collective security arrangement which may be worked out under Articles 51 or 52 of the Charter."

My contention is that there was little chance of the United Nations playing a central security role when it was founded, and that subsequent developments within the organization and in the world now exclude anything more than a peripheral security role for the UN. So that my point of view will not be misunderstood, I want to state clearly that, although the UN's security role may be marginal, it is also inexpensive if contrasted with the cost of modern arms, and I am in no way suggesting that the peacemaking efforts of the UN be curtailed. Likewise, in spite of my assertions, I favour continued efforts by Canada within the Committee of 33 to secure prior agreement on terms of reference for peacekeeping missions — although I think the prospects of success are slight — and I support a continuing Canadian willingness to provide peacekeeping forces whenever needed for UN service, however infrequently such operations may be authorized. Direct challenges to our security being almost non-existent, Canadians can afford to expend some effort on behalf of others beyond our borders. Thus, although

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'Europe has become the model for reconciliation and constructive integration'

I believe that the Canadian Government should persist in working for an improved UN peacekeeping capability, I likewise consider that it should be supported by a realistic public awareness of the limited prospects of the organization. It is with this objective that I intend to assess the UN's achievements and its potential in the tough and sometimes dirty business of maintaining peace and security.

Two basic facts regarding the postwar world have to be digested: first, the impressive number of armed conflicts that have occurred since 1945 (David Wood had by 1968 counted some 80 such conflicts); and secondly, the armed peace that has prevailed in Central Europe in the same period. Although the world is still a place of violence, Europe, which has spawned within a generation the two most devastating wars of human history, is not only at peace but has become the model, even the inspiration, for reconciliation and constructive integration.

Why has peace prevailed in Europe, in spite of the persistence of the greatest peacetime military confrontation ever recorded? The usual explanation, presented by George Ball among others in the July 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, is:

"We maintain the peace by preserving a precarious balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union. . . . It is the preservation of that balance which . . . is the central guiding principle of American foreign policy."

This kind of analysis, with its analogies to the nineteenth century Concert of Europe, has now been brilliantly challenged in a remarkable book by Coral Bell entitled *The Conventions of Crisis*. She writes:

"It is not a *balance* of power (in the sense of an equality) which preserves peace: it is a solid preponderance of power on the side of the *status quo* coalition, formal or informal."

This assessment is supported by a most stimulating examination of diplomatic relations between the great powers. Among the additional factors Dr. Bell believes have contributed to the absence of great-power conflict are these:

- (1) The exchange of hostages each side achieves through the capability of its nuclear-strike forces to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary;
- (2) new methods of surveillance, supplementing traditional methods of espionage, which assure a high level of knowledge of the adversary's forces and virtually rule out the risk of strategic surprise;
- (3) what Coral Bell calls "common strategic analogy". (What a paradox that

the nation states of Europe at the end of the last century, sharing common social systems and economic doctrines, had less mutual understanding and strategic relationships than do the United States and the U.S.S.R. A most encouraging observation to be derived from President Nixon's experience in China is that the Chinese leadership seems, if anything, more able than the Russians to appreciate benefits of limited compromise with the United States where the risk of nuclear war is involved.)

Security through crises

Coral Bell's principal theme is the highly-sophisticated security system that has grown between the nuclear powers and their allies. It has, in fact, been gradually developed through the experience of postwar crises. This involves increasingly implicit acceptance of the notion of strategic spheres of influence. Never has this approach been put more directly than by President Nixon in defending his decision to mine the coast of North Vietnam:

"I particularly want to address my comments tonight to the Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as a great power. We recognize the right of the Soviet Union to defend its interests when they are threatened. The Soviet Union, in turn, must recognize our right to defend our interests. . . . We expect you to keep your allies and you cannot expect us to do otherwise than continue to keep our allies. But let us and let all great powers, keep our allies only for the purpose of their defence — not for the purpose of launching invasion against their neighbours. Otherwise the cause of peace, the cause in which we have so great a stake, will be seriously jeopardized."

Compare this with the rollback rhetoric that Nixon himself and John F. Dulles had used 15 years earlier, and you will once prompted a commentator to observe of Dulles that his assertions should have been taken "with a whole warehouse full of salt". In the past, for example, when Hungary was invaded, the United States protested loudly, but recognized in practice a Soviet sphere of influence. Now the United States has accepted openly a divided world. Nor is this new reality limited to the United States. Chancellor Willy Brandt's great achievement has been to bring Germans to accept publicly the division of their country into two states.

This description of international politics suggests a world divided into spheres of influence. This is only a partial truth. Large parts of the world lie outside

per-power's control. Even so-called
ent states may decline to take directions
m their protector, although the pro-
ting state may, in turn, disengage by
using in specific instances to provide
clear back-up. Thus China's decision to
opt the nuclear option probably flowed
m a Soviet refusal to support their at-
tempt in 1958 to take over Quemoy and
atsu.

This situation points to the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons as the main new
factor that has caused the nuclear powers
step back from direct conflict with one
another. However, where nuclear con-
tention is not involved, local conflict
can still occur. Hence, Kashmir has been a
region of intermittent battle for 23 years,
between Berlin and the East German bor-
der have not. There remains the tricky
problem of handling situations of indirect
confrontation such as Vietnam. Compare
the Soviet attitude in 1960, when shooting
down an unarmed U-2 led to the cancella-
tion of President Eisenhower's visit to the
U.S.S.R., with the Soviet acceptance of
President Nixon's visit to Moscow within
three weeks of ordering the mining of
Haiphong harbour. Is this not a demon-
stration of the degree to which both sides
have adopted the "limited adversary" ap-
proach? With specific reference to Viet-
nam, the extent to which the Americans
have consistently assessed correctly how
far they could push the Russians and
Chinese without their feeling obliged to
act in self-defence is surprising. At the
same time, they have consistently under-
estimated the determination of the North
Vietnamese. Can it be that great powers
understand each other's reactions better
than they do those of smaller nations?

Inis Claude, in a perceptive assessment
titled *The Changing Nature and Role of
the United Nations*, has written: "In con-
siderable measure the UN has served as
the registrar of prudential pacifism, the
depository for ratifications of the proposi-
tion that war has become excessively dan-
gerous business". This cautious opinion
was expressed in 1964, at a time when the
United Nations was at the summit of its
peace-making achievements.

United Nations settlement role

Although the Congo force was the most
ambitious and costly of the UN's peace-
keeping operations, the high point of its
contribution to the preservation of world
peace was, in my judgment, its inconspic-
uous but critical role of facilitating a set-
tlement of the Cuban crisis of 1962. The
Secretary-General's appeal, prompted by
a group of non-aligned nations, to the two

super-powers to stand down provided
Nikita Khrushchov with an opening for a
conciliatory reply indicating a desire to
find a solution. Subsequently, the UN head-
quarters provided neutral ground for the
Kusnetsov-Stevenson talks, which worked
out the final compromise settlement.

This important facility in moderating
a major East-West crisis stands in splendid
isolation. Article 107 of the Charter has in
practice been used to justify the exclusion
of the UN from consideration of the Berlin
and German problems and the efforts of
successive Secretaries-General to mediate
the Vietnam conflict have consistently been
rebuffed by the participants. Some had
thought the admission of the People's Re-
public of China would open Vietnam for
UN consideration, but Secretary-General
Kurt Waldheim's offer of his good offices,
first made early in April, fell as flat as the
efforts of his predecessor. It is true that,
in earlier years, the United States had
taken the Vietnam question to the Security
Council, but this had been done to under-
mine domestic critics pressing for UN in-
volvement, in the full knowledge that the
Security Council would fail to reach any
decision. This kind of action weakened
rather than strengthened the UN, and il-
lustrates why an uninformed and idealistic
public can be a harmful influence.

Boycott on Korea

In the early days of the Cold War, when
the Soviet Union was always in the min-
ority at the UN, it experimented briefly
with a boycott of the Security Council.
The stratagem was a disaster, in that it
freed the Council to approve a UN cover
for operations in Korea in 1950. Ironically,
this use of the UN against a Soviet interest
convinced them that — whatever the dis-
comfort — they had to participate in the
organization in order to use the powers
granted them in the Charter to protect
themselves. It also explains why no further
Korean-type operation is conceivable. Thus
they persevered through a decade, a decade
in which the Soviet veto was circumvented
by taking issues to the General Assembly
under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.
But, with the loss of their majority in the
1960s, the Western nations have increas-
ingly come to share the Soviet view of the
Council as an instrument to protect their
interests. As a result, the "Uniting for
Peace" procedure, as a device for seeking
General Assembly authority for peace-
keeping missions, has been allowed to lapse.

The United Nations has, not surpris-
ingly, a more impressive record in mod-
erating conflicts in which the great powers
have not been centrally involved. UN as-

*Soviet convinced
of need to use
powers of Charter*

sistance in these situations has ranged from mediation through the provision of lightly-armed forces to support ceasefire agreements. All have required the assent of the host country; no coercion has been involved.

It is instructive to divide these various operations into five-year periods according to the dates of their establishment. Four observer missions had been set up by 1950. Nothing happened during the next five years. Three operations were established between 1956 and 1960, and four more in the next five years. Since 1966, no new activities have been approved or even formally proposed.

These peacekeeping missions have all involved one of four regions or activities: three covered the withdrawal of a former colonial power; four have occurred in the Middle East, two in the Indian subcontinent and two in the Eastern Mediterranean. Peacekeeping operations in colonial situations have arisen only when the Western nations were prepared to have the UN involved; sometimes the United States has even forced the pace, as it did over West New Guinea. But interested Western nations have since used the veto if necessary to prevent UN involvement when serious conflict could be expected, namely over Rhodesia and South Africa.

The Middle East is a special situation for several reasons: the UN's responsibility for the creation of Israel; the personal involvement of Dag Hammarskjöld in preventive diplomacy in that area; the reputation he established there; and, finally, because the great powers are desperate for any instrument to control that powder keg. In spite of Egypt's expulsion of UNEF, the Middle East remains the most likely area of future UN peacekeeping activity. The same cannot be said of the Indian subcontinent. Previous Indian sympathy and support for UN peacekeeping efforts have been largely destroyed by their frustration over what they regarded as the UN's ineffectiveness in preventing Pakistani military activities in Bangladesh and the attendant refugee problem.

The UN's exclusion from all recent major conflicts — Biafra, the Sudan, Bangladesh and Northern Ireland — has generally been interpreted as proof of the organization's ineffectiveness. Some attribute this situation to the UN's relative lack of success in those operations it did organize, success being measured in terms of some kind of resolution of the problem that caused the conflict. This seems to me to be a rather superficial assessment. Seven of the 11 situations in which UN missions operated were successfully resolved by one

means or another. Only the unsuccessful operations drag on — in Cyprus, Kashmir and the Middle East. The fourth, UN Truce Supervision in 1967 even though its establishment in 1956 was brilliant and highly constructive achievement. Little wonder, therefore, that an impression of failure prevails.

Congo operation

The United Nations force in the Belgian Congo was the most successful operation in terms of local achievement by the UN. The force initially prevented direct Soviet support to Prime Minister Lumumba, thereby forestalling a direct great-power confrontation in Africa — and, after five years of confused conflict, conducted a military operation that defeated the secessionist movement in Katanga. Thus the Congo owes its unity to the United Nations. But the cost to the organization in every respect was so great that success can best be regarded as a Pyrrhic victory. Debts were built up that, in spite of some dubious financing experiments, still weigh down the organization. Defeat of the position of the Western nations on Article 19 established the principle that payment for peacekeeping operations could not be by assessment — a principle which I personally am happy to see confirmed. The dependence and initiative of the Secretariat General were drastically curtailed, and Dag Hammarskjöld lost his life in the crisis. Even more important, the idealism of the newly independent Third World nations toward UN peacekeeping was blighted in the four years of constant bickering and struggle within UN headquarters over the direction and financing of the operation, and, when some of the more radical Arab states tried to end it, they found they could not. I consider it significant that peacekeeping operations have been improved since the final winding-up of the Congo operation.

The Cyprus force has been on station for over eight years. It has done a superb job of keeping the peace in a situation where civil war constantly threatened. Measured by what it has prevented, both on the island and in keeping Greece and Turkey from being drawn into the local conflict, this UN operation is worth every dollar it has cost. However, even these successes have required, in addition to the UN's own efforts, the vigorous intercession on three occasions of very senior officials backed by the Sixth Fleet. Moreover, the local political conflict seems to have no nearer resolution than when the force was established. Critics who say that the UN should engage in peace-restoring

*Middle East
remains
most likely area
for future venture
in peacekeeping*

that a mediator was initially appointed for this purpose. Galo Plaza took his task seriously, and after about a year of study mediation issued a report. It was immediately attacked by the Turkish community, and that effort suffered a setback

from which it has never recovered.

Assessing the significance of UN peacekeeping missions, Coral Bell observed that they had "been an essential element in the success of what may be called the 'tidying-up' phase of many a crisis". "Yet", she

The following is a list of United Nations peacekeeping missions. These include operations involving observers serving in a supervisory role and those involving the employment of armed forces interposed between disputants to a conflict:

UNSCOB: 1947-51; observers in Greece to report on intervention from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria; terminated soon after Yugoslavia's decision to cease support of the Greek insurgents brought an end to the conflict.

UNCI: 1949-50; observers to supervise the cessation of hostilities between Indonesia and the Netherlands; successfully assisted in the transfers of sovereignty to Indonesia.

UNMOGIP: 1949 to the present; observers in Kashmir to supervise the local cease-fire; has exercised some moderating influence, but has not prevented periodic incidents and even battles along the cease-fire line.

UNTSO: 1949 to the present; observers in Jordan and Syria and now informally extended to Lebanon; has not prevented two major wars and constant border raids, but has exercised some moderating influence on this most explosive and multi-faceted conflict.

UNEF: 1956-67; a force of several thousand men that successfully carried out patrols to control the cease-fire line in Gaza for 11 years until its expulsion by the U.A.R. Israel had never allowed UNEF to operate on territory under its control.

UNOGIL: 1958; a short-lived observer mission that, in effect, covered the landing of U.S. marines and subsequently suc-

cessful U.S. mediation to maintain unity in Lebanon.

ONUC: 1960-65; a force amounting at one time to 20,000 men, which ultimately conducted a military operation that defeated the secessionist movement in Katanga and restored unity to the Congo.

UNTEA: 1962; achieved its objective of covering Dutch withdrawal from Dutch New Guinea in seven months. There was token endorsement in 1969 of the process of consultation of the Papuans, although this was regarded as an act of expediency.

UNYOM: 1963-64; a small force acting as observers in Yemen, paid for by the two antagonists, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. Fighting continued after the force was withdrawn until Saudi Arabia gave up supporting the royalists and the republicans established overall control.

UNFICYP: 1964 to the present; a force of a few thousand men, now reduced in size, which has, under difficult conditions, effectively preserved the ceasefire between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus. The UN's mediation efforts have achieved no conspicuous success.

UNIPOM: 1965-66; an observer team set up for the Indo-Pakistan frontier (as distinct from the cease-fire line in Kashmir, already manned by UNMOGIP) after frequent military attacks on each other's territories. It owed its speedy success to Soviet mediation at the highest levels in Tashkent.

*No new operations
will be established
without tolerance
of great powers*

continued, "when the UN role is examined more closely in particular crisis situations, it will be seen very often to consist of conferring legitimacy on crisis management by the great powers." I consider this to be an accurate assessment. Operations that have achieved success have often owed it to parallel activity by a great power, such as Soviet mediation of the India-Pakistan conflict in Tashkent, or U.S. promotion of a political settlement in Lebanon in 1958. Now that the Security Council is again acting as the primary UN organ competent to authorize peacekeeping missions, it follows that no new operations will be established unless the great powers look with favour — or at least tolerance — on them. Seen in these terms, involvement in peacekeeping operations is almost a surrogate alliance role. Canada has been acceptable because of, rather than in spite of, its NATO membership, although trust and respect beyond the alliance have also been important.

Inis Claude has pointed out that "the United Nations has no purposes and *can* have none — of its own." "it is a *tool*," he said, "and like other tools, it has possibilities and limitations, but not purposes." Comparing the UN to a hammer whose handle competitors seek to take hold of, each for its own purposes, he noted a "struggle to decide whose purposes will be served by the UN".

Limited in mediation

This lack of independent power greatly limits the UN's capacity for mediation. While an industrial mediator is backed up ultimately by the power of the state, UN mediators dispose of no autonomous powers. I have already noted that Galo Plaza's utility ended once he had taken a public position on Cypriot problems. To avoid similar rejection, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring refrained for four years, until his memorandum of February 1971, from taking a public position on any matter of controversy between Arabs and Israelis. Egypt's favourable reaction to his 1971 memorandum may have ended his acceptability to Israel. If so, how great is his utility now as a mediator?

In its early days especially, the United Nations had a moral authority that to some degree compensated for its lack of power. This has been important because, the Congo force excepted, no UN mission has ever had the kind of strength that would enable it actually to prevent conflict between determined local adversaries. In addition to having good communications and an ability to talk to both sides, these UN missions have also sought to exploit their

symbolic significance to prevent incidents from getting out of hand. In Gaza, it was perhaps fortunate that Canadian forces were expelled when they were. Had they remained, they would have been caught in crossfire like the remaining UN contingents and, lacking the means to defend themselves in a full-scale battle, would probably have suffered casualties. The position of the British in Northern Ireland is a frightening example of the limitations of an intermediate military force. A larger force might have done better for a few weeks. But, as the mystique wears off, which has long since happened in the Middle East and Kashmir, their ability to deter conflict declines. The one advantage that remains is international publicity.

The great powers have, of course, never relied on the United Nations for their security. But most of the states that recently acquired independence turned initially to put their faith in the UN. However, these days have passed; and the developing world is now arming, much faster relatively than the great powers, though naturally in absolute terms their arms supplies are miniscule. In the nine years, only seven nations have reduced their military budgets in absolute terms (and of these Canada is the largest state to do so). By contrast, some 100 nations, mainly Third World countries, have increased their military budgets by an average rate of 11 per cent a year. This phenomenon naturally varies with the security threat as perceived by each country. India has in recent years increased its defence expenditures to more than 3 per cent of limited gross national product and figures for Egypt and Israel in 1970 were at the alarmingly high rate of 19½ per cent and 26½ per cent respectively.

Colonial vestiges

Tensions in the Third World have been aggravated by anomalies inherited from their colonial past — especially unnatural frontiers. In addition, there is the constant and natural process of adjustment to changes in the local disposition of power, resulting in recent years primarily from the withdrawal of the protecting colonial nations. An illustration of this process followed from Britain's decision in 1967 to withdraw its military presence from the Suez Canal. In 1971, just as Britain divested itself of its last defence commitment in the Persian Gulf, Iran occupied the Trucial Islands, formerly held by one of the Trucial Sheikdoms supported by Britain in order to reinforce its position as the strongest power in the region. Increasingly, India has begun to act in the sub-

nt as the primary regional power, which
s. Should the United States, frustrated
its Vietnam experience, withdraw its
ces from other parts of the world, one
ld anticipate a series of regional con-
ts and military operation as local forces
ght to adjust to the new constellation of
ces.

Some have suggested that the UN
ould anticipate these troubles and take
eventive action. This sounds prudent and
se, but how could it be done? The UN
not act without authority; and the Se-
curity Council is unlikely to authorize
tion until a crisis develops. This leaves
y the possibility of a personal diplo-
matic initiative by the Secretary-General,
d here the individual qualities of the
n can vary greatly. Hammarskjöld was
subtle and resourceful diplomat, and U
ant was not, so that during the latter's
ure of office the possibility of preven-
e UN diplomacy scarcely existed. In any
se, have outsiders — even the United Na-
ns — the right to intervene in a situa-
n that may or may not lead to tension
d conflict? To be specific, an impartial
eign observer looking at the Quebec
uation might conclude that trouble
ght erupt within a decade. To suggest
e least offensive possibility, how would
e Canadians have reacted if the Secre-
ry-General, when receiving his honour-
degree from Carleton University in
e May, had warned of trouble and of-
red good offices. In fact, I see no prospect
any action in such situations until con-
ct actually threatens.

Apart from any action the Security
ouncil may or may not take once conflict
curs, holding a debate in the Council un-
oubtedly has some dampening effect. The
orld publicity generated by the debate on
e Hungarian invasion in 1956 inhibited
viet conduct and increased the cost of a
milar intervention in future. The United
ates was likewise affected by the unfav-
ourable publicity over the landing of
ces in the Dominican Republic. Finally,
e opportunity to let off steam acts as a
mestic safety-valve, reducing internal
essures for more drastic and dangerous
ion that are always generated at such
oments of international tensions.

Questioning reforms

dedicated supporters of Charter reform,
cluding the World Federalist Move-
ent, advocate giving the United Nations
e effective security capacity by measures
ch as the elimination of the veto, a per-
manent UN force, etc. Not only do I see no
spect of such reforms being agreed to;
question whether they are desirable. It

is true that, in the early days, the UN was
more active, but it could afford to be be-
cause its membership was limited to the
victorious states. With the Soviet Union in
a continuing minority position, the United
States acted in effect as a majority leader
and gave the organization certain purpose
and direction. With the admission of 16
nations in 1955 — a move which Canada
led — this arrangement began to collapse.
The United States lost its dependable ma-
jority once the newly independent nations
began entering the UN in numbers after
1960, and with this development the or-
ganization lost that particular sense of
direction achieved in an earlier phase.

OAS used power

Canadians, more readily than most other
people, support proposals for giving the
UN autonomous power because the or-
ganization has never in any vital matter
acted against Canada's interests. But we
should stop to think of what is being ad-
vocated. Only one international organiza-
tion providing for the use of force, includ-
ing economic sanctions, by majority de-
cision has actually used that power — the
Organization of American States. It was
under the provisions of the Treaty of Rio
that United States forces were landed in
the Dominican Republic. The Canadian
Government, when considering the pos-
sibility of seeking membership in the OAS,
decided against doing so in view of the
"potential obligation to apply political eco-
nomic sanctions against any other country
by virtue of an affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the members".

This was a correct decision so far as
OAS membership was concerned. At the
level of the United Nations, the proper use
of military force implies a centralized po-
litical direction that does not now exist and
is hardly even conceivable within a cen-
tury. Canadians should find it easier than
most to understand the problem; we are
having enough trouble trying to hold our
own federation together. How would it be
in a world federation? The OAS can — in
spite of difficulty — take decisions by ma-
jority because of the dominant presence of
the United States. As long as there are
rival super-powers in the United Nations,
this possibility is not politically feasible.

The more the UN becomes a genuinely
world organization, the more important
the veto becomes, as a necessary device to
permit its continued functioning. Inis
Claude brilliantly illustrated the impor-
tance of the veto: "(It) was not intended
not to be used, but to function, in the man-
ner of a fuse in an electrical circuit, as a
safety device to stop action whenever the

*'Proper use of
military force
implies centralized
political direction'*

heat of opposition might threaten otherwise to start a conflagration (within the organization)." Reformers of the Charter want to remove the fuse. If they were allowed to do so, they might destroy the UN as a world organization, and it would then become another regional organization dominated by one or other of the great powers, and serving the interests of that power and its allies.

Intervention questioned

Now let me introduce another heresy. Would UN intervention in Biafra and Bangladesh to stop the fighting have produced long-run benefits? Even assuming successes of the kind achieved in Cyprus, would the balance of advantage have rested with an operation intended to stop the fighting and, in effect, preserve the *status quo*? Even on the matter of relief, where a good case can be made, Hugh Winsor — a Canadian journalist who had strongly advocated international relief for Biafra — reluctantly acknowledged, in a recent review of John de St. Jorre's *The Nigerian Civil War*, "that the net effect of the massive relief operation was to prolong the war and increase the total suffering". What, of course, has surprised everyone in Biafra has been that, in spite of the famine and fighting, it proved possible to reconcile Biafra and the rest of the country so quickly. Obviously, with the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that any measure that delayed a military settlement increased rather than diminished human suffering.

An even stronger case can be made out for non-involvement in Bangladesh. Suppose the UN had been patrolling India's Eastern border; this might have inhibited the military solution achieved through Indian intervention. If so, India would have been left coping with 10 million refugees and fighting would have dragged on in Bangladesh between West Pakistani regulars and the Mukti Bahini. Now the refugee problem has been largely resolved and fighting has ended with minimal casualties. India has also benefited from a secure Eastern border, so that it can afford to reduce its high level of military expenditure and devote more resources to

internal development. Perhaps even Pakistan is better off as a consolidated and united state of 60 million people. Therefore, instead of lamenting the non-recourse to the United Nations in these two conflicts, I see actual benefit.

I can reach these conclusions without anguish because I believe there are other activities in which the UN has a necessary role to play, as our only general, and almost universal, world organization. The business of the UN is increasingly to find common ground for international action — on the control of the sea and continental shelves, on pollution, on disarmament, on international trade, on better aid. The more the UN becomes a world organization, the better it can contribute to the reconciliation of these issues; and at the same time, the less it can serve as an instrument for promoting security, even if it retains a peripheral role that may occasionally have great importance. So, say, do not try to remodel the United Nations into a security organization. For, if you succeed, you will weaken its capacity to act as an instrument for promoting a broader world order.

'Possibility of justice'

This argument is open to the challenge that the system on which the central post-war peace has been built involves the perpetration of some injustice. Michael Howard, in an article in the April issue of *Europe's counter*, postulates an imaginary conversation with a young idealist who cries out to his elders: "Do you realize what you are doing?" To which he has the elder reply: "Yes, unfortunately we do." For, in Howard's view, "the system of international stability which we have constructed since the war *does* involve the acceptance of necessary injustice". Coral Bell notes the same point, apropos of Munich: "often happens in international politics, a moral impulse (to remedy the injustice of the Versailles settlement) had disastrous consequences." All of which led her to the unexciting but surely wise conclusion that "evolving the conventions which sustain the order (or at least reduce the most damaging forms of disorder) opens one's way toward the possibility of justice".

In the span between 1957-58 and 1967-68, Canada contributed \$5.04 million in support of UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Between 1906-61 and 1964-65, Can-

ada provided another \$10.18 million in support of UN operations in the Congo for peacekeeping, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Contributions to both operations were assessed by the UN General Assembly.

Warning from Waldheim . . .

Some analysts of the United Nations structure and its potential for dealing with the world's problems have decried the tendency of member states to relegate the UN to the periphery of major events and crises. But this theme has acquired a new impetus in the wake of the India-Pakistan conflict and the latest developments in the Vietnam war.

On his visit to Canada late in May, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim drew attention to what he described as an alarming trend "toward bypassing the methods of settling disputes offered by the UN Charter. Instead, he said in a convocation address at Carleton University, governments often seem to prefer to settle their problems "either through secret diplomacy or even by force".

Mr. Waldheim said it was fashionable in some quarters to "express contempt for the world organization set up by the victorious powers of World War II to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'".

The Secretary-General continued: "What is the reason for this reversion? The United Nations machinery, cumbersome and long-winded as it sometimes is, tends at the end to re-establish communication and to reduce tension and risk in a conflict situation. The process of secret diplomacy, on the other hand, contains elements which easily lead to misunderstanding and which tend to disregard the general interests of all members of the international community in peace. The world at large has paid dearly for such misunderstandings in this century.

"I do not say that United Nations peacekeeping or the procedures of the Security Council are by themselves adequate to solve the international conflicts of our time. I do say, however, that they point in a far more promising direction than the methods of the past, which have produced wholesale disaster twice in this century. But the United Nations will not fulfill its promise until governments decide to use it in the way it was intended to be used.

"There is also a tendency at present to deride the United Nations as a weak and ineffective political organization which is no match for the guile and superior wealth and wisdom of powerful sovereign states. And yet it was the great powers brought



Canadian Press photo

During his visit to Ottawa, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim conferred with External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp and had talks with Prime Minister Trudeau. They reviewed international problems, including the Vietnam conflict and specific UN issues such as the world body's financial situation. The Secretary-General (right) is shown with Mr. Sharp and Mrs. Waldheim as he signs the guest book on his arrival at Canadian Forces Base Uplands.

face to face with reality in six years of total war that took the lead in setting up the United Nations and that pioneered its system of conciliation, negotiation, disarmament and collective security. . . ."

Mr. Waldheim recalled that, ten years ago, in the Cuban missile crisis — regarded by many as the most potentially dangerous international confrontation since the Second World War — , the UN Security Council was very soon involved by the parties themselves. They recognized that the situation threatened not only the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union but also the peace of the world at large. "Greatly to the credit of all concerned," he said, "the Security Council and the Acting Secretary-General played a major role in assisting the two great powers involved to put an end to the crisis."

But ten years later, the Secretary-General said, the situation seems different: "Last year a war between two of the larger members of the United Nations, India and Pakistan, took place in spite of all the efforts of my predecessor, for months in advance, to involve the United Nations in a peacemaking role and to assist the parties to avoid a military conflict. In recent weeks, the world has watched with anguish and anxiety the raising of the stakes and the escalation of military activity in Vietnam. Although this is one of history's longer and bloodier wars, the United Nations Security Council has never become effectively involved in an attempt to find a settlement. Now that the war is more violent and more dangerous than ever, there appears to be even less likelihood of the involvement of the Security Council or of the peacemaking possibilities of the Charter"

In a press conference in Ottawa on May 24, the Secretary-General referred specifically to his proffer of the good offices of the UN to the parties in the Vietnam conflict. He said the UN could not force permanent members of the Security Council to do something and the UN Secretary-General had no executive power. But there were possibilities of being helpful.

In his convocation address, Mr. Waldheim noted that UN peacekeeping had served well in many parts of the world, especially in filling the power vacuums that resulted in some areas from the process of decolonization.

"Peacekeeping has always been to a large extent an improvised affair and it is in every sense a voluntary activity," he said. "Host governments voluntarily accept peacekeeping operations on their territory; troops are voluntarily provided by other governments; and United Nations

peacekeeping succeeds to the extent that the conflicting parties voluntarily refrain from using force.

"The peacekeeping technique still plays a very useful role, for example in Cyprus, as a guarantee to all parties and as a helpful and calming presence. The recent stationing of United Nations observers in southern Lebanon is a good example of the use of United Nations military personnel to decrease tension in a critical area."

Peacekeeping has its limitations and long-term disadvantages, the Secretary-General made clear. The voluntary nature of the peacekeeping technique limits its application to areas where the conflicting parties are prepared voluntarily to exercise great restraint. In addition, although it has proved in some situations a valuable method of stopping actual fighting and reducing tension, "it has also had a certain tendency to freeze situations rather than to provide incentives or methods for achieving a basic settlement of fundamental issues".

The Secretary-General concluded, therefore, that it was highly important that, in future, *peacekeeping* should be complemented by more effective methods of *peacemaking*.

"It is important to remember also that the improvised technique of United Nations peacekeeping, effective though it has been in a number of crucial situations in the past, is historically at best an emergency stopgap until the wider aims of the Charter can be realized. Only when disarmament becomes a reality and when all nations decide to give the United Nations Charter a real chance in the field of international co-operation and security shall we see a really significant advance toward a reliable system of world order and world peace."

"The practice of peacekeeping . . . has persisted over 20 years. It has now reached a plateau where it may become lodged and atrophy or from which it may move forward and be renewed, beginning a new chapter in international efforts at conflict control. . . ."

"Those conditions which gave rise to peacekeeping after the Second World War — decolonization and the ensuing discord — will not, in all likelihood, be repeated in the same manner. . . . But conflict will certainly occur, and it is erroneous to believe that peacekeeping was an adaptation only to those kinds of conflict generated by the

retirement of imperial powers and the birth-pangs of fledgling states. Responding to conflicts which threaten the peace, the United Nations evolved peacekeeping as a substitute when faced with inability of the Security Council to enforce the peace under the authority granted it by the Charter. The challenge now is to reconcile these two methods of preserving peace. . . ."

(Henry Wiseman, in his study of peacekeeping for the Behind the Headlines series, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, February 1972)

The long, frustrating quest for a peacekeeping formula

by Murray Goldblatt

The concept of United Nations peacekeeping to assist in the settlement of conflicts by interposing disinterested forces or observers has been applied in a series of missions since the inception of the world body. But there has been no overall agreement on the future form of UN peacekeeping machinery. Instead, the long and frustrating quest for such an agreement on the institutional and practical procedures governing UN peacekeeping operations continues.

The latest phase in this search began in 1965, when the UN General Assembly authorized the establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations — known in UN nomenclature as the Committee of 33. Its assignment was to undertake "a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the organization".

For the first three years, the Committee of 33 made almost no progress. Then, in 1968, it decided to set up a small Working Group composed of eight members chosen from the committee. The Working Group was made up of four big powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France — and four middle powers — Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico and Egypt. This Working Group took as the first model in its program a study of UN military observer missions in an effort to draft accepted procedures under which they could function. This type of mission — known as Model 1 — was distinct from larger-scale operations involving troop contingents (Model 2). There was agreement in the Working Group that both models would concern only those operations authorized and established by the Security Council. As Henry Wiseman of the University of Guelph noted in his recent study of the subject, this set to one side the question of the "residual authority of the General Assembly with regard to all phases of observation and peacekeeping".

Once reference material on previous

UN military observer missions had been prepared, the Working Group got down to serious study of Model 1 in early 1969. The result of the Working Group's deliberations in the balance of that year was agreement on a partial draft of Model 1 — the model dealing with observer missions. There was provisional agreement on five of eight proposed chapters in the model, but basic questions remained unresolved — and it should be remembered that final agreement on any one of the chapters was dependent on an accord covering the complete text of all eight.

Progress in the Working Group was confined to provisional agreement on such questions as the Security Council's authority to fix the approximate length of the peacekeeping mandate; organization, function and deployment of observer missions; operating procedures such as those for patrols and fixed observation posts; equipment, facilities and services for the mission; and administrative matters.

Split on basics

Basic questions on which there was no agreement included these:

- Establishment, direction and control of the mission, involving the respective responsibilities of the Security Council and the Secretary-General;
- role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council's Military Staff Committee in day-to-day control of peacekeeping operations;
- method of financing peacekeeping operations.

The Working Group also failed to achieve a consensus on a number of related matters, such as the procedure for appointment of a commander for the mission and the legal arrangements that would govern relations between the UN and the host country.

At this stage, the impasse on key questions could be traced to a disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the fundamental issue of control

*Failure to achieve
accord in five years
prompted voices
of dissatisfaction*

and direction of peacekeeping operations. The United States envisaged the Secretary-General in the primary role, while the U.S.S.R. maintained that control and direction should remain in the hands of the Secretary Council.

The Committee of 33 and its eight-power Working Group registered no further progress in meetings during 1970. In its report to the UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee in the autumn of 1970, the Committee of 33 noted it had been unable to continue the "encouraging" progress reported for the previous year. But it recommended its mandate be renewed and suggested continued negotiations in the Working Group offered the best available way of reaching agreement.

During general debate on the question, some delegations expressed dissatisfaction with the failure to report agreement on the essentials of a model for military observer missions — to say nothing of larger scale peacekeeping operations — five years after the appointment of the Committee of 33. In particular, some delegations drew attention to the failure to deal effectively with the problems of financing peacekeeping initiatives.

Kuwait introduced a resolution calling for establishment of a peacekeeping fund to be financed by compulsory contributions and placed at the disposal of the Security Council. But a majority of member states considered this proposal premature, arguing that it was impractical to try to resolve financial difficulties while the essential political obstacles to an acceptable approach on peacekeeping remained to be overcome. The UN Assembly set aside the Kuwait proposal and unanimously adopted instead a resolution introduced by members of the Working Group; this called for a study of Kuwait's plan and other proposals by the Committee of 33 and intensification of the work of the Committee in order to complete Model 1 by May 1, 1971. If that was not possible, the Committee was to "re-examine its methods" in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate before the convening of the twenty-sixth Assembly session in the fall of 1971.

No progress in '71

But 1971 was in effect a re-run of the previous year. The Committee of 33 reported that it had been unable to fulfil its mandate; no progress had been made toward achievement of agreed guidelines for peacekeeping operations. The Committee, however, recommended a "renewed collective effort to break the deadlock".

In response to this recommendation, the Committee's mandate was again re-

newed by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session through adoption of a resolution on December 17, 1971, noting the need to reach agreement on the nature of UN peacekeeping operations. The resolution recommended the submission of quarterly reports to the Committee of 33 by the Working Group and requested member states to provide the Committee before mid-March of 1972 with any views or suggestions on the overall subject. In mid-January, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim drew special attention to the request in transmitting the text of the resolution to member nations.

Despite the repeated failure of the Committee or its Working Group to make progress toward fulfilling its mandate in 1970 and 1971, the General Assembly was obviously prepared to adopt an attitude of forbearance on this issue. This attitude was a reflection of a number of elements. There was an appreciation in the General Assembly that the dispute on the nature of peacekeeping operations involved a fundamental question of interpretation of the UN Charter. Secondly, the pressure for some solution to the issue had eased; there was no early prospect of a new peacekeeping mission and therefore no sense of urgency surrounding the debate. Finally, the conflict in the Committee of 33 represented an open clash between the views of the United States and the Soviet Union; other member states were reluctant to force a direct confrontation on the question.

Adoption of the resolution at the twenty-sixth Assembly last fall did not produce any immediate results in the committee, and, in fact, the Working Group itself, as of mid-June, had not met in 1971. As part of an effort to revitalize its work on liberations, the Committee decided in July to enlarge the eight-power Working Group and broaden its representation. The Committee's Bureau, originally consisting of Mexico, Canada, Czechoslovakia and Egypt, was expanded to six nations and the Working Group, including Bureau members, to a new total of 13 instead of 8 countries. The Bureau — executive arm of the Committee of 33 — will include Nigeria as chairman; Canada, Czechoslovakia, Brazil and Japan as vice-chairmen; and Egypt continuing as *rapporteur*. The enlarged Working Group will embrace these Bureau members, the original four big powers (the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France) and three additional states: Argentina, India and Pakistan.

Although by mid-year the Committee had achieved little apart from this reorganization, there has been a respons-

the General Assembly's request for the views of member states. Submissions have been received from the United States and the U.S.S.R. — key participants in the prolonged discussions — as well as from 14 other countries.

As already noted, Canada has been a member of the Committee of 33 from its inception and of the eight-nation Working Group. In that capacity, Canada did submit a detailed memorandum on the facilities, services and personnel that member states might provide for UN standby forces and observer missions. This was followed by a working paper in March 1969 containing Canada's proposals dealing with prior agreement on certain recognition procedures to be employed by the UN and member nations after a peacekeeping operation had been authorized. The Canadian proposals also set out guidelines for selection of a force commander, strength and composition of a UN force, standing operating procedures and training. Canada's position on the entire range of issues involved in peacekeeping machinery has been in process of being re-examined.

S.-Soviet plans

Both the U.S. and Soviet positions, set out in their submissions to the Committee of 33, represent some modification of earlier approaches. The United States had originally conceived of a framework for peacekeeping in which the Secretary-General would have full authority. The Soviet Union had striven to endow the Security Council with sole executive power at each stage of the operation. But, in the submissions of March and April of this year, each super-power had moved from the position assumed in 1968-69.

The U.S. plan still vests the Secretary-General with actual control and direction of the operation after it has been authorized by the Security Council. But it proposes creation of a new consultative body — an advisory subcommittee to be established by the Security Council in line with the UN Charter's Article 29 ("The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions"). This subcommittee would include permanent members of the Council (the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, Britain and France) and representatives of nations contributing troops, personnel and facilities to the operation.

Under the U.S. plan, the subcommittee would hold a "watching brief" over conduct of the operation on behalf of the Security Council. The subcommittee would provide continuing consultation and ad-

vice to the Secretary-General on key operational matters. But the subcommittee's deliberations would not be governed by the great-power veto. In the words of George Bush, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, the Secretary-General would retain "sufficient discretion to assure managerial effectiveness in the conduct of the peacekeeping mission and in adapting it, within the bounds of the Security Council's mandate, to changing circumstances". The U.S. plan also provides that decisions of the Secretary-General, as executor of the Security Council's mandate, would be subject to "disapproval" by the Council. But any vote in the Council based on an appeal of a decision by the Secretary-General would be deemed procedural — in other words, *not* subject to veto.

The U.S. set of proposals was put forward initially in bilateral discussion with Soviet representatives in February 1970. The two powers had begun these discussions late in 1969, reviewing the issues involved in Model 2 (operations with troop contingents), although Model 1 (observers) was incomplete. The U.S. plan suggests that, until such time as a "reliable and equitable system" for financing peacekeeping is agreed on, permanent members of the Security Council would undertake "to pay their fair share of operations authorized by the Security Council".

The Soviet submission clearly retains control and direction of the operation in the hands of the Security Council, with the possible assistance and advice of the UN Military Staff Committee. The Soviet proposal's governing clause reads: "Having authorized a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the Security Council shall continue to exercise supreme control with regard to all aspects of the establishment of this operation and the direction of it through the entire operation."

Veto retained

But the Soviet plan also contemplates the creation of a subsidiary organ by the Security Council in accordance with Article 29. Such a subsidiary organ or committee of the Council — tentatively labelled Committee on Direction of Operation — would be directly responsible to the Council for advice and assistance in regard to the operation. In the Soviet view, the nucleus of this committee would be made up of the permanent members of the Security Council. These big powers would constitute a subcommittee working on the basis of "agreed decisions of all its members; there will be no voting". In other words, the veto would apply to its proceedings. Decisions of the overall committee would be

*Soviet submission
retains control
in the hands
of Security Council*



Canadian Forces photo

Corporal W. A. Wright of Oshawa, Ontario, meets a Greek Cypriot during a jeep patrol in Cyprus. Cpl. Wright is a member of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, which is in Cyprus for a six-

month tour of duty as part of the UN peacekeeping force on the island. Canada has provided a contingent for the seven-nation UN force on Cyprus since its creation in 1964.

considered adopted if a majority of committee members, including all members of the subcommittee, agreed to them. The Security Council could invite other UN member states — and in particular non-permanent members of the Council and countries furnishing military personnel, facilities and services to the operation — to become members of such a committee.

Under the Soviet plan, the Secretary-General would assist in the implementation of Security Council decisions, performing such functions "as are entrusted to him" by the Council and reporting to the Council on "the performance of these functions".

There is clearly a common element in the U.S. and Soviet plans in the form of a subsidiary organ to the Security Council, but each plan is keyed to a different concept of where primary power rests. The basic U.S. position envisages actual control and direction of the operation in the hands of the Secretary-General, with a consultative body serving in an advisory capacity to him. The Soviet scheme has the opposite thrust: it casts the Security Council with its subsidiary Committee on Direction of Operation in the role of executive body and the Secretary-General in a consultative or advisory role.

The Special Committee on Peacekeep-

ing Operations (Committee of 33) is still considering these and other submissions and procedures for peacekeeping operations. Its mandate also embraces a study of methods for financing such operations, but there has been no progress in this area.

Inquiry into financing

At the twenty-sixth General Assembly session last fall, the Assembly established a separate special committee of 15 nations to consider all aspects of the UN's financial situation and report back to the twenty-seventh session later this year. The five permanent members of the Security Council as well as Canada are represented on this Committee of 15, which began discussions in New York in February. The committee is dealing with the full range of financial difficulties facing the UN as it copes with the problems of restoring the organization to solvency. These difficulties include cash availability, rising budgetary levels and the cumulative effects of the failure of such powers as the U.S.S.R. and France to help finance past peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Middle East.

With the Committee of 15 in session, there is a possibility that the two questions — procedures for UN peacekeeping operations and a method of financing them — could be resolved separately. But, if the

an agreement on a framework for peacekeeping operations in the Committee of 33, it might facilitate a consensus on a method of financing.

Its membership and activity in the Committee of 33 and its Working Group, as well as the new Committee of 15, makes it obvious that Canada has had deep and continuing interest in the concept of UN peacekeeping. As Peter Dobell notes elsewhere in this issue, Canada has participated in ten peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the periodic assessments of Canada's place in the foreign policy and defence priorities, a commitment to possible UN peacekeeping operations has been repeatedly cited by the Government and by Parliamentary committees which have undertaken studies of the subject.

In the White Paper on defence of 1964, for example, peacekeeping was ranked among the priorities in the organization of defence forces. Peacekeeping was placed on this list with forces for the direct protection of Canada — the first priority; forces-in-being as part of the deterrent in the European theatre; maritime forces contributing to that deterrent; and reserve forces and mobilization potential.

The White Paper said that the fact that Canada was "one of a small number of powers capable of and eligible for United Nations service, with a highly trained and diversified military establishment, qualifies it for varied roles in United Nations operations". The Government said Canadian forces would be trained and equipped in a way which would permit "immediate and effective response" to UN requirements. Success in UN peacekeeping operations may depend on the speed with which they can be established and the ability to function with limited personnel in broad areas, the White Paper said. There would be a need for mobility in deployment, method of operation and logistic support.

In a new statement of defence priorities in 1969, the Government listed the performance of an international peacekeeping role that might be assumed by Canada as fourth on a roster headed by surveillance of Canadian territory and frontiers. Other priorities were defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. forces and fulfilment of such NATO commitments as might be agreed on.

Foreign policy review

The Government, in its Foreign Policy Review tabled in the Commons in June 1970, stated that it has been a continuing objective of Canadian foreign policy to work toward strengthening the authority of the

United Nations, particularly the capacity of the UN "to act as a peacekeeping agency for the control of conflict and the mediation of disputes". The Government committed Canada to a continued pursuit of this objective, although the review, in its UN sector paper, suggested that prospects for major operations involving peacekeeping forces were limited. The review said the types of strife likely to occur with increasing frequency were related to internal conflict and hence did not readily lend themselves to UN intervention. Demands on the UN were more likely to take the form of requests for establishment of military observer missions for specific purposes. The Government said Canada should continue its standby arrangements and training of Canadian forces for possible service with the UN.

The Foreign Policy Review said that, because of Canada's exceptional knowledge and experience in peacekeeping, it should continue to take an active part in UN negotiations on the organization's peacekeeping role and in preparation of guidelines or models for UN operations. But the review made it clear that Canada's response to requests for participation in future UN peacekeeping missions should be decided in each instance "in the light of its assessment of whether the UN can play a useful role".

In the Government's defence White Paper issued in August of last year, this theme of assessing the usefulness of possible UN peacekeeping missions was developed. This was coupled with a reaffirmation of Canada's support for the peacekeeping concept.

The defence White Paper, *Defence in the Seventies* was perhaps blunter in its characterization of earlier peacekeeping ventures than previous documents. Canada's experience had provided it with an exceptional insight into "the successes and failures" of past and present missions: "The experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning. Some operations have been severely hampered by inadequate terms of reference and by a lack of co-operation on the part of those involved Certain operations have tended to become 'open-ended' in the absence of a political settlement between the parties to a dispute."

The White Paper said benefits could be derived from these efforts, however, and the Government "will consider constructively any request for Canadian participation in peacekeeping ventures when, in its opinion, based on the lessons of the past and the circumstances of the request, an operation holds the promise of success

'The experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning'

and Canada can play a useful role in it".

In keeping with this statement, the White Paper again asserted the Government's intention to maintain a battalion group of the Canadian Armed Forces on standby for possible peacekeeping missions.

The Defence document cited Indochina and the Middle East as two areas where creation of some kind of peacekeeping or truce supervisory operation might form part of an eventual settlement. "If asked to participate in such an operation," the White Paper said, "as major factor affecting the Government's decision would be the existence of realistic terms of reference. They would have to reflect a consensus by all parties on the purposes which the operation was intended to serve and the manner in which it was to discharge its responsibilities."

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp has repeatedly made the same point in statements and interviews about the need for realistic terms of reference. In one interview in February of this year, for example, the Minister said in reference to the Middle East: "... We believe, in the interest of the world, not only our own interest, that the next time any peacekeeping forces are established the rules of the game should be very clearly stated in advance ... and that that is agreed to by both sides, not by just one side." In answer to another question, Mr. Sharp said that, if the terms of reference were clear and satisfactory, Canada would participate and this would be true for Indochina as well as for the Middle East.

Shortly before the Government published its foreign policy review in June 1970, the Commons Committee on External Affairs adopted and released the report of its Subcommittee on the United Nations and Peacekeeping, product of an 18-month study. In strong terms, the subcommittee urged Canada to maintain its support for peacekeeping as a principal element in Canadian foreign policy. Differing with other forecasters, the subcommittee said its study led it to believe the opportunities for effective peacekeeping would increase.

"No system of order, even that order temporarily facilitated by UN peacekeepers, is absolutely neutral — i.e., value free. Under any order, some élites are preferred over others, some claims are endorsed over others. ...

... UN peacekeeping has particular utility in conflicts outside Soviet-American

The subcommittee report warned that for Canada to lose heart and reduce its interest in peacekeeping because of observations predicting a declining role for such missions would be "an abdication of responsibility". The report recommended a strengthened system of UN peacekeeping, proposed creation of a UN standby force of up to 25,000 and establishment of a UN Peace Fund of at least \$60 million to support peacekeeping ventures.

During the latter part of 1970 and early 1971, the full Commons External Affairs Committee conducted a study of the Government's Foreign Policy Review and, in particular, the first general volume of the six-part review. The committee's report, tabled in June 1971, suggested that this general policy outline implied a rather more "cautious" attitude toward Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping than formerly. The committee said the review rightly pointed out the limitations to Canadian peacekeeping, but was troubled by this passage: "... The Government is determined that this special brand of Canadian expertise (in peacekeeping missions) will not be dispersed or wasted on ill-conceived operations but employed judiciously where the peacekeeping operation and the Canadian contribution to it seem likely to improve chances for a lasting settlement."

The External Affairs Committee's concern about what it felt was a more cautious attitude on the part of the Government has been echoed by other observers, who have suggested Canada was displaying a dwindling interest in peacekeeping. But Canadian readiness to participate in peacekeeping missions has been reaffirmed by the Government in the Foreign Policy Review and last year's Defence White Paper. The change — if there has been any at all — represents no diminution of commitment to peacekeeping. The recasting of Canadian intentions is in a sense a product of the wisdom of hindsight. Canada wants to make it clear that it will press for terms of reference designed — as much as is possible in ventures of this kind — to assure the usefulness of any future essays in peacekeeping.

spheres of influence, where the two superstates back different factions and where the factions are relatively balanced in power. ...'

(David P. Forsythe, "UN Peacekeeping and Domestic Instability", *Orbis*, Winter 1972)

'The rules of the game should be very clearly stated in advance ...'

Examining UNCTAD's plan to help the 'hard-core' 25

Mary Fletcher

The adoption of a program of action on behalf of the least-developed among the developing countries was one of the major items of political importance at the third session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago.

UNCTAD III, like its predecessors in Geneva and New Delhi, was concerned with evolving aid and trade policies that will give all the developing countries a chance to make progress.

But within that broad framework, the conference in Chile's capital over a six-week span in April and May devoted special attention to the needs of the least-developed — the 25 nation states of the Third World that had been classified as the "hard core least developed among the developing nations". A review of UNCTAD's approach to this question involves an examination of the way in which the action program came into existence, its relevance to the real needs of the least-developed countries and its likely developmental impact on them.

It is difficult, however, to discuss the action program without defining in development terms what we mean by the least-developed among the developing nations. This is a complex problem heavily dependent on value judgments as to what development is and how to achieve it.

The term "hard-core least-developed" further defines the continuum of developmental stages between rich and poor. Presumably this continuum graphically displays the picture of economic and social evolution from the most unsuccessful economic unit to the most successful. But how do we define success in economic and social terms — viability, material comfort, contentment, energetic creativity, health, literacy, long life? Even if we could agree on a quality that represents success, there remains the difficulty of quantifying it for the purpose of graphic display. Some mathematical indicators of economic growth do exist. Growth rate, gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita*, sectoral indicators such as literacy-rate and share

of manufacturing in the economy are the major ones. It would seem, however, that all are inadequate as measures of success. It is easy to use a numerical concept such as GDP *per capita* as a yardstick for development, but it only measures average income. It fails to measure the distribution of wealth and, in failing to do so, glosses over the existence of impoverished sections of a population. Surely the reduction of poverty is the problem we should be concerned with in development. But we have no mathematical formulae to describe the transfer of welfare or the way in which population expansion, political decisions and other factors may impede such transfers.

Why not Bangladesh?

If the reduction of poverty is our goal in development assistance, why do India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia not appear on the list of hard-core least-developed? The answer given by the UN body responsible for identifying the least-developed was that those four countries possess the internal resources to improve their status without massive outside assistance. In other words, they are capable of pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps. This is not the case with those nations that have been identified as the hard-core least-developed. The latter are slow-growers because of their physical remoteness from world markets and their lack of developed human and material resources.

The 25 nations classified as the least-developed are:

Afghanistan	Laos	Somalia
Bhutan	Lesotho	Sudan
Botswana	Malawi	Tanzania
Burundi	Maldives	Uganda
Chad	Mali	Upper Volta
Dahomey	Nepal	Western Samoa
Ethiopia	Niger	Yemen
Guinea	Rwanda	
Haiti	Sikkim	

In more precise terms, the criteria used to identify the least-developed countries were:

- gross domestic product *per capita* under \$100;
- manufacturing share in total product less than 10 per cent;
- literate adult population over 15 years under 20 per cent of population.

These countries have certain other characteristics than those used to identify them. Many of them are landlocked, or not easily accessible from the major trading-routes. The majority lack petroleum or significant mineral resources; some have insufficient navigable waterways, or terrain unfavourable to beasts of burden, accompanied by a complete or partial lack of rail network. Their economies are heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture; their export structure is undiversified; their growth-rate is poor; their mortality level is high. Their populations are often nomadic; they lack cohesive, large internal markets. They also suffer from the lack of administrative infrastructure and the high unemployment that afflict all developing countries.

The most significant symptom of a least-developed country appears to be a slow rate of growth. This suggests that these countries are facing difficulties of a special kind and that the measures in aid and other fields taken to help the developing countries in general have been less effective in such cases.

Certain of the characteristics that have been mentioned, such as the lack of petroleum and other significant supplies of mineral resources, suggest that some of these countries may lack potential for development. With this in mind, one may ask whether it was worth while to undertake an action program on their behalf. If the majority of these countries lack potential for development, would not welfare payments in perpetuity from the developed countries be a theoretically realistic solution? Perhaps — but significant petroleum and mineral resources may yet be discovered. Dryland farming and water-conservation techniques may be developed and change their development prospects radically. In the meantime, much can be done to modernize the economies and develop the human-resource potentials of the least-developed.

These ideas suggest not only the desirability but also the necessary main lines of an action program for the least-developed. Ideally, it should attempt to survey in detail the needs and potential of each of the least-developed countries. It should

concentrate on research into generally recognized problems such as water conservation and dryland farming. Increased technical assistance should be forthcoming to build up administrative infrastructure and communications and financial nets for a modern market economy. Export-oriented industries must be developed if the least-developed countries are to have a chance to gain an equitable share of world trade. In order to undertake these activities, of course, more development assistance is needed from the developed countries and international institutions over a long period of time. Even more important is a fresh approach to the setting of priorities and the choice of projects to be implemented is needed. For example, the UN Development Program might be asked to undertake small-scale capital projects — which it is not currently authorized to do — to speed up the process of development in the least-developed countries.

Three-point program

The action program approved by the developed and developing countries at Santiago incorporated these ideas and a host of others of rather more marginal usefulness. Its major components include commercial policy measures, aid measures and a procedure for reviewing the progress made in implementing the action program.

There were three important undertakings by the developed countries on behalf of the least-developed countries in the area of commercial policy. First they agreed that, in pre-financing buffer or reserve stocks, the least-developed countries should, in principle, be exempted from paying their share or, if this were not possible, assistance should be given to alleviate the financial burden on them. Secondly, the developed countries agreed that, in current and future multilateral negotiations to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, special consideration should be given to products of interest to the least-developed countries. Basically this meant that developed countries agreed that in the course of the 1973 GATT negotiations products of interest to the least-developed countries, such as coffee, oils and oil seeds, cotton, and hides and skins, could be dealt with first. Although there is no undertaking to this effect, it is also possible that "special consideration" may mean that the tariff cuts on those products might be larger.

The third major concession to the least-developed countries by the developed countries was an agreement to extend the scope of the generalized system of preferences to include agricultural, mineral and

*Number of nations
may lack potential
for development*



Canadian delegation to the UNCTAD sessions was headed initially by Senator David Martin, Government leader in the Upper Chamber, with Donald McPhail, Canadian Ambassador to Venezuela, filling in his place when Senator Martin returned to Ottawa. Pictured are some members of the Canadian delegation during a session in Santiago. front row (from left to right) Maurice Rochon, Trade

and Commerce Department, Mr. McPhail, and Senator Martin; back row, David Roberts, Finance Department, Eric Bergbusch, External Affairs Department, Counsellor at the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, William Dobell, executive assistant to Mr. Martin, and Mrs. Margaret Catley-Carlson, External Affairs Department, Aid and Development Division.

handicraft products of interest to the least-developed countries. In Canada's case, agricultural and handicraft products are already included in its preference offer. Raw materials, including minerals for industrial processing, are, in general, allowed into Canada at very low duty or duty free. However, the undertaking to consider extending the generalized systems of preferences to these products will have some importance to the European countries.

It might be worth while to ask what effect these concessions can have on the development of the economies of the least-developed countries. Assistance in the pre-financing of buffer stocks or exemption from the payments could assist the least-developed countries by liberating foreign exchange, which in most of their cases is very limited, for other uses such as the purchase of equipment and supplies to develop and continue the operation of their export-oriented industries. The result, however, of releasing this additional foreign exchange would not have as large a multiplier effect on the economies of the least-developed countries and would, therefore, be of less direct benefit than other measures, such as tariff reductions, on their produce. The decision to give

special consideration to products of interest to the least-developed countries in multilateral tariff negotiations raises the possibility that there may be a multiplier effect on the economies of the least-developed countries if their access to the markets of the wealthy developed countries and the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe is really improved.

The likelihood of positive repercussions, however, is limited by two factors: (1) the products concerned are primary products and may, therefore, have little multiplier effect in the economy; and (2) any tariff cuts that are made for these products will not offer special advantages to the least-developed countries but will merely maintain their competitive status with other producers of the same products. The effect of the possible extension of the duration of the generalized system of preferences for a long-enough period to permit the least-developed countries to benefit from the scheme could be of great value to them. But its value depends on the development, over the next few years, of significant export-oriented products in which GSP offers were made. In summation, one could say that the measures adopted in the field of commercial policy

Proposal at Santiago...

At the UNCTAD conference in Santiago, Canada proposed that donor nations increase by one third the amount of concessional aid to developing countries channelled through multilateral financial agencies. This proposal was discussed in UNCTAD's finance committee, but no final action was taken on it. The proposal on concessional financing was included in the report of the conference.

The Canadian proposal was put before UNCTAD III by Senator Paul Martin Government leader in the Upper Chamber and head of Canada's delegation at Santiago, in a speech to the conference that brought together delegates from 141 countries. In this portion of his statement, Mr. Martin said:

"... Canada believes that increasing amounts of development assistance are needed on soft terms if the developing countries are to advance toward a minimally acceptable standard of living within a reasonable period. We recognize that both the quality and the volume of assistance are important.

Canada, for its part, has accepted the international targets for total flows and official development assistance. While we have been unable to accept deadlines for their achievement, we see the targets as incentives to developed countries to continue increasing the amount of their development assistance.

And we ourselves have made significant advances. Since UNCTAD II, Canadian appropriations for development assistance have increased at an average annual rate of 15 per cent while our GNP has only increased at about half that rate.

"... There is a related area of concern to Canada. Although flows of concessional aid through major multilateral institutions now amount to about \$1.5 billion a year, it is apparent that developing countries require additional resources on concessional terms. Several proposals have been put forward to increase the transfer of resources to developing countries. It is in this context that Canada would propose that this conference accept an objective of \$2-billion for concessional financing through the multilateral agencies. We would hope that the funding of these agencies might reach this figure as and when new levels of subscription are agreed upon. This proposed increase in resources would be distributed through such institutions as the IDA (International Development Association), UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and the regional development banks. If this one third increase in the program were accepted internationally, Canada would be prepared to shoulder a proportionate share of the burden. . . ."

for the least-developed countries are of very slight immediate value to them. In the longer term, they are, however, of value, if their industrial-development programs over the course of the next ten or so years are pursued with energy and success.

Aid measures

The aid measures agreed upon in the context of the action program for the least-developed countries give more reason for optimism. The principal measures agreed upon by the developed countries include the acceptance of a recommendation that they increase their aid flows to the least-developed countries through both bilateral and multilateral channels. Further, they agreed to study the possibility and desirability of establishing a special fund specifically for the least-developed countries. The developed countries also agreed that,

in identifying projects for the least-developed countries, more flexible criteria would be used, and they recommended that international institutions such as the International Development Association and the United Nations Development Program adopt the same flexible approach. They conceded that it would be extremely important to offer increased technical assistance to the least-developed countries in the field of administration and undertook to recommend that individual, in-depth country surveys of each of the least-developed countries be conducted to determine their needs and development potential.

It can be seen that the measures in the aid field correspond more to the present real needs of the least-developed countries than the measures agreed upon in the trade field. If these measures are pursued successfully, they will make commercial policy

asures in the future more useful to the
st-developed countries than they are
7.

The process of negotiating this action
gram at UNCTAD III confirmed many
he features of UNCTAD confrontation
tics. The principal paradox was that
hopes of the least-developed countries,
embodied in the first draft of their
olution, far exceeded what was polit-
ly attainable, and may even have gone
ond what was needed.

The second feature was that the facade
nity among the developing countries as
whole, the Group of 77, masked only
htly an unwillingness of the more-
eloped to countenance any measure to
p their least-developed friends which
ht have any adverse effect on the more-
eloped.

Although the action program adopted
UNCTAD III did not reach the level of
hopes of the least-developed countries,
achievement embodied in the action
gram is real and corresponds closely to
real needs of the least-developed coun-
s. Whether it has any hope of achieving
purpose of moving them into the cate-
y of developing countries with normal

growth-rates will depend very much on
several factors. The first is luck. If the
surveys reveal in individual cases that
certain countries are destitute of natural
wealth, there is very little hope that they
can become viable economic entities unless
they can develop a tourist potential. Even
if their natural wealth is adequate, their
ability to enter into world trade on a more
adequate footing and to improve their
economic state will depend very much on
political decisions taken by the govern-
ments of the least-developed countries
about how to develop their resources.

The action program adopted at San-
tiago is a statement of our intentions and
earnest hopes. Its potential as a means of
assisting the least-developed countries de-
pends on the way in which both sides move
to implement it.

*Miss Fletcher is a member of the policy
branch of the Canadian International
Development Agency who served on the
Canadian delegation at the UNCTAD
sessions in Santiago. Articles assessing
the overall results of UNCTAD III will
be published in the next issue of
International Perspectives.*

Canada's five-point program ...

ing the sessions of the Sixth Committee
UNCTAD in Santiago, the Canadian
legation in its submission outlined five
cial measures which it considered es-
sential to progress in resolving the prob-
s of the least-developed countries.
se included:

(1) Immediate attention to provision
ncreased technical assistance in partic-
r areas. In the bilateral field, the Cana-
n delegation considered "training in
omic planning, project identification
implementation to be very important
he least-developed countries are to be-
e fully masters of their own destiny".

(2) Individual country surveys of the
sical resources and development poten-
of each of these countries — possibly
an international agency such as the
ted Nations Development Program.

(3) Progress in rural development,
racing production, marketing and
munity development activities. "Since
agricultural sector dominates the
nomies of the least-developed coun-
s, we believe progress here is essential
heir development prospects, especially
e the agricultural sector must provide

marketable surpluses to support urbaniza-
tion and industrialization"

(4) Regional co-operation among the
developing countries aimed at speeding up
the development process for all. Such co-
operation "could offer an opportunity to
link assistance to the landlocked and least-
developed countries, especially in the de-
velopment of transport and marketing
facilities".

(5) An increase in the financial re-
sources available to the least-developed
countries — a measure without which none
of the other activities can take place. The
submission noted that Canada's bilateral
assistance will continue to be oriented to-
ward a few countries of concentration. But
a significant proportion of aid will be pro-
vided on a multilateral basis. Canada is
giving serious consideration to earmark-
ing a portion of these funds to the least-
developed nations. One possibility is al-
location to them of a portion of Canada's
increasing contribution to the UNDP.

*(Summary and quoted passages from
statement of Canadian delegation to
Sixth Committee, April 24, 1972).*

Possible sources of conflict after the Sino-American thaw

By Roger Dial

In the events of mankind, Richard Nixon's stroll on the Great Wall of China is taken to be of the order of feats performed by John Glenn and Moses. Having said this, however, it remains difficult to assess the future impact of the visit or explain how the *détente* in fact came into being. A multitude of factors surely lay behind the surprising thaw. Indeed, the biologist with a theoretical understanding of the genesis of life is probably better equipped than the international relations specialist to explain the complex and rare configuration of forces that allowed or caused the policy shifts in China and the United States at this time. It is quite apparent that the Sino-American *rapprochement*, if it is that, came on President Nixon's initiative. Our focus here, however, will essentially be on the Chinese side. Why were the Chinese willing and prepared to move into accord with the United States after more than two decades of hostility?

One should probably say at the outset that, from the Chinese perspective, a patching up of Sino-American relations has been a possibility at other junctures since the late 1940s. In particular, the summer of 1955 saw a most conciliatory China. A brief reconstruction of that situation may, in fact, be instructive.

The Americans had recently completed the construction of a containment instrument for their policy against Communism in Asia (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, September 1954). The Taiwan Straits crisis that lasted from September 1954 until April 1955 revealed a military stalemate, and indeed served to formalize the

Formosa-American defence alliance (December 1954). The military side of the Sino-Soviet alliance was very much in question in the wake of the Korean War, not to mention Nikita Khrushchov's water support during the Taiwan crisis (October 1954). The non-aligned states, led by the Colombo "powers", were on the diplomatic offensive in reaction to bipolarism in general and American alliance-building in particular. China's clearest option was to align itself with the non-aligned. The Bandung Conference (April 1955) provided China with friends, a forum separate from the Soviet Union and a diplomatic advantage over the Americans to compensate for the very obvious military and strategic advantage of the United States. The diplomatic advantage, of course, could have been lost by a lesser statesman than Chou En-lai. But 1955 found Chou at the peak of his power internally and fully capable of making foreign policy decisions on the fly as it were.

By the end of July 1955, the international images of Chou and John Foster Dulles were caricatures of their respective countries: Chou, the reasonable, underdog proponent of compromise and conciliation; Dulles, the intransigent, sabre-rattling proponent of unnegotiable armed containment. Dulles had, in fact, been successful in his own terms, in implementing a European-style containment policy in the Orient. Only the image was distasteful, and that, of course, was the source of Chinese and non-aligned strength. To polish up the image, the Americans agreed to talk with the Chinese (contrast to the vivid picture of Dulles refusing to shake Chou En-lai's hand in the previous year at Geneva). The bilateral talks began on August 1 in Geneva (later switched to Warsaw), but were doomed to failure. The Chinese wanted American recognition, a U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan, trade and cultural exchange and a seat in the United Nations. The Americans wanted 40 million nationals being held in China and scarce anything more. One side was dissatisfied

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ch the *status quo* and compelled to
ke compromises in changing it. The
er side was satisfied with the *status*
o, indeed the architect of it. The Chi-
se position wasn't stationary by any
ans, nor was Chou's internal authority.
at opportunity to reverse the direction
Sino-American relations had been lost.

Context of 1971-72

o general aspects of the present situa-
n are auspicious by comparison to the
55 configuration. Chou En-lai is again at
top of the Chinese political heap, with
le personal discretionary power. And
United States could scarcely be less
ppy with its international situation. The
dership question does appear to be cru-
l. With his ingenious adviser, Henry
ssinger, Richard Nixon has reorganized
American foreign policy system in
h a way as to make it work for him as
as for no other President. How long he
manipulate the bureaucracy and main-
n a personal initiative in the foreign
icy field is open to question.

The similarly unique power position
Chou En-lai has, of course, come into
ng through a different process. In a
se, China was a divided polity before
Cultural Revolution. The division was
erally most apparent in the contradic-
n between the revolutionary national
os and the pragmatic policy behaviour
a well-institutionalized bureaucracy.
ly through considerable introspection
l calculated attack was the division
nsformed into conflicting groups. A
olution, after all, must have two sides
an enemy to conquer. But China is no
ger a divided polity, except perhaps in
ional terms. Bureaucracy and expertise
re been the survivors, if not the out-
ken victors, in the epic drama of "cul-
al revolution". And Chou En-lai is the
disputed architect, protector and master
he state bureaucracy, with particularly
se ties to the foreign relations organiza-
ns. His authority is probably more
ble and long-term (ignoring his age)
n that of Nixon or Brezhnev. For the
riet leader there is the "Khrushchov
h" (the garden and the illicit memoir)
uld he take a tack in foreign affairs
popular with his party colleagues. At the
ne time, Nixon's rare licence in foreign
icy could disappear rapidly should the
ditional powers in the American foreign
icy process (State, Defense, CIA) out-
nk the Kissinger task force.

Although an auspicious leadership
figuration was surely an important,
haps necessary, feature, it alone was not
possible for the Nixon-Chou cordiali-



Great leaps forward

ties. Other factors need consideration.
First of all, what brought out the Chinese
red carpet so fast for Kissinger and Nixon?
Was Taiwan the calling-card?

Pragmatic on Taiwan

The Chinese have demonstrated a thor-
oughly pragmatic approach to the Taiwan
question since the establishment of the
regime in 1949. The only position they have
not taken in that time is one of writing-off
the island province and its satellites. A
well-planned amphibious assault was the
first tack. Unfortunately, the prolonged
preparations aborted with the Korean War
and the intervention of the American navy
in the Taiwan Straits. By 1953, there was
little hope of a military solution — war re-
sources had been squandered on the
Korean campaign, and the Americans had
moved into something of an alliance with
Taipei, albeit inexplicit and ambiguous
from the mainland perspective. Thus,
China sought a multilateral diplomatic
solution by way of having the Korean
peace talks include other Far Eastern
questions, in particular Taiwan.

This approach having failed, China
returned to a combative position in the
autumn and spring of 1954-5. Marginal
success was achieved regarding some off-
shore islands, but the campaign also stim-
ulated a formal Taipei-Washington secur-
ity pact. Chou next announced in 1955 that
the PRC was prepared to take up the Tai-
wan question on a bilateral basis with the
United States. Though such talks were, in
fact, initiated, they did not lead to a return
of Taiwan to the mainland, nor did the
direct offers of autonomous status and an
honourable position for Chiang bear fruit.
By 1958, a military posture was again as-
sumed, but this time with the rather lim-
ited objective of assuming control of
Quemoy. On Chinese initiative, the War-

*Neither talks
nor direct offers
produced change
in Taiwan status*

saw talks were begun again in September 1958 and, while no concessions were made on ultimate rights to Taiwan, alleviation of the Quemoy "thorn" was the immediate diplomatic objective.

We do not know, of course, exactly how Taiwan features in the Sino-American thaw. The Americans can no more deliver Taiwan to China than the Chinese can deliver South Vietnam to the United States. But a mutual "interest-out" agreement seems a likely trade-off. Neither Hanoi nor Taipei can sustain their position over the long haul without their present allies. The Chinese leadership is no doubt prepared to be patient if the ultimate outcome is assured. As for their "unbreakable bond" with Hanoi — well, there is the June 1954 precedent for "compromise", and I imagine such a double sell-out would come as a greater shock in Taipei than in Hanoi.

At a more general level, the Chinese constellation was positively oriented to the Nixon orbit by the beginning of the 1970s. There have probably been only two major

complex Chinese foreign-policy formulations or phases since 1949. Both had their core essential questions of national defence. The first phase consisted of an alliance with the Soviet Union and Communist-bloc solidarity. Traditional Chinese interests and geopolitics from the beginning militated against a perfect union or thoroughly functional alliance. Long before the last bit of cement melted from the package of international relations, the Chinese had set about constructing an alternative international alignment for themselves in the Afro-Asian world. To do this, the Chinese did not have to invent non-alignment, anti-colonialism or revolutionary movements. All of these elements were available in great abundance from roughly 1955 to 1965. What they were required to do was facilitate the unity of those forces and fashion them into the kind of alliance or bloc that would alter the bipolar system into a tripolar one — a system that would offer China the security lost more than a century earlier. Unfor-



President Nixon helps China's Premier Chou En-lai take off his coat before the beginning of their historic series of meetings in Peking in February. On his return to Washington, the President described the visit as the "necessary

beginning" of a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. "We have started the long process of building a bridge across the gulf that separates the Chinese and American people," Mr. Nixon said.

Wide World Photo

ately, the clays of non-alignment, anti-colonialism, and revolution were of different textures and unwieldy. What began at Bandung in 1955 crumbled into absolute unity at Algiers in 1965.

Though half a decade has passed since China's two major foreign-policy ventures came to naught, no alternative had been explored. The years were ones of introduction. Ironically, as the Chinese passed the time in internal struggle, the United States' postwar policy of containment and anti-Communism met its gruesome end in south-east Asia. As Chou En-lai and Chen Yi once appeared frantic in the vain last-ditch struggle for Afro-Asian unity, Johnson and Nixon have taken strong measures in vain to make an archaic policy work in Indochina. In a very real sense, the United States has found itself without much of Nixon's unparalleled summitry. The Nixon answer comes virtually unaltered from one of Henry Kissinger's books — a concert of the great and middle powers to replace armed bipolarity.

Plans for China

Just how much Kissinger's new order will serve Chinese national interests remains to be seen. Indeed, we cannot be sure yet how much of Nixon's unparalleled summitry will fade with the newsreels, not to speak of the forthcoming American elections. However, if we suppose for the moment that the concert is real, that the Soviet, American and Chinese leaders have genuinely agreed to reduce the tensions and successfully resolve the problems between themselves, what, may we ask, is in it for China? Taiwan is the obvious first plum. We may expect diminished tension on the Sino-Soviet frontier. No doubt there would be access to broader trade to facilitate the economic expansion that almost certainly will be the Chinese priority in the coming decade. A voice in the United Nations has, of course, already fallen to them. Most of all, of course, it means that China would no longer be encircled and beleaguered by Soviet and American hostility. That end has been the preoccupation of Chinese foreign-policy makers for the past two decades; is it possible that they would reject it now?

However, the grand Metternichian dream for peace in our time may not be the utopia that it seems. It is a "big boys' " situation to a peculiar "big boy" problem.

To be sure, the thought of a world without Sino-Soviet, Sino-American and Soviet-American cold wars is comforting. But the big boys probably cannot resolve the problems of the little boys. They may well disregard the interests of the lesser states and, worse yet, disagree about what is good for them. This is simply to say that the concert of the super-powers will solve what is essentially a rare and limited source of international systemic disfunction — i.e., fear, suspicion and ideological antagonism. The ongoing major source of systematic disfunction — hard, real conflicts of national interests — requires another kind of machinery. Perhaps the United Nations could become such a machinery if divorced from the Security Council; perhaps not.

The issue is particularly pertinent to China for several reasons. The Chinese often speak of "problems left over from history", by which they mean debts owed by the former imperialist powers. Unlike the assault on so many other states and cultures that succumbed to colonialism, the assault on China was prolonged and ultimately incomplete, albeit narrowly. Where others were swallowed up whole, to be reborn more or less whole as the empires were dismantled, China was taken apart territorially, materially, and psycho-culturally in a piecemeal fashion. Even without the Cold War atmosphere, the solution of these problems will be highly complex and conflictual.

Secondly, China is a large state with multidimensional international interests. At many levels — e.g., arms control — it is the newcomer. Its interests have not been represented, or even considered, in existing accords, and one may expect that they will take the unpopular position of "undoing some of the already done". China's largeness as a state also means that it will have a big stake in the "future issues" — environment, seabed, fisheries, for example.

Conflicting interests are inevitable. When do little conflicts of interest become big ones? Quite clearly, the end of the Cold War, if that is the Nixon-Chou-Brezhnev aim, does not in any sense mean peace. Conflict is here to stay, and the Chinese are likely to be in the thick of it. The Nixon-Chou talks were an instance of international politics, not an end to international politics.

'The big boys . . . may well disregard the interests of the lesser states'

The Law of the Sea conference: factors behind Canada's stance

By J. Alan Beesley

The United Nations on December 17, 1970, took a decision of considerable importance to Canada. The world body decided that a third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea would be held in 1973 if necessary preparations could be made by then. The first two such conferences were held in 1958 and 1960.

In Resolution 2750 adopted at the UN General Assembly's twenty-fifth session in 1970, it was agreed that among the subjects to be included on the agenda of a third conference were "the establishment of an equitable international regime — including an international machinery — for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the marine environment (including, *inter alia*, the prevention of pollution) and scientific research".

The decision was arrived at after many weeks of negotiation, with some countries arguing that all that was needed was a conference limited to three issues: breadth of the territorial sea, passage through straits, and coastal fishing rights. Others, including, in particular, Canada, argued that any approach to redeveloping the Law of the Sea must be comprehensive and must deal with the whole range of issues left unresolved or resolved imperfectly at the first conferences. The Canadian delegation played an active part in the negotiations and in fact chaired the final rounds of negotiations that reached agreement. As a consequence, it was the Canadian delegation that introduced the "compromise" resolution into the UN and read into the record a number of "understandings" relating to the decision.

Canadians may wonder why Canada has taken and is continuing to take such an active interest in resolving the various contentious issues of the Law of the Sea and of the environment. The answer can be deduced in part simply by looking at a map of Canada. Canada is obviously a coastal state. It is said to have either the longest or the second-longest coastline in the world, and that is the first fact of life in determining Canada's approach to any attempt to resolve Law of the Sea issues. A second major fact of life, which is not quite so evident, is that Canada is not a major maritime power with an extensive shipping fleet, and this affects the Canadian position considerably, compared, for example, to that of many other Western states. A third important fact of life is that Canada is a coastal fishing nation interested in preserving the living resources in the waters adjacent to its coasts rather than a distant-water fishing nation.

These three facts, or factors, tend to group Canada with other coastal states, including, in particular, those of Latin America, but the matter is more complex than that. Canada is also one of the major trading nations of the world, and, as such, interested as much as any state in maintaining freedom of commercial navigation. Given the lack of a Canadian mercantile fleet, the Canadian approach to certain questions such as flag-state jurisdiction, especially flags of convenience, is understandably different from that of major flag states, however close Canada's relations with such states may be. An obvious example is the relevance to the world of today of present international law concerning flag-state jurisdiction to the problem of pollution by oil-tankers.

Continental shelf

Yet another factor influencing the Canadian position on the Law of the Sea is that unlike many other coastal states (including most of the Latin American states), Canada has a huge continental shelf comprising an area amounting to almost 40 per cent of its land-mass. It is considered

be the second-largest continental shelf in the world, exceeded only by that of the U.S.S.R., and is said to comprise approximately two million square miles. Moreover, Canada's continental shelf, like that of Argentina, is deeply glaciated, with the consequence that it extends to great depths at considerable distances off Canada's coast in the north and off its east coast, so that simple distance or depth formulas for defining the outer limits of the continental shelf have little relevance to the Canadian situation. Thus, not surprisingly, Canada continues to support the "exploitability" laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention, defining the outer edge of the continental shelf in terms of the limits of exploitability and the recent decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea continental shelf case. This decision affirmed that the continental shelf is not some artificial, highly theoretical abstract concept but the actual physical extension seaward of the submerged land-masses.

Another factor of some importance is that Canada is not a major power. Although Canada is an ally of some of the world's major Western powers and therefore to some extent shares their preoccupations concerning global Western naval strategy, at the same time it has much in common with other coastal states concerned about their own security interests, particularly those involved in naval passage through straits, close to their shores. Another significant factor is that Canada is a non-nuclear power and is deeply committed to disarmament, and this has affected Canada's approach to such questions as the Arms Control Treaty and the denuclearization of the seabed. Not surprisingly, there has been a distinctly Canadian approach on that issue (as on most others in the related field of disarmament and environmental protection in international law in general).

Yet another factor, or rather a range of considerations, influencing Canada's approach to the Law of the Sea issues is that Canada is at one and the same time both a developed and a developing country. This duality of perspective has particular application to the offshore, that is to say the continental shelf. Canada has the technology developing countries desire, gained the hard way by learning through doing, and in this respect Canadians probably rank amongst the foremost in the world. Canadian experts can be found involved in drilling operations and offshore exploration operations in widely-scattered parts of the globe. But, at the same time, Canada lacks the vast amount of risk capital re-

quired to develop its offshore resources (or considers that it does, which may have the same consequence in policy terms).

Huge investments

Exploration and exploitation of the petroleum resources of the seabed involve huge investments. On this issue, Canada's point of view is more analogous to that of developing countries concerned about controlling such investments in their interests than to that of many developed countries which are primarily concerned to protect their own investments in offshore exploration and exploitation operations near other countries' coasts from being nationalized. Canada tends to be more interested in guarding and protecting its own resources on its own continental shelf.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that it was a Canadian delegation that first proposed, in a UN forum, in September 1971 in the Sixth (Legal) Committee, that it was time for the world organization, to consider developing a code of ethics leading ultimately to a multilateral treaty to regulate the activities of multinational corporations. The Canadian proposal was based on the argument that, if states had long been the subjects of international law, and individuals were now the objects of international law, as in the Human Rights Conventions for example, why not attempt to develop international law applicable to the large multinational or transnational entities, many of them with budgets bigger than those of most Western governments, which were regulated on a hit-and-miss basis by unharmonized national legislation. The application of such an initiative to the question of pollution havens suggests the need for the development not only of trade law on these questions but of international law.

Connected with this aspect of the problem is one that is becoming increasingly important in Canada at present, and that is the whole issue of foreign ownership and control of multinational corporations. Merely to consider in a superficial manner the range of problems raised by the possibilities brought about by new technology to exploit the non-living resources of the continental shelf and the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is to be aware of the complexities of the problem. In the exercise of "sovereign rights" over the continental-shelf mineral resources, pursuant to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention to which Canada is a party, the problem is perceived through the perspective of a country which requires a very clear-cut, authoritative interface for dealing with companies drilling off its shores —

*Time to consider
a code of ethics
for governing
multinational
firms*

particularly with respect to pollution control, but also on many other commercial and economic issues. (This explains why Canadian legislation administered by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources and by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development is as tough as any in the world, both on pollution control and on such matters as the terms for exploration and exploitation of offshore mineral resources. However, Canada's laws on these questions are development-oriented and deliberately designed to encourage exploration and exploitation of resources. It is that element that makes Canadian legislation rather interesting to developing countries and this is why Canada's delegation has spent much time in the UN Seabed Committee explaining the approach embodied in Canada's legislation.)

Innocent passage

Another factor in the Canadian position is that, although Canada supports the general conception of the widest possible freedom of commercial navigation consistent with environmental protection and coastal state security, Canadians are understandably sensitive about the need to redevelop and "modernize" the conception of "innocent passage" through such straits as Canada's Northwest Passage. Under what conditions can loaded oil-tankers be capable of innocent passage of such straits? An additional and related factor is that Canada has already established the 12-mile territorial sea, which has long been claimed by the U.S.S.R. but is not accepted by Canada's major ally, the United States, except as a part of a comprehensive settlement of outstanding Law of the Sea issues. (As a result of Canada's 12-mile territorial sea, Canada has control of the eastern (Barrow Strait) as well as the western (Prince of Wales Straits) "gateways" to the Northwest Passage, whether or not other states accept Canada's long-standing claim that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are Canadian.)

Another factor in determining Canada's approach to the third Law of the Sea Conference relates to the question of freedom of scientific research. While, like other technologically-developed states, Canada has a high degree of expertise, enabling it to carry out its own scientific research in coastal waters and the subjacent seabed, Canada shares some of the concern of developing countries about the difficulty in differentiating between "pure" scientific research and commercial research by other states and about protecting Canada's "sovereign rights" over the continental

shelf researches, not only on economic grounds but for well-founded reasons of national security. Although it shares some of the preoccupations of the developing country coastal states, Canada is at the same time interested in fostering and furthering, as are other developed countries, the freest possible basis for scientific research in coastal waters. Merely to consider the question is to perceive very clearly that the problem is not simply of "free access to coastal waters" in return for "free access to scientific information gained from research in such waters. One of the underlying problems is the lack of the technology on the part of many developing countries to make adequate use of the results of such research.

Marine environment

The final preoccupation of Canada — and one of the most important — flows from the first — the length of Canada's coastline. This is the need to protect Canada's own marine environment from degradation. It is sufficient to refer to Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the breakthrough it is achieving in developing international environmental law, and the recent amendment to the Canada Shipping Act extending Canadian pollution control to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy — Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance and Queen Charlotte Sound. Canada cannot be oblivious to any development concerning international environmental law, if only because of the position it has taken in its own national legislation. The importance of the issue to Canadians can be gathered from the fact that the Arctic pollution control legislation was affirmed unanimously in the House of Commons and, more recently, the Canadian stand on the Cherry Point pollution spill, which was also affirmed unanimously in the House of Commons.

In the light of the considerations outlined above, it is easy to see why Canada attached importance to being a member of the original 35-member *ad hoc* UN Committee on the Seabed (established as a result of the initiative of Malta), and the later Standing Committee of 42, now expanded to 96 members at the initiative of Sweden. Since passage of the UN resolution on a third Law of the Sea Conference the mandate of the Seabed Committee has been extended to include preparatory work for the Conference on all of the issues mentioned in the 1970 Resolution 2750, together with any other issues that warrant consideration at that time.

Turning to how Canada is implementing its own approach to these Law of the

questions, the best way of explaining Canadian position is to say that Canada has adopted a pluralistic approach — acting unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally as appropriate.

Canada has not hesitated to move unilaterally when it was the only way to meet a particular problem. It was by this means that Canada established its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Zones, its 12-mile territorial sea, its fishing zones and its pollution-control zone.

In the light of the controversy that has arisen over Canada's "unilateral" legislation, it is appropriate to bear in mind that the Law of the Sea has always been developed by state practice, i.e. unilateral measures gradually acquiesced in and followed by other states.

The three-mile territorial sea, to the extent that it was a rule of law, was established by state practice. The 12-mile territorial sea, which is now virtually a rule of law, has been established in exactly the same way, by state practice, by countries doing just what Canada has done, namely passing their own legislation. Canada does not, however, take the position that every country has an unlimited right to set its own maritime boundaries. It recognizes, as is pointed out in the 1951 decision of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, that an act by a coastal state delimiting its maritime jurisdiction has effects on other states.

For just such reasons Canada has negotiated with other countries affected by fisheries and pollution-control legislation. This is, of course, a difficult, laborious, time-consuming and delicate process maintaining Canada's national position while still attempting to seek equitable accommodations with other states that are affected by its measures.

Types of agreements

As it can be seen that, if Canada has acted unilaterally, it has been equally effective bilaterally and has negotiated a series of agreements phasing out the fisheries activities, in Canadian territorial sea and fishing zones, of Norway, Britain, Denmark, Portugal and Spain (not yet in force), and has negotiated a completely new agreement with France concerning such fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Canada has also carried out intensive negotiations with Denmark and France concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf between Canada and these countries and has undertaken the process of negotiating continental shelf delimitations with the United States. Can-

ada has also negotiated and recently renewed a reciprocal fishing agreement with the United States whereby the nationals of either country may fish up to three miles from the shoreline of the other.

Canada has also negotiated a fishing agreement with the U.S.S.R. applicable to waters off Canada's west coast and is engaged in negotiating an analogous agreement with the U.S.S.R. covering waters off Canada's east coast. Canada has also carried out a series of intensive negotiations with the United States and the U.S.S.R. and other Arctic countries concerning the possibility (not yet in sight) of developing a multilateral agreement to ensure the prevention of pollution and the safety of navigation in Arctic waters.

What has Canada been doing on the multilateral level? One need only look at the records of IMCO, of the Seabed Committee and of the Stockholm Conference to get some idea of how active Canada has been in attempting to develop international environmental law and a new international Law of the Sea.

Canada is probably as active as any other country on a whole range of Law of the Sea problems, technical rules of the International Maritime Consultative Organization and international environmental law issues. The question arises as to why Canada has consistently advocated a comprehensive co-ordinated and integrated approach to the Law of the Sea rather than an attempt to settle some of the easier issues first *seriatim* and proceed to the more intractable ones. There are three reasons for this approach. First, the Canadian view is that only at a comprehensive Law of the Sea Conference can there be a balancing as between the national interests of individual countries and as between national interests and those of the international community. Secondly, the comprehensive approach represents an attempt to meet the difficulty in reaching agreement as to which issues are the priority questions. States are generally agreed on the high priority of one issue — the seabed beyond national jurisdiction — but are deeply divided on the relative importance to be attached to almost all other issues. Thirdly, almost no single issue left unresolved in this field of contemporary international law can be settled in isolation from other unresolved issues. There is interpenetration and interconnection which can be illustrated by examining any one of them.

For example, Canada from the beginning has been active in the Seabed Committee on the question of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

*States in accord
on high priority
of seabed zone
beyond national
jurisdiction*

This question, raised by the Ambassador of Malta, concerns the limits to be designated for this region, the regime applicable and the machinery for implementation of such a regime.

Canada has accepted from the outset that there is an area of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. While Canada supports the "exploitability test" laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, it does not argue that this give it the right to march out into the very centre of the ocean. So Canada has taken a serious interest in this question, and made a number of proposals and suggestions and participated in all of the deliberations of the Seabed Committee.

Seabed issues

The issues being discussed in the Seabed Committee involve first the regime for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. What international law will apply in that area? Where do the limits of the area begin? What are the kinds of legal rule states will agree to as governing exploration/exploitation in that area? What kind of international machinery will be required, if any, to implement this regime? There are a whole host of problems raised by this issue, ranging from such matters as serious security questions to basic economic problems for developing countries, the always very delicate issue of boundaries, although they are not national boundaries in the usual sense because no state has sovereignty over the Seabed beyond its own territorial sea. States are naturally zealous to protect their "sovereign rights" over the mineral resources of the continental shelf.

In addition to the seabed problems in the context which has been explained, there is a widespread feeling in the UN that the Continental Shelf Convention itself requires some elaboration and clarification. The Continental Shelf Convention, in Canada's view, represents a significant development of international law, and much of that convention will have to be retained in any new approach. The "exploitability test" is an elastic one, and it may be that the international community will have to devise some different legal basis for measuring the extent of national jurisdiction. There is a clear interrelation between the regime and limits of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction and the limits and regime of the continental shelf (which begins at the outer edge of the territorial sea and ends at the edge of the international area which will be preserved "for purely peaceful uses for the benefit of mankind, particularly the developing

countries").

To take another example, Canada very seriously concerned about the problem of over-fishing, and believes the time has come to do something about it. It is somewhat ludicrous, in an age when technology has made fishing quite a different thing from what it once was, to say simply that "freedom of the high seas" applies and that one of the freedoms is the right to fish at will. We think that the fishing problem has to be resolved through recognition by the international community, in the interests of conservation, that there will have to be an agreement on a management conception, with the coastal states playing a very large role in managing the fisheries resources off their coasts. We are not arguing that the coastal states should have exclusive rights to all the fish in such areas but are supporting the inclusive approach whereby other states would be permitted to fish subject to certain preferential rights to the coastal state. All concerned, however — and this is important — would fish on the basis of strict conservation rules, so that it would no longer be a case of whoever comes first grabbing up all the fish and letting the others go home with empty ships.

The fisheries problem is linked to the problem of the breadth of the territorial sea, because a number of Latin American states claim a 200-mile territorial sea within which they restrict foreign fishing. Closely connected with the breadth of the territorial sea is an issue that has been raised by the United States and the U.S.S.R. — namely, the right of passage in straits that would be affected by the 12-mile territorial sea. What they want is an unrestricted right of passage, not innocent passage. That is a question that raises difficulties for many coastal states as well as Canada (with respect to the Northwest Passage). That is one of the issues that will have to be resolved if we want a complete accommodation and not merely a picking away at the problem.

Pollution problem

The problem that, in a sense, is the most complex of all is that of pollution, first, because the law is so undeveloped. This is why Canada acted unilaterally. It is why Canada reserved its position on the International Court on this issue. There is almost no environmental law on the international plane. What there is, Canada has helped to create. Canada has been consistent. In the Boundary Waters Treaty with the United States, as early as 1909, the two countries agreed to an obligation not to pollute their respective boundary water

*Zeal to protect
'sovereign rights'
over resources
of continental
shelf*

Trail Smelter case was an arbitration involving a dispute between Canada and the United States, which went on for many years, ending in a ruling that a state should not so use its own territory as to damage the territory of another state. A smelter in Trail, B.C., was sending fumes across the border and damaging forests and agriculture, etc., in the United States. Canada accepted state responsibility for the damage.

Canada had a very strong position on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (an environmental as well as an arms-control measure), on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (another arms-control measure with environmental implications), and on the sea Arms Control Treaty (which also has environmental aspects).

A second reason why the pollution-control problem is so complex is that coastal states, in attempting to protect their environment, must necessarily pass measures that affect not only commercial vessels or fishing vessels or naval vessels or private yachts but all of these. Thus all normal means of navigation are at one and the same time subjected to controls by coastal states. However minimal the interference with freedom of navigation, these costs raise for major maritime powers basic questions concerning their conception of the freedom of the high seas.

What is the particular policy being pursued by Canada on the many unresolved Law of the Sea issues? The idea basic to the Canadian approach — unilateral, bilateral and multilateral — to all of the issues mentioned is “functionalism”. The Canadian approach is not a doctrine based on preconceived notions of traditional international law nor is it a radical or anarchistic approach careless of continuing further to the already chaotic state of the Law of the Sea. The Canadian position has been to analyze the problem and attempt to determine the specific measures needed to resolve the issues. On the multilateral plane, Canada, at both the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences, pioneered the functional approach (which was once embodied in the Law of the Sea) whereby states assert over various kinds of “contiguous zones” only that amount and kind of jurisdiction necessary to meet the particular problem in question. When Canada has acted unilaterally, it has reined in as much as possible from asserting full sovereignty and instead has asserted only that jurisdiction necessary to fulfil the particular functions required.

Sovereignty comprises a whole bundle of jurisdictions — that is to say, everything from criminal law, customs law, fishing

regulations, shipping regulations and anti-pollution control to security measures. A state will exercise its sovereignty, for example, in the territorial sea subject only to a right of innocent passage. States also exercise their sovereignty over their internal waters (subject to no qualifications.)

Canada suggested at the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences that a 12-mile territorial sea may or may not have been required at that time, but what was essential was to accord to coastal states fisheries jurisdiction out to 12 miles. This was the origin of the well-known Canadian “six-plus-six” formula (i.e. a six-mile territorial sea and a further six-mile exclusive fishing zone). The proposal failed by a fraction of a vote to become accepted at the 1960 conference as a rule of international law.

Classic example

Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act provides a classic example of the functional approach. Only that degree of jurisdiction was asserted that was essential to meet the real (as distinct from the psychological) needs, as has been made clear by a number of statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The same can be said of Canada's amendments to its Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act. Where total sovereignty was needed (as in the case of Barrow Strait, for example), it was asserted and, for this as well as other reasons, Canada established a 12-mile territorial sea, replacing the 1964 Canadian legislation, which had established a 9-mile exclusive fishing zone adjacent to Canada's pre-existing 3-mile territorial sea and laid down the basis for determining it from straight baselines.

In the same 1970 amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, Canada laid down the legislative basis for proclaiming exclusive fishing zones “adjacent” to its coast. Subsequently, by Order-in-Council, the special bodies of water on the east and west coasts mentioned earlier were established as Canadian fishing zones. A little later, pursuant to amendments to the Canada Shipping Act, pollution control was established over those zones. (Canada did not legislate to implement its long-standing claims that certain bodies of water, such as, for example, the Bay of Fundy on the east coast and Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance on the west coast, are Canadian internal waters. Canada simply asserted the kind of jurisdiction necessary to extend fisheries and pollution-control jurisdiction.)

The ways in which Canada has applied

Fraction of vote blocked adoption of 'six-plus-six' coastal formula

*Aim at declaration
of principles
as a framework
for environmental
law*

the functional approach to such issues as marine pollution, fisheries control and the seabed beyond national jurisdiction will be discussed in subsequent issues of *International Perspectives*. But it may be useful at this point to explain the relation, in the Canadian view, between the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June, the IMCO Conference in 1973 and the Law of the Sea Conference, also scheduled for 1973.

It has been the Canadian position since the decision of the UN to hold an environmental conference in Stockholm this year that such a conference could provide a unique opportunity to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to the future development of international environmental law. Such law has been virtually non-existent until now, and it was the Canadian view that it would be a major achievement if the conference could reach agreement on a declaration of principles that would not only provide guidelines to states for their future action but lay down the framework for the future development of international environmental law. What was proposed by Canada to achieve this end was the adoption and endorsement by the Conference of marine pollution control principles and of a declaration on the environment which would embody principles of international environmental law founded on the Trail Smelter case.

Stockholm guidelines

Canada therefore argued strongly that the Stockholm Conference should produce legal principles as well as exhortations to co-operative action. Canada argued that these legal principles should then be referred by Stockholm to the 1970 IMCO Conference for information and guidance and translation into technical rules for the safety of navigation, since only IMCO has the necessary expertise to carry out such a task. Canada has argued further that the Stockholm principles should be referred to the Law of the Sea Conference for action. Only the Law of the Sea Conference provides a forum for the major redevelopment of the Law of the Sea so badly required, particularly that relating to the protection of the marine environment. (IMCO is not by its constitution a law-making forum, and it is the Canadian view that no attempt should be made to redevelop the Law of the Sea under the aegis of IMCO.)

With these considerations in mind, Canada was the first (and only) state to table a declaration of marine pollution control principles in the Inter-Governmental Working Group on Marine Pollu-

tion that was preparing for the Stockholm Conference. At the same time, Canada began to work with the United States and other countries to develop a convention to forbid dumping into the sea of certain toxic substances carried from land to sea in ships. Canada was also the first country to table a declaration on the human environment, and the Canadian declaration had a high degree of legal content, analogous to the UN declarations on human rights and on outer space.

The marine principles elaborated in the Working Group on Marine Pollution at Ottawa in November 1971 and the draft Convention on Dumping (first submitted by the United States at that Working Group and later redeveloped at a meeting in Reykjavik) have now been referred onward by the Stockholm Conference for action by the Seabed Committee (the preparation committee for the Law of the Sea Conference) and for the information of the IMCO Conference (in the case of the marine-pollution principles), and to a separate conference to be held in London (in the case of the draft articles for a dumping convention).

Three principles endorsed

It is worth noting that not only the 21 marine-pollution principles agreed to at the November 1971 UN Working Group meeting in Ottawa were endorsed by the Stockholm Conference and referred to IMCO and the Seabed Committee but the three controversial Canadian coastal state jurisdiction principles were also referred to the Seabed Committee. It should be noted also that the draft Dumping Convention articles "blessed" by Stockholm are now no longer a "licence to dump" as was the case with the earlier drafts. The articles now provide the basis for an effective draft convention. It is effective for two reasons: first, environmentally, in that it specifies a "black list" of toxic substances that cannot be dumped at all and a "grey list" of other toxic substances that can be dumped only under strict controls; and, second, from a jurisdictional point of view, because it would permit enforcement by all parties to the Convention against ships "under their jurisdiction". (The action proposal actually approved at Stockholm read — "against ships in areas under their jurisdiction".) Thus the draft Convention may represent a real breakthrough in that it may lay down a basis for an accommodation between flag states and coastal states, enabling both to enforce the Convention against offending parties much as is the case with respect to slave ships and pirate ships.

The draft declaration on the human environment approved by the Stockholm Conference contains a number of legal principles based on those embodied in Canada's original draft declaration, principally the duty of states not to carry out activities within their jurisdiction that deleteriously affect the environment of other states or the environment beyond any state's jurisdiction, and the duty to develop further law of liability and compensation for damage. Thus the first objective in Canada's three-pronged approach has been achieved. Needless to say, much still remains to be done.

One closing comment may be in order. An impression is sometimes created that Canada is attempting to assert its claims in ways that ignore the interests of other countries. An examination of the action taken by Canada and the statements made by Canadian representatives in a series of international and other forums (going back to the 1969 Brussels IMCO Conference) indicates the contrary to be the case. Canada has attempted to work out the basis for an accommodation between coastal states and

maritime powers, between coastal fishing states and distant-water fishing states. Canada has suggested that these issues be approached conceptually as matters in which maritime — distant-water fishing states — agree that coastal states exercise certain management and conservation and environmental preservation powers on behalf of the international community as a whole, subject to strict treaty rules and subject to third-party arbitration as to the manner in which such authority is applied. The concepts that Canada has been suggesting are "delegation of powers" by the international community to coastal states and the acceptance of the duties of "custodianship" by coastal states in the interests of the international community as a whole. Whether these concepts eventually find general support, it is worth noting that they were reflected in the third Canadian principle just referred by the Stockholm Conference to the Seabed Committee.

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The pressing implications of Canada as a seabed power

Gordon Hawkins

are occasionally plagued by contemporary Canutes. Learning nothing from his presumption or the intransigence of the sea, they seem to think that, almost on command, the ocean is now ready to yield the vast mineral wealth that lies buried beneath its bed.

They do not recognize clearly enough that its extraction depends not only on the establishment of a steady mastery by man over his machines but on agreement between man and his neighbour as to the governance of the ocean floor.

Yet these modern myth-makers — science-popularizers, speech-writers, writers for the slightly-less-than-learned journals — do have a point. League by league and fathom by fathom, the seabed is responding to man's probing and is giving up oil and gas and other minerals at a faster rate than was foreseen in 1958, when the General Convention on the Continental

Shelf was signed. In another decade, more than a third of the world's production of oil and gas will come from under the sea.

Since 1958, the advances in underwater technology and the world's galloping consumption of hydrocarbons have made it clear that management, more than plunder, is essential if the seabed is not to be a divisive element in the world's affairs.

It is clear that sooner or later, whatever the conflicting evidence on the rate at which oil and gas and mineral mining

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will develop economically in the deeper waters, and whatever the conflict of interest between and within states, some sort of international organization for the control of the seabed is inevitable.

We have come to realize, too, that for this purpose a program and structure will have to be created radically different from any we now have. The problem of its creation is *sui generis*. It concerns the control of territory that, whether it belongs to everybody or to no one, is now both sought after and ungoverned.

The purpose of this article is three-fold: to substantiate the strong conviction that Canada has the capacity to become a major influence in the future of seabed development; to touch upon some of the problems involved and Canada's attitude and performance in relation to them; and to argue that the continued effectiveness of the Canadian role will depend upon the readiness of the policymaker to adopt the pace that the bureaucrat has set.

On three oceans

For Canada, the subject has to be of major importance. With a shoreline on three oceans, the second-largest continental shelf in the world, a special concern for the economics and management of non-renewable resources, a record of innovative action in the related problems of pollution prevention, and with considerable experience and expertise at its command in international law and marine science and technology, it hardly has any choice. It is no accident, therefore, that there should be forceful and creative Canadian participation in what, with the universal explicitness of United Nations prose, is known as "the examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof, underlying the high seas and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and of the use of their resources in the interests of mankind".

In any discussion of an international seabed regime, recognition must first be given to the prior or at least equal need to resolve the problems contained in the phrase "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" and the complex questions posed by the enigmatic wording of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. This instrument stated that a nation's seabed jurisdiction shall run to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that to where the depth is such that it "admits of the exploitation of the natural resources". In other words, if you can work it, it's yours. And oil and gas technology in advanced nations has been working it well

beyond the 200-metre mark.

Proposals for new limits abound: greater depth criterion; a distance measure; a mixed depth-and-distance rule (say 200 metres or 50 miles, whichever is the better); the end of the continental shelf, often, the continental margin, which is the point at which the abyssal depths properly begin. It has even been proposed that limits are potentially boundless and that the entire ocean floor should be carved up arbitrarily along lines drawn equidistant from the closest points adjacent to and opposite coastal states and islands, and that states should leave it at that. The problem is further compounded by existing claims: the extent of the territorial sea, some 12 miles which run to three miles, some (including Canada) to 12 miles and some — Latin America states with little or no continental shelf — to 200 miles. To some, the need to resolve this issue before an international regime can be considered makes the prospect of any kind of regime distant beyond belief.

Others, accepting that the limitation is *a sine qua non*, insist that agreement is not out of the question. Canada has taken the view that the only possible progressive procedure is to discuss both questions simultaneously, and the Canadian representatives on the UN Seabed Committee proposed that every state should make known the limits beyond which it will never claim in the hope that this practical move might lead to the resolution of some very basic differences while, at the same time, allowing the question of a future regime to be argued with a greater sense of reality.

Issue for conference

Another conditioning factor to be taken into account as one looks at the prospect for a seabed regime is the Law of the Sea Conference promised for 1973. If it meets, the question of the establishment of a equitable international regime will probably be the most spectacular of the issues on its agenda. It should be noted, however, that the relevant resolution of the UN General Assembly that called for this conference charged it with the responsibility of dealing with a broad range of related issues, including "those concerning the regime of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal states), the preservation of the marine environment (including, *inter alia*, the prevention of pollution) and scientific

Program to control territory that is 'both sought after and ungoverned'

search". The seabed issue thus takes its place in a full-scale revaluation of international marine questions.

It has been suggested that, with the present deep differences between states, the 1973 conference might never happen. Alternatively, it could be argued that with a preparatory committee of more than 90 member states, the conference has, in a sense, already begun. And, as with the UN Armament Commission, it might expect to meet for a long stretch of years, spinning out toughly-concluded agreements, first on one and then on another of the topics assigned to it by the General Assembly. In any ways, such a procedure might yield much clearer and more lasting results than the one in which the pressures and deadlines of a single meeting forced compromises subsequently found to be unacceptable, as proved to be the case with the Continental Shelf Convention itself in 1958. It is illustrative of one of the themes of this paper to note in this connection that a structure for the future international machinery of the seabed regime, complete with the outline of legislative, executive and regulatory bodies and of an administrative tribunal, were put forward by the Canadian delegation at the July 1971 sessions in Geneva. Further, viewing the prospects of the conference itself, the delegation made proposals for the establishment of transitional machinery so that, without waiting for a post-1973 treaty to come into force, the orderly and safe development of seabed resources might take place "without waiting for the law to catch up with technology".

There are differences in approach to the seabed issue that exist between capitalist and socialist states, between economic and defence interests within states, among broad-shelf states, narrow-shelf states, and shelf-locked states (whose continental shelf abuts on the shelf of another state). But it is between the technologically-advanced countries and those of the developing world, coastal and shelf-locked alike, that the deepest divisions exist.

Behind most of the proposals that have been made for an international seabed regime, there lies the assumption, explicit or otherwise, that some part of the royalties and profits of exploitation shall be made available to the underdeveloped nations either through the United Nations Development Program or by some other means. The plain fact, however, is that these contributions will be small in amount for a long time coming if they are to come from mining income beyond the continental shelf. The problem, therefore, may not be

one of simply achieving consensus on the new limits of national jurisdiction. It may mean a choice between a narrow limit and the abandonment of claims beyond that point, or a combination of a wide limit and a levy on that part of production that occurs within the outer limit but beyond, say, a distance of so many miles from the base-line of the territorial sea. These proceeds would then be placed at the disposition of the UNDP or a comparable agency. The points at issue, of course, are: where those lines should be drawn; how much shall be retained by the coastal state or its oil, gas, and mineral mining industries; what percentage shall be allocated to the developing world and by what formula; and how the administering agency should be constituted and governed.

Nixon proposal

One of the most widely advertised attempts to tackle this problem was the Nixon Proposal of May 23, 1970, which called for a treaty-based renunciation of all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed beyond the depth of 200 metres, and the creation of an international regime, whose writ would run beyond that depth. The proposal also called for a trusteeship zone between the 200-metre isobar and the seaward limit of the continental margin. This intermediate zone would be administered by the coastal state, and its industry would explore and exploit the area on the understanding that a percentage of the royalties and profits would be paid to an international seabed-resource authority for use as aid funds in the developing world.

The proposal met resistance, on the one hand from within the petroleum industry of the United States, which regarded it as a gratuitous dispersement of wealth from an extension of its own land-mass and on the other from within the developing world, which saw the device, and particularly the proposals made for its administration, as a stratagem to ensure effective control of that part of the seabed wealth that was likely to be economically exploitable in the foreseeable future. Clearly, the stand that Canada finally takes on this issue is crucial. Is it to take the national interest/economic growth position as this is understood from the Government's foreign policy review? Or will it act as an adequately endowed "have" country, which does not need to claim for itself alone the whole of the resources of the continental shelf, slope and rise, and hence is prepared to commit itself to a regime that will substantially and directly benefit the "have-not" countries of the world?

*Plan of President
prompted resistance
from within
developing world*

It is because Canada's contribution to this overall debate has been so substantial and its position on the central issue so crucial that it is necessary to consider at this point the Government's policy positions and, more particularly, the means by which it is reaching them.

Its record in the UN Seabed Committee and Subcommittees, the main arena for this debate, is, by any measure, extraordinary but, within the country, largely unknown. This is true in both the legal and the economic and technical spheres. It is probably true to say that the general recognition, if at times grudging, of Canada's forthright position on some issues, the acceptance of its mediatory role in others, and a respect for the expertise on which it draws, are very considerable. It is quite apparent to anyone who roams the corridors when the Seabed Committee is in session.

Because of the different priorities, skills and ambitions of senior civil servants who make up interdepartmental committees, and the need for constructive manoeuvre and accommodation within the international conference room, a totally co-ordinated and monitored policy is always difficult to pursue. Yet what little evidence is available seems to show that, as this large nexus of issues is subjected to the rigours of multilateral diplomacy, the co-ordination of Canadian policy at the bureaucratic level, if far from ideal, is impressive.

Canada's contribution

In manpower terms, there seems to be an almost disproportionate Canadian contribution at this level. The reasons for it are worth speculating about. The small international law fraternity in Canada, both in the public service and in the ranks of its academic mentors, has been of special quality. The conspicuous role it has occupied in discussions of the current issues of "hydrospace" has come about, it could be argued, because it is matched with an equally marked technical competence in the fields of natural-resource development and marine science and technology. While this latter has been most apparent in the size of investment and the quality of personnel in government-sponsored research, development in the private sector of Canadian marine industry has been picking up some speed. It is interesting to note that, at the recent Oceanology International Exhibition and Conference in England, there was a Canadian section of 17 companies, advertising a range of oceanographic equipment from deep-diving manned submersibles and surface ships for off-shore

drilling-rigs to underwater towing systems and seismic sub-bottom profile equipment.

Another complicating factor in the measurement of Canada's role is its long experience in the West and the North and now on the ocean floor, of devising procedures for the control and encouragement of oil and gas exploration and exploitation. Our methods and our legislation are of considerable interest to countries with less experience.

It is precisely at the point where we can fully appreciate the public-service lawyer and resource-development expert that a critical question has to be posed. We have reached a point where able bureaucrats, in the full exercise of their expertise and function and operating in an area of technical complexity, have been able to formulate relatively hard policy positions before the issues themselves have surfaced in a significant way in domestic political argument. Furthermore, scientific and technical negotiations in a multilateral setting have acquired a momentum of their own that is difficult for the policymaker to direct once the dynamic process has begun. This raises a question of political responsibility.

No one supposes that this question in some form or other, is not in the mind of the foreign policy community. Indeed it may seem to require a special kind of government to use this particular vehicle for airing the issue. The point, though, is that, if, as is being argued here, the issue of an international seabed regime is of special concern and responsibility in Canadian external relations, it is essential not that bureaucratic initiative and expertise should be contained but that the issue itself should be looming much larger on the domestic political scene so that, under the scrutiny of the parliament and the attentive public, a much clearer political direction is exercised.

Political security

The need for the maintenance of shared political perspectives on this kind of issue is accentuated still further by the growth of what might inelegantly be called "transnational specialist coalitions" or the growth of contact and power that specialist units within a bureaucracy, through representation in transnational organizations of both an official and an unofficial character, are achieving. In their concluding essay in the Summer 1972 volume of *International Organization*, titled "Transnational Relations and World Politics", Joseph S. Nye and Robert K. Kachane conjure up a complicated nightmare stemming from the interaction of private and public foreign policies. "Imagine," they suggest, "in relation to

*Seabed regime issue
'should be looming
much larger on the
domestic scene'*

development of ocean resources, a coalition of international oil companies, some elements in the Pentagon and the Department of the Interior and parts of other government departments opposing a coalition made up of international scientific organizations, the Department of State, other elements in the Pentagon and the Department of the Interior and certain foreign governmental units." If this seems too much of a fantasy, it should at least be conceded that the development of informal coalitions of parts of one national bureaucracy with parts of another against

either governments or a combination of a national bureaucracy and the bureaucracy of an international agency against governments are not far-fetched formulations. The essence of this present argument is that the politician has a pressing responsibility to see that this issue is brought out and argued about more fully in national politics so that a special conjunction of talent and opportunity can be turned to full account. Then what D'Arcy McGee called "the sense that comprehends the sea" could give a new and appropriate depth to our international role.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty ratified

Canada has ratified the Seabed Arms Control Treaty negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and approved by the United Nations General Assembly in the autumn of 1970. In announcing Canada's ratification on May 18, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp described the treaty as an important step toward the exclusion of the seabed from the arms race.

The treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (i.e. chemical and biological weapons) on the seabed and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. It also prohibits the emplacement of structures, launching facilities or installations designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. It does *not* prohibit the emplacement of conventional weapons that are not part of systems for mass destruction or any other underwater weapons systems that are not actually placed on the ocean floor—for example, nuclear submarines.

The Canadian delegation to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) played an active role in negotiations leading up to the treaty. Canada was among the first states to urge that the broadest possible range of arms-control measures should be extended to the widest possible area of the seabed and ocean floor.

With its ratification by 22 governments, including the United States, the U.S.R. and Britain, the treaty now enters into force. The Secretary of State for Ex-

ternal Affairs welcomed this development as "a major step forward in the long and difficult process of achieving a comprehensive system of arms control and disarmament".

Canada's ratification is accompanied by an interpretative declaration intended to make clear Canada's position on a number of Law-of-the-Sea issues related to the treaty. The declaration makes these points:

(a) The treaty cannot be interpreted as allowing states to place non-prohibited (i.e. conventional) weapons on the seabed and ocean floor beyond the continental shelf, or to use this area for anything but peaceful purposes.

(b) The treaty cannot be interpreted as allowing any state other than the coastal state to place non-prohibited weapons on its continental shelf.

(3) The treaty cannot be interpreted as in any way restricting the right of the coastal state to carry out inspection and removal of any foreign weapons or components or weapons systems on its continental shelf.

Instruments of ratification were deposited on May 17 by Canada's representatives in London, Washington and Moscow, where the treaty is open for signature and ratification. The document is officially known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof.

The goals in the dispute over Namibia's future status

At the heart of the protracted dispute between South Africa and the United Nations over Namibia (South West Africa) lies the question of to whom jurisdiction over the territory belongs and how this jurisdiction should be effected and exercised. Below this surface issue are some very complicated legal issues, as well as moral and humanitarian considerations.

On the resolution of this question depend a great many consequences for the future of Southern Africa, as well as for international institutions. At the same time, many of the most intractable dilemmas of the post-colonial heritage in Africa are present in the Namibian situation. While it is very easy for many people to say that they do not want the territory to become an integral part of South Africa, it is much more difficult to specify with any precision a course that will satisfy the aspirations of all its diverse peoples, not to mention those of UN members themselves. The new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, could hardly have chosen a more difficult problem as his first major mission in multilateral diplomacy.

The early explorers of the African coastline referred to the area north of the outlet of the Orange River as the Skeleton Coast because of its dry and inhospitable nature. Further inland lies sparse grasslands and a small area of more fertile land, but the great bulk of the territory is only marginally susceptible to cultivation. The total area of Namibia, 318,000 square miles, is slightly smaller than that of British Columbia. The generally inhospitable climate has had the effect of preserving in the area a substantial number of Bushmen and other primitive people who were largely eliminated elsewhere in Africa by the technologically more advanced Bantu-speaking and European peoples.

The boundaries of Namibia are a typically bizarre and arbitrary result of colonial coincidence. It was, in effect, scraped together by Germany from lands other colonial powers did not want. The

one substantial deep-water port along coastline, Walvis Bay (with some 4 square miles of surrounding territory), indisputably an integral part of South Africa, having been incorporated in the (British) Cape Colony by Sir Bartolomeus Frere in 1878, at the same time that he refused a proposal to annex all South West Africa. The Caprivi Strip, which stretches along the northern border of Botswana to the Zambezi from the northeast corner of the territory, was acquired by Germany in 1890, along with Heligoland, as compensation for ceding Zanzibar to Britain and was part of a drive for German influence in Central Africa. The northern boundary cuts the territory of the Ovambo people in two, and similarly fractures other peoples as well.

Germany fought a bloody war with the Herero and Nama peoples in the course of securing its hold over South West Africa, with the result that a large segment of the Herero people fled South West Africa in 1904 and have lived ever since in Botswana (where their descendants currently number about 50,000).

Mandates concept

Early in the First World War, South African forces under General Botha captured South West Africa from the Germans, and South Africa pressed strongly to have the territory incorporated into the Union of South Africa. At the Paris Peace Conference, where General Botha cited its strategic importance to South Africa as well as its contiguity to South Africa proper. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, however, was strongly opposed to the principle of territorial aggrandizement by the victorious powers and wished to see the former German colonies placed under supra-national control by the proposed League of Nations. General Smuts was instrumental in bringing about the compromise whereby the former German territories became "mandates" of the League of Nations administered by individual League members.

General Smuts advanced the Mandate

cept as an argument against those who wanted the former German colonies to return to Germany, and was not entirely used to see it applied to South West Africa, which the South Africans regarded as a special case. In response to pressure from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to annex the former German colonies they occupied, the Allied powers at Paris agreed that those territories should be "Class C" Mandates, which were defined as "territories, such as South West Africa... which... can best be administered under the laws of the mandatory power as integral portions thereof...". All League mandates included obligations to administer the mandatory power to administer the mandate in the interests of the indigenous inhabitants, and to fulfil certain other requirements. General Smuts subsequently stated that administration of the territory as a Class C Mandate was tantamount to annexation into South Africa. The League Council, to which South Africa submitted annual reports on the administration of the territory, included a voting representative of South Africa when the mandate was being discussed, and was required to take decisions on these occasions by a unanimous vote. The Permanent Mandates Commission, which undertook the League's detailed supervisory functions, was composed of experts who were not supposed to represent the political views of their countries of nationality. The reports of the Commission on South West Africa were, on the whole, favourable to South Africa.

After the Second World War, the League of Nations was dissolved, and all mandatory powers except South Africa concluded agreements with the United Nations to convert their League mandates to United Nations trusteeships, as provided for in Article 77 of the UN Charter. At the last session of the League of Nations in 1946, there was an opportunity for the competent League organs to pronounce on the succession of its legal responsibilities with regard to mandates, but they did not do so. In 1946, South Africa proposed to the UN General Assembly that approval be given for the incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa. This the Assembly refused to do. Despite the absence of a trusteeship agreement, South Africa submitted on a voluntary basis two annual reports on the administration of South West Africa to the UN Trusteeship Council in 1946 and 1947. The Charter made no provision for the continuation of mandates and South Africa contended that the trusteeship system was purely voluntary.

With the Nationalist Party coming to power in South Africa in 1948 and the accession of a steadily increasing number of ex-colonial countries to United Nations membership (to whom the Nationalists' policies of racial segregation were profoundly offensive), the prospects for a trusteeship agreement vanished. From this point on, a series of increasingly strong resolutions was passed in the General Assembly condemning South Africa both for its racial policies and for its failure to recognize any UN authority over South West Africa.

Ruling of 1950

A series of cases before the International Court of Justice failed to elucidate clearly the nature of South West Africa's international status, although the Court did rule in 1950 that, although South Africa was not obliged to conclude a trusteeship agreement, the Mandate remained in force and competence to modify the international status of the territory rested with South Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.

In 1962 Ethiopia and Liberia brought a suit against South Africa charging that it had failed to administer the territory in the interests of its inhabitants, in particular by applying *apartheid* laws in South West Africa. The significance of this suit lay in the fact that, under Article 94 of the UN Charter, Security Council sanctions could be invoked to secure compliance with an ICJ judgment in contentious proceedings (the only other grounds for Security Council sanctions are in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression). After extended presentations by both sides, however, the Court finally delivered an eight-to-seven verdict in 1966, stating that Ethiopia and Liberia had failed to establish a legal right or interest in the subject matter of the case, thus avoiding any legal decision on the substance of the case.

The majority of General Assembly delegates registered their dissatisfaction with the Court's judgment in no uncertain terms and responded to the situation by passing Assembly Resolution 2145 on October 27, 1966, by a vote of 114 to 2 (South Africa and Portugal), with three abstentions (Britain, France and Malawi). This resolution declared that "South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the mandated territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa"; and resolved "that in the circum-

*Ethiopia, Liberia
brought suit
against South Africa*

Assembly's
authority to
withdraw mandate
from South Africa
affirmed by Court

stances the United Nations must discharge those responsibilities with respect to South Africa". In effect, therefore, the General Assembly moved the South West African issue from the juridical to the political arena. By its affirmation that "South West Africa is a territory having international status" it registered the conviction of practically all UN members that South Africa must not be left to decide the fate of the territory unilaterally. The administrative responsibility for the area would henceforth lie with the UN, pending the early realization of the inhabitants' right to self-determination and independence.

The Security Council subsequently passed Resolution 264 on March 20, 1969 (Britain and France abstaining), which affirmed the essential provisions of Assembly Resolution 2145 but stopped short of labelling the situation a threat to the peace. Subsequently the Security Council asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia and the Court (whose membership had been substantially altered by the Assembly in elections for vacancies following the 1966 judgment) came up with an opinion, in June 1971, that in substance affirmed the competence of the Assembly to withdraw the mandate from South Africa.

In its judgment, the Court relied on the argument that, while the General Assembly had only recommendatory powers under the Charter, its Resolution 2145 had been endorsed by the Security Council, whose decisions all members were required to accept under Article 25 of the Charter. It should be noted, however, that Britain and France, two permanent members of the Security Council, have stated that they continue to believe the General Assembly exceeded its jurisdiction in passing Resolution 2145. There appears to be good reason to doubt that unanimity could be attained among the permanent members of the Security Council at this stage in favour of measures of coercion against South Africa over the Namibia issue.

Council's role

In the United Nations, a great many resolutions have been passed in both the General Assembly and the Security Council aimed at affecting the removal of South Africa from the territory and securing its early independence. The UN Council for Namibia, created in 1967, was given the task of administering this country but, owing to the South African *de facto* control, the Council has failed even to set foot in it. The Council has been able to fulfil a few extraterritorial functions, however,

such as issuing travel documents for Namibians abroad, which are recognized by a number of countries, including Canada. There is also a United Nations Trust Fund for Namibia, which undertakes payment for refugee training and provides financial support to Namibians suffering from persecution or oppression.

South Africa, which has had effective control of the administration since 1948, has nevertheless stopped short of accord South West Africa the same status and treatment as the provinces of South Africa proper and has made other moves which imply a recognition that South West Africa enjoys a certain international status. At meetings with an *ad hoc* Assembly of Experts in 1951-53, South Africa offered to negotiate an agreement with Britain, France and the United States, as the three remaining Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War, for some form of continuation of the mandate (this proposal was, however, rejected by the UN Assembly). In 1958 the Assembly established a Good Offices Committee, which met South African officials and reported back that South Africa was willing to consider a scheme for partitioning the territory. The Assembly rejected this idea. In January 1971, at the time that the ICJ was considering its advisory opinion on Namibia, the Republic offered to conduct a plebiscite among the people of the territory as to their preferred future course, under UN supervision. The timing of this offer and the conditions attached led the Court to refuse it consideration, and South Africa subsequently withdrew the offer.

The plans South Africa is at present implementing for Namibia are based on the report of the Odendaal Commission of 1963. This report recommended that the territory's 567,000 population (estimated in 1966) should develop along segregated racial lines in 11 separate "homelands". These vary in size from one for the 270,000 Ovambos to one for the 10,000 Kooekwaers. The overall administration of the territory under this plan would remain closely linked with that of the Republic.

There were about 96,000 whites in Namibia in 1966, of whom about 70 per cent were Afrikaner, 20 per cent German and 10 per cent English-speaking. Under the "homelands" scheme, the whites would continue to control the main centres of economic activity and (along with, to a lesser extent, the coloured and Rehoboth "Basters") enjoy a markedly higher standard of living than the other peoples of the country.

The economy of Namibia depends on its cash economic base mainly on its c

The problem of Namibia is both a challenge and an opportunity for the United Nations. If successfully resolved, it

would provide a demonstration that multilateral diplomacy under the aegis of the United Nations is capable of significant accomplishments. Having advanced extensive claims of jurisdiction, which have now been supported by the International Court of Justice, the Assembly majority understandably is seriously concerned that South Africa should be able to defy its quasi-unanimous resolutions with impunity. The Security Council has committed itself to obtaining a change in the Namibian *status quo* and the permanent members' commitment to the world organization will inevitably be measured for many by the willingness they show to give substance to the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

The map illustrates the geographical features and administrative divisions of South West Africa. Key locations include:

- Coastal Area:** Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, Cape Cross, Lüderitz, Oranjemund.
- Interior Towns:** Windhoek (capital), Rehoboth, Karibib, Otjiwarongo, Tsumeb, Grootfontein, Tsumkwe, Maun, Bitterfontein.
- Geographical Features:** Kunene River, Okavango River, Kunene, Etosha Pan, Lake Ngami, Makgadikgadi (salt pans), Orange River, Vioer River, Vioer River.
- Neighboring Regions:** ANGOLA (PORT.), ZAMBIA, RHODESIA, BOTSWANA, SOUTH AFRICA, NAMIBIA.
- Scale:** 0 to 200 Miles / 0 to 200 Kilometres.
- Inset Map:** Shows the location of South West Africa within the continent of Africa.

Despite the overwhelming UN support for early independence for Namibia as an integral unsegregated whole, however, it is far from clear that universal agreement exists on the form that it should take or the processes to attain it. Experience in decolonization elsewhere has shown that the administration of a territory in the years immediately preceding independence plays a key role in determining its future course. Should direct UN control of Namibia ever be attained, the type of interim pre-independence regime to be installed would crucially affect its future. Any UN administration of Namibia would be faced with highly delicate and controversial policy decisions on, *inter alia*, language (Afrikaans, German, English or Ovambo), political representation, land distribution, water rights and economic policy. The UN administrative structure would have to attempt to cope with these problems under the pressure of strongly divergent views from interested parties both inside and outside Namibia.

Shaken by strike

Recent events in Namibia indicate that the South African grip on Namibia may not be as firm as its officials have hitherto believed. The strike by 13,000 Ovambo mine-workers in January severely shook the administration and led to unprecedented Government concessions regarding the conditions for contract labour in the diamond mines and other sectors of the economy (without, however, fundamentally altering the basis of this harsh system). The strike led to something approaching open rebellion in Ovamboland and the expulsion of the outspoken Anglican Bishop Colin Winters and three of his colleagues. Previously Ovamboland had been the first "homeland" to be established in Namibia and the Ovambo were regarded by Pretoria as pro-South Africa. South African observers apparently underrated the collective consciousness of the people there and the symbolic nature for them of the ICJ advisory opinion.

In March of this year, UN Secretary-

General Waldheim visited South Africa and Namibia on the invitation of the public and in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution of February 4, 1972. This resolution authorized him, in consultation with a committee of representatives of Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia, to initiate talks with all parties concerned with a view to establishing the necessary conditions in order to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

This exercise in multilateral diplomacy is extraordinarily difficult, not only because of the vast gulf separating South Africa's position from that of the majority but also because divergent interests among UN members themselves, hitherto submerged, could make solutions even more difficult to achieve. Mr. Waldheim's mission nevertheless had an auspicious beginning; he and his five Secretariat advisers were able to travel widely throughout Namibia meeting representatives and leaders of every community as well as holding substantive confidential discussions with South African Government leaders in Pretoria.

There is still considerable reason to hope that South African Government leaders will see the wisdom of avoiding a type of open confrontation with the United Nations that could not fail to have serious consequences for all concerned, both domestically and internationally. For other UN members, there remains a need to think hard and deeply about the concrete steps that can be undertaken to redress the international responsibilities all countries bear toward the people of this territory. The foremost goal for everyone surely is still the one spelt out in Article 2 of the Mandate agreement of December 1970, which is "... the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory ...".

This article was prepared in the Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs of the Department of External Affairs.

Strike by miners of Ovamboland led to concessions for contract labour

NATO and European security



The NATO ministerial meeting in Bonn on May 30 and 31 coincided with the completion of President Nixon's talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Foreign ministers of the alliance are shown at the opening session in the Deputies' Tower in Bonn. Reporting on the meeting to the Commons on June 5, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp said NATO members welcomed the strategic arms limitation agreements as an "important turning-point in efforts to curb the nuclear-arms race and enhance international security through nuclear-arms control".

Mr. Sharp noted that on June 3 the foreign ministers of the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France had signed a final pact ending the Berlin Agreement on force. At the same time, representatives of West Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland had exchanged instruments of ratification concluding their non-aggression treaties.

"Together these developments open the way for the alliance to take part in multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and for the two German states to begin negotiations on a *modus vivendi* . . ."

Mr. Sharp said NATO ministers agreed in Bonn to accept the invitation of the Finnish Government to hold multilateral preparatory talks to prepare for a European security conference. The decision to convene a formal conference will depend on the outcome of these preparatory talks.

In addition to a European security conference, NATO ministers devoted considerable attention to the question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Mr. Sharp said: "... We believe any real improvement in security in Europe will remain illusory unless it is accompanied by some reduction in the concentration of military power in the area."

The Minister suggested that this did not mean that force reductions should be negotiated at a conference. It would be impossible in practical terms to carry out negotiations on such a complex matter among 35 conference participants. He felt, however, that preparations for a conference and for MBFR negotiations should proceed as far as possible in parallel: "In order that force reductions complement the political achievements of a security conference, talks on the two subjects should be concurrent but separate."

Mr. Sharp stressed that there should be no illusions about the difficulties ahead: "... We shall have to combine continued defence preparedness with pursuit of *détente*, alliance solidarity, with willingness to seek accommodation with the other side, and firmness on basic principles with flexibility on means . . ."

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72/8 In Search of a Fresh Canadian Industrial Policy. An address by the Minister of Finance, the Honourable John N. Turner, to the Canadian Club of Toronto, April 4, 1972.

72/9 Canada Forges Another Link with Latin America. A statement by the Honourable Paul Martin, Leader of the Government in the Senate and Head of the Canadian Delegation to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank, May 10, 1972, in Quito, Ecuador.

72/10 Canada's Unique Relation with the United States. An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, to the Buffalo Area Chamber of Commerce, Buffalo, New York, May 9, 1972.

72/11 Some Aspects of the World where Canada Works and Trades. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, at the Canadian Business Outlook Conference, Vancouver, May 11, 1972.

72/12 The Canadian Foreign Service. Comments by Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Ambassador of Canada to the United States, at Fletcher School, Boston, on March 14, 1972.

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Sign Investment Insurance Agreement with Israel, May 1, 1972.

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Canada Ratifies Seabed Arms Control Treaty, May 18, 1972.

Establishment of Canadian Consular Office in Stuttgart, May 19, 1972.

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European Space Research Organization

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Hungary

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Signed at Ottawa October 6, 1971.

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Israel

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International Perspectives

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The Meaning of Stockholm

Bonn's Ostpolitik and its Impact

UNCTAD III Revisited

A Long-Term Agenda for Rhodesia

International Perspectives

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Subscription rates: Canada, United States and Mexico, \$3.00 a year, single copies 75 cents; other countries \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00.

Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Information Canada, 171 Slater Street, Ottawa, Canada.

Authorized as second class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.



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International Perspectives is designed as a publication combining articles by officers of the Department of External Affairs and the editors with contributions from people who have no connection with the Department. These contributors from outside the Department are expressing their personal views on Canada's role in the world and on current international questions of interest to Canadians.

Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Stockholm: creating the basis for global environmental law

by Geoffrey F. Bruce and Norman Riddell

In the fall of 1968, the UN General Assembly decided to hold a world conference on the human environment in Sweden in 1972. While some countries had programs and regulations designed to protect their people and their natural environment against excessive pollution and against the unplanned exploitation of their natural resources, few recognized that the cumulative effects of pollution and of the unregulated use of the earth's resources were beginning to threaten the health of the human environment. Indeed, those few wise men and women — one thinks immediately of Rachel Carson — who tried to warn of the risks of the uncontrolled use of chemicals, the careless disposal of industrial and urban wastes in the atmosphere, rivers, lakes and seas and the irresponsible exploitation of the world's renewable and non-renewable resources, were often belittled as prophets of doom. In short, the concern for the environment, which is so widespread in 1972, was scarcely recognized in 1968, and certainly had little political force.

It was Sweden in 1968 that enlisted the support of Canada and a number of other countries, that recognized and expressed the dangers facing the world environment and successfully appealed to the UN and all its member states to act quickly before it was too late.

A little more than three years later, the international community met in Stockholm in June of this year and the theme of the conference was, appropriately, "Only One Earth".

As discussed in an earlier article in *International Perspectives*, the task of preparing for this conference was formidable. The secretary-general of the conference, Maurice Strong, the former head of Canada's foreign aid program, assisted by a small secretariat and guided by a 27-member preparatory committee, of which Canada was a member, sifted through thousands of pages of scientific, technical, economic, social, legal, historical and general information material in order to pre-

pare the final 700 pages covering more than 200 recommendations and the supporting documents for governments to consider at the conference. Their work involved an assessment of the present state of the environment, the identification of the threats to it and the determination of the measures that people and their governments must take in order to manage the world's resources and to limit the rate of pollution to levels consistent with a healthy environment and the need for continuing economic growth in developed and developing countries.

Only one earth

The results of the conference are in, and it is now clear that, as the "first step on a new journey of hope for the future of mankind", as Maurice Strong put it, it was an outstanding success. In approving the Declaration on the Human Environment and 109 recommendations for international action, the representatives of 113 countries recognized that there was only one earth, that it was threatened and that it must be protected. Although none of the decisions are legally binding, the governments represented at Stockholm committed themselves morally and politically to act individually and in co-operation with other governments and interested organizations to work together in establishing an "Earth Watch" to keep the state of the environment under constant surveillance and in creating an organization and an environment fund to co-ordinate the environmental programs and activities of the UN system and its member governments.

While many countries have done much, and while much remains to be done,

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the UN Conference on the Human Environment was an indispensable step toward the recognition of the sensitive interdependence of living things on earth. The conference created a comprehensive basis for a new international law of the environment. This conference will undoubtedly take its place as one of the most important in the history of the United Nations.

Who was at Stockholm? And how were these important results achieved in a conference of only two weeks' duration?

The representatives of 113 governments and of many international and national organizations representing environmentalists, scientists, humanitarian causes, trade and industry, labour, education, na-

tive peoples, agriculture, fishing and forestry, the churches and many other interests gathered in Stockholm for this conference. The Soviet Union and several countries associated with it refused to attend because the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was not invited. Those governments will have an opportunity to participate, if they wish, in the program of work flowing from the conference when its decisions are taken up this fall by the UN General Assembly, in the Specialized Agencies of the UN system and in many other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Six themes

It is difficult, if not impossible, to define what is covered by the term "environment" — and fortunately governments do not try. What it does cover is suggested by the general themes of the work of the conference, which were considered as separate but closely interrelated problem areas. They were:

- The planning and management of human settlements for environmental quality;
- the environmental aspects of natural resources management;
- the identification and control of pollutants of broad international significance, e.g. the release of chemicals into atmosphere, rivers and oceans;
- the educational, informational, social and cultural aspects of environmental issues;
- development and the environment;
- the international organization and complementation of the recommendations of the conference for future action.


The Declaration on the Human Environment was considered as a separate dimension of the conference's program of work.

Among the wide range of issues discussed by the conference was the question of population policies. Delegates adopted the Secretariat's recommendation that special attention be given to population concerns as they related to the environment in the preparations for the 1974 World Population Conference. They approved two new recommendations, dealing with the provision of family-planning information and the other with research into human reproduction. They did not, however, have the time to consider world population policy that would take into account the capacity of the world's resources and economic systems to support human life. This question will undoubtedly

The Canadian delegation to the Stockholm conference included a broad spectrum of federal and provincial spokesmen and representatives of non-governmental organizations. The delegation was headed by Jack Davis, Canada's Minister of the Environment, and included:

Senator Alan Macnaughton, vice-chairman of the delegation; Dr. Victor Goldbloom, Quebec's Minister of the Environment; William Yurko, Alberta's Environment Minister; Eymard Corbin, Parliamentary Secretary to the federal Minister of the Environment; Paul Tremblay, Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Glen Bagnell, Nova Scotia Minister of Mines; Neil Byers, Saskatchewan Environment Minister; G. W. N. Cockburn, Minister of Fisheries and Environment for New Brunswick; William C. Doody, Newfoundland Minister of Mines, Agriculture and Resources; and R. F. Shaw, Deputy Minister of the federal Department of the Environment.

Secretary-general of the delegation was Geoffrey Bruce, Director of the External Affairs Department's Scientific Relations and Environmental Problems Division. Advisers to the delegation included representatives from the federal and provincial governments and five non-governmental organizations: Everett Biggs, Deputy Minister of Ontario's Department of the Environment; W. W. Mair of Manitoba; Arthur J. Hiscock of Prince Edward Island; James MacDonald, Canadian Labour Congress; George Manuel, National Indian Brotherhood; David McCreery, National Youth Conference; Miss C. N. Norminton, Canadian Federation of Agriculture; V. C. Raudsepp of British Columbia; and Louis Renzoni, Mining Association of Canada.



UPI Photo

The Stockholm conference dealt with the growing problems of marine pollution such as those caused by oil spills. In the picture an oil-retaining boom is drawn into place around a 240-foot

oil-tanker that ran aground off the northeast Atlantic coast of the United States. The ship left a ten-mile trail of home-heating fuel at the entrance to Long Island Sound.

one of the central themes in the 1974 conference on Human Population.

The Stockholm conference approved Canada's proposal for a UN Conference on Demonstration on Experimental Human Settlements. This conference, which is to be held in Canada in 1975, evoked considerable interest and may prove to be a forum for broad-ranging discussions of development policy as well as technical problems of human settlements. All Canadian governments will undoubtedly be involved in preparations for this conference.

The conference also approved an Indian/Libyan recommendation to establish an international voluntary fund to help developing countries establish housing projects. Canada opposed this recommendation because it believed that there already were funds and programs in existence to deal with such projects. But the delegation stated that Canada would be willing to increase its foreign aid to take into account environmental and urban-growth problems in developing countries. This proposal is of considerable importance and will certainly be reconsidered in the two conferences on population and human settlements.

Marine pollution

The question of pollutants of broad international significance was dealt with in two areas — marine pollution and other pollutants. The conference endorsed Canada's

recommendation on marine pollution (including ocean dumping) — an action which represented a major breakthrough in Canada's efforts to obtain recognition of the rights of coastal states and to establish the basis for international law governing the marine environment that will replace the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. The proposed ocean-dumping convention has been referred to the UN Seabed Committee and to a further intergovernmental conference to be held in London before November 1972. Canada will want to review its position in preparation for these meetings as well as the 1972 Conference of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization and the Law of the Sea Conference, tentatively scheduled for next year. Both these conferences will deal with aspects of marine pollution.

Canada will also want to continue its efforts to secure support for the fisheries-management principles it advocated at Stockholm, and may wish to use the proposed fisheries-management conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization in February 1973 or the meetings of the Seabed Committee for this purpose.

The Stockholm conference also approved a Canadian proposal for the establishment of an international registry of clean rivers. This proposal will require further development and refinement.

Dealing with other pollution problems, delegates strengthened the secretar-

iat's original proposals and endorsed development of arrangements for testing the potential dangers of pollutants, international inter-calibration programs, a registry of chemicals in the environment, a registry of releases of radioactive materials into the biosphere, international correlation of medical and environmental data and primary protection standards for humans. One important dimension of the program for monitoring the earth's atmosphere and thus detecting changes in the world's climate was the conference's decision to set up a global network of 110 stations "to keep watch" on climatic variations. Canada has already completed three of these and will build a total of ten.

The question of nuclear testing, and particularly atmospheric testing, also aroused considerable attention. China attempted to expand the condemnation of tests of nuclear weapons to other weapons of mass destruction and to obtain a worldwide ban on the use of all such weapons. France indicated that it would not be bound by any resolution against nuclear tests. Canada supported a resolution condemning all nuclear tests.

The question that received the most attention in the area of resource management was an American proposal for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. Canada supported this proposal as the lesser of two evils, but noted that its stand was contrary to its general principle that all renewable resources should be harvested for the benefit of man on the basis of optimum sustainable yield. The conference also approved a proposal for an international study of available energy resources and called for environmental-impact statements for all development projects. Canada supported this proposal, both as an energy- and resources-rich country and as a major aid donor.

Formula for trade

As expected, economic development issues in developing countries were a major theme of the conference. Canada declared that it would increase its aid at a faster rate in recognition of the environmental needs of developing countries and, to break a serious impasse in the conference between developed and developing nations, introduced a formula on measures to mitigate the impact of environmental measures on world trade.

Conference discussions of the educational, informational, cultural and social aspects of environmental problems underlined the concern the Canadian public had expressed in the government's pre-conference hearings in each of the ten provinces

and the Northwest Territories — namely that a new and multi-disciplinary approach must be taken to public education in order to stimulate public support and understanding for environmental programs. The conference also recognized the importance of involving local governments and non-governmental organizations in this process. The Canadian delegation, which included representatives from the federal and provincial governments, the Mining Association of Canada, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the National Youth Conference, the National Indian Brotherhood and the Canadian Labour Congress, provided a precedent for effective team-work for this purpose.

In its treatment of the educational, informational, cultural and social aspects of environmental problems, the conference also discussed a number of conservation conventions currently at various stages of negotiation among governments. These are: (i) a draft convention for the preservation of islands for science; (ii) a convention for the protection of the world's cultural and social heritage; (iii) a convention on the export, import and transit of certain species of wild animals and plants; and (iv) a convention to set the framework for international regulations governing the management of migratory game.

Post-Stockholm machinery

On the question of post-Stockholm institutional arrangements needed to co-ordinate the UN's environmental activities and implement conference recommendations, the conference recommended creation of:

(1) A 54-member governing council for environmental programs to promote international co-operation in environmental matters and give general policy guidance on environmental programs of the UN and its Specialized Agencies;

(2) an environment secretariat headed by an executive director elected by the General Assembly, with the core of staff paid from the regular UN budget;

(3) a voluntary environment fund with a five-year target of \$100 million to finance new environmental activities of the UN and its Specialized Agencies;

(4) an environmental co-ordinating board to ensure co-operation and co-ordination of plans and activities among organizations concerned with implementation of environmental programs.

All these recommendations were supported by Canada.

No decision on the location of the UN environment secretariat was taken but it is expected that the General Assembly will select the city this fall.

Canada undertakes to increase aid at a faster rate

The problem of obtaining and exchanging information and scientific and technical data recurred in the examination of almost every area of the conference's work. To meet these needs, the conference approved the establishment of an International Referral System that will link environmental institutions of countries in a network designed to improve and speed up the exchange of scientific, technical and other data.

Contrary to initial expectations, the declaration on the Human Environment provoked the major debate of the conference. Argentina and Brazil differed about the need for consultations in the event that a country planned or implemented a project that would have environmental consequences for its neighbours. Since the conference was unable to reach agreement on this principle, it was referred to the forthcoming UN General Assembly for consideration.

Declaration approved

Argentina wanted an international commitment not to test or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Other states made further proposals. In the end, the conference approved a 26-principle declaration, the basic item of which recognizes the sovereign right of each state to exploit its own resources but with the proviso that each state has the responsibility to ensure that its activities do not cause damage either to other states or to areas beyond

national jurisdiction. The Chinese maintained reservations about the principle on nuclear testing, but did not oppose the approval of the declaration by the conference.

One disappointment at the conference was the lack of support for a proposal put forward by Jack Davis, Canada's Minister of the Environment, for establishment of international pollution-control standards. In the section of the Conference Report on Development and the Environment and in the Declaration of Principles, the conference opposed uniform application of pollution-control standards. The developing countries regard the unused assimilative capacity of their environment as an economic resource. They do, however, accept the fact that the assimilative capacity of the environment is limited and they would support standards designed to keep pollution emissions below the danger-point. The Canadian delegation was able to obtain recognition of the importance of harmonization of international product standards — a move aimed at averting use of environmental and pollution controls as devices for restricting trade.

The delegates discussed the question of holding a second Conference on the Human Environment in several years and Mr. Davis, who headed Canada's delegation, said Canada would be pleased to serve as host for such a meeting. The delegates agreed to leave the decision on a second conference to the General Assembly.

*Lack of support
for establishment
of standards for
pollution curbs*

The Stockholm charter ...

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm adopted a declaration of principles to serve as a foundation for a global attack on pollution. The document, entitled *Declaration of the Human Environment*, goes before the UN General Assembly for ratification at its twenty-seventh session in the fall.

The declaration is regarded as the first step toward development of environmental law. Despite its non-binding character, the document is being considered as a sort of constitution against which future environmental actions could be measured in world opinion. The achievement of a consensus among representatives of the 113 nations at the conference gives the programme strong moral backing.

Following are the 26 principles adopted after much debate at Stockholm:

- (1) Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating *apartheid*, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.
- (2) The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora



UPI Photo

Shirley Temple Black, one of the U.S. delegates to the UN Conference on the Human Environment, listens to the debate in Stockholm's Congress Hall. In this session, China pressed for reconsideration of some aspects of the Declaration on the Human Environment, the document containing the principles designed to govern a global attack on pollution.

and fauna, and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management as appropriate.

- (3) The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must be maintained and wherever practicable restored or improved.
- (4) Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely imperilled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation, including wildlife, must therefore receive importance in planning for economic development.
- (5) The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion and to ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all mankind.
- (6) The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to en-

sure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the people of all countries against pollution should be supported.

- (7) States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with the legitimate uses of the sea.
- (8) Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favourable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life.
- (9) Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of underdevelopment and natural disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substantial quantities of financial and technical assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the developing countries and such timely assistance as may be required.
- (10) For the developing countries, stability of prices and adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw material are essential to environmental management, since economic factors, as well as ecological processes, must be taken into account.
- (11) The environmental policies of states should enhance, and not adversely affect, the present or future development potential of developing countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by states and international organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meeting the possible national and international economic consequences resulting from the application of environmental measures.
- (12) Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the environment, taking into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any costs which may emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards into their development planning and the need for making available to them, upon their request, additional international technical and financial assistance for that purpose.
- (13) In order to achieve a more rational

*Duty to safeguard
wildlife heritage
- and its habitat*



Wide World Photo

Two-year-old Aaron Christopher Graves
 joins hundreds of other San Francisco
 city area residents in helping clear

beaches of bunker oil that spilled when
 two Standard Oil tankers collided under
 the Golden Gate Bridge last year.

management of resources and thus to improve the environment, states should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve the human environment for the benefit of their population.

(1) Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect and improve the environment.

(2) Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbanization with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the environment and obtaining maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for all. In this respect, projects which are designed for colonialist and racist domination must be abandoned.

(3) Demographic policies which are without prejudice to basic human rights and which are deemed appropriate by governments concerned should be applied in those regions where the rate of population growth or excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on the environment or development, or where low population density may prevent improvement of the human environment and impede development.


(4) Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of planning, managing or controlling

the environmental resources of states with a view to enhancing environmental quality.

(18) Science and technology, as part of their contribution to economic and social development, must be applied to the identification, avoidance and control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems and for the common good of mankind.

(19) Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension. It is also essential that mass media of communication avoid contributing to this deterioration of the environment but, on the contrary, disseminate information of an educational nature on the need to protect and improve the environment in order to enable man to develop in every respect.

(20) Scientific research and development in the context of environmental problems, both national and multinational, must be promoted in all countries, especially the developing countries. In this connection, the free flow of up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience must be supported and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environmen-



UPI Photo

Ingemund Bengtsson, Sweden's Minister of Agriculture, presides at the final session of the conference, which approved the Stockholm declaration of principles.

tal problems; environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries on terms which would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an economic burden on the developing countries.

- (21) States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Peter Calamai of Southam News Services noted that the real challenge facing the Stockholm meeting was eloquently summarized by British economist Lady Barbara Ward and U.S. ecologist Rene Dubos in their book *Only One Earth*:

"The establishment of a desirable human environment implies more than the maintenance of ecological equilibrium, management of natural resources and the control of the forces that threaten biological and mental health.

- (22) States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
- (23) Without prejudice to such criteria which may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in some cases to consider the system of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the more advanced countries, but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
- (24) International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all states.
- (25) States shall ensure that international organizations play a coordinated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection and improvement of the environment.
- (26) Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.

"Ideally it requires also that social groups and individuals be provided with the opportunity to develop ways of life and surroundings of their own choice."

Mr. Calamai suggested the conference had largely faced up to the first part of the challenge, but "only in the vaguest way" during the conference talk about curbing the spread of one-quarter of the world so that the needs of the remaining three-quarters could be met". (*Ottawa Citizen*, June 1, 1972).

No empty ritual, conference went beyond its limited goals

by D. A. Chant

For the average Canadian with environmental awareness and concern, the events associated with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment had a number of components. In Canada, a public and semi-public process culminated in the statement on Canada's position to the House of Commons during the first week of June by the Minister of the Environment, Jack Davis. The official paper for presentation to the conference was then completed. At the conference itself in Stockholm, June 5 to 16, our official delegation and other Canadians played some interesting roles, which received considerable domestic attention.

Also widely reported in Canada was the Independent Conference on the Environment organized by Dai Dong and sponsored by the International Fellowship for Reconciliation; it convened in Stockholm, June 1 to 8. Canada had three Dai Dong participants: Professor Fred Knelman of Montreal, Professor Henry Regier of Toronto and myself.

Less well reported and not widely recognized by environmentalists was the work done by federal, provincial and international civil servants in drafting position papers for the preparatory committee of the United Nations conference in Geneva. In effect, over a period of several years, these people negotiated the formulation of objectives and recommendations, many of which subsequently were accepted. Canada's experts on various aspects of fisheries and the marine environment played an especially leading role in these negotiations. Though widely recognized by their international colleagues, Canadians generally are unaware of their contributions.

Most Canadian environmentalists are openly dismayed at the way in which the Canadian position statement was developed, and this triggered considerable criticism about the Stockholm conference itself. Many had hoped that Canada would take a strong position of leadership in the world community, recognizing and clearly

pointing out the environmental hazards of continued "boosterism": population growth, uncontrolled technology, unregulated production and consumption and heedless resource exhaustion. Instead, they became aware of a series of drafts of Canada's paper that were developed in rapid sequence. Some of these were semi-secret and, when they could be obtained at all, bore little apparent relation to one another or to the hopes of environmentalists. The first few were trivial, over-written, self-congratulatory overviews of the Canadian environment and the progress being made by our Government and industry to clean up pollution. There followed one or two that seemed to deny the existence of these hazards and the concern felt by so many people. Environmentalists were further dismayed by the difficulties and frustrations of attempting to identify exactly what our Government's position was.

Suddenly a series of public hearings was announced, to be conducted at the last minute, in April, by E. G. Corbin, Parliamentary Secretary to Mr. Davis; Robert Shaw, Deputy Minister of the federal Environment Department; and Senator Alan Macnaughton, vice-chairman of the Canadian delegation to Stockholm. Notice of these meetings was short, background information from Ottawa was scarce, and few were able to prepare presentations of real substance. Tokenism and condescension were so obvious as to be almost visible, hanging like a fog in the meeting halls across the country. The atmosphere was not improved by a number of obvious and

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sarcastic remarks about "academic ecologists", who made up a large part of the audience at most of the sessions. The word "ecologists" slipped from some tongues with what can only be described as venom, almost as though we were Communists and these were the 1950s, or socialists to B.C. Premier W. A. C. Bennett's followers.

Fears not justified

As a result of all this, many Canadians became convinced that the Stockholm UN conference would be a meaningless international ritual, without substance or sincerity, insight or action.

Happily, in retrospect, the Stockholm conference, and Canada's participation in it, did not justify these fears. Environmentalists are not filled with satisfaction, it is true, or very optimistic about the determination, or indeed the ability, of the international community to preserve the integrity of the global environment. But the conference accomplished far more than I personally predicted, and Canada began to come of age environmentally, on the international scene, though we remain embarrassingly compromised on many major environmental questions.

There was widespread misunderstanding in Canada about the immediate purposes of the United Nations conference. Many assumed, apparently, that its purpose was, then and there, to develop effective policies for pollution abatement and environmental protection and by international agreement to put them into effect immediately. Maurice Strong, Secretary-General for the conference, pointed out many times that the goal was much more limited: simply the acceptance of a declaration on the human environment and the establishment of an agency within the United Nations to monitor environmental quality and to co-ordinate international environmental activities. The conference was entirely successful in this, though all recommendations still must be approved by the UN General Assembly. To some, this may seem to be too little, too late, simply standing by and carefully recording the progressive deterioration and eventual destruction of the global life system. But to me it is an important and necessary first step to the eventual control and reversal of deterioration and I am surprised that it was accomplished with such unanimity.

Against the background of these limited objectives, further accomplishments of the conference are icing on the cake. And there were many additional accomplishments, ranging from a recommendation for a ten-year moratorium on whaling (which has no chance of UN approval) to one sup-

porting the principle that nations do have the right to pollute air or water that will shortly flow into a neighbour's territory. Astonishingly, almost all of the recommendations on the agenda, number more than 200, were approved, much to the credit of the experts who formulated them. Of course, even assuming that the General Assembly accepts most or all of these, there is little the UN can do directly to enforce them. But the very fact that an official, government-appointed delegation of 113 nations approved these recommendations, albeit sometimes in a diluted form, is an achievement of considerable dimensions.

Despite the natural reservations, cynicism, even suspicion, of many people, the conference must be viewed with optimism. Certainly there is a vast gulf between agreement and the formulation of a problem and the development of a co-operative, effective program for its solution. And the full problem has not yet been formulated internationally. We have yet to see in full the sentiment of the *have-not* nations toward the *haves* over resource disparities and economic and resource imperialism. They suspect that we are playing games with the environmental issue to achieve political and economic objectives. They point to the many "important" Canadians who still hold to the dangerously-outworn convictions that growth *per se* is good, and that bigger is better. The link between such boosterism and environmental deterioration is now so clear that the Third World suspects our sincerity when we do not even have clearly-stated internal policies on such questions. These problems may stagger the mind with their complexity, and the UN's record of effecting international co-operation is not good. But without the first steps nothing could ever be achieved and they have now been taken.

Canada's role

Canada can indulge in some self-satisfaction over its participation in the Stockholm conference for several reasons. First, of course, because of the leading role played by Mr. Strong in organizing it and achieving the success it enjoyed. Second, because of the important role played by the faceless civil servants who helped to draft the conference documents. And third, because of the effectiveness of the Canadian delegation, both in formal sessions and behind the scenes in achieving agreement, and at times compromise, on contentious issues that threatened to disrupt, if not ruin, the conference.

Canada's official delegation included Mr. Davis, Mr. Corbin, Mr. Shaw, Senat

*'Canada began
to come of age
environmentally'
on world scene*

naughton, and the Quebec and Alberta ministers responsible for environmental affairs, Dr. Victor Goldbloom and William Pirko. In addition, the party of officially credited observers was composed largely of the environmental ministers from the other provinces or their designates, and civil servants representing federal departments and agencies. Only a handful of non-governmental organizations were represented and there was no one from environmental or conservation groups. The lack of representatives from the latter, and from the academic community, was widely criticized and interpreted as a rebuff and an insult when the composition of the Canadian party eventually was disclosed. However, our delegates, unrepresentative as they were, did work diligently and did add greatly to Canada's reputation for sincerity and concern about environmental issues, even though at times their viewpoints may have been ecologically naïve. In an age when the discipline of economics still reigns supreme, ecological civet   is seen by some as no serious weakness.

The final reason for some degree of dissatisfaction was Canada's background document and its official statement to the conference's plenary session. Rumour has it that the statement was written almost singlehandedly by Mr. Davis himself. It was these two documents that had roused the greatest criticism and dissatisfaction among Canadian environmentalists. The reason for this is that ours is a relatively sophisticated society with some awareness of the root causes of the environmental crisis to be found in the Canadian dream, and we recognize that our affluence does prevent us from doing something about curing these causes now.

The cost of affluence

Gradually, Canadians are beginning to recognize the necessity of population regulation and of control of "growth". True, we still draw a false dichotomy between affluence, on the one hand, and the environment, on the other. And yet, from the pinnacle of our high living standard, with all the material things it brings us, we are beginning to acknowledge the environmental costs we have paid for our affluence and to worry about the real quality of our lives. In their impatience, environmentalists may sometimes forget the privations of less fortunate peoples, and some made the mistake of reacting to Mr. Davis' documents as if they were addressed only to ourselves. They resented their simplicity, their seeming superficiality, their apparent glossing over the hard facts of ecological reality, forgetting that they were not phrased for

us primarily but for the international community, much of which has not yet reached our level of awareness.

To the credit of Mr. Davis and his advisers, some Canadian initiatives were important and skilfully balanced on the borderline between bland emptiness and the harsh reality that is still unacceptable to the majority of nations. Many Third World countries still have as their highest priority the attempt to struggle to the same peak of conventional affluence that we now enjoy. Paradoxically, then, in the Canadian context our position papers were timid and equivocal; in the global context, in some ways they were remarkably bold.

There is a moral in this paradox. In the future, the Government should take Canadians more fully into its confidence. If we had been told that Canada's documents were recognized as not being as emphatic as many would wish but were considered to be pushing the outer limits of likely international compromise, then they might have been accepted far less cynically. Criticism and confrontation might have been reduced and constructive responses might have been more common.

Dai Dong conference

These insights (if such they were) were sharpened for me by Dai Dong's Independent Conference on the Environment. Notice the absence of the word *human*, with its anthropomorphic arrogance in this context. Dai Dong came into being two years ago, when a dozen prominent scientists from around the world gathered in Menton, France, to consider environmental problems. They drafted a strong document, entitled "A Message to Our 3.5 Billion Neighbours on Planet Earth", on environmental deterioration, resource depletion, population, overcrowding and hunger, and on war and the environment. The Menton statement was subsequently endorsed by more than 3,000 scientists in many countries, with more than 100 in Canada. A year ago, it was presented to U Thant, then UN Secretary-General, at UN headquarters in New York. U Thant also endorsed the statement and arranged for its publication in the *UNESCO Courier* in July 1971.

Dai Dong literally means "a world of great togetherness", a conception which originated in pre-Confucian China. It was adopted as the name for the organization that emerged from the Menton Conference, and its members are those who signed the initial message. The independent Stockholm conference arose from an idea first explored at the time of our meeting with U Thant, and was supported by the staff

*Third World nations
still have goal
of achieving
affluence of others*



United Nations Ph

Maurice Strong (centre), Secretary-General of the Stockholm conference, holds a press conference and urges an international consensus on ways of preserving and improving the environment. The conference approved an administrative structure for the UN's environmental

unit and Mr. Strong, former head of Canada's foreign aid program, is expected to be named executive director of the program once it has been endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Mr. Strong is flanked by UN officials W. M. Bassow (left) and William Powell.

and financial resources of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an international organization dedicated to the prohibition of war and the promotion of human rights. The independent conference was not organized to confront the official UN conference, but rather to complement it by bringing together a group primarily composed of scientists to examine the environmental crisis, free, it was hoped, from national self-interest in ways not possible for the UN delegates. The Dai Dong conference was to culminate in an independent statement on the environment, to be presented to the UN conference. These purposes were achieved in a limited way only.

The Dai Dong conference had two main discordant features. Of the 40-odd delegates, fewer than half were scientists and not all of these were competent environmental scientists. Perhaps because of this, the supposedly objective examination of environmental problems played only a minor part in the proceedings. The other problem was that some of the participants were idealistic revolutionaries. A number

of these organized a caucus more interested in overthrowing their home governments, establishing their own national sovereignties, smashing Western economic and resource imperialism. While advocating an end to imperialistic wars, they endorsed violence in revolutions of the people. This raised the impossible inconsistency of "good" wars as well as "bad" ones. For these participants, the environmental issue was simply there to be exploited to achieve their objectives. Worthy and desirable as some of these objectives might be in their own right, so blatant an exploitation of the environmental issue did little for the cause of environmental protection.

Process of compromise

Similar disparate views and purposes also appeared, of course, at the United Nations conference itself. Here they were avoided, rationalized and/or overcome more effectively than with Dai Dong, perhaps because there had been a period of more the

Dai Dong sessions used to pursue national aims of revolutionaries

vo years for the processes of compromise to be perfected, whereas we at the Independent Conference had little more than a week. Some issues were virtually dropped from the UN agenda long before the conference because it was impossible to achieve any sort of consensus, whereas the Dai Dong delegates continued throughout their short time together to argue and debate them hotly. In the much smaller and more intimate forum of the Dai Dong conference, where discussion was to be free from national posturing, consensus was rare, compromise always difficult and sometimes impossible, schisms between the so-called developed and underdeveloped nations frequent, and personal confrontation sometimes unpleasant, particularly on the issues of population, sovereignty and violence. The result was an independent statement, duly presented to the UN conference and now to be widely distributed around the world in many languages, which contains a number of strong and worthwhile statements but falls short of the directness and clarity of its parent, the original message from Menton.

Perhaps the strongest inference that emerged from the Dai Dong conference was that the developed countries are the main culprits in environmental degrada-

tion. If, as we state repeatedly, the growth of populations, conventional economics, asocial technologies and the like, are such threats, why do the developed countries not have honest internal policies on such questions? Why are such gluttonous libertines urging abstinence in the developing countries? As one Dai Dong delegate related, he can easily raise funds from Western nations for 20 birth-control clinics in Kenya but not one penny for a school.

It is far too soon, of course, to judge accurately the full value of all the activities associated with the United Nations Stockholm conference to Canada, let alone to the world community. Mr. Strong acquitted himself well and the conference may have accomplished much more than its rather modest objectives. Canadians emerged as realistic analysts of environmental problems and as skilful negotiators. And the participants in the independent conference contributed to global awareness of the magnitude and complexity of the environmental problems that confront us. The world community must now capitalize on these steps, resolve its differences regarding the environment and, on this foundation, develop international co-operative programs to restore and preserve its quality.

An accelerating threat to the environment ...'

We consider that there is a fundamental need for an environment which permits the fullest enjoyment of the basic human rights reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including, in particular, the rights to life itself . . .

"We recognize that life on the planet Earth is dependent on the land, the earth, the water and the sun and upon other systems of life on Earth.

"We are aware that human life is also dependent upon the maintenance of the ecological balance of the biosphere . . .

"We are increasingly aware that human life is affected by environmental processes and influences which are in turn affected by human activities . . .

"We are conscious that economic and social development and the quality of the environment are interdependent . . .

"We accept that the limited resources of the biosphere, including in particular land, air and water, require rational utilization . . .

"We recognize that there is cause for concern that irrational utilization of these resources is posing an accelerating threat to the environment . . .

"It is the firm position of the Canadian Government and people that environmental problems are the concern of all human beings and all peoples irrespective of their social or political systems, geographic situation or state of economic development . . .

"It is the equally firm position of the Canadian Government and the Canadian people that all human beings and all peoples have equal rights to an environment adequate to their needs . . ."

(Excerpts from a statement delivered at the Stockholm Conference by J. A. Beesley, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, in which he noted that the concepts he had set out were reflected in the Draft Declaration on the Human Environment.)

Ostpolitik: the results for Bonn and its implications for Europe

By Robert Spencer

In the two and a half years since Willy Brandt became the German Federal Republic's first socialist Chancellor (and the first member of the Social Democratic Party to head a German government since Hermann Mueller's "great coalition" tottered to a fall in March 1930), the shape of West German's policies *vis-à-vis* Eastern Europe has dramatically altered. Old dogmas have been abandoned, old shibboleths cast aside; new links, which no one would have dreamed of a few months earlier, have been forged.

One should not forget that the current *Ostpolitik* was preceded by Christian Democratic Union Foreign Minister's Schroeder's efforts in the earlier Sixties to penetrate the ice in the East; and, of course, it was Brandt himself who, as Foreign Minister in the "great coalition" of 1966-69, reaped the first fruits of establishing diplomatic links with Bucharest and Belgrade. But the formation of the Brandt-Scheel Government after the elections in September 1969 opened a period in which initiative has followed initiative in such a manner as to provoke criticism that, under the energetic direction of State Secretary Egon Bahr in the Chancellor's office, the Government was moving too swiftly.

Since 1969 the *Ostpolitik* has unfolded in clearly-defined stages. The first, and essential, preliminary was the conclusion of the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, which accepted the territorial *status quo* as their basis. This stage, in which the Federal Republic appeared to be making all

the concessions, with no tangible *quid pro quo* from the East, was followed by the Berlin agreements of 1971-72. These took the form of an agreement between the four occupying powers, underwriting and indeed strengthening the existing position of Berlin; and they included two supplementary intra-German agreements — one between the Government of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Berlin Senate concerning access for West Berliners to East Berlin and East Germany, the other between Bonn and the Government of the GDR concerning transit traffic on the land and water routes between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. The ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties by the *Bundestag* on May 17, 1972, paved the way for formal approval of the four-power agreements on Berlin; these duly came into effect on June 5. This, in turn, opened the way toward the next stage in Bonn's *Ostpolitik* — the gradual development of a more peaceful order in Central Europe.

Historic pacts

Conclusion of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties has been hailed in some quarters as a great turning-point in Germany's postwar history. A writer in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* has compared May 17, 1972, with the capitulation of the Third Reich on May 8, 1945, and the regaining of sovereignty by the Federal Republic on May 5, 1955. Such rhetoric has its hazards; but preoccupation with details ought not to obscure the historic significance of the agreements. As Theo Sommer expressed it in the respected weekly *Die Zeit*, a simple reading of the treaty texts makes it clear that they were not only formal non-aggression pacts but agreements that fixed frontiers; that the Federal Republic for the rest of its existence has renounced any territorial claims against any other state; and that, while an acceptable revision of frontiers is juridically possible, politically the prospect is unrealistic.

The *Bundestag*'s vote has also been



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scribed as a decisive act of self-liberation, in that it delivered Bonn from the handicaps of unresolved territorial issues and the lack of a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with its Eastern neighbours. The recognition of prevailing political realities involved something more, a form of self-recognition, for Bonn has now acknowledged the Federal Republic for the enduring political structure it has been and will remain. The German-born French writer Alfred Grosser has recently noted that in 1948 the majority of West Germans made a choice that is very rare in the twentieth century when they demonstrated their preference for a certain political and economic system even at the cost of turning their backs on the achievement of national unity. In mid-1972, they ratified that decision but in a more definitive fashion.

In the course of the protracted proceedings before the final ratification, the *Bundestag* approved, with no votes against and only five abstentions, a ten-point interpretative statement, previously agreed by both government and opposition leaders, and presumably acceptable also to Bonn's negotiating partners in Moscow and Warsaw. The statement clarified some points in the treaty texts; and in recognizing that, though the treaties were based on the day's frontier, they did not anticipate an eventual peace treaty and in reiterating the inalienable right of Germans to self-determination (and thus including a more specific reference to the undiminished right to an eventual peaceful reunification) it undoubtedly eased the consciences of many deputies, even if it did not win the more vote for the treaties. Certainly it prevented a decisive split between the opposition CSU under Strauss and Reiner Erzel's CDU. But, of course, only the treaty texts themselves have any legal validity.

While Moscow would not stand in the way of an eventual desire of the GDR to join the Federal Republic, the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line as the Western border of Poland is clearly irrevocable. Painful as it may have been, the West Germans have acknowledged the loss of the Eastern territories. From that undertaking there can be no turning back. Confirmation of this last point came early and rather unexpectedly, when, within a few weeks of the ratification of the Warsaw Treaty, the American drew the appropriate conclusion. He announced at the end of June that it had ended the 27-year provisional arrangements in the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line, and was replacing the temporary apostolic administrators by Polish bishops and remov-

ing Berlin from the theoretical dependence on Wroclaw (the former Breslau).

Bonn-Moscow relations

If the Warsaw Treaty, as an act of reconciliation, puts German-Polish relations on a new footing, the same cannot be said of the Russo-German Treaty. Bonn and Moscow have had diplomatic relations since 1955. And relations between Bonn and Moscow will depend in the long run on other factors than a mere treaty. The new phase of *Ostpolitik* was initiated in 1969 not as the result of the discernment of any hopeful opening to the East but rather out of the conviction that the attempt must be made whatever the prospects of success. It has been one of the remarkable features of the diplomatic landscape that Bonn's *Ostpolitik* coincided in time with a Soviet *Westpolitik*, so that Moscow was unexpectedly receptive to Bonn's advances. How long the winds will blow warm from the East will depend, of course, on the U.S.S.R.'s perception of its own interests. There appears at the moment to be no lessening of desire for closer relations with Bonn. But one should not envisage this as a permanent feature. Nor do the treaties guarantee peaceful and friendly relations with the East for an indefinite future.

In taking a decisive step away from the provisional, by acknowledging existing frontiers, and in disclaiming any territorial ambitions in the East, Bonn has aligned itself with Western *Ostpolitik*, in the sense that its relations with the East are now no different from those of any other Western state. At the same time, freed from political encumbrances in the East, Bonn can now work more energetically towards its West European objectives. The launching of the *Ostpolitik* was preceded by the major initiative in *Westpolitik* (or *Europapolitik*) in The Hague in December 1969. The treaties just ratified do not involve a sacrifice of 25 years work in the West. Rather they provide the indispensable basis for a further strengthening of ties with the enlarged European Economic Community and with North America. The importance Bonn attaches to the forthcoming European summit derives in part at least from the need, after all attention has focused on the East, to dramatize the key importance of the West. Indeed, the longer-range significance of the acknowledgment of existing frontiers may well lie in the recognition that Germany has moved westward.

For centuries Germany was regarded as *das Reich der Mitte*, the kingdom of the centre, lying astride the line dividing Europe's heartland. That line has now be-

*'How long winds
will blow warm
from the East'
will depend
on U.S.S.R. view
of its own interests*



Wide World Photo

West and East German officials have held a series of meetings on intra-German problems such as Berlin pass and transit arrangements, and are moving on to a broader exchange on establishment of

normal relations. In this photo, West German State Secretary Egon Bahr (left) says goodbye to his East German counterpart Michael Kohl at the end of a session, while reporters surround them.

come a frontier. Since (and indeed before) 1945, the German population has shifted westward, reversing the pattern that resulted from the great colonization movements of the Middle Ages. Crowded between the mouth of the Elbe and the Saar, and comprising three-quarters of the inhabitants of the former Reich, the Federal Republic now appears unmistakably as a Western, rather than a Central, European state. Ironically, too, although the quest for some form of unity has been one of the strongest drives in German history, Germans have repeatedly failed to enshrine unity in any viable institutional form. This pattern is now being repeated; and the tragedy of the current division is that, unlike the earlier patterns of division, today it is mitigated by no single uniting institution; and the frontier — unprecedented in German history — separates not states of similar character but two antagonistic social and political systems.

Modus vivendi in Berlin

The more immediate consequences of the Eastern agreements are apparent in Berlin. Once again, and perhaps for the last time, Berlin has been at the centre of the

diplomatic exchange, as in a rare display of unity Bonn and its allies agreed that the ratification of the treaties would depend on the prior conclusion of agreements over Berlin. Here, too, one must be cautious about such rhetorical flourishes as "new era". The Berlin agreements represent no final solution to the Berlin problem; what they do is to underwrite a *modus vivendi* on the basis of the current situation which goes far beyond what had been considered possible when the negotiations opened. And that is a very great gain. The four-power agreement provided fresh guarantees for the security and independence of West Berlin, as the legal position and the obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union and the GDR have been laid down for all time to see. Especially, as Richard Löwenthal put it, they ensured against Berlin becoming a second Taiwan, subject to abandonment at any time, by prolonging into an indefinite future the indispensable United States guarantee.

If Berlin can now live in safety, without having to lay in stockpiles in the event of a fresh blockade, and without having to face the meetings of the *Bundestag*, which in the past have served both to underlin

Frontier separates two antagonistic political systems

Bonn's role in the city and at the same time to bring about serious traffic interruptions, Berliners have already seen some of the more tangible benefits which the intra-German agreements have brought them. For example, they can now visit East Berlin and East Germany for up to 30 days a year, with a delay between application and entry permit that can be as short as 48 hours (and, as in the past, if they can produce telegraphic evidence, stamped by the East German police, testifying to a family crisis, with no delay at all); and they can travel along the *Autobahnen* (and the Hamburg *Bundestrasse*) to the West with only a brief identification check at the border points.

Traffic access

All the evidence that has accumulated since June 5 is that traffic along the access-routes has been without difficulty. Some problems have been experienced over the requirement for sealing transport trucks, but this stems largely from the fact that many vehicles are not yet equipped to be sealed. Similarly, the passage of West Berliners into the GDR has been generally smooth, the only controversy being over the possibility of "immediate" visits following application (where bad drafting appears to have encountered the GDR's concern for its own security and where some people appear to have been barred).

It is too early to say just how these new arrangements will affect fresh investment in Berlin, or the flow of young people in it, without both of which the city cannot live and prosper. Certainly they ought to make Berlin a more attractive, less claustrophobic place to live, though of course the Wall and the enclosing barriers on the perimeter remain. An early piece of evidence of reviving confidence has been the startling rise in road and rail traffic to the West since June 5, and a noticeable decrease in air travel along the short-haul routes to the West. Despite the earlier "goodwill" gesture of the GDR in making visas available for visits to East Berlin at Easter and Whitsun, some 300,000 West Berliners have visited East Berlin or the GDR in the past two months.

Always a little sceptical about the rhetoric of *détente*, Berliners retain an underlying sense of concern about their city's long-range future. In its negotiations, the GDR was not prepared to consent to any arrangement which might in the slightest way endanger its own internal security, and it insisted on its own view of the prevailing legal situation in Germany at Berlin. West Berlin, for example, in

the GDR's view remains an independent third unit, while East Berlin is incontrovertibly the capital of the GDR. But the GDR authorities have carried out the accepted arrangements to the letter, and no doubt they will abide by them — at least until the GDR's overriding goals of entry into the United Nations and recognition by Bonn's NATO allies are achieved. But what then? Will pressure on West Berlin be renewed, as it could be without actually violating the letter of the recent agreements? This may be unlikely, for as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* recently noted, it would be impossible for the GDR to stand alone for long against the current of *détente*.

More real, perhaps, are fears of another sort. What will be West Berlin's role as Germany's largest city if East Berlin becomes, as it may, Communist Europe's second-largest capital, with 100 embassies from all parts of the world, and if Schönefeld, not Tempelhof or Tegel, becomes the hub of central Europe's airlines? To put the question another way: can West Berlin define and achieve a role to fit the new situation, replacing the former role as outpost of the West by a new role as a bridge or link between East and West? Can it use the quiet to develop a role as it once used the storm, and emerge as an outpost of coexistence? Or will West Berlin be bypassed by more favourably situated centres, and become a backwater, perhaps even downgraded by its kin in Bonn? It was one thing to subsidize Berlin in its heroic days as a beleaguered outpost; but will West Germans come to think that Berlin is too expensive a luxury to subsidize if it loses its identity and its political, and perhaps also its symbolic, significance? It is one of the disappointing aspects of today's Berlin that there appears to be remarkably little public or political debate on the city's future.

Ostpolitik incomplete

In two significant directions the *Ostpolitik* remains incomplete. Efforts to round out the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with a non-aggression pact along lines similar to Czechoslovakia have hitherto been without success; and this has held up the establishment of diplomatic relations with Budapest. The irony is that the Federal Republic is Czechoslovakia's best Western trading partner, and if the sluggish Czech economy is ever to be brought to life it will only be with West German assistance; still more curious is the fact that an agreement with Prague involves for Bonn none of the bitter renunciation of long-held German territories, as was the case with Warsaw. The *Sudeten* borderlands of Bo-

*Will West Germans
think of Berlin
as a luxury
if it loses
identity, symbolism*

*Treaty ratification
signals new drive
to improve links
between Germanies*

hemia, from which the long-settled German population was expelled after 1945, was never part of the Bismarckian *Reich* until seized by Hitler in 1938. But two more days of talks in June, and 15 months of effort, foundered once again on the Czech determination to have the West Germans acknowledge not only that the Munich agreement is invalid (which they have repeatedly done) but that it was invalid *ab initio*. Bonn fears that such a declaration would have adverse effects on the legal status of the three million former *Sudeten* residents now living in West Germany. But the talks broke off without polemics on either side, and the Czechs appear to understand the importance of not contributing an inflammatory issue to the forthcoming West German election campaign. It may thus be possible to work out a formula acceptable to both sides without too long a delay.

The ratification of the Moscow and the road but the start of a new drive to improve relations between the two parts of Germany. Bonn's efforts are currently directed at achieving a *Generalvertrag* that would provide the basis for the relations between the two German states and crown the earlier intra-German agreements on Berlin. These agreements at least showed that some agreement with the GDR was possible; but, so far as one can determine at this stage in the preliminary negotiations, conducted with great secrecy, the two sides seem far apart.

Bonn's view, suggested in Brandt's governmental declaration of October 1969 (with the conception of two states in the German nation) and spelt out in the 20 points presented to East German Premier Willi Stoph at Kassell in March 1970, includes: the unity of the nation, relations on the basis of respect for human rights, maintenance of four-power responsibility for Berlin and Germany, and many areas of technical or human co-operation. East Berlin's attitude is conveniently summed up in the word *Abgrenzung*, the insulation or demarcation, intellectually and politically, of the GDR and its citizens from contact with the Federal Republic and its insidious disease of social democratism, as well as acknowledgment of the inviolability of the GDR's frontiers and its recognition as a sovereign state under international law.

Among the essential differences in the way of agreement two stand out: how to reconcile East Berlin's quest for full diplomatic recognition with Bonn's determination to preserve some acknowledgment of the fact that, as parts of one nation, the two German states and their citizens can-

not be foreign to each other; and how to preserve some recognition of the continuing validity of the rights which the former occupying powers have exercised since 1945.

Erich Honecker, the First Secretary of the East German Communist Party, has not much concern for the German nation despite the provisions of Article 8 of the GDR's constitution. Towards the end of June he referred to Bonn's references to the "unity of the nation" as a mere fiction and the word *Deutschland* is being systematically superseded in organizational labels by "DDR" (ironically, the name of the party's official paper remains *Neue Deutschland*). Nor has he much respect for the four-power rights. It is true that Honecker has made occasional encouraging statements, such as his reference in Sofia in April to the fact that the Germans on both sides of the frontier spoke the same language, and he has promised that, once the Eastern treaties are ratified, "the German Democratic Republic is ready to embark on an exchange of views with the Federal German Republic on the establishment of normal relations". This fresh phase in intra-German talks between Egon Bahner and his East German counterpart Michael Kohl was adjourned on June 29 until early August after a meeting of both delegates with East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer. It promises to be much more difficult than either the Berlin pass or transit negotiations.

But despite the formidable obstacles to be surmounted, there are some grounds to expect that a minimal agreement may be reached by the end of this year, perhaps by confining it to those items on which agreement appears possible. Brandt clearly needs it to round out and cap his Eastern policy; indeed, there are some fears that the urgency of reaching some agreement may lead to accepting less than satisfactory terms. Moscow has a less direct interest than in the Berlin negotiations on which the fate of the Soviet-German treaty hangs but Moscow may nevertheless again see the wisdom of pressing East Berlin to be accommodating in the interests of Moscow's developing links with Bonn and of sustaining in power Willy Brandt, in whom the Soviets appear to have a large measure of confidence. And the GDR leadership, especially, knows that, without an intra-German agreement, by definition acceptable to the Federal Republic, the cherished goal of entry into the United Nations will be vetoed by the Western powers, and that the long-sought recognition by Bonn's allies will continue to be blocked. Here is Bonn's trump card.

Canada's record at UNCTAD III and the meaning of Santiago

by W. M. Dobell

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was created in the early 1960s because the many newly-independent nations then emerging had been largely omitted from the institutional structure of the period immediately following the Second World War. They did not wish to be passed in future in the process of international financial and commercial decision-making. They sought the development that had brought wealth to longer-established states, and trade was the accepted means of achieving it. Participation of developed countries in UNCTAD implied a recognition that the developing nations could not be left out of the structure of the international system, though it left open the determination of their proper role.

UNCTAD in the 1960s was not a rival to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or to the International Monetary Fund. It was not seen as necessarily a permanent organization, but possibly a pressure group that could influence the GATT, the IMF and similar organs that had been established by the industrialized nations. UNCTAD was to awaken the conscience of the international community, and the international trade and monetary organizations were expected to respond to the equity of the developing world's claims.

UNCTAD has not been well reported, however, and a community cannot respond to what it does not know about. Moreover, in the international trade and monetary crisis of the latter half of 1971, decisions were reached by a handful of wealthy countries — decisions that affected the flows of international currencies, the terms of trade and the value of foreign-exchange reserves of developing countries — without the Third World being afforded more than minimal consultation.

UNCTAD III, held in Santiago from April 13 to May 21 this year, could have been taken up in bitter acrimony on this cardinal perspective — and Canada was extremely anxious that it should not. The Canadian delegation came to Santiago with

certain initiatives and guidelines for negotiation.

Canadian initiative

One may start with the major Canadian initiative, although neither was it planned nor did it turn out to be a central issue at the conference. Rather, it was conceived as a valuable, yet manageable, contribution to the financial-resource requirements of the developing nations. Canada introduced a resolution proposing that the conference accept an objective of \$2 billion for concessional financing to developing countries through the multilateral agencies. The institutions comprising the multilateral agencies include notably the soft-loan component of the World Bank — the International Development Association — and the United Nations Development Program, as well as the various regional development banks — i.e., the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank and the forthcoming African Development Bank.

This year the pledges of developed countries should run to more than \$800 million to IDA, a quarter of a billion dollars to UNDP and a half-billion to the regional banks. This should total approximately a billion and a half dollars, with more than half the sum going to IDA. The fourth replenishment of IDA is due just after the mid-point in the Second Development Decade and should bring in on its own a conservative \$400 million. The replenishment of the other multilateral agencies will involve lesser sums, but it is highly unlikely that the present year's pledges

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of about \$1.5 billion to all the multilateral agencies will not be exceeded by a third when new levels of subscription are agreed upon.

Canada is not prone to employ "pie-in-the-sky" figures at major international conferences, but when cautious projection produced the prospect of a one-third increase in one of the most respected and vital of international programs, it seemed useful to ask the conference to accept the objective. Since the Canadian contribution to multilateral concessional financing is only one factor in the total, the only purely Canadian commitment was to shoulder a proportionate share of the \$2-billion burden, if the program were accepted internationally. Given the Canadian International Development Agency's forward planning program and steadily increasing resources, covering the possible new commitment presented no domestic budgetary problem.

*Doubt among donors
whether target
of \$2-billion aid
could be realized*

Forward development planning is not, however, within the capabilities of many countries, and is not commonly practised by those few that possess the facilities and aptitudes. Thus, the regular donor states did not know whether the pragmatic \$2-billion figure was likely to be realized. Several months of advance consultation might have alleviated the problem, but, regrettably, the initiative had been agreed on by the Canadian Government too late to afford time for that indispensable step.

Resolution 'dead'

The Canadian delegation was able to rally Australia and the Netherlands as co-sponsors, but the reservations of such normally co-operative allies as Britain and Denmark, among others, limited donor country support for the resolution. Hesitation about long-term commitment, combined with a preference for bilateral assistance, was largely responsible. The Canadian resolution is being printed in an appendix to the conference report but, since even resolutions that are passed are not always followed up, the resolution must be regarded as dead. That, of course, does not prevent the \$2-billion figure from ultimately being met or even exceeded, but it does make it difficult for Canada to claim credit for securing international acceptance of the objective.

The reservations of some developed countries were not the only obstacle to passage of the resolution. At the other extreme, a number of developing countries were appreciative of what the UNCTAD Secretariat regarded as a positive contribution by Canada but reluctant to endorse a modest proposal that might end by eclips-

ing a more lucrative form of assistance. Attainment of the 7 percent target for official development assistance by 1975 was one objective that had priority in the eyes of less-developed countries, though good tactics on their part led them not to pressure the developed countries to the point of irritation.

Canada's net flow of official aid in 1970 was .43 per cent of gross national product and the total net flow of financial resources was .72 per cent of GNP. Paul Martin, then External Affairs Minister in the Government of Prime Minister Pearson, had spoken at the 1967 UN General Assembly session of attaining the 1 per cent total development-assistance figure by 1970-71, a commitment that the successor administration of Prime Minister Trudeau did not deem crucial enough to endorse. (Senator Martin, Government Leader in the Upper Chamber, headed the Canadian delegation at Satiago).

A particularly cherished aim of the developing countries throughout the conference was the establishment of a link between the special drawing rights (SDR) issued through the International Monetary Fund and the creation of additional credit required by the developing countries (SDR may be used by the central banks of governments for settling official international payments according to a special formula.) The conception of a link between these SDR and the creation of additional credit sought by developing nations was born in the 1960s and had fully developed at the New Delhi UNCTAD II meetings of 1968. Its adoption by the Santiago conference was one of the great aspirations of developing countries in the months prior to April 1972.

Apples and oranges

The Group of Ten — the group of predominantly Western European countries that has dominated international monetary decision-making — has never been happy with the prospect of a link between what it regards as apples and oranges, i.e. the smooth functioning of the monetary system and the provision of development aid. The developing countries regard the link as a means of drawing on the under-utilized SDR to make available to themselves additional financial resources. It would represent one attempt at the international level to cope with an often-expressed and commonly inaccurate domestic complaint: those who can get credit don't need it, and those that need it can't get it.

Many developed countries have been sceptical of the efficacy of the scheme. They have seen risks that a formal link

could not necessarily increase the total development assistance available or, if it did, it might be at the cost of excessive liquidity in the international system. Some developed countries, such as Italy, have seen its advantage in providing more aid without a requirement for legislative approval, though it would require IMF amendment or a parallel agreement among ODA donors.

Canada foresaw that many other developed countries would not accept a formal link at Santiago, and hoped that the prospect of a sizeable rise in concessional financing through the multilateral agencies might have widespread appeal to very different sorts of countries. Yet it was exactly the proposal's image as an alternative to the link that caused developing countries to sideline the Canadian initiative lest it inhibit passage of the higher priority link between the operation of the monetary system and the provision of development aid. As it turned out, the conference voted neither the concessional financing proposal nor the link. The economic spokesmen of France and Germany, Giscard d'Estaing and Karl Schiller, vied with one another in concocting a gossamer of phraserology calculated to evoke sympathy for the link without entrapping their governments into anything. World Bank President Robert McNamara appealed unmissably for additional resources, though whether this involved the link was decidedly less clear.

Compensation sought

The President of the European Community Commission, Sicco Mansholt, called for a special issue of SDR to compensate developing countries for the depreciation in the value of their reserves as a result of the devaluation of the American dollar. This discussion of SDR in the context of currency reserves was not really a variation on the basic link issue but the linkage of SDR with yet another extraneous issue. It had no appeal outside of the developing countries — not even among the governments of the European Community countries. It does illustrate, however, how enmeshed the question of development assistance became with the broader problem of the international monetary system in the wake of the crisis of the latter half of 1971.

The resolution dealing with the monetary system and SDR was eventually worked out after an all-night sitting, and was adopted on Sunday, May 21, two days after the conference was originally supposed to have ended. It was probably the resolution stirring the greatest interest at

Santiago, all but the Communist countries being concerned to achieve an acceptable text for the success of the conference.

Formula for link

The paragraph on the link invites the Executive Directors of the IMF to present their studies on the possible implementation of a viable scheme as soon as possible, but refers to the primary role of SDR as a reserve asset. The resolution also asks the IMF to review the conditions for drawing on the compensatory financing facility to see if the developing countries may be enabled to make more use of it. While the Group B, or wealthy countries, voted for the compromise resolution, Canada participated in a joint statement of interpretation which noted that endorsing the studies or link already under way in the IMF did not prejudice the outcome, and that the future role of the SDR, including the link, had to be considered in the context of monetary reform. This gloss on the operative paragraphs will certainly be recalled if any developing countries endeavour to claim that the link was endorsed in principle.

The sections of the resolution that dealt with the monetary system were equally carefully negotiated. The IMF was reaffirmed as the central forum for decision-making on the international monetary system, but it was urged — with Canada's blessing — that developing countries should effectively participate in the decision-making processes of that system and in the reform of that system. A plea was made for monetary, trade and finance problems to be resolved in a co-ordinated manner, and the Secretary-General of UNCTAD was requested to consult his opposite numbers at IMF and GATT and report back to UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board on ways in which this could be effected.

Again the interpretative statement released by Canada and other Group B countries reserved approval in principle of the case for new intergovernmental machinery. The statement asserted that the resolution should not be interpreted to mean that any intergovernmental machinery for co-ordination would be established. As clarified by the wealthy countries, this intentionally major, and sweeping, resolution cannot easily be subject to misinterpretation in the future. Whether it will be later looked back on as a seminal resolution rather than an ephemeral public relations achievement will be a key judgment affecting the historical verdict on the conference as a whole.

Suspended judgment may also be re-

IMF reaffirmed as central forum but plan to give developing states role in system

quired on the ultimate value of the important compromise resolution on multilateral trade negotiations, which was unanimously approved by the conference. It lists matters particularly sought by the developing countries — such as full participation in negotiations, preferential access to markets, and immediate implementation of concessions — and recommends that negotiating ground-rules incorporate special attention to their needs. Whether these become working guidelines or pious exhortations will not be known for at least a year.

Canada was pleased at the considerable developing-country interest in and support for the expected 1973 round of negotiations under GATT. The delegation was able to support genuinely and earnestly the call of developing countries to participate “fully, effectively and continuously” in the negotiations and to make full use of appropriate GATT documentation.

One paragraph of the resolution requests the Secretary-General of UNCTAD and the Director-General of GATT to co-ordinate their activities in assisting developing countries to prepare for and participate in the coming GATT round. Though this might appear to be giving instructions to GATT’s executive, it is an admonition rather than a directive — and one, moreover, that does not go beyond a 1968 UNCTAD resolution that its Secretary-General should maintain regular contact and consultation with his GATT colleague. Reaffirmation of the point is intended to emphasize its increased importance.

Two resolutions

These two resolutions on the reform of the international monetary system and on multilateral trade negotiations reflected a sincere willingness on Canada’s part to accept developing countries more fully into the negotiating process. Something had to be done to prevent the developing countries from turning desperately toward any new system — whether rigidly planned or chaotically disorganized — that would provide them with seats round the table rather than in the grandstand. The limitation on this participation lay, nonetheless, in the realization that the allocated role should not exceed the capability to meet its requirements.

In the Canadian view, the two resolutions met the requisite stipulation and should be implemented in succeeding years in a forthcoming and co-operative manner. Nevertheless, there is no compulsion behind the resolutions, and some reserve in forecasting their liberal implementation is in order.

The third resolution adopted to which Canada attached particular importance in terms of a satisfactory conclusion to the conference related to the least-developed the poorer nations. It was expected that the possible addition of Bangladesh to the “hard-core” list of 25 poorest nations might have provoked a public division. Canada could have accepted a decision either way on this issue, but the real split was between the Asians and the Africans and was kept to corridor in-fighting. The list was restricted to predominantly African countries of small populations.

Action program

The Action Program on behalf of the least-developed countries incorporated a comprehensive list of useful measures. In the negotiations on this measure, Canada played an active role. In particular, Canada spoke in favour of a high degree of concessionality in aid and the financing of small-scale projects by the regional development banks. The delegation did reserve its position on the question of establishing a Special Fund for the least-developed countries, but not because it opposed special assistance in itself. The UNCTAD Secretariat’s figures suggest that the 25 nations have a population of 148 million, or 8.5 per cent of the Third World population yet have received 6.3 per cent of the available development resources. The Canadian position supported the additional resources, but indicated a preference for utilizing existing multilateral agencies as the channel.

The original Secretariat shopping-list of measures was very extensive, and some of the most useful proposals were adopted. It was agreed that technical assistance be concentrated on removing bottlenecks to industrialization and to the encouragement of export-oriented industries. The 25 least-developed countries trade very little, so the Canadian view has been that development assistance is more likely to be helpful than commercial policy measures. Resource surveys to determine the potential for development were particularly recommended by Canada, as was technical assistance in establishing a governmental planning capability, and — in these countries of predominantly subsistence-level agriculture — the development of dry-land farming techniques and water resources. These proposals form a part of the Action Program that was duly established.

Before the conference, it was known that the landlocked developing countries would be presenting a case for special treatment. Their request was met principally in the commitment to assist in the

provision of transportation. The special pleading, however, prompted some of the island countries of special concern to Canada, such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, to claim that they too suffered from an isolation problem. The conference agreed to establish a panel of experts to look into the special problems of developing island nations.

The trade measures adopted to help the 25 "hard-core" countries were weaker than the financial and technical assistance sections. This was as it should be, according to the Canadian perspective, because of the negligible trading involvement of these nations. The Canadian delegation was not, however, in an ideal position to stress this point, having failed to date to implement its own offer under the Generalized Preference Scheme (GPS) conceived at UNCTAD in 1964 and endorsed at UNCTAD II. Despite this, Canada supported the extension of the original GPS for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods in order to include agricultural, handicraft and mineral products of interest to the least-developed nations, plus the prolongation of the duration of GPS.

Under the original GPS, each developing country had been invited to submit a package of trade concessions for developing countries. Canada's offer was announced in September 1970, and was accepted by UNCTAD Secretary-General on behalf of the developing countries as a first step because of its broad coverage of products — it already included agricultural products and handicrafts — and its restraint on quotas and safeguards. The Secretary-General also suggested that the offer fell short of expectations, since the actual tariff cuts were not as pronounced as desired. Its implementation required legislative action which was not pursued — by the time of the conference.

The failure to have legislated the GPS in the Canadian Parliament before the conference might well have provided an easy target for critics at Santiago. To some extent this occurred, but the observations were phrased much more diplomatically than they might have been. This was partly because the explanation of Canadian delay was discreetly given before others criticised it and partly because the heat generated at the conference was more temperate than at the Delhi Conference in 1968.

In the latter months of 1970, the Parliamentary timetable in Ottawa was filled with debates on the Public Order Bill to cope with the October crisis in Quebec, and in the latter months of 1971 the time was consumed on the first sweeping income-tax

reform in decades. This explanation for the delay in passage of the GPS legislation does not account for the period between — namely, the first half of 1971. The uncertainty of the effects of the American surcharge of August 1971 provided further reason for the failure to have debated the GPS in Parliament in late 1971. Yet the surcharge was lifted in mid-December, and the conference did not commence until mid-April 1972.

The American DISC legislation may produce adverse expansion and employment problems in Canada. Yet that is an unpredictable feature of the future rather than of the past, and the Canadian Government stated at Santiago and reaffirmed in Parliament in Ottawa that the GPS legislation would be introduced at the earliest feasible date. It would not seem as if DISC had to that point much to do with GPS delays. Only the persistently high unemployment of the last two or three years provides a continuous explanation of why Canada shared with the United States the distinction of being among the last of the developed countries to implement its GPS commitments.

Commodity agreements

By candidly admitting that it was stalling on GPS implementation to avoid outright rejection by Congress, the U.S. Government drew the worst sting out of a tricky issue. On commodities, it did the reverse. The American Under-Secretary of State claimed that his Government supported "the negotiation of a workable and effective cocoa agreement", whereas many of his colleagues from developing and developed countries alike believed that the U.S. negotiators had been blocking the completion of an international cocoa agreement for years. This produced considerable discussion of whether to complete the agreement even if the United States, with 40 per cent of the international market, stayed out. A resolution to call a plenipotentiary negotiating conference on cocoa was adopted at Santiago and duly supported by Canada, but the sought-after agreement still lies in the future.

Canada has participated in the negotiation of commodity agreements, with the exception of that on olive oil, in which observer status seemed sufficient. The wheat, sugar and tin agreements were negotiated under UNCTAD auspices, and Canada recognizes that, in the creation and elaboration of commodity agreements, UNCTAD exercises a positive negotiating role. It is not an exclusive role. The coffee agreement, for example, owes little to UNCTAD, which is no reflection on UNCTAD since

*U.S. eases sting
on GPS issue,
admits stalling
on implementation*

it is one of the least satisfactory of international commodity agreements.

Canada normally avoids requesting one international body to deal with a question when another is already seized of it. A resolution was presented on the last full day of the conference requesting the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to convene a special session of the Committee on Commodities to organize intensive intergovernmental consultations in order to achieve concrete and significant results on trade liberalization and pricing policy early in the 1970s. Canada did not vote against the resolution, though it did express the reservation that negotiations on the reduction of trade barriers fell within the competence of GATT. This reservation might not have been expressed had negotiations taken place prior to the resolution's introduction.

*Press for results
in price policy,
trade liberalization*

Another resolution introduced at the last minute was one on World Bank financing of buffer stocks, an aim which Canada should have no difficulty in supporting. It was apparent that the World Bank had received insufficient opportunity to consider the resolution before it was submitted to plenary, and, under the circumstances, the Canadian delegation abstained. In time, the resolution will doubtless be looked back on as far-sighted and imaginative, and the French — who inspired it — as trail-blazers. Perhaps nothing can stop an idea whose time has come, but with countries represented from every time-zone in the world there can be uncertainty about the proper time.

Canada likes to think it has a fairly liberal policy on commodities and prides itself on having virtually no tariff on agricultural products. It voted for the resolution on the competitiveness of natural products. Canada does not like to see prices on commodities stabilized at so high a level that they induce over-production, nor does it favour new forms of discriminatory access that could cut into the traditional markets of established vendors. Apart from these qualifications, Canada shares a reasonably wide common ground with the developing countries on commodities.

Early warning

Canada had hoped to gain acceptance of an early-warning system for commodities — that is, a convening of producer and consumer nations in advance of the bottom falling out of the market for any commodity. Since three-quarters of the trade of developing countries is in commodities, Canada would have been pleased to have initiated a successful proposal relating to commodities. The UNCTAD Secretary-

General was also striving for results in the commodities field. The UN's Secretary-General was pressing him to keep costs down, and commodities — the one area in which UNCTAD's negotiating jurisdiction was practically unchallenged — afforded him his most promising ground. The Canadian early-warning proposal, nonetheless, lacked the instant appeal of a self-evident truth, as well as prearranged co-sponsors who could have talked up its virtues. Since it was difficult to attract support for two surprise resolutions, the delegation concentrated its lobbying on the more important — if ultimately equally abortive — resolution on concessional financing discussed above.

The shipping resolutions were worked out carefully, and five of the six were unanimously adopted. The sixth was a proposal to begin work on a universally acceptable code of conduct for liner conferences. That part of the resolution was acceptable to Canada. But it went on to call on the UN General Assembly to convene a plenipotentiary conference immediately, including in the terms of reference the instruction that it establish in the code machinery that would be binding on the governments. The resolution was being negotiated with a view to gaining near-unanimous acceptance, but the developing and the Communist countries would not modify the drafting enough to satisfy the developed nations. The resolution was adopted, but will probably not prove meaningful unless it is implemented in a way that takes account of ship-owning nations' views.

The six resolutions on manufactures were unanimously accepted as a result of shrewd bargaining, and Canada supported an export-promotion resolution that attracted the necessary support. The resolution on the total inflow of financial resources to developing countries was adopted without a formal vote, though Canada expressed its reservation about the target date. Canada preferred to see if the goal was achieved when the time arrived, rather than accept a commitment on which it might falter. This reflected the Trudeau Government's insistence on limited and carefully-defined commitments approved fully in Cabinet and unspecific in regard to target dates.

Canada also had reservations in regard to the resolution on the mobilization of internal resources. The delegation would have been happy to see a resolution that dealt with the obligation of developing states as well as the external constraints on them, but the domestic responsibility of developing countries was omitted from the resolution. Since the resolution was unob-

ectionable as far as it went but was deemed limited, incomplete and unbalanced, the delegation opted for an abstention.

Canadian reservations

Beyond the outstanding single resolutions or groups of resolutions, other proposals adopted were too disparate to discuss meaningfully in brief compass. In nearly all cases, Canada was able to support the consensus, and it is therefore the exceptions that require clarification. Canada abstained on a suggestion made by the President of Mexico early in the conference that a charter of economic rights be drafted, and voted against the declaration of principles to govern international trade policies. Although the Pearson Commission had deemed debt relief a legitimate form of aid, Canada was unable to support the resolution on debt-servicing introduced by the developing nations. Despite its own reservations about some of the consequences of foreign investment, Canada opposed the developing countries' resolution on foreign private investment.

It is very easy to be in two minds about how Canada should have voted on these issues. In each instance the reason for failing to support a resolution was sound: the cost was unaccounted for, another body was already charged with the task, different debt problems were insufficiently distinguished, or just plain bad drafting was at fault. There is always a temptation, when confronted with well-intentioned resolutions such as these, to vote for the intention and then place a reservation on the record. Perhaps Canada should have done so on the charter and the declaration, though it would have been somewhat absurd for Canada to have come out against foreign private investment considering that it had established an international reputation for itself as a call-house for wealthy entrepreneurs and investors.

The reservation is nonetheless a suspect device if employed too often; it is only carried off successfully if performed in near isolation or if the joint reservation does not impede implementation of the substance of the resolution. When the supplementary financing resolution — which seemed a judged possible action by the World Bank — slipped through the plenary session without a vote, Group B collectively entered a negating reservation. This reservation engendered far more ill will at Santiago than the Canadian failure to vote affirmatively on a few imperfect resolutions.

Several other resolutions passed by the conference dealt with subjects that the UN was discussing elsewhere. On these, the

record indicates a varied Canadian voting pattern, but one that reflects the aim of reinforcing rather than undercutting other UN agencies or committees. Canada abstained on the Suez Canal resolution, the subject matter of which was more pertinent to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and on a seabed resolution that anticipated the conclusions of the UN Seabed Committee. Canada voted against another seabed resolution imposing an immediate moratorium on the exploitation of seabed resources. On the other hand, the environment and disarmament resolutions were intended to encourage the work of the pertinent UN conferences and Canada had no difficulty in taking an affirmative position on them.

Canada was unsympathetic to the passage of resolutions on the Vietnam war but, as many other nations agreed that UNCTAD was an inappropriate forum, references to the war were bitter but inconclusive. Thirty unnamed journalists from ten countries, including Canada, issued a circular threatening to discontinue reporting of UNCTAD III unless Vietnam was fully debated in plenary. The conference, however, was so sketchily reported before, as well as after, the threat that the handling of the Vietnam issue can hardly be deemed responsible for media apathy.

Public concern

Coverage of the conference was extensive in Chile and neighbouring countries, and both extensive and perceptive in Britain and the Netherlands, where international development enjoys a broad and articulate constituency. Elsewhere, including Canada, discussion of UNCTAD before, during and after Santiago was perfunctory and shallow. When the United Nations determined in 1970 that there should be a strategy for a Second Development Decade, Canada was responsible for the section geared to the mobilization of public opinion. The section was expected to have its impact principally in the United States, with which Canada was supposed to enjoy a special relationship. Canada voted for a similar resolution on mobilization of public opinion at Santiago, though with diminished expectations and without being responsible for its introduction.

For a wealthy North American nation — one far more attuned to listening to the sales pitch of its manufacturers than to the importunings of distant Third World peoples — the Canadian voting record reflected an accustomed stolid balance between the adventurous and the immobile. Some 30 of the 47 successful UNCTAD resolutions went through by consensus and, of

Pattern of voting aimed at backing other UN bodies

the 17 others, Canada voted for 4 and abstained on 6. The total Canadian voting picture was thus 34 affirmative, 7 negative, and 6 abstentions, about par for a developed country. Some Canadians would have liked to have seen Canada follow the voting pattern of a developing country, supporting nearly everything. But then nations should really try to implement everything they have endorsed, and UNCTAD resolutions always call for far more changes in the practices of developed nations than they do of developing countries.

The Group D, or Communist countries, are proportionately as much of the object of Third World pressure in UNCTAD as is Group B. The Communist trade organization in Eastern Europe, Comecon, has seen its trade with the EEC grow faster than its total foreign trade or its internal bloc trade. In 1970, Eastern Europe bought more EEC goods than did Latin America, though a dozen years before it had only offered a third as good a market as Latin America. Its small disbursement of aid to developing countries also indicated a greater East-West than North-South concern in the trade and development sphere.

The People's Republic of China, which attended a major international conference for the first time since assuming a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, accused a super-power that was unmistakably the U.S.S.R. of encroachment, plundering and aggression. Since China was quietly assessing the power relations at Santiago, its intervention indicated a belief that the Soviet bloc was isolating itself from the main negotiations at the conference, and that China could with advantage stand aside from that bloc. This it did, though it did not join the group of developing countries. The effect was to keep the influence of both the Soviet bloc and China to a minimum, as well as to produce more majority voting — as at UNCTAD I — than the consensus method that characterized UNCTAD II at NEW Delhi.

UNCTAD's impact

An increase in majority voting did not mean a departure from consensus politics, and still less the adoption of the outright confrontation advocated by minorities in many of the countries, including Canada, and practised at Santiago by a few governments — notably Cuba, though it specifically excepted Canada from its fire. What was implicit at Santiago was the recognition by developed countries of the permanence of UNCTAD, and of its particular negotiating role.

There was some movement towards

making UNCTAD a UN agency, a switch that could have created more change in book-keeping than in real influence. There was also an attempt to give it negotiating powers in manufactures, such as it had acquired in commodities. Above all, there was the move to grant UNCTAD a coordinating role in trade and monetary matters, though a consultative function was all that was accorded it.

The formal changes at Santiago were less important than the intangibles. The size of UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board was increased from 55 to 68 — to keep it as representative as possible in an enlarged membership — and the board was empowered to hold biennial sessions on development strategy. More significant was the recognition by almost all powers at Santiago that UNCTAD had become a major international political organization. Many thought this was already true by 1968 in New Delhi; by 1972 in Santiago there could be no question that it was true.

Canada's future role

In view of this reality, it is fair to ask if Canada could not play a fuller role at the next UNCTAD meeting with a larger delegation, including very senior officials and experienced conference professionals, and whether the Canadian media would not pay more attention to UNCTAD in such circumstances. The case of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, which followed shortly after the end of UNCTAD III, provides an instructive contrast. It appeared that a large delegation was going to Stockholm, the media decided to follow, and the Canadian public drew the impression that Canada was running the conference. It appeared that a small delegation was going to Santiago, the media decided not to follow, and the Canadian public drew the impression that Canada was dragging its heels.

Three factors contributed to this distorted perspective. The organizer of the Stockholm conference chanced to be a prominent Canadian, Maurice Strong, whereas UNCTAD does not have and is unlikely ever to have a Canadian Secretary-General. The Stockholm conference lasted a fortnight — brief enough to maintain a strong delegation for its entirety — whereas the six-week Santiago session entailed flying down specialists when it was certain they would be required but not retaining them in Chile to staff unscheduled meetings. By June, moreover, it was clear there would be no June federal general election and ministers would not be required on the hustings. But in April speculation on possible polling dates was rife, and sparing a minister for even a third of a

*China saw gain
in standing aside
from Soviet bloc*

much longer conference was commensurably more difficult.

One method of focusing more attention in Canada at UNCTAD IV might be to invite Parliamentarians to serve on the delegation, as is done at the General Assembly and for some conferences. Obviously this would appreciably raise the delegation's budget. Yet most politicians could be counted on to stir up the public's interest in the proceedings before and after the conference. They would also be inclined to read the media stories while they were here.

Before UNCTAD IV, Canada will have to come to a decision on this question of the size and composition of its delegation. It will also have to reach interdepartmental agreement on, and obtain Cabinet approval of, any initiative it may wish to take at that conference — months before the opening gavel. Initiatives at UNCTAD often involve budgetary expenditure or legislative enactments by other governments, or both. To be productive, they should be discussed laterally, at GATT, at the IMF, or even at a special pre-conference meeting of the countries that would be responsible for possible implementation.

In the meantime, Canada has more immediate concerns than planning for UNCTAD IV. At Santiago, our most concrete proposals were in the realm of official development assistance; the greatest consensus of developing countries was in

the spheres of monetary and trade policy. We submitted initiatives where our own record was strong; we reacted to others' initiatives where it concerned them most. Developing countries came to Santiago uncertain of whether to become revolutionary or reformist at the point when some of their bargaining points — co-ordinated at a pre-Santiago meeting in Lima — were predictably resisted. Canada argued that the IMF and GATT committee structure should be enlarged, revised and updated. Canada staked its good faith on the cause of reform, and many developing countries took Canada at its word.

Canada now has an obligation to try to see that the IMF does become more representative and open in its decision-making, that the GATT is more than an organ of the industrialized world, that our own Generalized Preference Scheme offer of 1970 is promptly implemented and that the spirit of the other UNCTAD resolutions we supported is carried forward and into operation. Canada expressed the view at Santiago that the success of UNCTAD conferences could not be determined at the close of one conference but rather in the years between one UNCTAD conference and the next. The UN Secretary-General made the same point. That gives Canada and the other participating countries about three and a half years to prove that UNCTAD III at Santiago was a success. It may take much of that time.

'Clear conscience' for the rich but frustration for the poor

by Domingos A. Donida

About 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 27, during a break in the last plenary session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a Chilean delegate who had reacted strongly to statements made by the United States, West Germany and Canada a few hours earlier smilingly suggested to a European delegate: "Let's go for a glass of champagne." The European answered: Sir, UNCTAD is not a *fiesta*." The Chilean replied: "But in Chile, sir, it is customary to drink champagne at funerals."

As a matter of fact, funeral, setback, disappointment, frustration were the current expressions used by the delegates of

the Group of 77 to describe their feelings towards the third UNCTAD.

The many international journalists attending the conference only expressed in their own words this same pessimism en-

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gendered by more than 1,200 hours of dialogue between the deaf. The spokesman for the Venezuelan delegation explained the reason for his frustration thus: "The rich countries do not have the least political desire to pay any attention to the problems of the Third World, and even less to solve them."

Among the Group B countries (those with developed market economies), with rare exceptions, the impression was more optimistic; they had succeeded, behind a facade of understanding, in maintaining the very attitude for which Raoul Prebisch of Argentina, former UNCTAD Secretary-General, had reproached them during the second UNCTAD in New Delhi: "The developed countries, with the rare exception, continue to regard the problem of underdevelopment as a marginal problem that can be taken care of piecemeal with a few insufficient measures rather than with prompt and decisive action." "Prosperity," he added, "among individuals as among nations, tends to create an attitude of detachment, if not indifference, with regard to the well-being of others."

Near the end of the third UNCTAD, Presbisch — who had organized the first two conferences with such high hopes by introducing a report by Barbara Ward to the Economic Commission for Latin America, Santiago — resembled a defeated general. "The third UNCTAD is the conference of lost illusions," he said. Moreover, the spokesman for the Netherlands delegation deplored the fact, during the plenary session, that the developed countries had dashed the expectations of the Group of 77. "I admit," he said, "that we have reached agreement on a few subjects proposed at the Conference, but not on the major political orientations."

Objective reasons for gloom

Most, if not all, of the press comments painted an even gloomier impressionistic picture of the Santiago conference. This pessimism is based on numerous objective reasons, the main ones being:

On the one hand, the Group of 77 (actually 96 countries) agreed in Lima in November 1971 to submit the maximum common denominator of its claims to the third UNCTAD. On the other hand, the developed market-economy countries (Group B), burdened by the changes that had taken place and by economic, monetary and trade crises, agreed on a minimum common denominator of concessions to be offered to the Third World. Furthermore, the socialist bloc, convinced that it was not responsible for the present state of underdevelopment caused by the im-

perialistic and colonialist policies of the capitalist countries, often departed from the position taken by the Group of 77. The socialist countries are more interested in developing their trade with the rich countries in Group B than with the Third World.

China remained aloof from all group, preferring a cautious tactic. This alignment of forces reduced the Santiago conference to a broadened reproduction of the Lima conference. In fact, the resolution proposed by the Group of 77 received only weak additional support from the "have" countries, support that was often diplomatic and followed by strong "voting reservations". From the standpoint of practical consequences, this means that the rich countries — the only ones able to reverse the international trade trends that are harmful to the development of the Third World — will not be eager to commit themselves firmly to concerted and specific action. Pleading the urgency of their own problems, such as new members joining the European Economic Community, "stagflation" (unemployment and inflation at the same time), the United States balance-of-payments deficit, and the international monetary crisis, the rich countries see the development of the Third World as a simple by-product of their own economic conditions.

Not accepting this marginal position, the Group of 77 supported its argument in favour of full participation in international decisions on all the problems vital to it, citing the unfavourable trends in international trade (its share in international trade dropped from 21 per cent in 1960 to 17 per cent in 1970), the growing additional charge on its debt services (now over \$60 billion), the persistent protectionism of the rich capitalist and socialist countries with respect to their semi-finished and manufactured goods, and the difficulty in maintaining a stable and profitable price for its basic commodities and raw materials.

Different views of UNCTAD

This created a stalemate for the duration of the conference; there was no possible balance between supply and demand. They did not overlap. Another reason for the frustration of the poor and the "clear conscience" of the rich stems from their different conceptions of the very nature of the conference. In the Lima declaration and in the successive submissions at Santiago, the Group of 77 reiterated its faith in UNCTAD as a forum for negotiation with concrete implication for immediate action. Even though its claims are presented in

technical language, quotas, SDR, GSP (?) and so forth, it is aware that behind this jargon lies the undeniable fact that poverty is becoming more acute and international co-operation is decreasing.

The rich countries, however, categorically state that UNCTAD is only a table for consultation. They come to hear complaints and to state their good intentions, which never materialize. In fact, the gap between an understanding of the development problem and the political will to act is growing ever more conspicuous. When they agree on international trade problems, they immediately add that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the appropriate forum for negotiation; if the problem is monetary reform, it is referred to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). No one can deny the advantages that these two organizations have secured for industrialized countries since as far back as the Bretton Woods Agreements; nevertheless the interests of the underdeveloped countries are not represented in them. It is even apparent that the poor countries have derived no major benefit from those organizations. We need only note the use of the special drawing rights (SDR). The SDR were created by the IMF at the request of the Group of Ten, "the club of the rich"; the intention was simply to increase world liquidity and to oil the trade machinery. After three allocations of SDR, 14 industrialized countries had received \$6 billion and 120 underdeveloped countries \$3 billion. Why two-thirds to 14 countries and one-third to 120 countries? Because the main criteria for allocating SDR are (a) the wealth of the country and (b) its participation in international trade.

It is, therefore, understandable that the problems raised at UNCTAD are referred by the rich countries to GATT and the IMF, organizations created to defend their interests and totally controlled by them.

Disunity in Group

The apparently strong unity of the Group of 77 is showing considerable cracks. Africa maintains ties with European countries that were its absolute masters 15 or 20 years ago. Political independence has not been followed by the desirable economic independence. Today's ties, like those of the colonial era, offer real advantages whose costs are not always visible and measurable.

On the other hand, Latin America, economically dependent on North America and further advanced industrially, lays stress on aspects that are of little interest

to Africa. Discussion on the less-developed countries even threatened to break the unity of the Group of 77 (only one Latin American country, Haiti, was included in the list of 25 least-developed countries).

This divergence among the countries of the Group of 77 is often accentuated by the conflict between the interests of the élite in power in the underdeveloped countries, almost always tied to the interests of the mother country, and the true needs of the second-class population of the country. For example, can a government that systematically denies the franchise to 40 per cent of the population, because it is illiterate, be expected to defend the interests of those second-class people at an international conference? Any defence of such people would be tantamount to self-accusation, and that would be political suicide.

The "rich" countries have approved a series of measures favouring the 25 least-developed countries of the world, although the establishment of a special fund for the "super poor" has been discarded. According to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the definition of poor countries and the co-operative measures provided for constitute the highlight of the conference.

The other relatively important gain made at the conference was the approval of a code for the conduct of shipping conferences. This agreement laid the groundwork for more equitable shipping legislation because Third World exporters are given greater power in their negotiations with Western ship-owners, who, until now, have monopolized this field.

The machinery of UNCTAD was strengthened as a result of the resolution to increase the number of members of the Trade and Development Board, which will comprise 68 members (instead of 55), as follows: 21 industrialized countries, 15 African, 14 Asian, including Mainland China, 11 Latin American and seven of the socialist bloc. There was unanimous agreement on co-operation for the development of tourism in the underdeveloped countries, and positive measures are expected in this field. However, the rich countries voted against the most important draft resolutions.

Hence, all indications are that the second development decade is off to a bad start. If the first decade could be described by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD as "the development decade without a development policy", the second runs the risk of being the decade of the credibility gap in international co-operation. One need only analyse the results of the main questions studied by the various committees of UNCTAD.

The conference did not arrive at a co-

herent and integrated policy on basic commodities; yet these constitute one of the major concerns of the Third World countries. The picture is already very familiar: Malaysia must export more than twice as much rubber in 1970 as in 1960 in order to pay for the same quantity of imported manufactured goods; Ceylon must export more than one-and-a-half times as much tea in 1970 as in 1960 in return for the same volume of imported goods. This deterioration in exchange terms affects many other countries whose exports consist of temperate foodstuffs, agricultural products and processed minerals, such as cereals, meat, fish, dairy products, wine, oil seeds, tobacco, cotton and wool.

It should be further added that most of the underdeveloped countries depend on the export of one or two basic commodities for their foreign-currency earnings. What did the third UNCTAD contribute to the resolution of this problem? From the opening of the conference, the industrialized countries showed a keen desire to cooperate. Two trends clearly emerged: the German delegation defended the more liberal proposition that provided for measures that would generally favour the entry of basic commodities on the markets of the developed countries (lowering of customs tariffs, elimination of quotas). The French delegation preferred to draw up agreements, commodity by commodity (like the agreements on coffee and sugar) in order to regulate production and stabilize prices. The categorical opposition to each other of the two methods blocked the way to a real solution. After lengthy discussions, the industrialized countries came back to the *status quo* by submitting a text in which they stated that they would abide by Resolution 73, passed on September 18, 1970, by the Trade and Development Board. That text is only a vague declaration of intent, which leaves the way open for each industrialized country to adopt measures, case by case, according to its choice. No meaningful progress was, therefore, made, and there is nothing to indicate that it will be otherwise in the future. According to Mr. Mansholt, the European Economic Community is undergoing change and does not find itself in the best position to develop a clearcut strategy on external problems. The United States has still not brought its balance of payments into balance and, furthermore, this is an election year. Canada even questioned UNCTAD's competence to deal with the problem of basic commodities. In the rich countries' view, all that the underdeveloped countries can do is wait for the day when all the problems of the developed countries

are finally solved, after which they will perhaps be "charitably" invited to partake of the abundance.

Disunity on disarmament

The discussion on the commercial and economic aspects of partial disarmament did not meet with the approval of the powerful countries. Nevertheless, the argument put forward by the Group of 77 did carry some weight. Worldwide military expenditures had exceeded \$200 billion in 1970, and, if the proportion of world production that they absorb annually at the present time continues, they could total from \$300 billion to \$350 billion (at 1970 prices) by the end of the decade. According to Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, this sum is 25 times as large as the total amount of all assistance programs and already exceeds the total gross national product (GNP) of all the underdeveloped countries. "What is worse," he stated, "defence expenditures are increasing by 6 per cent a year; this rate of increase in destructive power is greater than the rate of growth of the total world production of goods and services." Hence, an end to the arms race would contribute both to improving international relations and to maintaining world peace and security, thus freeing resources for peaceful purposes, including assistance.

According to some economists (e.g., Barbara Wood, a 10-percent reduction in inflationist-type military expenditures, if transferred to development assistance, would make it possible to meet quickly the proposed target of 0.7 per cent of the GNP for official assistance. An increase in assistance to underdeveloped countries would be the natural consequence of a substantial reduction in military expenditures. This reallocation of resources would bring about an increase in total revenue and in world trade. The motion to this effect, made by the Group of 77, was defeated. The draft resolution by the Group was withdrawn in favour of a watered-down draft submitted by the president of the conference, which was adopted by 80 countries with nine abstentions (precisely the more powerful countries). China did not take part in the vote "because the problem of disarmament cannot be resolved as long as the United States and the U.S.S.R. continue to increase their armaments in their dispute over world supremacy".

Canada stated that it did not believe that the argument that a reduction in military spending would automatically generate additional funds for development was realistic.

The measures proposed for lightening the Third World's debt also received an unequivocal "no". The Group of 77 consider the problem to be vital. In fact, according to the UNCTAD study, the data from 80 developing countries show that the total external public debt increased at an average annual rate of 14 per cent during the Sixties and that, at the end of 1969, totalled about \$60 billion. As a result, the net transfer of resources (gifts and public loans) dropped from \$5.4 billion to \$2.2 billion between 1965 and 1969. This reduction in the net transfer of resources affected mainly low-income Africa, India and Pakistan. More than 20 per cent of the export earnings of Third World countries go into debt-service payments, and this proportion is tending to increase. The President of the World Bank pointed out in his speech that "the debt service of the developing countries is increasing twice as fast as the export earnings which should finance them". Despite these facts and trends, the spokesman for Britain, undoubtedly expressing the opinion of the members of Group B (developed market-economy countries), stated that the external debt-service relief measures would be a bonus for poor management and would run the risk of weakening the bases of international credit.

On this subject, as on many others, the developed countries wished to retain full freedom to examine requests for the renegotiation of debts, separately, case by case, and always after a crisis had become obvious. The case of Chile is a striking example of such a crisis. In his inaugural address, President Allende stated: "The value of our exports is \$1,200 million in 1972; this same year we have to pay \$408 million as external public-debt service. It is not possible for a country to allocate 34 per cent of ever 100 dollars it receives to payment of the external debt."

Already the Pearson Report (*Partners in Development*, Commission on International Development, Denoël, 1969, Pp. 3-9.) had recommended: "Aid-giving countries should consider debt-relief a legitimate form of aid and permit the use of new loans to refinance debt payments, in order to reduce the need for full-scale renegotiations."

Creditor countries are opposed in principle to tying aid to debt relief. The creditor countries will continue to be held on a "short leash", without the leeway necessary to develop plans in advance with reasonable security.

The "rich" countries did not reach a consensus on projects concerning monetary reform and the "tying" of SDR to addi-

tional development financing. After lengthy debate, they got around to studying "the possibility of tying the SDR to aid" in the context of world monetary reform. At the same time, the advantaged countries rejected the proposal made by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Mr. Perez Guenero (Venezuela), to establish a permanent liaison committee between UNCTAD, the IMF and GATT. Through such a committee, the underdeveloped countries would have been able to participate more effectively in monetary and trade negotiations in 1973. The tying of the SDR to development financing would have permitted the creation of additional liquidity for the underdeveloped countries that will soon be receiving only 0.35 per cent of the total GNP of the industrialized countries. The United States, which had demanded a separate vote for the "tying" clause, after lengthy consultations abstained from voting. This abstention added the last gloomy touch to the long sleepless night of the final session of the third UNCTAD.

Third chance missed

At the conclusion of UNCTAD, the countries of the Group of 77 were in the same position with regard to the rich countries as European union workers at the beginning of the century were with regard to their bosses. The bosses listened to them but refused to take out their wallets. Mr. Mansholt was right to say: "The Santiago conference is the place where everyone says what should be done and where no one does enough." At Santiago, a third opportunity to lay the groundwork for a more rational reorganization of the world economic system was allowed to slip by. Even the study of a charter of economic rights and duties of states, suggested by the President of Mexico, did not receive the massive support of the group of developed Western countries. Such a charter, similar to the Charter of Human Rights, could, in principle, counteract the commercialism of the present economic powers.

Poverty and wealth cannot coexist indefinitely. The present world situation, where one-third do not sleep for fear of the two-thirds who have nothing to eat, must be remedied.

The mass media, political leaders — indeed, public opinion — could attach a great deal more importance to underdevelopment and its causes and bring pressure to bear on governments so that they would take measures to narrow the gap separating the "have" countries from the Third World countries. Public opinion has forced governments to take measures to prevent

pollution and to preserve the physical environment, despite the costs involved. A serious social pollution created by the irrational way in which international trade operates is strangling millions of human beings, and yet public opinion remains insensitive to it. We are still far from an interdependent economy on this small planet of ours.

The third UNCTAD has eloquently proved that the world is not a community, that the "have" countries' assistance to the development of the Third World is too marginal, that "free" international trade is a myth that profits the developed countries at the expense of the Third World. Nations are not agreed on the worldwide development objectives to be achieved; as

a result the discussions on the means to be adopted for reaching them were unproductive. The third UNCTAD should serve at least as a warning to public opinion. World survival is at stake and everyone — rich and poor — depends on it.

Lester B. Pearson said in his address at the Conference on International Economic Development, Columbia University, New York, that no planet could survive half enslaved, half free, half engulfed in poverty, half on the way to the anticipated joys of limitless consumption, the result of unprecedented production, and that neither our ecology nor our morality could survive such a contrast. What is going to happen when that minority majority, the Group of 77, becomes aware that there is strength in numbers?

The widening gap . . .

Two recent statistical reports indicate that the gap between the have and have-not nations is widening despite the flow of development assistance from the industrialized states.

According to the *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, the total *per capita* output — industrial and agricultural — of the developed countries increased by 43 per cent from 1960 to 1970, while the *per capita* increase in the developed countries in the same span was only 27 per cent. Moreover, the less-developed nations start from a much lower *per capita* base.

In terms of consumption of energy, the developing countries in 1970, with a population more than twice as large as that of the developed countries, consumed only a little more than one-seventh of the total energy produced.

In terms of caloric food intake *per person*, Ireland stood first with an average daily consumption of 3,450 calories followed by New Zealand with 3,320; the United States, 3,290; France, 3,270; and Britain, 3,180. At the other end of the scale, the intake *per person* in Indonesia was listed at 1,750 calories; in Bolivia, 1,760; Somalia, 1,770; Ecuador, 1,850; and Algeria, 1,890 calories.

In terms of adequacy of housing, the 1971 *UN Yearbook* shows that in Britain there is a density of only .6 persons *per room*; the United States achieved the same percentage. In Switzerland it was .7 persons *per room*. In contrast, the Central African Republic had an average of 3.4

persons *per room*; Pakistan, 3.1; and India, 2.6 persons *per room*.

The growth of population in the underdeveloped nations is much higher than that in the developed countries despite much lower life expectancies and much higher infant mortality.

The World Bank, in its annual report issued in September, said that, despite impressive economic growth in the poorer nations, "it is probably true that the world's burden of poverty is increasing rather than declining".

The Bank's report, prepared for the annual meeting of this UN specialized agency and the International Monetary Fund, attributed the increase in poverty in part to rising population. But it added: "Statistics conceal the gravity of the underlying economic and social problems, which are typified by severely skewed income distribution, excessive levels of unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, low rates of literacy, serious malnutrition and widespread ill health."

The Bank report said the total debt and the annual cost of debt service of the poorer countries had continued to increase.

The report said, however, there had been progress toward development and it stressed that generalizations about developing countries — their prospects for growth, their potential for expanding trade, their ability to carry debt burdens — were hazardous. (*New York Times* summaries, July 10 and September 18, 1972).

A long-term agenda for dealing with the problem of Rhodesia

by Colin Legum

The chances of finding a political settlement for the Rhodesian crisis remain as remote now as they were in 1965 when Ian Smith led his white breakaway to implement the principles of the Rhodesian Front, the most basic of which is to "ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in responsible hands". Neither white nor black Rhodesians, nor the rest of the world, failed to understand the meaning of "responsible hands", or the significance of the challenge. The rebellion destroyed any hope of a non-violent and accepted transition to majority rule. For the future, Rhodesia and the world community must live with the consequences of that reckless act.

Mr. Smith's promise that UDI would turn out to be "a nine-days' wonder" has dragged its frustrating way through almost seven difficult years; yet even now the Rhodesian Front has failed to understand the reasons for either black hostility or world opposition to its regime. At no time has there been any sign of recognition on its part that Rhodesia is not an island but a dangerously exposed frontier land between black-ruled and white-ruled Africa.

The fiasco of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals has shaken the self-confidence of white Rhodesians, but not their characteristic sense of self-righteousness; while the Pearce Report has bolstered the morale of black Rhodesians without in any way changing their immediate prospects. As President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania wrote in his important message to the 1972 summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) about the British Government's policy in accepting the Pearce Commission's conclusions:

"... Obviously this does not 'solve' the Rhodesian issue. It merely means that the Smith regime continues in power in Rhodesia; that it continues to be regarded as illegal, to be without international recognition, and that sanctions against it continue. But it would not be true to say that the situation has therefore returned to

what it was previously. The power situation is the same; but the effect of the commissioners' visit to Rhodesia, the African reactions to that visit, and the report itself, can never be undone. It is the implications of these things that have to be considered in answering the question 'What now?'"

Major realities

Before considering this question, it might be useful for purposes of further analysis to identify the major political realities about the situation in Rhodesia now:


(1) The Smith regime remains firmly in political control. Any conceivable threat to Mr. Smith's personal leadership (which seems less likely now than a few months ago) is unlikely to change fundamentally the white-dominated power structure, with the Rhodesian Front at its apex.

(2) Mr. Smith's black and white challengers have not yet developed a strategy, or the means for effectively implementing one, to change the power balance.

(3) In the new phase, which has already started, the regime will seek to break Bishop Muzorewa's African National Conference (ANC) by harassment, before moving to outlaw it. It is already engaged in giving greater powers to the chiefs to re-establish their control over the tribal trust areas they so conspicuously lost during the visit of the Pearce Commission.

(4) The British Government has no new ideas about what to do next. Having listened to Sir Alex Douglas-Home, in public and in private, the following seems clear: He sees his "pause for reflection" as

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*Rhodesia situation
not considered
one of priorities
by Britain's
Heath*

a period during which he hopes the Africans might have second thoughts about the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals; he has no expectations that Britain might get Mr. Smith to agree to anything more than the last set of agreed proposals; he is determined to stand by Britain's Five Principles; he expects no great difficulties in getting the Tory Party to renew sanctions in November, even though he is no great believer in the value of sanctions other than as a means of inconvenient pressures on the Smith regime. In short, his position is typically (but not surprisingly) Micawberish. As for Prime Minister Heath, he shows no inclination to make Rhodesia one of the priorities of 10 Downing Street, nor is he likely to do so unless the issue becomes divisive within the Tory Party, which it is not yet.

(5) Even if effectively applied, economic sanctions will not by themselves succeed in toppling the Smith regime. But they remain of crucial importance for reasons that will be presently discussed. They are already doing far greater economic harm than is usually supposed.

(6) Because Rhodesia is deeply embedded in the Southern African sub-system, its future is intimately bound up with developments in that area. The Smith regime would be greatly helped if Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda were to fail in his current efforts to establish his effective authority over his country; on the other hand, it would be seriously undermined if the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) were to succeed in seriously undermining Portuguese rule, especially in strategic Tete Province, wedged between Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia.

(7) The African states can, as yet, play only a limited role in directly helping to change Rhodesia's internal power structure. They can, and they do, help the Zimbabwe guerrillas; they give moral and economic support to the ANC; they can contribute toward making sanctions more effective; and they can keep up pressure through the United Nations and the Commonwealth. But increased African pressure — and especially more effective guerrilla operations — must reckon with the possibility of South Africa's active intervention.

(8) The situation inside Rhodesia will change fundamentally only when the black factor becomes a serious challenge to white rule. This is unlikely to happen until the country's internal security and its economy are in serious jeopardy and external pressures are intensified, perhaps in response to greater internal black pressure and to what happens in Mozambique.

(9) The overriding single reality about Rhodesia is that the struggle there is over the maintenance of white supremacy, although different in degree and character; this is the dominant determinant of the policies of all the white-ruled countries in Southern Africa.

Long-term settlement

What conclusions can be drawn from this range of assumptions? The most immediately obvious conclusion is that a settlement of the Rhodesian problem is long-term rather than short-term: it calls for patience, persistence and commitment; and it leaves no room for the kind of facile optimism to which Harold Wilson was inclined to treat us from time to time. It is not in its present phase, a problem amenable to peaceful negotiations, either between the black and white parties directly involved or through third-party intervention.

The Pearce Commission findings amply demonstrated that an Anglo-Rhodesian agreement negotiated without African participation or consent will fail to meet the British Fifth Principle — the test of acceptability. This is not to say, however, that there might not be a resumption in the future of direct talks between the British Government and the Smith regime, with some possible arrangement to seek to implement a new agreement without the help of a Pearce Commission — perhaps even through a secret ballot, which is increasingly favoured by the Rhodesia Front. Such an exercise might get Britain off the Rhodesian hook, but it cannot bring any assurance of stability to the peoples of that country.

Another fairly obvious conclusion is that the Smith regime will move vigorously to repair the breaches in the Rhodesian Front dikes opened up by the brief political holiday allowed to Africans during the operations of the Pearce Commission. The one lesson they have failed to learn — indeed, are incapable of learning — is that the majority of black Rhodesians do not like, or accept, white rule, and least of all Mr. Smith's rule.

Despite the clear evidence of the futility of relying on tribal chiefs, Mr. Smith has announced his intention of reinforcing their position by giving them powers far in excess of their authority. The implications of such a policy are further political repression of blacks and the elimination of the ANC and of Bishop Muzorewa in much the same manner as ZAPU and ZANA and their leaders, Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole, were eliminated. The predictable outcome is a further intensification of black bitterness and a

greater readiness to listen to advocates of violent methods of struggle.

We can also expect an intensification of the policy of racial separation in the South African mould of *apartheid*. The new policy of provincialization, which is now to be embarked on, is simply another version of Bantustans.

Guerrilla strategy

So far, the guerrilla movement in Rhodesia has been ineffectual. The initial ZAPU and ZANU strategy of attempting guerrilla incursions into the country from Zambia ended in failure; it has been abandoned. There are signs of a new strategy being devised, which will seek to infiltrate trained guerrillas into the countryside to build up cells of resistance in the tribal trust areas. Such a policy will take time to develop. Meanwhile, it would be foolish to try to predict whether it will be successful or not. All one can say with any degree of confidence is that a new generation of young black leaders has begun to emerge in the last few years. The most impressive of these have been received into the new front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (ROLIZI), which has linked up with an important section of ZAPU. The new leader, Sheldon Samwela, is a graduate of Boston University and is impressive by any standards.

The OAU has officially recognized ROLIZI as well as its rival ZANU-ZAPU Joint Military Command. The future development of these Zimbabwe guerrilla movements will depend on two external factors: the willingness and ability of President Kaunda to sustain their bases in Zambia; and the fortunes of FRELIMO in Mozambique. In the middle-term future, Rhodesia's stability may be largely affected by the capacity of the Portuguese to retain their control over Tete Province. Too little attention has, as yet, been given to the significance of the Portuguese troubles in Tete and its likely effects on the security of Rhodesia.

Ian Colvin of the London *Daily Telegraph*, a writer normally sympathetic to the Portuguese, wrote after a recent visit to the area: "... Mozambique could be described as the sick man of Southern Africa ... that Communist-trained guerrillas swarm in its remoter areas and pose an ineliminable threat to the Cabora-Bassa hydroelectric project. In Rhodesia and South Africa, there is even concern that the Portuguese might set up a black Government as a means of extricating Portugal from increasing pressures from the militant African states."

Reports of guerrilla gains tend to be

minimized by the Portuguese and their allies and to be exaggerated by their enemies. A more careful evaluation would treat sceptically claims that FRELIMO can quickly break Portuguese rule or that the Portuguese are winning. The Portuguese have, in fact, slowly been losing ground since guerrilla operations began in 1963; their position has become more difficult, especially since the middle of 1971.

It is wrong to evaluate the Portuguese position only in terms of Mozambique. Their capacity to wage a long war of attrition will be greatly affected by the simultaneous pressures on them in Guinea-Bissau and Angola. These combined pressures will in turn continue to affect political development inside Portugal itself, where the Caetano regime faces three rival challenges: the militant left-wing resistance movement; the ultra right-wing militarist-commercial coalition, with strong vested interests in Portuguese Africa; and the new class of technocrats and industrialists, who see their future as members of the European Community. In the end, Portugal's policies in Africa — and their repercussions on Rhodesia and South Africa — will be determined by the interplay of forces in metropolitan Portugal and the Portuguese colonies.

The predictable effects of a deteriorating security position along the Rhodesia-Mozambique frontier will be to reinforce the Rhodesian Front's determination to maintain white supremacy and not to yield to any winds of change. But though nobody should underrate the determination of white Rhodesians to defend their way of life, their capacity to do so would be greatly affected by any serious weakening along their Portuguese flank. Not only would this increase their security risks and call for increased expenditure on security forces, it would threaten their shortest route to the sea and seriously impede their elaborate sanctions-breaking machinery.

The Portuguese factor, therefore, is of crucial importance to white Rhodesia. Here again one must sound a note of caution; it is necessary always to keep in mind two possibilities: first, that the Zambia regime could change to something resembling Malawi's; and second, that South Africa might move its armies across its frontiers to underpin the outer perimeter of the "White Redoubt". The latter possibility is real so long as Mr. Vorster remains in power; it would be less certain if he should be supplanted by a *verkrampste* leader like Dr. Andries Treurnicht, since there is a strong tradition among the inward-looking section of Afrikanerdom to draw its *laager* firmly within South Africa's own

Portuguese factor of key importance to white Rhodesia in security plans

frontiers. The dispute between these two sections of Afrikanerdom over this precise issue has already surfaced.

However, should South Africa's armies become deeply engaged in Mozambique, it is reasonable to suppose that their action would not only create a different situation in Southern Africa but affect international opinion and policies.

Internal threats

Apart from these external threats to Rhodesia's security, there is also the likelihood of internal threats. These could come, as already indicated, from a more effective guerrilla strategy linked to growing black bitterness inside the country. There is, unfortunately, no reason to suppose that black feelings can become anything but more hostile under a regime such as Mr. Smith's.

A serious source of internal disaffection is the steady growth of black unemployment. Already an estimated one million of Rhodesia's 5.4 million black population are unemployed and their numbers are added to annually by 45,000 school-leavers. (An interesting and possibly significant factor, too, is the increasing exodus of young white Rhodesians who see no future for themselves in the present society.) There are other serious causes for black frustration, arising from lack of educational and social disabilities.

It is indisputably true that maintaining sanctions will hit black Rhodesians harder than whites and, in the short run, will further worsen their condition; but their disabilities precede the application of sanctions. The fundamental nature of a minority-ruled society is to favour its own kith and kin over the majority. In the long term, only a fundamental change in Rhodesia's power structure can bring meaningful change to its black citizens.

Impact of sanctions

Economic sanctions have begun to bite; those who judge Rhodesia's economy from its shop-windows or by the officially published statistics, miss the deeper significance of the damage done to the core of the country's economy. These have been carefully described in the report recently published by the Africa Bureau, London. The best brief description of Rhodesia's difficulties is to be found in the following statement made by Mr. Smith himself when, on November 26, 1971, he defended the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals at a conference of the Rhodesian Front:

"If only Rhodesians could be apprised of the facts and predictions available to

Government — our economic requirements and anticipated development difficulties and the security problems which loom before us — then they would more readily understand our position. Rhodesia could have gone on without a settlement and her position would not have been prejudiced this year or next. But it is our assessment that in ten or 20 years' time the position would not be so good for our children."

The failure of the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations has not changed that position — except that the more effective application of sanctions could considerably reduce the time-scale indicated by Mr. Smith.

Sanctions, as I have already suggested will not by themselves suffice to defeat the Smith regime. What, then, is the case for persisting with sanctions?

First, because it is the only policy that guarantees virtual international agreement in treating the Smith regime as an outlaw within the world community; not a single country (not even Portugal or South Africa) has recognized it diplomatically. Second, because of this isolation, Rhodesia has been denied access to the world's money markets, which are indispensable to its long-term survival. Third, it has served the purpose of denying outright victory to the rebels and of preventing them from solidifying their control; they are kept economically weak, and politically and militarily insecure. Fourth, it has been the only effective pressure to make white Rhodesians even consider a negotiated settlement. Fifth, it has sustained the morale of the black and white opponents of the regime. Sixth, it has prevented further polarizing of African and Western opinion over the problems of Southern Africa's white-ruled states.

All this mounts up to a fairly substantial vindication of sanctions. But why have sanctions not operated more effectively in the past?

Because South Africa and Portugal have, from the first, refused to co-operate and have provided markets and trade channels to the outside world. Because the main effects have been shifted off white shoulders on to those of black Rhodesians, who have been forced to rely even more on subsistence agriculture. Because, for diverse reasons, the world community did not match Britain's own efforts, which, by and large, have been exemplary. Because the African states in the past lacked confidence in the credibility of British policy and so failed to exert pressures at the United Nations on those countries and had defaulted on sanctions. Finally, because the UN sanctions machinery has been almost

Internal factors include exodus of young whites, growth of jobless in ranks of blacks

visory for an international effort under chapter 7 of the Charter.

International approach

What should be the role of the international community in the Rhodesian crisis? First and foremost, it should recognize that the white rebellion in Rhodesia forms an integral part of the wider struggle going on through Southern Africa. Rhodesia should not be regarded in isolation from the rest of the subcontinent. Next, though it should recognize the limitations of international intervention, it could mobilize its collective power to make sanctions more effective while, at the same time, giving direct support and encouragement to the white and black opponents of the Smith regime. Commonwealth solidarity is one important factor. But the biggest immediate contribution is to give a new lease of life to the UN sanctions program by insisting more rigidly on member states honouring their obligations. (A useful start could be for the United States to rescind exemptions on Rhodesian chrome and other strategic minerals.) The most important contribution, however, would be to develop a new strategy for enforcing sanctions.

This strategy should start by recognizing that Portugal and South Africa will refuse co-operation in any program of international sanctions. But this is not fatal to its operations. The key to an effective sanctions policy is to deprive the Smith regime of foreign-exchange earnings; this is much more important than denying it ports. It has already lost the benefit of the most important pre-UDI source of foreign-exchange earnings — tobacco. Now it relies almost entirely on the export of minerals, beef and agricultural products. Since the last two sources of income are derived largely from markets within Southern Africa, there is probably little that can be done about this; but they are insignificant compared to the earnings from minerals.

All Rhodesian minerals are sold overseas. Portugal and South African cannot, therefore, assist the Smith regime only by facilitating the export of its minerals. In any circumstances, very little can be done to block the shipment of these minerals to the ports of Mozambique and South Africa. The objective, therefore, should be to intercept the embargoed cargoes at their ports of disembarkation. British intelligence has, so far, rendered admirable service in pinpointing precisely at which cargoes leave the ports of Mozam-

bique or South Africa. The problems arise at their destinations. The experience in the past has been that, with few exceptions, even when cargoes have been apprehended for inspection, the recipient countries have proved unco-operative.

UN inspection

The need, therefore is to provide for a UN system of inspection of all suspect cargoes and not to leave their identification to authorities of the receiving country. This system can be supervised by a team of UN technical advisers. All cargoes declared black must be confiscated — not just returned to the point of embarkation, as has sometimes happened. If this were to happen, Rhodesia would not only lose the foreign-exchange earnings from its exports but it would suffer serious losses in the cost of mining, transporting and paying sanctions-breakers for their services. It would require the loss of only a relatively small number of such shipments to take the profit out of the trade for sanctions-breaking ships and companies. Without their services, the task of breaching sanctions would become increasingly difficult, if not, indeed, impossible.

Finally, if all UN member states can be persuaded to pass and enforce the same kind of legislation as adopted by Britain to prosecute the captains, owners and agents of ships engaged in sanctions-breaking, the operation of sanctions could be made very effective. It is significant that not a single British ship or agent has been known to engage in sanctions-breaking; the penalties have been made too high.

Here, then, is a practical international approach to the question of making the world's first collective attempt at imposing sanctions effective.

For these who believe in the importance of developing some alternative to international military sanctions, the chance of demonstrating the possible efficacy of economic sanctions offers a stirring challenge. But we should not lose sight of the fact that even an effective sanctions program is only one factor in the effort to defeat Rhodesia's Smith regime. We should not be discouraged by the time it takes, or by the near certainty that the going will get rougher in Rhodesia and in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, the distribution of power in the subcontinent makes it unlikely that the situation can be changed in that part of the world by peaceful means alone. Our aim should be to reduce, so far as possible, the loss of life, misery and economic chaos.

*Economic sanctions
only one element
in any effort
to defeat regime*

ICER and its two-year search for an approach to integration

By J. R. Maybee

In the first part of the Foreign Policy Review published in June 1970, the Government announced its decision that "there should be maximum integration in its foreign operations that will effectively contribute to the achievement of national objectives". To further this purpose, the Government established the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations (ICER). The committee, which was set up at the deputy-minister level under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, was given the responsibility "for guiding the process of integration during its initial phases and for advising the Government on such matters as the formulation of broad policy on foreign operations, the harmonization of departmental planning with the Government's external interests, the conduct of foreign operations, the allocation of resources for those operations". The Committee and its companion body the Personnel Management Committee — a subcommittee of ICER — held their first meetings in July 1970, and have been meeting at irregular intervals since that time.

The Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations and the program it was assigned to carry out had their origin in a study commissioned by the Government in 1969. An interdepartmental task force under the chairmanship of S. D. Pierce, a retired ambassador with a distinguished record of foreign service, was directed by the Government to "study and report" on all the operations abroad of the Federal Government, with a view to the maximum degree of integration that would be con-

sistent with the most effective achievement of the Government's objectives and to examine the administrative areas of Government operations abroad to determine where savings might be achieved or efficiency improved. This task force produced its report in March 1970. The report, in turn, was studied by an *ad hoc* committee of senior officials on Government organization (a group that included the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Secretary to the Treasury Board, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Deputy Minister of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce) and the committee submitted its findings to the Cabinet. The Cabinet took its decision on the report in May 1970 and announced the main points of its decision in *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, which was published in June 1970.

In *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the principal objective of the assignment to the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations may be identified in the statement that "the Government needs a strong and flexible organization for carrying out its reshaped foreign policy". It is significant that, while the Government went on to identify its purpose as "maximum integration in its foreign operations", this purpose was qualified with the phrase "that will effectively contribute to the achievement of national objectives"; this has left to the committee of deputy ministers the problem of deciding for purposes of recommendations to the Cabinet exactly what degree of integration would be most effective for the conduct of Canada's foreign operations.

It is significant that the Government spoke of the need for a "strong and flexible organization" in the singular. At the time when the ICER was established, there were approximately 1,880 Canadian and 2,220 locally-engaged employees of some 22 departments, boards, agencies and other organizations of government appointed or employed at 115 locations in 69 countries.

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ther than Canada. The Government's objective of the integration of foreign operations did not require the moulding into a single organization of this vast conglomeration of Federal Government employees broad, but it was at least to be one of the options to be considered.

In its policy statement headed "Organizing for the Seventies" in *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the Government also directed that a task force be established to report on "the means necessary to integrate all the support services of the Government's foreign operations". This task force, made up largely of personnel who had been working with the Pierce Task Force, made its report to the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations in July 1970, recommending that support services be integrated.

One of the first tasks, therefore, of the ICER was to prepare a plan for a submission to Cabinet for this important organizational step. Such a plan was submitted in December 1970 and, after approval by the Cabinet, was announced in January 1971. As a result of this decision, support staff for the bulk of foreign operations (including administrative, clerical, stenographic, and other support staff, local employees, vehicles, furnishings, etc.) were integrated into a single system under the management of the Department of External Affairs, effective April 1, 1971. This represented a major new commitment for that department and involved the transfer of about 1,000 employees (mostly locally-engaged staff) and annual expenditures exceeding \$10 million by other departments.

Country-planning system

The responsibilities assigned to ICER by the Government included advice on the full range of subjects relating to the management of foreign operations: the formulation of policy, the harmonization of plans and programs, the allocation of resources, the implementation of foreign operations and policies for the management of personnel. The ICER had undertaken to deal with the question of the integration of support services because it had been identified as a high-priority problem. ICER chose as its second area for its attention the harmonization of plans and programs. Specifically, it called for proposals for a country-planning system. It was hoped that country-planning might be that element of total foreign-operations management system that would tie the various parts together.

Working with an eye to the sobering experience of the U.S. State Department in

its only partially successful efforts to develop a comprehensive country-planning system, the officials in Ottawa who were assigned the task set to work with two basic notions in mind — first, that the ultimate integration of the foreign service personnel of the various departments and agencies maintaining personnel abroad was, if not a foregone conclusion, at least a likely eventuality and, secondly, that the situation called for the application of program-planning and budgeting systems to foreign operations.

As initially presented, the outline of a country-programming system was put forward with somewhat more modest objectives. The system was intended to enable the Government to see how its resources were being employed in a given country in pursuit of identified policies and objectives. Summary information of this kind, it was said, should enable the Government to see how its resources for foreign operations were being employed on a global scale, and would be an important point of reference when decisions were made on the allocation of resources for foreign operations. One component of the system — the country program — was tried out on a global scale early in 1971. The information that posts included in their programs provided a tentative but useful outline of the way in which Government resources were being used for foreign operations at that time. Although the preparation of these programs constituted a considerable administrative burden for many posts, the operation had significant benefits in terms of getting a better-articulated statement of the various aspects of post operations and the information was also of considerable use at headquarters. On the other hand, it quickly became evident that it would be a considerable time before the country-planning system could contribute significantly toward linking together the other elements of foreign-operations management — policies, resource allocation, operations and personnel management.

Policy co-ordination

During the spring of 1971, ICER member departments studied a wide range of options (including various types of structural integration) as to what measures might be recommended to the Government to carry forward the "Organizing for the Seventies" program. The view that prevailed was that the committee should defer consideration of further measures for structural integration until progress had been made towards the resolution of the problem of policy co-ordination at headquarters between the various departments

System involving country program tried in 1971 on global scale

and agencies responsible for programs with international implications. This has been and continues to be a prime source of attention for the ICER and its member departments. Because of its importance, I propose to examine this question a little more closely.

The Canadian Government has traditionally been organized functionally, with each minister and department responsible for a fairly clearly defined area of activity. Those departments of government administering programs with external implications have historically been relatively few in number and, in general, there has been a tradition of good co-ordinating and consulting procedures between them. Outside the principal foreign service departments (External Affairs, Industry, Trade and Commerce, Manpower and Immigration and National Defence), requirements for specialized representation abroad were, until the mid-Sixties, relatively few in number and modest in extent (e.g., the Departments of Labour and of National Health and Welfare, and the National Research Council).

In the last few years, however, the international dimension of a number of government programs has been growing quickly. The Canadian International Development Agency presents a special case; the rapid expansion of the Canadian aid programs for developing countries has had a marked effect on the pattern of Canadian representation abroad. It has been a major factor in the opening of a number of new diplomatic missions, and the requirement for aid officers in Ottawa with field experience has produced an arrangement whereby the aid work abroad is shared between External Affairs officers and aid officers posted abroad by CIDA. Other departments have also been developing an increasing interest in the international aspects of their programs; these include some of the longer-established departments (e.g., the Departments of Energy, Mines and Resources and of Transport) as well as some of the newer departments, particularly those with a horizontal co-ordinating mandate, such as the Department of the Environment, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology.

Drastic side effects

There are a number of considerations relating to these developments that make the problem of policy co-ordination particularly complex:

- (1) It is becoming increasingly evident that the policies and programs pursued by one department can have

drastic effects on the programs of others. There are no rules, however, to control these side effects, and each department must work out its own tactics for handling them.

- (2) The traditional methods for handling interdepartmental relations by defining areas of jurisdiction are becoming less valid. Problems do not divide neatly along departmental lines of demarcation. The question of the movement of super-tankers carrying oil from Alaska along the West Coast of Canada involves, for instance, a number of departments — External Affairs, Transport, Environment, Energy, Mines and Resources, Regional Economic Expansion — to name the most obvious. Each of these departments approaches a problem of this kind from the point of view of the policies it is charged with promoting; these policies are not necessarily reconcilable with those of other departments.
- (3) The informal modes of consultation that have served well in enabling some of the older-line departments to keep in step with one another in some well-defined areas of co-operation are not likely to be adequate in situations where several large departments should co-ordinate their different approaches. This is particularly true in the case of large departments, where vertical communication between a deputy minister and desk officer may not always be quick and effective. Delays involved in consulting with several departments may, furthermore, be unacceptable in a fast-changing situation.
- (4) Easy international communications and transport make it relatively simple for government departments to "do their own thing" internationally. To send off on a two or three weeks trip abroad a senior official from Ottawa armed with a brief case and an air ticket may seem a simpler and more effective way of handling the international aspects of a domestic program than trying to use the personnel and facilities of established Canadian missions abroad.

The challenge to ICER to develop a better pattern of policy co-ordination in the face of the problems sketched in the foregoing paragraphs is formidable indeed. The ICER has already worked out a tentative set of principles to form the basis of better co-ordination arrangements for foreign operations, and has begun the task of exploring with other departments ways

*Other departments
begin to expand
foreign dimension*

giving practical expression to these principles. Undoubtedly, useful things can be done in terms of improving the methods, procedures and machinery for co-ordination — revitalizing moribund inter-departmental committees, establishing new ones where required, canvassing the use of task forces, providing for better inter-departmental communication, sharing information about policies and plans. These are remedies rather than cures, however, and will certainly have to be reinforced by other measures.

In another part of the forest, the Personnel Management Committee is pushing forward with several inglorious tasks that may eventually make a significant contribution to better policy co-ordination. The committee is seeking to develop co-ordinated personnel policies and to rationalize the miscellaneous and often inconsistent personnel practices of the several foreign service departments. Whether or not all foreign service personnel are eventually integrated into a single service, the steps being taken to put them so far as possible on the same footing are bound to have beneficial effects for better co-operation between the departments concerned. The Personnel Management Committee is also developing programs for the secondment and exchange of personnel between foreign service departments, and also between foreign service departments, on the one hand, and domestic departments, on the other. Policy co-ordination is in many respects a "people" problem, and the more public servants there are who understand the policies and programs of other departments the more likely it is that the co-ordination procedures decided upon will be employed with perception and understanding.

A pervasive problem in relation to policy co-ordination is the very loose way in which the term "policy" is employed in government. Whether the questions being discussed are long-range or immediate, "policy" and a number of related terms are used indiscriminately without com-

monly understood distinctions of meaning — aims, goals, objectives, strategies, policies, tactics, programs, projects. This makes for difficulties in communication between one department and another, between officials and ministers and between government and the public. The situation calls not just for a standardized vocabulary but for more systematic and disciplined procedures in the formulation of proposals for the Government to consider and in implementation of Government decisions once a plan of action has been selected.

Foreign Policy for Canadians sets forth a conceptual framework that could be employed as a basis for developing a more systematic approach to the problem of formulating Canada's foreign policy. The approach outlined therein would require the definition of national objectives in all significant areas of government activity, under each of the six policy themes (economic growth, social justice, quality of life, peace and security sovereignty and independence, harmonious natural environment). It would also require the devising of alternative policies that might be employed to attain the national objectives and the relating of program proposals to the different policies identified as viable alternatives.

Not surprisingly, this kind of approach to the discussion and planning of Government business does not commend itself very strongly to senior officials accustomed to handling the problems of government pragmatically, as they come, and in relation to traditionally-recognized areas of departmental jurisdiction. Yet some better way than is now available should be found to ensure that ministers can make decisions on programs and courses of action on the basis of a comprehensive appreciation of the interplay of different national objectives and to enable officials to perceive the programs they are implementing as parts of a coherent whole. This is a problem of the integration of the Government's foreign operations that remains to be solved.

*Finding method
making decisions
based on interplay
of national goals*

meet the challenge of coming decades, be equipped to take advantage of new opportunities, to keep abreast of the rapid evolution of events, the Government needs strong and flexible organization for carrying out its reshaped foreign policy. Modern management techniques are called for.

The Government has decided that there should be maximum integration in

its foreign operations that will effectively contribute to the achievement of national objectives. . . .

. . . The Government's view is that, if its foreign policy is to be carried out effectively, the organization for doing so must be closely-knit, fully-qualified and responsive to the changing demands that inevitably will be made on it. . . . (*Foreign Policy for Canadians*, June 1970.)

Seeking a route for achieving a more dynamic United Nations

Canada feels the United Nations can be made more effective and more dynamic without rewriting its Charter. The world organization's effectiveness and vitality depend not upon changing its basic structure so much as upon the political determination of its members to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities under the present Charter. In short, the effectiveness of the UN is directly dependent on the political will of its members.

Despite this overall approach, Canada is prepared to give careful consideration to all specific proposals for re-

vision or more effective use of the Charter which might enlist broad support among member states.

This is the gist of the Canadian Government's reply to the UN Secretary-General's invitation for suggestions on review of the UN Charter. Under a resolution adopted by the twenty-fifth General Assembly, the Secretary-General called on member states to submit proposals for review of the Charter and this question has been placed on the agenda for the twenty-seventh General Assembly session this fall. Text of the Canadian reply follows.

A basic premise of Canada's foreign policy is to continue to work actively to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for international co-operation, and to improve its capacity to meet its responsibilities. It has been suggested on various grounds that, to achieve this end, a review of the Charter is necessary. It has been pointed out, for example, that the Charter is now 26 years old, that conditions have changed greatly since it was drawn up, that a majority of the present members of the organization did not participate in drafting it, and that the United Nations has not fulfilled all the hopes of those who did draft it in 1945.

The Government of Canada is prepared to give careful and serious consideration to all specific proposals for revision or more effective utilization of the Charter which might command broad support amongst the membership of the organization.

In considering such proposals, it must be borne in mind that it has proved to be very difficult to achieve agreement on textual amendments in the past. Charter revision is governed by Article 108 of the Charter, which states: "Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including

all the permanent members of the Security Council."

Hitherto it has been possible to reach agreement on amendments in only two respects, providing for enlargement of the Security Council from nine to 15 and enlargement of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 and recently — subject to ratification — to 54.

Nonetheless, the Charter has proved to be a remarkably flexible document, capable of growth and adaptation in response to changing conditions and needs of the international community. The involvement of the United Nations in the emergence to independence of non-self-governing territories, its activities relating to international development, its concern with racial discrimination and *apartheid*, are all examples of how a broad rather than narrow interpretation of the Charter can make it a living Charter, responsive to the needs of the United Nations' members. There is in the Canadian view no reason why this should be any less true in future. The United Nations can be made more dynamic without rewriting the Charter; its effectiveness and vitality depend not upon changing the basic structure of the organization so much as upon the political resolve of the member states to fulfil the obligations and the responsibilities each has taken up in subscribing to the provisions of the Charter. In short, the effectiveness of the United Nations is directly dependent on the political will of its members. No documentary revision in itself can

be a substitute for that will; nor can it be shown that where the will exists the present form of the Charter has frustrated it.

Against this background, the Government of Canada questions whether it would be productive to undertake revision of the Charter as a whole at this time. Questions of textual revision (as, for example, the removal of certain provisions such as Article 107) and, in particular, opportunities for change within the existing framework should be approached in a constructive spirit on a functional or case-by-case basis.

Canadian initiative

It was with this objective that Canada took the initiative to propose in 1970 the establishment of the Special Committee of 11 to study ways and means of improving the procedures and organization of the United Nations General Assembly, including the organization of work, rules of procedure, methods and practices. The work of this committee culminated in acceptance of substantial procedural reforms by the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1971.

Similarly, Canada has actively supported the proposal that a special committee of legal experts be set up to conduct a careful and searching review of the role of the International Court of Justice in the light of the comments of member states, in the hope that this proposal may be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session. Other efforts along similar functional lines to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations will have Canada's active co-operation.

Charter review is often approached primarily as a matter of strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council. It is in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security that the United Nations has most generally been regarded as falling short of what it is expected to achieve. In Resolution 2864 (XXVI), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to include in his report to the General Assembly XXVII suggestions on ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Council. Numerous ideas have been put forward relating to this subject over the years.

Of particular current interest are proposals which have recently been advanced by members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, including the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., for the development of a subsidiary body under Article 107 or through activation of the Military Staff Committee, in order to advise the Security Council and the Secretary-General

on the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping as such is not spelled out in specific terms in the Charter. It is noteworthy, however, that such proposals need not call for revision of the Charter; they are capable of implementation within existing Charter provisions.

Based on the extensive experience of Canadian forces in past United Nations peacekeeping operations, Canada will continue to play an active part in the preparation of guidelines and institutional arrangements designed to strengthen the peacekeeping role of the organization and more effective use of the Security Council.

Suggestions have also been made from time to time involving amendment of the Charter to alter the voting procedures in the Security Council and the General Assembly, in particular to introduce limitations on the use of the veto, and various systems of weighted voting.

A close examination of the effects and implications of such proposals leads to the conclusion that in present circumstances revisions of this nature would not be feasible or in some instances desirable.

Removal of veto

An attempt to remove the veto from areas of decision-making in the Security Council (for example, as has been suggested in relation to admission of new members under Article 4, or recommendations for specific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI, and indeed which Canada proposed at San Francisco in 1945) might attract some support in the United Nations General Assembly, but in present circumstances would still encounter firm opposition amongst permanent members of the Council. In the same way, any given formula to allocate greater voting strength in the General Assembly to member states according to the size of their assessed contribution to the regular budget or other factors, such as population or GNP, might conceivably find support (depending on the particular formula proposed) amongst those members who might thereby qualify for preferred status. However, it would inevitably have little appeal to the majority of members, who, under any of the various formulae proposed, would find themselves placed at a relative disadvantage.

The variety of problems within the competence of the Assembly would make it virtually impossible to establish just and rational criteria for the allocation of votes other than the existing system of one vote for each member state. In certain instances, for example, physical proximity to a situation involving security considera-

*Permanent members
would oppose
any attempt
to remove vote*

tions might be a more important and relevant factor in assessing the influence a member should have in the Assembly than its economic resources or population.

Weighted voting in the United Nations General Assembly would strike at the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of states enunciated in Article 2 (1) of the Charter. The rule of sovereign equality in the General Assembly may be viewed in a sense as a counterpoise to the pattern in the Security Council, where the permanent members enjoy an overriding veto power on substantive questions.

It may be true that there is imbalance between voting procedures and power realities in the United Nations General Assembly. Resolutions may be drafted by the majority despite the differing views of the small minority of members whose co-operative contribution is invariably essential to the success of any United Nations activity. In the Canadian view, the importance of this consideration can be exaggerated. The General Assembly is a diplomatic convocation in which the interplay of delegations cannot but reflect the interplay of political realities in the international community.

It is precisely because of those realities that those who value the United Nations for what it is, no less than for what it might become, must be sensitive to the risk of grave damage to the organization itself which could result from a direct confrontation of irreconcilable political forces within the membership. In this light, the principle of unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council must be accepted as an indispensable mechanism to prevent intolerable strains on the fabric of the organization.

New member category

Suggestions for Charter amendment have also been made regarding membership of the Security Council, including, for example, a proposal for a new category of permanent or semi-permanent members, drawn from among those states regarded as best able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such suggestions give rise to many of the same difficulties and objections noted above.

In practice, as in the case of proposals for weighted voting in the General Assembly, it would be very difficult to determine acceptable criteria for creating a further category of states, in addition to the permanent members, who would be entitled to preferred treatment in elections to the Security Council. One criterion which is sometimes proposed on the basis of a

somewhat narrow reading of Article 23 the ability to contribute materially to the maintenance of international peace and security. From an examination of the membership of the Security Council over the last 26 years, it is clear that there has in fact been a significant correlation between the size of assessed contributions to the regular budget and the frequency with which member states have served as non-permanent members of the Council. It is to be anticipated, however, that an increasing number of non-permanent members will be drawn from among these states which each pay assessments of less than 0.1 per cent of the budget (currently some 65 per cent of the total membership). It would be difficult to sustain the view that these smaller states should be discouraged from taking an active part in the work of one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It would be equally difficult to assert that larger or wealthier states should be singled out by virtue of their wealth alone as being in a special position to contribute responsibility and constructively to the work of the Council.

Difficulties of a comparable nature are created by proposals to reconstruct the regional basis on which non-permanent members of the Security Council are now elected. Most of these proposals tend to produce an imbalance, to the disadvantage of smaller states, and to imply more or less arbitrary judgments of the fitness of particular members for service on the Council.

In Canada's view, the election of members to the Security Council is best left to consultations within the regional groups with each group exercising discretion to ensure that the candidates put forward for membership are able and willing to make a substantial contribution to the Council's work.

A number of thoughtful observers, including the Secretary-General, have quite rightly underlined the likelihood that if the world were called upon to repeat the experience of San Francisco the results would not be nearly as impressive as our present Charter. The decisive element in the evolution of the United Nations over the past 26 years has been not the relatively minor changes that have been made in the Charter but the changing purposes and aspirations of its members. The Government of Canada is of the view that what is needed is not so much an overhaul of the Charter as a more effective implementation and utilization of the existing framework for positive international co-operation in order to achieve the goal of making the United Nations an effective instrument in harmonizing the actions of nations.

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- No. 72/15 The Choices in Canada-U.S. Relations. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, to the Rotary Club, Toronto, June 20, 1972.
- No. 72/16 The Planning and Management of Human Settlements. A statement to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, on June 8, 1972, by the Honourable Victor Goldbloom, Minister of Environment for the Province of Quebec.
- No. 72/17 The Problem of Marine Pollution. A statement by the Minister of the Environment, the Honourable Jack Davis, to the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 14, 1972.

No. 72/18 Stop Testing Nuclear Weapons. A statement by the Minister of the Environment, the Honourable Jack Davis, to the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 14, 1972.

No. 72/19 Declaration on the Human Environment. A statement on June 14, 1972, to the plenary session of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, concerning the Draft Declaration on the Human Environment, by Mr. J. A. Beesley, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Algeria

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria relating to the sale of wheat by Canada.
Signed at Ottawa August 18, 1972.
In force August 18, 1972.

Federal Republic of Germany

Air Transport Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Signed at Ottawa September 4, 1959.
In force July 19, 1961.
Terminated August 1, 1972.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany amending the Schedule to the Air Agreement between the two countries of September 4, 1959.
Signed at Bonn December 10, 1965.
In force December 10, 1965.
Terminated August 1, 1972.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to amend the Route Schedule to the Air Transport Agreement between Canada and Germany signed September 4, 1959.
Signed at Bonn December 4, 1969.
In force December 4, 1969.
Terminated August 1, 1972.

Italy

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Italy constituting an agreement to amend the Agreement for Air Services as specified in the Agreed Minute of April 28, 1972.
Signed at Toronto August 28, 1972.
In force August 28, 1972.

Philippines

Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Signed at Manila August 29, 1972.
In force August 29, 1972.

Tunisia

Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Tunisia.
Signed at Tunis August 8, 1972.
In force August 8, 1972.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Governments of Canada and the United States of America extending until June 30, 1973, the agreement regarding the leasing of certain lands situated within RCAF Station Good Bay of December 5, 1952.
Signed at Ottawa July 13, 1972.
In force July 13, 1972.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America amending the Agreement of March 9, 1959, Concerning the Tariff Tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Signed at Washington July 27, 1972.
In force July 27, 1972.

Multilateral

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
Done at The Hague December 16, 1970.
Canada's Instruments of Ratification deposited June 20, 1972.
In force for Canada July 24, 1972.

Convention on Acts of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation.
Done at Montreal September 23, 1971.
Canada's Instruments of Ratification deposited September 20, 1972.

Amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil done at London in 1954 and amended in 1962.
Done at London October 21, 1969.
Canadian Instrument of Acceptance deposited June 20, 1972.

Agreement to amend Article 56 of the Agreement of August 3, 1959, to Supplement the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces with respect to Foreign Forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Done at Bonn October 21, 1971.
Canadian Instrument of Ratification deposited June 20, 1972.

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries relating to amendments to the Convention.
Done at Washington October 6, 1970.
Canada's Instrument of Adherence deposited July 27, 1972.

Agreement for the Mutual Safeguarding of Secrecy of Inventions relating to defence and for which Applications for Patents have been made.
Done at Paris September 21, 1960.
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited August 2, 1972.
In force for Canada September 1, 1972.

Autumn 1972

International Perspectives

Special Issue



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Canada-U.S. Relations:
Options for the Future

Foreword

The Canada-U.S. relationship was identified in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* as a key factor in Canadian policy-making. Over the past year or so a number of studies have been in progress of the relationship and its impact on Canada. The present article reflects some of the main assessments and conclusions which have emerged from those studies. In the preparation of the article I have had the benefit of the advice and assistance of my colleagues in the Government and officials in the Department of External Affairs.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Mitchell Sharp". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial 'M' and 'S'.

Secretary of State for External Affairs

Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future

By Mitchell Sharp
Secretary of State for External Affairs

The options

- Canada can seek to maintain more or less its present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy adjustments;
- Canada can move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States.
- Canada can pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.

In the review of Canadian foreign policy which the Canadian Government published in 1970 under the title *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, the challenge of "living distinct from, but in harmony with, the world's most powerful and dynamic nation, the United States" was described as one of two "inescapable realities, both crucial to Canada's continuing existence" in the context of which Canadian policy needs — domestic and external — must be assessed. The other was the "multi-faceted problem of maintaining national unity".

If the importance of this unique relationship is such as to affect the whole of Canada's foreign policy, it is in turn influenced by the nature of the world environment, and of the relations the United States and Canada have with other countries. As was recognized in the foreign policy review, and has been dramatically illustrated by more recent developments, the postwar international order is giving way to a new pattern of power relations. The preponderant position of the two super-powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., is being reduced by the emergence of other major power centres. China, with its vast population and immense potential, has emerged from its long isolation, achieved the status of an important nuclear power, and taken its place in the community of nations. Western Europe is making historic strides towards unity through the enlargement and development of the Eu-

ropean Economic Community. Japan has developed as a modern, industrial giant in Asia. Confrontation is giving way to negotiation and accommodation in East-West relations and major progress has been achieved on the road toward a political settlement in Europe.

In this evolving new world situation, enlarged opportunities are opening up for Canada and the United States to extend and broaden their relations with Communist countries and with the developing world, while continuing to develop their ties with their more traditional political and trading partners. These major changes will undoubtedly have a bearing on Canada-U.S. relations in the years ahead and on the option that may be open to Canada in particular.

The Canada-U.S. relationship, as it has evolved since the end of the Second World War, is in many respects a unique phenomenon. It is by far our most important external relationship, but it is more than an external relationship. It impinges on virtually every aspect of the Canadian national interest, and thus of Canadian domestic concerns.

Because of the vast disparity in power and population, it is also inevitably a relationship of profoundly unequal dependence; the impact of the United States on Canada is far greater than Canada's impact on the United States.

Some two decades ago, Lester B.



Pearson warned that, as the two countries became more interdependent, relations between them would become more, not less, difficult. As interactions increased, conflicts of interest and differences of views were also bound to increase. Preserving harmony in the relationship would require careful and sensitive management.

In recent years, however, the occasional strains and difficulties that have affected relations between the two countries have also had a more basic and deep-seated source. In a Canada undergoing profound and rapid changes associated with industrialization, urbanization, improved education, cultural development and a major reassessment of values, there has been a growing and widely-felt concern about the extent of economic, military and cultural dependence on the United States, and the implications for Canadian independence.

Apart from the relationship itself, which has become more complex, public attitudes in Canada have also changed. In the past, Canadians have generally supported an easy-going, pragmatic approach to our relations with the United States in the belief that Canada's separate national existence and development were fully compatible with an unfolding, increasingly close economic, cultural and military relationship between the two countries. Many Canadians no longer accept this view, or at least do not regard it as self-evident. It is widely believed that the continental pull, especially economic and cultural, has gained momentum. In this on-going national debate, the fundamental question for Canada is whether and to what extent interdependence with the United States impairs the reality of Canada's independence. How strong has the continental pull become? Can it be resisted and controlled and, if so, at what price?

I. The Continental Pull

It is important and instructive to view the evolution of Canada-U.S. relations in longer-term historical perspective. In terms of Canada's relative dependence on the United States, it is possible, as recently suggested by an American political scientist, to distinguish three main historical periods.

Three phases

The first, lasting until Confederation and some two decades beyond, was an era in which the United States was viewed as posing a military threat to Canada; although the intensity of that threat was steadily diminishing and trade with the

United States was becoming important. Reciprocity in trade had been a major issue just before Confederation and in the long recession of the 1880s and 1890s there was even a movement in Canada in favour of union with the United States. But Canada depended mainly on Britain for its security, for investment capital and as a market and source of imports. The Treaty of Washington in 1871 eliminated most of the outstanding U.S.-British issues in North America, and the settlement of the Venezuela dispute in 1895 finally marked the end of the U.S. threat to Canada and to the British Empire. Canadian perceptions of the United States as a military threat, however, were to linger on for many years thereafter.

The second period may be viewed as an era of gradual transition, characterized by a movement from internal autonomy to full external sovereignty — achieved by the Statute of Westminster in 1931 — and by a gradual transfer of military, economic and cultural dependence from Britain to the United States. This period lasted until the Second World War. The transfer of strategic dependence from Britain to the United States became fully apparent and accepted in the 1930s with the mounting threat of war in Europe. President Roosevelt pledged U.S. defence assistance to Canada in speeches first in 1936 and more clearly in 1938 in Kingston, and Prime Minister King responded with assurances about Canada's continental defence obligations.

In economic terms, the United States had already surpassed Britain as Canada's main source of imports by the turn of the century. Britain, nevertheless, continued to be Canada's main market until after the First World War, and remained about as important as the United States until the Second World War. Free trade with the United States — the reciprocity issue — was a major national issue in 1911, but Canadians rejected this course for fear of its longer-term political implications. The shift from Britain to the United States as the primary source of new investment capital had taken place before the First World War. By and large, however, the inter-war period was characterized by a relative balance in Canada's relationship with Britain and the United States; it was still the era of the Atlantic Triangle.

Strategic dependence

The third period begins with the Second World War and extends to about the present. Canada's strategic dependence on the

United States was an accomplished and accepted fact. The war had propelled the United States into unquestioned preponderance as Canada's main trading partner and source of investment capital. Britain had dropped far behind, in second position and, even after the full recovery of the British economy and the restoration of convertibility, the British share of our trade was to follow a generally declining trend. This is the era of the "special relationship", of the new realities of military alliance and close defence co-operation, of increasing economic and cultural interaction, of exceptionally close personal ties between political leaders and senior officials of the two countries. Both countries had been thrust onto the world stage: the United States as the acknowledged leader and protector of a Western world which felt itself threatened by Soviet expansion; Canada as an important military ally and economic power.

The Canadian view of the United States was influenced in large part by the Cold War and by the conviction that U.S. leadership and active involvement in European and world affairs were essential for peace and security. Memories of U.S. isolationism and protectionism weighed heavily in shaping Canadian attitudes. NATO, the new Commonwealth and the United Nations provided congenial, multilateral frameworks for postwar Canadian diplomacy and served to mitigate and dilute to some extent the growing U.S. influence on Canada. The pattern of rising interdependence between Canada and the United States was generally viewed, at least until the end of the 1950s, as a natural and beneficial phenomenon, without wider and disquieting political ramifications. Politically significant expressions of concern about this trend began to manifest themselves in the late 1950s. However, it was not until the 1960s that this trend of opinion gathered strength and found roots in broader circles throughout the country.

This brief historical overview is useful in providing some sense of the shifting pattern of Canada-U.S. relations. It shows that the essential features of the relationship as it exists today took shape mainly in the period beginning with the Second World War. Any attempt, however, to assess the strength of the forces drawing the two countries closer together requires a more searching examination of their manifestations in the defence, economic, and cultural fields.

In the defence field, the pattern in this third era has been one of increasing co-

operation and co-ordination for the most part. Some of the highlights in this evolution were the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) as an advisory body to the two governments to co-ordinate plans for the defence of North America; the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement, extending wartime co-operation into the economic sphere; the establishment in 1946 of a Military Co-operation Committee; a joint declaration in 1947, continuing co-operation for North American defence into the postwar period; the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, establishing the first and only formal alliance between Canada and the United States; the joint "Statement of Principles for Economic Co-operation" in 1950; the conclusion in 1958 of the North American Air Defence Command Agreement (NORAD), establishing an integrated anti-bomber defence system; the Defence Production Sharing Program, started in 1941, and continued after the war, which has involved substantial sales in both directions.

Extra-continental threats

The cornerstone of this defence relationship consisted in the mutual recognition that North America was no longer immune from extra-continental threats. Canada was considered by the United States as a vital and strategic area, while Canada recognized its strategic dependence on the United States to ensure its defence against an outside threat. It was this dual recognition which led in 1940 to a U.S. commitment to the defence of Canada and to a Canadian commitment to ensure that Canadian territory, air-space and coastal waters would not be used for hostile actions against the United States. With the Cold War, the development of nuclear weapons and the rising threat of long-range Soviet bombers in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the U.S. defence interest in Canada intensified; it was no longer sufficient to ensure that Canadian territory be denied to a potential enemy. The United States needed access to Canadian territory for radar warning systems, air-bases and other defence purposes. Canada shared the U.S. interest in an effective North American system and, generally, in protecting the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. As long-range missiles were developed by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet Union moved toward nuclear parity with the United States, this shared Canadian and U.S. interest became one of protecting the stabil-

ity of mutual nuclear deterrence between the two super-powers. The Canadian interest was somewhat ambivalent, however, since U.S. forces and bases in Canada were viewed as posing problems for Canadian sovereignty.

With the continuing development and improvement in long-range nuclear-armed missiles and in radar detection systems, the relative importance of the bomber threat declined. The United States had less need for Canadian territory and, to some extent, for close Canadian involvement and participation in North American strategic defence planning. As a result of these technological developments, the level of interdependence in the Canada-U.S. defence relationship has remained static or declined somewhat in relative terms over the 1960s. The gradual improvement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and the conclusion of various agreements between them to reduce the risks of confrontation have reinforced this trend.

Nevertheless, Canadian territory, airspace and coastal waters continue to be of key importance for the strategic defence of the United States, and the Canadian interest in contributing to the maintenance of stable nuclear deterrence is undiminished. Defence co-operation between the two countries remains firmly anchored and close, but the momentum of the Fifties and Sixties toward closely-integrated and structured defence arrangements has abated. This situation could change, of course, as a result of technical innovations such as the introduction of new defence and warning systems, or a return to a more active military confrontation between the super-powers.

Economic arena

By contrast, in the economic field, the continental pull has operated strongly throughout the postwar period and has developed its own built-in momentum. The North-South pull has, of course, been a factor throughout Canadian history. At the time of Confederation and until the 1920s, however, there were strong countervailing forces promoting an East-West bias in Canada's economic development and in its trade and financial relations across the Atlantic. These were buttressed by the national economic policy introduced following Confederation. The development of the transcontinental railways in Canada, the subsidization of freight rates and the establishment of protective tariffs for Canadian secondary industry were deliberately designed to strengthen economic

ties across Canada and to encourage the development of the West through the export of agricultural staples, mainly to Britain and Europe. Over time, however, the exploitation of our mineral and forestry resources assumed more importance and these found a large and expanding market in a rapidly industrializing United States. The economic axis was gradually turning in a North-South direction. With the conclusion of Commonwealth preferential arrangements in 1932 during the Depression gave new impetus to Canadian trade with Britain and other Commonwealth countries, annual U.S. capital flows into Canada had already surpassed those from Britain, and the establishment of these preferences encouraged U.S. firms to set up branches and subsidiaries in Canada to take advantage of export opportunities in Commonwealth markets.

In the postwar period, the economic pull of the United States became stronger still while the countervailing influence of Britain, Western Europe and the Commonwealth diminished. The U.S. need for Canadian resources became more intense. The rapid development of Canadian mineral and newly-discovered petroleum resources was financed mainly by U.S. capital. Large inflows of U.S. capital, mostly in the form of direct investment, were also encouraged by the increasing importance of the Canadian domestic market, by competition among large U.S. firms and generally by a hospitable investment climate. The availability of capital from Britain and Europe was circumscribed until the 1960s by the need to carry out the reconstruction and modernization of their economies. The phenomenon of large, multinational corporations, most of them U.S.-owned and U.S.-based, made its appearance during this period. It added a large new dimension to the interpenetration of the Canadian and U.S. economies and led to a further concentration of Canadian trade with the United States. By the late 1960s, nearly 80 per cent of the export and import transactions of U.S. subsidiaries in Canada were with their parent companies and affiliates in the United States.

In the new circumstances of the postwar period, Canadian economic and trade policies underwent major changes. Canada played an important role in the establishment of a multilateral trading system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and vigorously supported efforts to reduce tariffs and restrictions to trade on a multilateral and non-discriminatory

basis. This was intended to assist Canadian exports, mainly of agricultural, mineral and forestry products. At the same time, it became apparent that Canada's secondary industry needed access to large markets if it was to be competitive. For reasons of proximity, convenience and size, it was natural that Canadian exporters should concentrate their efforts on the United States. The pursuit of trade liberalization was dictated in part by a desire to diversify Canadian trade. In practice, it was accompanied by an increasing interdependence with the United States. To some extent this reflects geographic forces, but this trend has also been supported by special man-made factors favouring continental ties, including the attractions of the large and dynamic U.S. market, the large U.S. ownership of Canadian industries and the impact of the multinational corporation.

U.S. share climbed

The cumulative impact of all these factors is evident in Canadian trade and balance-of-payment statistics: in the last 20 years the U.S. share of Canadian exports increased from somewhat under 60 per cent to around 70 per cent. On the import side, the U.S. share, which had been higher, rose beyond 70 per cent. The U.S. share of foreign portfolio investment and direct investment in Canada rose to some 80 per cent of the total. U.S. ownership and control in both primary and secondary industries in Canada grew rapidly, reaching average levels in 1967 of 45 per cent in manufacturing, 56 per cent in mining and melting, and 60 per cent in petroleum and natural gas, with much higher percentages in individual sectors. Canadian dependence on the U.S. capital market also became substantial as provinces, municipalities and business enterprises made extensive use of this market to meet their growing needs.

While these few figures attest to the growing Canadian interdependence with the United States, the Canadian economy at the same time gained in strength, balance and maturity. The Canadian balance of payments on current account improved markedly, largely as a result of a fairly steady improvement in the trade balance. The generation of domestic savings in Canada has also increased significantly. This strengthening of the current account position has reduced Canada's dependence on net capital inflows.

While the trend in Canada's external trade has been toward increasing concen-

tration on the United States, the remainder of that trade has become much more diversified geographically. Japan has become a major trading partner and trade with that country in both directions has been increasing at a very rapid rate. Canadian trade with the European Economic Community has also steadily increased, although less rapidly. The U.S.S.R., China and many other countries are becoming significant trading partners for Canada.

These are positive developments, but they have done little so far to mitigate the overwhelming continental pattern of Canada's trade. In particular, the United States continues to be far and away the largest market for Canadian manufacturing exports, on which Canadian efforts are likely to be increasingly focused in the years ahead.

Cultural influences

The impact of U.S. cultural influences has been another source of public concern in Canada. Here again, the dominance of the United States is inadvertent, a function of its large size and power, of the communications explosion and of various other factors. For many students of politics, this is in the long run the most crucial area in terms of maintaining Canadian distinctness, the more so since the spread of U.S. interests and values is so diffuse and yet so difficult to identify and measure. While it is clear that there is a widening concern over the extent of economic dependence on the United States, there would seem to be less apprehension among the general public about U.S. cultural penetration. To a large extent, very much the same economic and commercial factors which account for U.S. penetration also explain the cultural penetration. This is because television, radio, films, periodicals, books, publishing and other media form part of a communications industry which responds to market forces much as other industries do. In addition, of course, the cultural impact of the media has become greatly enhanced by modern communications techniques. Consumer tastes, public values and social norms are assuming a degree of uniformity throughout the continent and are largely shaped in the United States. The nature of the dilemma was well delineated in the report of the Massey Commission.

There could be no question of imposing controls over the movement of ideas; instead, an essentially positive approach has evolved that relies mainly on the provision of public support and incentives to Canadian cultural activities but also, where

necessary, on regulation and control of foreign influences. Various public bodies have been established, such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in the 1930s, in radio and later in television, the National Film Board in 1939 and the Canada Council in 1957. These policies have had a favourable impact, though difficult problems continue to exist in a number of important areas. There have been encouraging signs, in both French-speaking and English-speaking parts of Canada, of cultural vitality and creativeness and of renewed interest in Canadian tradition and distinct values. Over all, the interactions and links between the Canadian and U.S. societies in the cultural field have been steadily increasing, even as a mood of resistance to U.S. dominance was emerging as a significant political factor.

In terms of common institutions, Canada-U.S. ties do not appear to have increased significantly, at least not in the last decade. An elaborate pattern of joint Canada-U.S. bodies has been developed over the years. These play an important role in evaluating and advising on joint problems and in pointing the way to solutions. But there is little or no joint decision-making. By and large, relations between the two countries are dealt with in the normal way, through intergovernmental consultations, negotiations and bargaining.

On balance, it is apparent that it is in the economic and cultural fields that the North-South pull has been especially strong. This is because advances in communications and modes of production and economic integration favour large units and markets and add to the pull of geography. On the other hand, in the defence and political fields, continental linkages have not significantly increased in recent years. The strongest continental pulls appear to derive from the ubiquitous presence of U.S.-owned subsidiaries of large multinational corporations, and from the wealth of informal, non-governmental ties between private groups, associations and individuals. Paradoxically, as these ties have expanded, the capacity of Canada to develop economically and culturally with less reliance on the United States and the outside world in general has also increased.

II. The Changing Context

New foreign policy perspectives

Over the past three years both Canada and the United States have been review-

ing their foreign policies. Many of the reasons given for doing so were identical on both sides. We were at the end of an era. The postwar order of international relations was drawing to an end. The conditions that had determined the assumptions and practice of our respective foreign policies were ending with it. The ending of the postwar era had not been a matter of sudden upheaval but of cumulative change over two decades that, in the aggregate, had transformed the international environment. The task now, we both concluded, was to shape a new foreign policy to meet the requirements of a new era.

In the new scheme of things both Canada and the United States saw a relatively diminished role for themselves. In our case, we argued that our role had been enhanced at a time when Canada had enjoyed a preferred position and a wide range of opportunities as one of the few developed countries to have emerged unscathed, and indeed strengthened, from the Second World War. The Canadian role was bound to be affected by the recovery of our friends and former enemies and by other changes in the configuration of world power.

The United States drew substantially similar conclusions from its review, subject, of course, to the very different scope of its role and responsibilities in the world. It also had to take account of the strain that 25 years of global commitment, aggravated by the Vietnam war, had left on its domestic consensus. It cited the growth among Americans of a conviction that the time had come for others to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership and its corollary that the assured continuity of United States involvement required a responsible but diminished American role. It is the sense of the Nixon Doctrine that it will enable the United States to remain committed in ways that it can sustain.

These perceptions on both sides have their counterpart in the role that national objectives and national interests are henceforth to play in the conduct of foreign policy. In the case of the United States, the greater weight to be given to the shorter-term national interest is a function of the diminished role it sees for itself and of the enhanced potential of America's partners. It looks to a sound foreign policy to support its national interests. It does not rule out new commitments, provided they are clearly related to U.S. interests. It is U.S. interests that in future will shape U.S. commitments, rather than, as they feel

was sometimes the case, the other way around.

The Canadian foreign policy review, if anything, goes further. It defines foreign policy as the extension abroad of national policies. The test of a sound foreign policy, it argues, is the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic national objectives. The most appropriate policy for the 1970s, therefore, our review concluded, will be one which strengthens and extends sound domestic policies dealing with key national issues.

To the extent that the national interest is seen as an active foreign policy ingredient, reactive policies are rejected on both sides. On the Canadian side, it is argued that an empirical approach cannot be continued indefinitely. A reactive, as distinct from an active, concern with world events no longer corresponds with international realities or with the Canadian Government's approach to foreign policy. What is required is a sense of direction and purpose so that Canada's foreign policy is oriented positively in the direction of national aims. The United States proceeds from not very different assumptions. For too long, in the view of the U.S. Administration, American policy has consisted of reacting to events. The United States tended to be drawn into situations without a clear perception of where it would end up. It will be necessary, in future, to infuse American actions with a sense of direction, to make a conscious effort, in fact, to create the conditions the United States wants.

Two different entities

In sum, the broad premises and underlying perceptions of the two foreign policy reviews have many points in common. It is in their implications for two quite different entities on the world scene that they inevitably differ. Perspectives of the Canada-U.S. relationship, in particular, could not differ more sharply.

On the Canadian side, we could hardly ignore the impact of the United States on virtually all aspects of our foreign relations. But the foreign policy review did not attempt to articulate a comprehensive policy to govern our relations with the United States. What it did do was to point to some of the central ambiguities of the Canada-U.S. relationship. It raised, without elaborating on it, the concept of counterweights to the influence of the United States. It also underlined the need for careful management of a relationship that was likely to become increasingly

complex, if not conflict-prone. Its major prescription envisages "the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty" in shaping the Canadian environment.

The U.S. foreign policy review and its annual updatings do not, on the other hand, deal specifically with Canada. To the extent that U.S. policy-makers think of Canada in broad foreign policy terms at all, it is in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. That Doctrine, as President Nixon explained it on his recent visit to Canada, rests on the premise that "mature partners must have autonomous independent policies; each nation must decide the requirements of its own security; each nation must determine the path of its own progress". To the extent that Canadian concerns are apprehended in Washington, therefore, the feeling is that a world in which power is more widely diffused and in which the relative weight of the United States is diminished should afford a country like Canada greater breathing space.

At first glance such a prognosis appears reassuring. In practice, however, it may give less than adequate weight to two important considerations. The first is that the Canada-U.S. relationship cannot be encompassed by governmental policies alone. To the extent that they see a threat to Canada in that relationship, most Canadians would be prepared to concede that it is a threat undesired by the United States. The trouble is that, even as an inadvertent process, it has acquired a momentum that, as one American student of Canadian affairs has recently put it, is "subject to profound internal growth". In the second place, the Canada-U.S. relationship is bound to be affected, at the levels of both deliberation and inadvertence, by policies on the U.S. side that reflect an explicitly narrower interpretation than in the past of the U.S. national interest.

This explicitly narrower interpretation by the United States of its national interest appeared to be reflected in the far-reaching economic measures that President Nixon invoked on August 15, 1971, as representing the elements of a "new economic policy". These measures were intended to compel changes in world monetary and trading arrangements. As such, they were global in their impact. They were not specifically directed against Canada. Because of the high concentration of our trade with the United States, however, and the affiliated structure of our industry, Canada was probably more exposed than any other country to the immediate im-

pact of the U.S. measures and had more reason to be concerned about their future implications. In particular, they threw into sharp focus the problem of Canada's vulnerability which has been a source of growing preoccupation to Canadians in recent years. It is, therefore, of considerable importance to us to be sure that we understand the problems and perceptions that are likely to shape U.S. policies over the medium term and which, in turn, Canadian policies cannot afford to leave out of account.

U.S. economic policies

Since 1968, the U.S. Administration has faced increasingly difficult internal as well as external economic problems. Inflation, a levelling-off of the economy and substantial unemployment were added to an already existing pattern of significant balance-of-payments deficits. During the spring and summer of 1971, urgent concerns developed over the apparent lack of success of efforts to control domestic inflation and the sharp increase in the deficit of the U.S. basic balance of payments. There was a possibility that the basic deficit, and especially the trade balance, would deteriorate still further, with no clear outlook for recovery.

The United States has experienced deficits in its basic balance of payments for most of the postwar period. However, until the mid-1960s, the U.S. Administration did not view these as reflecting a major disequilibrium in world trading and monetary relations. The level of the U.S. deficit was seen as generally in line with world liquidity needs and both the U.S. trade account and the current-account balance showed substantial surpluses.

From the early 1960s, U.S. long-term capital outflows were, nevertheless, a subject of concern both in the United States and in the major countries of destination. The concern of the U.S. Government centred on the balance-of-payments drain of these capital movements, which reduced the level of U.S. reserves and increased the vulnerability of the U.S. dollar, and on their inflationary effects. For other countries, concern related to the role of the U.S. dollar, which seemingly enabled the United States to avoid needed domestic economic adjustments while continuing to maintain large direct investment outflows.

The United States Government initiated efforts to moderate private capital outflows in 1961, and intensified these efforts in various stages afterward. From 1969, how-

ever, U.S. concern shifted from the capital account to the deteriorating U.S. trade position. The final step in these U.S. efforts, confirming this shift in emphasis, was the U.S. measures announced last August. Over this period the U.S. program to moderate private-capital outflows met with only limited success and, while net outflows were no doubt reduced, the growth of U.S. direct investments abroad was not significantly affected, since to a considerable extent these investments were financed from retained earnings and from local borrowing.

Basic determinants

Within the United States, several major recent studies, notably the report of the Williams Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy and the personal report to the President of his then Assistant for International Economic Affairs, Peter G. Peterson, have drawn attention to certain trends as major explanatory factors for the current difficulties of the U.S. economy, and the problems it may be expected to face in the years ahead:

(a) *The problem of controlling inflation*

As the Williams Commission Report indicates, unusually high government expenditures related to the war in Vietnam and inadequately compensated by domestic taxation probably account in large measure for the higher rate of inflation experienced by the United States in recent years, in comparison with other leading industrial countries. At the same time it appears from estimates made by the Federal Reserve Board that the price and income effects of inflation account only in part for the deterioration in the U.S. trade balance. These studies also suggest that in the United States, as indeed in other industrialized countries, important changes in domestic attitudes and social values have taken place, compounding the problems of controlling inflation and of managing the economy. The United States is faced with rising demands for policies, programs and expenditures to deal with domestic social and economic problems. Generally, these pressures seem to add up to a requirement for more effective public management of domestic economic development consistent with social needs and goals. This suggests that there may be substantially *more* rather than *less* government involvement in the economy in the future and that foreign economic policies will be more closely related to and coordinated with domestic economic policies.

(b) *The apparent deterioration in the U.S. competitive strength*

This trend detected by the various U.S. studies has caused the most concern, particularly since it seemed to corroborate widely-held fears, notably on the part of U.S. labour. It is still insufficiently documented to permit serious assessment, but it has clearly influenced the thinking of the U.S. Administration. Certain U.S. studies, including those of the Hudson Institute for instance, suggest that the gradual loss in U.S. comparative advantage in manufacturing will continue and will extend to other important manufacturing sectors — e.g., automobiles and machinery. U.S. competitive strength in the future might be concentrated in such fields as high technology, organizational and management techniques, and certain consumer goods, as well as in agriculture and certain raw materials. Meanwhile the importance of the U.S. manufacturing industry as a source of employment has been declining steadily and rapidly in relation to the service industries. These trends are viewed as indicative of fundamental structural changes associated with the gradual movement of the U.S. into the “post-industrial society”.

(c) *The rapidly growing influence of multinational corporations*

The rapidly growing influence of multinational corporations, mostly U.S.-based, is another basic and related trend viewed with some concern both within and outside the United States. These corporations have facilitated an accelerated movement of capital, technology, merchandising and marketing techniques and management to foreign countries with a resulting transfer of production of many products and components to areas outside of the United States. The major U.S. studies argue strongly that, on balance, the U.S. economy has gained more than it has lost from the activities of multinational corporations, but this view is not undisputed within the United States, notably by trade union organizations.

(d) *Economic policies of the EEC and Japan*

The U.S. Government has argued, moreover, that its trade position has seriously suffered from continuing and significant trade restrictions in the EEC and in Japan (e.g., the common agricultural policy, preferential arrangements and non-tariff barriers in the EEC, manifold administrative restrictions in Japan). This U.S. contention is valid in the sense that it is true that EEC agricultural price-levels

have encouraged the production of substantial higher-cost surpluses, and hurt export possibilities of the United States and other more efficient agricultural producers. Yet U.S. trade as a whole with the EEC has continued to expand and trade with Japan has also increased markedly in both directions. This U.S. view also takes insufficient account of U.S. barriers encountered by the products of other countries, though it may be an accurate reflection of current U.S. perceptions.

(e) *U.S. dependence on outside supplies of energy and mineral resources*

A further major trend which will adversely affect the U.S. trade balance and freedom of manoeuvre is the growing dependence of the United States on foreign sources of energy and mineral resources. The current U.S. deficit in minerals, fuels and other raw materials is even now substantial. It is expected to rise fairly slowly until 1975 and from then on more rapidly. In oil and gas the United States is already facing difficulties in meeting domestic demand and import needs are expected to grow rapidly. Nevertheless, the United States is and will in the foreseeable future remain much less dependent on outside supplies than the EEC or Japan because of its large domestic resources.

(f) *The significance of U.S. long-term capital outflows*

In contrast to existing concerns about the U.S. trade position, the growing level of earnings on U.S. long-term capital exports, particularly from U.S. private investments abroad, is viewed as a major source of strength in the future for the U.S. economy and balance of payments. This is one of the major conclusions drawn by all recent U.S. studies, notably by the Williams Commission, which strongly recommends that the United States eliminate its direct investment controls and support international efforts to secure a free flow of direct-investments across national boundaries without artificial impediments or incentives. According to the Commission's analysis, the maintenance of U.S. capital exports, in particular of U.S. private-investment outflows in the future, would represent a major U.S. interest.

It may be expected that, under a reformed international monetary system, the U.S. dollar will no longer enjoy the special position it has had in the past and that the United States will have to accept new disciplines broadly similar to those applying to other countries in dealing with balance-of-payments problems. At the same

time it must be recognized that the already large and growing surplus on earnings from U.S. private investments should provide considerable scope for continuing important outflows of investment capital in the future, assuming a reasonable improvement in the U.S. trade balance and some reduction in U.S. military expenditures abroad following disengagement in Vietnam. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that U.S. private investments abroad result from decisions of individual U.S. corporations, and that in large measure they are financed from reinvested earnings and local borrowing. The United States Government has only limited means of influencing or controlling such investments.

U.S. perception of its problems and national interests

There is, of course, concern on the part of the U.S. public about the future of the United States and the adequacy of its institutions and policies. Public anxiety focuses particularly on domestic tensions and divisions, while most Americans seem reasonably satisfied with their personal material standards. Racial violence has declined. The open and concerted protests of the young, sharpened by the Vietnam war, seem to have abated, but the roots of frustration have not been removed. More generally, there seems to have been a turning inward, with a concentration on domestic problems, combined with a disenchantment with foreign involvement.

Among the major social groups, the most significant shift in attitudes in recent years appears to have occurred within the labour unions. They have expressed themselves in favour of increased protection from import competition and also favour controls on U.S. multinational corporations to ensure that their activities conform to the U.S. national interest.

United States agriculture remains for the most part highly competitive and has a major interest in freer trade and international competition, but the farming community does not seem to have mobilized its efforts in this direction and is also concerned about domestic problems such as the decline in the farm population and in the number of small farms.

The attitude of the business community is ambivalent. Large corporations on the whole have a stake in freer trade and are seriously concerned about the possibility of a reversion to protectionism. Many enterprises, however, have suffered from increasingly stiff foreign competition and welcomed the additional protection they

received from the August 15 measures, including the 10 percent surcharge.

The national mood of uncertainty and concern over domestic problems is reflected in the U.S. Congress. There is still a significant base of support for liberal trading policies, but it is fragmented and appears to lack leadership. In general, Congress seems to be prepared to respond to the mood of the nation and it might well be responsive to protectionist initiatives. There is a strong disposition to believe that the United States has not been tough enough in trade and economic negotiations in the past and that it has received less than it has given. Whatever the direction of U.S. policies, one may expect Congress to insist that, in any future trade and economic arrangements, U.S. national interests will be fully protected and that the expected benefits will not be less than the value of U.S. concessions. This tendency to a rigid balancing of costs and benefits will inevitably tend to favour a narrower and shorter-term view of U.S. interests.

The thrust of U.S. economic policy in these circumstances is likely to depend largely on the will and the leadership of the executive branch, and especially of the President. Basically, the U.S. economic strategy initiated last August and the explanatory statements made by the President suggest that the major objectives of the Administration are to resolve the real and serious underlying economic problems of the United States on the course towards freer international trade and payments. At the same time, official statements have echoed the view that a major reason for the U.S. troubles is that the U.S. has been too generous in the past, while other countries have failed to carry their proper share of the burden.

Orderly system

United States interests are seen to require an orderly and effective international trading and monetary system, but one that will be reformed and adapted to the new international situation and that will better ensure that all major countries share in concessions and benefits. Although it is recognized that the most-favoured-nation principle continues to have validity as the foundation of the system, the emphasis is placed more on finding effective means to expand and facilitate trade and payments, consistent with domestic economic and social needs, and in improving the terms of competition by enlarging the scope of negotiations to include all policy instruments and procedures affecting trade and

payments. This objective and perception is reinforced by the political goal of the U.S. Administration to restore and enhance U.S. economic strength and vitality so as to enable the United States to play a reduced but still dominant role in world affairs that will be more easily sustainable over the long run.

At the same time, U.S. policy could also involve less liberal elements and might not be free of contradictions. A sharp swing toward economic isolationism seems unlikely, but it could result from failure to resolve the outstanding and difficult issues of reforming the trade and monetary system and of launching new and meaningful trade negotiations involving the enlarged European Economic Community and Japan, or from an inability to control domestic inflation and to bring the U.S. balance of payments into better equilibrium. Even if the United States manages to hold to the course of freer trade, it is expected to be an even tougher bargaining partner than in the past.

There is little evidence to suggest that the United States has consciously had in mind any particular continental doctrine with respect to Canada in the context of the Government's new economic strategy. At the same time, in implementing this strategy, U.S. policies and interests on particular Canada-U.S. issues, ranging from the automotive and defence-sharing agreements through the growing concern over congestion and pollution to the increasing U.S. need for energy and natural resources, could well converge towards a more continentalist U.S. approach. The U.S. interest in maintaining a substantial volume of U.S. investments abroad could also in practice involve some problems for Canada, notwithstanding the recent indications that the United States Government understands that on this matter Canada must decide for itself what policies are best suited to its own national interests.

The Canadian scene

Canadian attitudes, too, have been changing. Perhaps more than ever before, the Canada-U.S. relationship is becoming an absorbing focus of much Canadian thinking about the Canadian condition. This is nowhere more evident than in the foreign policy review, which attributes its own genesis in part to "frustration . . . about having to live in the shadow of the United States and its foreign policy, about the heavy dependence of Canada's economy on continuing American prosperity, and about the marked influence of that

large and dynamic society on Canadian life in general".

This is a relatively new set of perceptions. In fact, one of the most dramatic aspects of such evidence as is provided by the public opinion polls has been the change in Canadian attitudes over the past two decades. In the 1950s and early 1960s, most Canadians were firm in their support for U.S. policies and certainly gave no evidence of perceiving a U.S. threat to Canada. In 1956 as many as 68 per cent of those polled supported the idea of free trade with the United States. On the more general issue of dependence, the polls taken between 1948 and 1963 indicated that at least half of those polled did not think Canadian life was being unduly influenced by the United States. Indeed, a 1963 poll recorded 50 per cent as believing that dependence on the United States was beneficial to Canada. All in all, attitudes during that period appeared to be much more congenial to close Canadian involvement with the United States than is the case today.

The evidence suggests that the overriding issue to emerge from the Canada-U.S. relationship for most Canadians today is that of economic independence. For example, a cross-section of various polls indicates that 88.5 per cent of Canadians think it important for Canada to have more control over its own economy; that two of every three Canadians view the current level of American investment in Canada as being too high; that, while seven out of every ten Canadians are prepared to acknowledge that American investment has given them a higher standard of living than they might otherwise have had, almost half of them would be willing to accept a lower living standard if that were the price to be paid for controlling or reducing the level of American investment. These are admittedly national averages. They do not necessarily do justice to pronounced regional variations.

If the national mood is to be comprehended in one sentence, it would appear that Canadians remain aware of the benefits of the American connection but that, today more than at any other time since the Second World War, they are concerned about the trend of the relationship and seem willing to contemplate and support reasonable measures to assure greater Canadian independence.

Net flow reversed

It is a matter of more than passing interest that the movement of people between

Canada and the United States runs in remarkable parallel with the attitudes reflected in the public opinion polls. The 1950s, for example, saw an average of some 30,000 Canadians a year moving to the United States, against a reverse flow of only about 11,000. These were the years of the "brain drain", when doctors, engineers, teachers, artists, writers and musicians comprised the largest group of Canadian emigrants. By the 1960s, the net flow of Canadians moving across the border started to level off dramatically until, in 1969, for the first time in the postwar period, the movement of Americans to Canada actually exceeded that of Canadians to the United States by a small margin.

The trend may prove temporary. It probably reflects, to some extent at least, U.S. restrictions on Canadian immigration and the impact of the Vietnam war. Nevertheless, the trend is not without significance. It cannot easily be explained by the normal quantitative factors. The difference in *per capita* gross national product between the two countries has not varied widely on either side of the 25 percent mark and the gap in real *per capita* incomes has stayed about the same since the war. The skilled Canadian can still command a significantly higher salary in the United States. The sunny climates of California and Florida as places of retirement have also not changed. Indeed, the 18,000 Canadians who emigrated to the United States in 1969 obviously felt all the old pulls. But something evidently had changed.

Canada had matured. The outlines of a more distinct national profile were emerging. An increasingly industrial economy had taken shape. The revolution in communications gave promise of knitting the country more closely together. A quieter revolution had transformed the face of French Canada. The flow of immigrants from Europe and elsewhere was adding new dimensions to Canadian life. The foundations of Canada's cultural personality were being strengthened.

Inevitably, Canadians became more aware of themselves, of the kind of society they were intent on shaping, of the particular problems that lay ahead for them. They were concerned about maintaining national unity; about equalizing economic opportunities as between the different regions of the country; about the best ways of meeting the challenges of a bilingual and multicultural society. They were concerned about their future prosperity;

about the problem of providing employment for the most rapidly expanding labour force of any industrialized country; about the management of the resources with which their country had been richly endowed. They were concerned about the quality of their life; about the risks of blight brought about by unplanned urban growth; about the threat to the environment represented by industrial and technological growth; about the fragile balance of nature in the Arctic and the quality of the waters off Canada's coast.

If these concerns can be brought within a single focus, it is that of Canada's distinctness. And for Canada distinctness could, in recent years, have only one meaning: distinctness from the United States. What more and more Canadians were brought to realize was that, with all the affinities and all the similarities they shared with the United States, Canada was a distinct country with distinct problems that demanded Canadian solutions. It was not and is not that Canadians underrate the tremendous achievements of American society or its unbounded capacity for self-renewal. It is simply that more and more Canadians have come to conclude that the American model does not, when all is said and done, fit the Canadian condition. Such a conclusion has led, not unnaturally, to the assertion of the right of Canadians to fashion their national environment according to their own perceptions.

□ In this changing context, what is to be done about the continental pull and the internal momentum with which it is thought by many to be endowed? It is probably useful to start out by acknowledging that there are immutable factors that cannot be changed. Our history, our geography, our demographic structure have imposed and will continue to impose limitations on Canada's freedom of action. Whether we defend it or not, there will be 3,000 miles of common frontier with the United States. Chinese Walls, Maginot Lines or Iron Curtains have never lived up to the claims of impermeability that were made for them. We could conceivably keep out American products but not American ideas, tastes or life styles. We could theoretically have 100 percent Canadian content in our broadcasting but could hardly ban the airwaves to American stations. We could prohibit the migration of people but not eliminate the strong interpersonal relationships on each side of the border. Canadian independence can be realistic only within some measure of in-

terdependence in the world. Canadian energies should not be wasted or efforts misspent on policies that give little promise of being achievable.

In examining the options before us, therefore, we must necessarily focus on those areas of the Canada-U.S. relationship where movement is not foreclosed by factors about which nothing can be done.

III. The Options

This is not the first time Canadians have asked themselves which way they should go. The factor of geography remains a constant element in the equation. The disproportion between Canada and the United States in terms of power has not changed all that much. The continental pull itself has historical antecedents. The pursuit of a distinctive identity runs through the process of Canadian nation-building.

But if the signposts are familiar, the landscape is undoubtedly different. Many of the old countervailing forces have disappeared. The links across the common border have increased in number, impact and complexity. New dimensions are being added to the Canada-U.S. relationship all the time. On both sides, there is now difficulty in looking upon the relationship as being wholly external in character.

The world trend is not helpful to Canada in resolving this dilemma. For the trend is discernibly in the direction of interdependence. In the economic realm, in science, in technology, that is the direction in which the logic of events is pointing. In Canada's case, inevitably, interdependence is likely to mean interdependence mainly with the United States. This is a simple statement of the facts. It does not pretend to be a value judgment. In point of fact, the balance of benefits of such a trend for Canada may well be substantial.

But this evades the real question that looms ahead for Canada. And that is whether interdependence with a big, powerful, dynamic country like the United States is not bound, beyond a certain level of tolerance, to impose an unmanageable strain on the concept of a separate Canadian identity, if not on the elements of Canadian independence.

To pose these questions is simple enough. To propound answers to them is more difficult because any answer is likely to touch on the central ambiguity of our relationship with the United States. The temper of the times, nevertheless, suggests that Canadians are looking for answers. It is also apparent that many of the answers are in Canadian hands. This is because few of

the problems engendered by the relationship are, in fact, problems of deliberate creation on the U.S. side. They are problems arising out of contiguity and disparity in wealth and power and, not least, out of the many affinities that make it more difficult for Canadians to stake out an identity of their own.

Three courses

The real question facing Canadians is one of direction. In practice, three broad options are open to us:

- (a) we can seek to maintain more or less our present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy adjustments;
- (b) we can move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States;
- (c) we can pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.

Such a statement of options may err on the side of oversimplification. The options are intended merely to delineate general directions of policy. Each option clearly covers a spectrum of possibilities and could be supported by a varied assortment of policy instruments. Nevertheless, the importance of the options notion is not to be discounted. For, in adopting one of the options, Canadians would be making a conscious choice of the continental environment that, in their view, was most likely to be responsive to their interests and aspirations over the next decade or two. Conversely, no single option is likely to prove tenable unless it commands a broad national consensus.

Seeking to maintain our present position with minimum policy changes

The first option would be to aim at maintaining more or less the present pattern of our economic and political relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy change either generally or in the Canada-United States context.

The formulation notwithstanding, this is not an option meaning no change. In the present climate, any option that did not provide for change would clearly be unrealistic. The realities of power in the world are changing. Some of the international systems that have provided the context for our monetary and trading relations in the postwar period are in the process of reshaping. The United States is embarked

on a basic reappraisal of its position and policies. The Canadian situation is itself changing and new perceptions are being brought to bear on the Canada-U.S. relationship. All this suggests that some adjustments in Canadian policy are unavoidable.

The first option would neither discount the fact of change nor deny the need to accommodate to it. But it would imply a judgment that, at least on the present evidence, the changes that have occurred or are foreseeable are not of a nature or magnitude to call for a basic reorientation of Canadian policies, particularly as they relate to the United States.

In practical terms, this would mean maintaining the general thrust of our trade and industrial policies, including a large degree of *laissez faire* in economic policy, a multilateral, most-favoured-nation approach as the guiding principle of our trade policy, emphasis on securing improved access to the U.S. market, the vigorous export of commodities and semi-processed goods, and continuing efforts to industrialize domestically by rationalizing production, in large part for export. Presumably, little or no change would be made in the present way of handling matters at issue with the United States, which is one of dealing with each problem as it arises and seeking to maintain something of a "special relationship".

New constraints

But there is another side to the coin. The changes that are taking place on both sides of the border point to new opportunities and new constraints emerging for Canada. We would aim at seizing the opportunities and managing the constraints to the best of our ability. In the process we would be concerned about the balance of benefits for Canada, but we would be less concerned about how any given transaction or act of policy fitted into some overall conception of our relationship with the United States.

Nevertheless, other things being equal, we would seek to avoid any further significant increase in our dependence on the United States and our vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the U.S. market and to changes in U.S. economic policy. An effort to diversify our export markets would not be incompatible with the first option; nor would a policy to take advantage of accelerating demand for our mineral and energy resources to secure more processing and employment in Canada and, generally, to reap greater benefits from this major national asset; nor would some further

moderate Canadian action to achieve greater control over the domestic economic and cultural environment.

In sum, this is essentially a pragmatic option. It would not, by definition, involve radical policy departures. It would deal with issues as they arose on the basis of judgments made in relation to each issue. It is not a static option because it would address itself to the solution of problems generated by an environment which is itself dynamic. One of its main attractions is that, we trust, it would not foreclose other options.

The precise implications and costs of this option are difficult to predict because they would vary significantly depending on developments over the short and medium term. Accommodation of current U.S. pre-occupations, however limited, would entail some costs and could involve an increase in our dependence on the United States. If U.S. difficulties proved more durable, and if significant improvements in access to other markets did not materialize, pressures might develop in the United States and in Canada for further special bilateral arrangements. Alternatively, if protectionist attitudes in the United States were to find reflection in official policy, we might be forced to seek other markets on whatever terms we could and perhaps to make painful adjustments in order to reorient our industry to serve mainly the domestic market.

On more optimistic assumptions about the course of U.S. policy and the future of the international trading system, the first option might be followed for some time with ostensible success. The real question is whether it comes fully to grips with the basic Canadian situation or with the underlying continental pull. There is a risk that, in pursuing a purely pragmatic course, we may find ourselves drawn more closely into the U.S. orbit. At the end of the day, therefore, it may be difficult for the present position to be maintained, let alone improved, without more fundamental shifts in Canadian policy.

Closer integration with the United States

The second option is to accept that, in a world where economies of scale are dictating an increasing polarization of trade and in the face of intensified integrating pressures within North America, the continuation of the existing relationship, based on the economic separation of Canada and the United States, does not make good sense, and to proceed from that con-

clusion deliberately to prepare the ground for an arrangement with the United States involving closer economic ties.

The option spans a considerable range of possibilities. At the lower end of the scale, it might involve no more than the pursuit of sectoral or other limited arrangements with the United States based on an assessment of mutual interest. In effect, this would represent an extension of past practices except to the extent that such arrangements would be pursued more as a matter of deliberate policy. We might seek, for example, to adapt to other industries the approach reflected in the Automotive Products Agreement. The chemical industry is one such industry that could lend itself to rationalization on a North-South basis. The aerospace industry might well be another. We might also endeavour to negotiate a continental arrangement with the United States covering energy resources. Under such an arrangement, U.S. access to Canadian energy supplies might be traded in exchange for unimpeded access to the U.S. market for Canadian uranium, petroleum and petrochemical products (to be produced by a much expanded and developed industry within Canada).

This more limited form of integration has a certain logic to it and, indeed, warrants careful examination. It may be expected, however, to generate pressures for more and more continental arrangements of this kind that would be increasingly difficult to resist. Experience with the Automotive Products Agreement suggests that, in any such sectoral arrangements, there may be difficulty in maintaining an equal voice with the United States over time. Nor could we be sure that the concept of formal symmetry, on which the United States has lately insisted, is one that can easily be built into a sectoral arrangement without impairing the interests of the economically weaker partner. In the energy field, by dealing continentally with the United States, we would almost certainly limit our capacity to come to an arrangement with other potential purchasers, in Europe or Japan, quite apart from possibly impinging upon future Canadian needs. In sum, we might well be driven to the conclusion that partial or sectoral arrangements are less likely to afford us the protection we seek than a more comprehensive regime of free trade.

A free-trade area or a customs union arrangement with the United States would, to all intents and purposes, be irreversible for Canada once embarked upon. It

would, theoretically, protect us against future changes in U.S. trade policy towards the rest of the world, though not against changes in U.S. domestic economic policy. This option has been rejected in the past because it was judged to be inconsistent with Canada's desire to preserve a maximum degree of independence, not because it lacked economic sense in terms of Canadian living standards and the stability of the Canadian economy.

Risks involved

A free-trade area permits greater freedom than a customs or economic union, which calls for a unified external tariff and considerable harmonization of fiscal and other domestic economic policies. It might enable us, for example, to continue to protect our energy resources by limiting exports to the surpluses available after meeting present and prospective Canadian requirements and to ensure against harmful pricing practices. It would not debar us from continuing to bargain with third countries for improved access to their markets or from protecting ourselves against low-cost imports. Yet it must be accepted that the integration of the Canadian and U.S. economies would proceed apace and we should be bound to be more affected than ever by decisions taken in Washington with only limited and indirect means of influencing them.

Internationally, there is a real risk that the conclusion of a free-trade arrangement between Canada and the United States would be taken as setting the seal upon the polarization of world trade. To the extent that it was, our room for bargaining with third countries would inevitably be reduced and our economic fortunes become more closely linked with those of the United States.

The experience of free-trade areas (such as the European Free Trade Association) suggests, in any case, that they tend to evolve toward more organic arrangements and the harmonization of internal economic policies. More specifically, they tend towards a full customs and economic union as a matter of internal logic. A Canada-U.S. free-trade area would be almost certain to do likewise. Indeed, such a course could be argued to be in the Canadian interest because, to compete, we would probably require some harmonization of social and economic costs.

If a free-trade area or customs union is a well nigh irreversible option for Canada, this cannot necessarily be assumed to be the case for the United States. A situation

could easily be imagined in which difficulties arose in certain economic sectors or regions of the United States when the Congress might feel constrained to seek to halt or reverse the process. The central problem, here as elsewhere, is the enormous disparity in power between the United States and Canada.

It is arguable, therefore, that in the end the only really safe way to guard against reversal and to obtain essential safeguards for Canadian industry and other Canadian economic interests might be to move to some form of political union at the same time. The object would be to obtain for Canadians a genuine and usable voice in decisions affecting our integrated economies.

At first glance this might look like pursuing the argument to an unwarranted conclusion. The Europeans, it could be argued, have, after all, found it possible to operate a customs union without substantial derogations from their sovereignty. Even if this changes to some extent as they progress towards economic and monetary union, the prospects for full political union or confederation continue to look relatively remote.

But the configuration of power in Europe is different. The European countries are more recognizably different from one another; their identities are older and more deeply anchored; and they are much more nearly equal in resources and power. There is a certain balance in the decision-making system of the European Economic Community that would not be conceivable in a bilateral Canada-U.S. arrangement. For the Europeans, moreover, the problem has been one of transcending historical conflicts. For Canada, on the contrary, the problem has been one of asserting its separate identity and developing its character distinctive from that of the United States in the face of similarities, affinities and a whole host of common denominators.

Throughout this discussion it has been assumed that proposals for free trade or a customs union with Canada would be welcomed in the United States. This is not an unreasonable assumption, taking account of the substantial interpenetration that already exists between the two economies and the vested interests that have been created in the process on the part of U.S. business and labour. It is, nevertheless, an assumption that remains to be tested against changing attitudes in the United States and the implications for U.S. trade and other policies that, like Canada's, have been global rather than

regional in their general thrust. Congressional reaction, in particular, would be a matter of conjecture until the issue was on the table. Political union would presumably raise issues of a different order of complexity, although it has from time to time had respectable support in some circles in the United States.

Safeguards required

If we were to opt for integration, deliberate and coherent policies and programmes would be required, both before and after an arrangement was achieved, to cope with the difficult adjustments that would be entailed for Canada. An adequate transitional period would be essential. Some safeguards for production and continued industrial growth in Canada would have to be negotiated. Agriculture might emerge as another problem sector. In practice, any safeguards would probably be limited largely to a transitional period and could not be expected to cushion the impact of integration for an indefinite future. A tendency for the centres of production – and population – to move south might, in the long run, be difficult to stem. But the more relaxed environment Canada has to offer and the lesser prominence of pressures in Canadian society might also, over time, exert a countervailing influence on any purely economic trend.

The probable economic costs and benefits of this option would require careful calculation. The more fundamental issues, however, are clearly political. In fact, it is a moot question whether this option, or any part of it, is politically tenable in the present or any foreseeable climate of Canadian public opinion.

Reactions and attitudes would no doubt differ across the country. The cleavage of interest between the central, industrialized region and the Western provinces on this issue has become apparent in recent years. Attitudes rooted in historical tradition could be expected to play their part in the Atlantic Provinces. The reaction in the French-speaking areas is more difficult to predict. On the one hand, they tend not to draw a very sharp distinction between the impact of economic control of local enterprise whether exercised from the United States or from elsewhere in Canada. But it is not unlikely that among many French-speaking Canadians the prospect of union with the United States would be viewed as risking their eventual submergence in a sea of some 200 million English-speaking North Americans and as a reversal of the efforts made in Canada over the last ten

years to create a favourable climate for the survival and development of the French language and culture in North America.

There is a real question, therefore, whether the whole of Canada could be brought into union with the United States. Of course, full-fledged political union is not the basic intent of this option. But, to the extent that the logic of events may impel us in that direction, almost any form of closer integration with the United States may be expected to generate opposition in Canada. If it is true, moreover, as appears to be the case, that a more vigorous sense of identity has been taking root among Canadians in recent years, it is unlikely that opposition to this option would be confined to particular parts of the country.

A comprehensive strategy to strengthen the Canadian economy

The basic aim of the third option would be, over time, to lessen the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to external factors, including, in particular, the impact of the United States and, in the process, to strengthen our capacity to advance basic Canadian goals and develop a more confident sense of national identity. If it is to be successfully pursued, the approach implicit in this option would clearly have to be carried over into other areas of national endeavour and supported by appropriate policies. But the main thrust of the option would be towards the development of a balanced and efficient economy to be achieved by means of a deliberate, comprehensive and long-term strategy.

The accent of the option is on Canada. It tries to come to grips with one of the unanswered questions that runs through so much of the Canada-U.S. relationship, and which is what kind of Canada it is that Canadians actually want. It is thus in no sense an anti-American option. On the contrary, it is the one option of all those presented that recognizes that, in the final analysis, it may be for the Canadian physician to heal himself.

The option is subject to two qualifications. "Over time" recognizes that the full benefits will take time to materialize, but that a conscious and deliberate effort will be required to put and maintain the Canadian economy on such a course. "To lessen" acknowledges that there are limits to the process because it is unrealistic to think that any economy, however structured, let alone Canada's, can be made substantially immune to developments in the world around us in an era of growing interdependence.

The option is one that can have validity on most assumptions about the external environment. A basically multilateral environment, of course, in which trade is governed by the most-favoured-nation principle, would enhance its chances of success. But it would not be invalidated by other premises. That is because the option relates basically to the Canadian economy. Its purpose is to recast that economy in such a way as to make it more rational and more efficient as a basis for Canada's trade abroad.

The present may be an auspicious time for embarking on this option. Our trading position is strong. We are regarded as a stable and affluent country with a significant market and much to offer to our global customers in the way of resources and other products. Our balance of payments has been improving in relative terms. We are no longer as dependent on large capital inflows as we once were. A new round of comprehensive trade negotiations is in prospect during 1973. Above all, there is a greater sense of urgency within Canada and greater recognition abroad of Canada's right to chart its own economic course.

Keyed to exports

The option assumes that the basic nature of our economy will continue unchanged. That is to say that, given the existing ratio of resources to population, Canada will continue to have to depend for a large proportion of its national wealth on the ability to export goods and services to external markets on secure terms of access. The object is essentially to create a sounder, less vulnerable economic base for competing in the domestic and world markets and deliberately to broaden the spectrum of markets in which Canadians can and will compete.

In terms of policy, it would be necessary to encourage the specialization and rationalization of production and the emergence of strong Canadian-controlled firms. It is sometimes argued that a market of the size of Canada's may not provide an adequate base for the economies of scale that are a basic ingredient of international efficiency. The argument is valid only up to a point. The scale of efficiency is different for different industries and there is no reason why a market of 22 million people with relatively high incomes should prove inadequate for many industries which are not the most complex or capital-intensive.

The close co-operation of government, business and labour would be essential

through all phases of the implementation of such an industrial strategy. So would government efforts to provide a climate conducive to the expansion of Canadian entrepreneurial activity. It may be desirable, and possible, in the process to foster the development of large, efficient multi-nationally-operating Canadian firms that could effectively compete in world markets. It may also be possible, as a consequence of greater efficiencies, for Canadian firms to meet a higher proportion of the domestic requirement for goods and services. But that would be a natural result of the enhanced level of competitiveness which the option is designed to promote; it is not in the spirit of the option to foster import substitution as an end in itself with all the risks that would entail of carrying us beyond the margins of efficiency.

The option has been variously described as involving a deliberate, comprehensive and long-term strategy. It is bound to be long-term because some substantial recasting of economic structures may be involved. It is comprehensive in the sense that it will entail the mutually-reinforcing use and adaptation of a wide variety of policy instruments. Fiscal policy, monetary policy, the tariff, the rules of competition, government procurement, foreign investment regulations, science policy may all have to be brought to bear on the objectives associated with this option. The choice and combination of policy instruments will depend on the precise goals to be attained. The implications, costs and benefits of the option will vary accordingly.

In saying that the strategy must be deliberate, it is accepted that it must involve some degree of planning, indicative or otherwise, and that there must be at least a modicum of consistency in applying it. One implication of the conception of deliberateness is that the strategy may have to entail a somewhat greater measure of government involvement than has been the case in the past. The whole issue of government involvement, however, needs to be kept in proper perspective. The Government is now and will continue to be involved in the operation of the economy in a substantial way. This is a function of the responsibility which the Canadian Government shares with other sovereign governments for ensuring the well-being and prosperity of its citizens in a context of social justice. A wide variety of policy instruments and incentives is already being deployed to that end, largely with the support and often at the instance of those

who are more directly concerned with the running of different segments of the economy. It is not expected that the pursuit of this particular option will radically alter the relation between Government and the business community, even if the Government were to concern itself more closely with the direction in which the economy was evolving.

Much the same considerations apply to the relationship between the federal and provincial jurisdictions. It is true that, in the diverse circumstances that are bound to prevail in a country like Canada, the task of aggregating the national interests is not always easy. There may be a problem, therefore, in achieving the kind of broad consensus on objectives, priorities and instrumentalities on which the successful pursuit of anything on the lines of the present option is likely to hinge. Part of the problem may derive from a divergent assessment of short-term interests. In terms of longer-range goals, it is much less apparent why federal and provincial interests should not be largely compatible or why the elaboration of this option should not enhance and enlarge the opportunities for co-operation with the provinces. Indeed, there are many areas, such as the upgrading of Canada's natural resource exports, where the implications of this option are likely to coincide closely with provincial objectives.

Impact on U.S.

What of the impact on the United States, which could be critical to the success of the option? There again, it is necessary to keep matters in perspective. There is no basic change envisaged in Canada's multi-lateral trade policy. On the contrary, we could expect to be working closely with the United States in promoting a more liberal world-trading environment. Nor does the option imply any intention artificially to distort our traditional trading patterns. The United States would almost certainly remain Canada's most important market and source of supply by a very considerable margin.

The fact remains, nevertheless, that the option is directed towards reducing Canada's vulnerability, particularly in relation to the United States. A good deal of this vulnerability derives from an underlying continental pull, which is inadvertent. To that extent, the risk of friction at the governmental level is lessened, although it would be unrealistic to discount it altogether. Much would depend on what policy instruments were selected in support

of this option and how we deployed them. The state of the U.S. economy could be another factor determining U.S. reactions at any given time. On any reasonable assumptions, however, such impact as the option may unavoidably have on U.S. interests would be cushioned by the time-frame over which it is being projected and should be relatively easy to absorb in a period of general growth and prosperity. When all is said and done, the option aims at a relative decline in our dependence on the United States, not at a drastic change in our bilateral relationship. As such, it is not incompatible with the view, recently advanced by President Nixon in his address to the House of Commons, that "no self-respecting nation can or should accept the proposition that it should always be economically dependent upon any other nation".

Cultural options

The continental pull appears to be operating most strongly in the economic and cultural sectors. There are those who, like Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, argue that U.S. economic influence can be disregarded so long as Canada manages to maintain a distinct culture of its own. Many Canadians would disagree with him. Nevertheless, no prescription for Canada is likely to be complete that did not attempt to cover the cultural sector.

There are differences between the economic and the cultural forces that are at work in the Canada-U.S. relationship. In the first place, culture has more than one dimension; it means different things to different Canadians. Second, the cultural interaction between Canada and the United States is, if anything, even less a matter of governmental policy than the interaction between the two economies. Third, it is much harder to influence the movement of ideas than it is to influence the movement of goods. Finally, it is evidently not a threat about which the public at large feels anything like the concern that, according to the opinion polls, it feels about the threat to Canadian control of the domestic economic environment.

This is one reason why the cultural scene requires separate discussion. But there is another. In the economic sector, it is clear, Canadians do face difficult choices. It is a moot question whether this is really true when it comes to the cultural sector. This is not to discount the importance of a healthy cultural environment to the Canadian sense of identity and national confidence. It is merely to suggest

that in this sector the essential choices may, in fact, already have been made.

Domestically, two prescriptions have, by and large, been applied. The first is regulatory. It recognizes that some of the means of cultural expression are subject to the competition of the market-place in the same way as the offer of other services. The purpose of regulation in these instances is simply to ensure that, where the standards of the product are equal, the Canadian offering is not ruled out by terms of competition that are unequal. This is the general philosophy that has guided the efforts of the Canadian Radio and Television Commission. It is probably applicable in other areas where the Canadian product — whether film, record, or publication — is held back because the requisite measure of control of the distribution system is not in Canadian hands.

The other prescription has been to give direct support to cultural activity in Canada. This role has, on the whole, fallen to government. Support has taken the form of financial assistance, but also of institutions that have been established to encourage the expression of Canadian creative talent. The Massey Commission judged in 1951 that money spent on cultural defences was, in the end, no less important than money spent on defence so-called. In the eyes of most Canadians, this remains a valid judgment.

As in the economic sector, any policy aimed at lessening the impact of U.S. influences on the Canadian cultural scene should presumably have an external dimension. This is not simply a matter of diversification for its own sake. Canada's cultural roots are, after all, widely ramified. International projection will enable Canada to reaffirm its distinctive linguistic and cultural complexion. But it will also give Canadians the opportunity to test their product in a wider market and to draw, in turn, on the currents of cross-fertilization.

Mass market

In sum, Canadians will not be able to take their cultural environment for granted. It is on the cultural front, as on the economic front, that the impact on Canada of the dynamic society to the south finds its strongest expression. The impact has no doubt been magnified by the development of the mass media and their counterpart: the mass market. French-speaking Canadians may be less exposed to it for reasons of language, but they are not immune. Canadians generally appear to find it more

difficult to focus on it than on the U.S. impact on the Canadian economy, perhaps because the many affinities between Canadians and Americans tend to make any concept of a threat unreal. On the whole, the general directions of Canadian policy in the cultural sector have been set and they have been pursued with reasonable success. Perhaps we have already turned the corner. But it remains for these policies to be extended to other vulnerable areas and to take account of the further impetus that the new technologies may give to the cultural thrust of the United States as it affects Canada.

This is, fortunately, an area in which there is broad convergence between the perceptions and goals of the federal and provincial governments. It would not be unrealistic, therefore, to look to a high degree of co-operation between the two levels of government in creating the kind of climate we shall need over the next decade or two if Canadian themes are to find their distinctive expression.

It is also one of the areas in which Canadians can act with the least risk of external repercussion. It has been said that culture is imported rather than exported. This is not wholly true. But to the extent that cultural influences are brought in willingly, they can be shaped domestically without affront to the exporter.

The following quotation has a familiar ring to Canadians examining their current problems: "The true sovereigns of a country are those who determine its mind, its mode of thinking, its tastes, its principles; and we cannot consent to lodge this sovereignty in the hands of strangers". It is, in fact, an excerpt from an address delivered at the University of Philadelphia in 1823. Americans today will be no less understanding of Canadian concern in trying to follow the same advice.

IV. Summing Up

In looking into the perspectives for the Seventies, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* focuses on "the complex problem of living distinct from but in harmony with the world's most powerful and dynamic nation, the United States". The phrase is intended, presumably, not only to identify the problem but to define the parameters of the relationship. It is the requirement of both distinctness and harmony, therefore, that any option for the future of Canada-U.S. relations must be seen to satisfy, among others.

In essence, distinctness should be im-

plicit in any relationship between two sovereign countries such as Canada and the United States. The very fact that it has to be singled out as an objective of foreign policy says something about the Canada-U.S. relationship. The relationship is characterized by an array of linkages that, given the disparity in power and population, impinge on the sense of Canadian identity. This might be a sustainable challenge if evidence were not accumulating that the underlying trend in the Canada-U.S. relationship may be becoming less congenial to the conception of Canadian distinctness.

Distinctness has no autonomous virtue of its own. It is not an end in itself. In the process of nation-building, however, it is a substantial factor of cohesion. In the case of Canada, in particular, it is arguable that the perception of a distinct identity can make a real and discernible contribution to national unity.

The whole conception of distinctness is, of course, changing. There are challenges facing modern society that transcend national boundaries. There are areas of economic activity that can no longer be performed efficiently except on a scale that exceeds national dimensions. There is a whole host of linkages that lend cumulative substance to the reality of interdependence. This is a global trend from which Canada can neither claim nor expect to be exempt. It is a fact, nevertheless, that the Canadian situation in relation to the United States is unique in two respects: the linkages are probably more numerous and more pervasive than between any other two countries and the affinities between them are also such as to put particular strains on the definition of the Canadian identity. On both counts the problem of living distinct from the United States is only marginally related to the larger issue of global interdependence, which is a fact of life for all countries.

If Canadians say they want a distinct country, it is not because they think they are better than others. It is because they want to do the things they consider important and do them in their own way. And they want Canadian actions and life styles to reflect distinctly Canadian perspectives and a Canadian view of the world.

Against this yardstick the first option — seeking to maintain our present position with minimum policy changes — is not likely to represent much of an advance. On the contrary, if the continental pull is, in fact, becoming stronger, we may,

like the proverbial squirrel, have to run harder simply to stay in place. In the final analysis, the first option is not really an option of strategy at all. Directed as it is toward preserving the present balance in the Canada-U.S. relationship in an external setting of predictable change, it would inevitably involve a substantially reactive posture on Canada's part.

Costs involved

The second option—closer integration with the United States—would involve costs in terms of the Canadian identity. Even if limited to a free-trade area, it would probably be unrealistic to assume that the momentum generated by this option could be confined to the economic and industrial sphere. The many common denominators, based on contiguity and affinity, that link Canada and the United States, would receive a strong impetus. To resist them would require more deliberate effort and appear to make less sense because the second option implies a judgment that the effort to resist the continental pull is likely to be unavailing. To the extent that a real risk to Canada's distinctness as a political and cultural community was apprehended, recourse to the second option could involve a serious strain on the domestic consensus in Canada.

The third option—a comprehensive strategy to strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life—assumes that the continental tide can be stemmed to some extent and contained within bounds that approximate more closely the wider, global thrust of interdependence. It sees, as did the recent foreign policy review, "the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty" as "the key to Canada's continuing freedom to develop according to its own perceptions". More specifically, it looks to the mutually-reinforcing use of various policy instruments as the proper strategy to achieve greater Canadian distinctness. It inevitably takes account of its own limitations. It does not seek to distort the realities of the Canada-United States relationship or the fundamental community of interest that lies at the root of it.

Distinctness is not the only criterion by which the options available to Canada in its conduct of the U.S. relationship should be judged. Independence is another. Distinctness and independence are clearly related, but they are not the same thing. In the broadest sense independence is related ultimately to the capacity of governments to formulate and conduct policy

on the basis of national perceptions for the achievement of national objectives in the domestic and international environments. Distinctness, on the other hand, is an attribute that applies to a national society in all its various manifestations.

In trying to judge the constraints on Canadian independence arising out of the U.S. relationship, it is necessary to keep a proper sense of balance. In the first place, there is an all-too-natural tendency to think of such constraints as being deliberate manifestations of U.S. policy. This applies, in particular, to the integrating trend that is being apprehended on the Canadian side. In practice, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. policy towards Canada is being conducted on other than pragmatic lines as distinct from some general conception of progressive integration that would have the effect of gradually extinguishing Canada's separate existence as a national entity. It is important to distinguish, therefore, between the impact on the Canadian scene of non-governmental U.S. actors (such as corporations, business groups, trade unions, and the media), on the one hand, and of policies and actions of the U.S. Government, on the other. As a general proposition, there is no real evidence that the U.S. Government does now pursue a concerted policy of continental integration in relation to Canada. Conversely, however, the U.S. Government should not be counted on to inhibit any integrating trend that may be emerging as a result of the separate actions or interests of various U.S. constituent communities.

Rewarding relationship

In the second place, the Canada-U.S. relationship, in whatever way we may look upon it, has been a rewarding and enriching relationship for Canada on most counts. In particular, of course, it has been instrumental in endowing Canadians with an industrial structure and the higher standard of living that goes with it in a shorter time span than might otherwise have been achievable on the strength even of Canada's substantial natural and human resources. This is something that cannot be left out of account in any judgment of the constraints the relationship may have placed on Canadian independence. Nor are Canadians disposed to make their reckoning without taking account of the many positive aspects of the relationship. This accounts for the element of ambivalence that has always been a feature of Canadian policy towards the United States. As the recent foreign policy

review puts it, "for the majority of Canadians the aim appears to be to attain the highest level of prosperity consistent with Canada's political preservation as an independent state". The ambivalence has persisted, in essence, because policy choices at either end of the spectrum are likely to involve unacceptable costs to Canadians. To avoid such costs will presumably remain a primary objective of any policy option.

In the third place, it is difficult to make any pronouncement about the impact of the Canada-U.S. relationship on Canadian independence without at least a cursory look at the concept of the "special relationship". The term is not uniquely applied to Canada. Other countries, too, have intermittently used it to describe their relationships with the United States. This is presumably because it has been considered beneficial to enjoy a "special" relationship with the United States.

As far as Canada is concerned, there can be little doubt that the relationship with the United States has been and continues to be special in the sense that it is probably the most articulated relationship between any two countries in the world involving a unique level of mutual interaction, even if unequal in its impact. The intensity of the relationship and perceptions on either side of the border notwithstanding, it has been conducted, by and large, as a normal relationship between two sovereign states. On occasion, however, it has also involved transactions involving special ground rules that have not been extended evenly to other countries.

To the extent that the concept of the "special relationship" reflects an objective reality, it will continue to be valid. To the extent, on the other hand, that it denotes special arrangements between Canada and the United States, its currency is likely to diminish on both sides of the border. In the United States, the perception is gaining ground that the "special relationship" with Canada was an unbalanced relationship, that it involved accommodations in favour of Canada that are no longer tenable in the light of current economic and political realities, and that any restructuring of the "special relationship" would have to proceed on a basis of much more demonstrable equity of benefit to each country. On the Canadian side, there is a concurrent feeling that special arrangements with the United States, for all their acknowledged benefits, may in the end have curtailed our freedom of action, domestically as much as in the realm of foreign policy, and that the cumulative

impact of such arrangements taken together carries the risk of locking Canada more firmly into a pattern of continental dependence. This probably does not rule out some special arrangements in future, arrived at selectively on a basis of mutual advantage, but the prospect under anything like the third option would be for a more normal nation-to-nation relationship.

Any discussion of the theme of Canadian independence would not be complete without some judgment as to the realistic parameters of such a discussion itself. It would obviously be absurd to proceed from the assumption that Canada is today substantially deficient in independence. In fact, Canada probably has much more independence than most countries in the modern world and more than many Canadians recognize. There is no denying, on the other hand, that the pervasive span of the linkages between Canada and the United States represents a set of potential constraints on the latitude Canada has in dealing with its national problems. Some of these linkages are immutable; others are susceptible to modification. The real question is to what extent we can look to any policy option to enhance the measure of independence Canadians now enjoy without involving unrealistic, unacceptable and unwarranted costs.

Diversifying interests

The foreign policy review brings the concept of countervailing factors into play. Among these, it instances the active pursuit of trade diversification and technical co-operation with countries other than the United States. The notion that Canada's interests are best served by policies that seek to diversify those interests on a global basis as one means of avoiding excessive reliance on the United States is, of course, not a new one. In one way or another, it has been an explicit assumption behind Canadian support for trade liberalization over the years. If trade liberalization has not contributed significantly, if at all, to our explicit objective of diversification, a less liberal world-trading environment would probably have led to even stronger links between the Canadian and U.S. markets. The fact remains that, with more than two-thirds of our total trade concentrated in the United States, Canada is unique among industrialized countries in having a trading pattern that, by the standard of diversification, is so unbalanced.

This suggests that we should be unrealistic to set our sights too high. There is clearly no possibility of our being able to

surmount overnight Canada's heavy dependence on the United States for trade, investment and technology. But there is no reason why we should not aim, in the context of an expanding economy and expanding trade prospects, to achieve relative shifts that, over time, could make a difference in reducing Canada's dependence on a single market and, by extension, the vulnerability of Canada's economy as such. The stronger Canada that might be expected to emerge from the pursuit of such a policy is the objective of the third option. It is eminently clear, however, that for diversification to be achieved, even within the modest scale here suggested, trade policy will need to be harnessed to other policies — such as an industrial-growth strategy and a policy to deal with aspects of foreign ownership — that address themselves to the special factors at play in the North American situation.

There is one final point to be made about Canadian independence. There are those who believe that the growing trend toward regionalism in the world, coupled with the narrowing focus within which the United States may be induced to interpret its national interests in a period of retrenchment, will inevitably increase the continental pull exerted on Canada. Against this, however, it is arguable that, in the world foreshadowed by the Nixon Doctrine—a world in which power is likely to be more diffused and in which United States commitments may be tailored much more closely to resource capabilities and public attitudes in the United States —, the prospect of Canada's achieving its national objectives, domestically and internationally, will be enhanced rather than diminished.

Various options have been identified for the future management of the Canada-U.S. relationship. All these options have one common denominator: the need for the relationship to be harmonious. This is not only because no policy option is likely to be tenable in any context other than that of a harmonious relationship between Canada and the United States. It is also because, over a very wide spectrum, the interests of the two countries as continental neighbours and in the international environment are, in fact, in close harmony.

In particular, Canada and the United States would appear to have a very strong common interest in promoting improvements in the international trade-and-payments system. We have made common cause in these matters in the past and

there is every reason why we should continue to work constructively together. It would be a pity if the existence of some irritants in our bilateral trade relations were to create the impression that, on the big questions, Canada and the United States found themselves in opposing camps.

No anomaly

The foreign policy review speaks of living distinct from but in harmony with the United States. There is no anomaly in this proposition. The concept of distinctness is taken for granted as the natural context for international relations and no qualitative inferences should be drawn from it one way or the other. There are many countries in the world that certainly regard themselves as being distinct and have no difficulty in living in the closest harmony of purpose and endeavour with other countries. There is no intrinsic reason, therefore, why Canadian distinctness should in any way inhibit the continued existence of a fundamentally harmonious relationship between Canada and the United States.

It is fair to assume that, in the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian-American relations may become more complex than they have been in the past. It is part of the trend toward increasing complexity in the relationship that a larger number of issues may arise between us that engage the national interest on each side. It is also to be assumed that, if the national interest were interpreted in a new and possibly narrower focus, the issues arising between us would, on occasion, be judged to bear more critically on it than when the relationship was more relaxed. Finally, as governments on both sides of the border are more and more being drawn by their various domestic constituencies into areas of social and economic activity that involve the shaping of national goals, the nature of the issues between us and the means of resolving them may change.

There is nothing in all this that should be thought to imply a scenario for greater contention. Far from it. There will, of course, be issues, such as Canada's policies on foreign ownership and perhaps in relation to energy and other resources — and in many other areas — where perceptions will differ. The same will almost certainly be true of United States policies as that country continues to grapple with secular and structural problems of economic adjustment. On occasion, as Secretary of State Rogers recently put it, each govern-

ment "may be required to take hard decisions in which the other cannot readily concur". In the main, however, we should expect both countries to manage change in a spirit of harmony and without doing unnecessary damage to interests on the other side. Above all, it is in Canada's interest to work closely with a dynamic and outward-looking United States whose influence and the leverage it can bring into play will continue to be critical to the achievement of some of Canada's principal objectives in the international environment.

In the final analysis, harmony is not an extraneous factor in the Canada-United States relationship. It has marked the relationship because it is based on a broad array of shared interests, perceptions and goals. It also reflects the many affinities that have linked Canadians and Americans

traditionally and that continue to link them as members of changing but still broadly compatible societies. What is an issue at the moment is, as someone has aptly defined it, "the optimum range of interdependence" between Canada and the United States. All the evidence suggests that the issue is being reviewed on both sides of the border. But, understandably, it is of immensely greater significance for Canada. If the outcome is a Canada more confident in its identity, stronger in its capacity to satisfy the aspirations of Canadians and better equipped to play its part in the world, it is an outcome that is bound to make Canada a better neighbour and partner of the United States. Above all, it is an outcome that should buttress the continuation of a harmonious relationship between the two countries.

November / December 1972

International Perspectives

A Journal of the Department of External Affairs



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NORAD: Choices for Canada

The Hockey Series with the Soviet

Two Koreas: End of an Ice Age

Appointment in Peking

Where is Sadat's Egypt Going?

International Perspectives

International Perspectives is issued bimonthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Mention of *International Perspectives* as the source would be appreciated. Letters and comments on the issues discussed in the publication are welcome.

Subscription rates: Canada, United States and Mexico, \$3.00 a year, single copies 75 cents; other countries \$4.00 a year, single copies \$1.00.

Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to: Information Canada, 171 Slater Street, Ottawa, Canada.

Authorized as second class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.

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Published by authority of
the Honourable Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

NORAD: Origins and operations of Canada's ambivalent symbol

by Roger Swanson

Since its creation in the late 1950s, the North American Air Defence Command has matured into an ambivalent symbol. With its combined command and its single air-defence plan, NORAD is symbolic of the degree of consensus that can exist between two sovereign nations faced with an external threat. However, NORAD is also symbolic of what many Canadians would like to avoid — an organizational tie with the United States that is bilateral rather than multilateral (i.e., in which the full impact of U.S. power is not "multilateralized" or diffused by the presence of other nations).

NORAD has contributed to the effective security of Canada and the United States since its inception. However, NORAD itself is — and always has been — insecure. This insecurity stems from its parentage. If NORAD's mother can be regarded as the increasing severity of an immediate Soviet threat to North America, its father is the technological-military advances that made this threat more and more imminent as the decade of the Fifties progressed. NORAD's history is, therefore, one of perpetual battle against shifting threat-perceptions and technological obsolescence. The immediacy of the Soviet threat to North America has been subject to two very different sets of perceptions — Canadian and U.S. The technological-military advances that make this Soviet threat credible subject NORAD to constant obsolescence, forcing Canada and the United States to allocate money to defence rather than to other pressing priorities.

NORAD was established on an interim basis in August 1957, formally effected in May 1958 for a ten-year period, and renewed in March 1968 for an additional five years. Since NORAD comes up for renewal in 1973, the present is an appropriate time to review its background and those considerations that might concern Canada and the United States in negotiations over its renewal.

NORAD's antecedents can be divided into three periods: (1) initial co-operation

from the late 1930s up to and including Second World War co-operation; (2) preliminary postwar air-defence contacts from 1946 to 1949; and (3) permeative Canadian-U.S. air-defence co-operation from 1950 up to and including the establishment of NORAD.

The first period witnessed the shattering of a number of historical precedents. In August 1936, in a speech at Chautauqua, New York, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave the first public pledge of U.S. defence assistance to Canada. This was the genesis of Canadian-U.S. defence co-operation, for, until late in the nineteenth century, Canada had regarded the United States as a military threat (and with some justification, given the U.S. invasions of Canada and subsequent U.S. filibustering). Canadian fear of U.S. aggression had largely dissipated with the advent of the twentieth century. In fact, Canada had had a War Mission in Washington during the First World War. However, Canadian-U.S. defence co-operation did not really occur until the late Thirties. This was because Canada's defence orientation continued to be British, and because a disintegrating international system — that was to culminate in the Second World War — had not yet disturbed the complacency of the North American environment.

In August 1938, at Kingston, Ontario, President Roosevelt publicly presented an even stronger pledge of defence assistance than in his 1936 statement. Two days later,

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Prime Minister Mackenzie King made public the Canadian counterpart of this pledge. The history-making Ogdensburg Declaration followed in August 1940. At a meeting between Mr. King and Mr. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York, a six-sentence, unsigned press release was issued that literally altered the course of Canadian-U.S. history. For the first time, Canada and the United States became informal allies.

In addition, the first organizational component of the Canadian-U.S. defence relation, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), was created. As its name implies, the PJBD was intended to be permanent rather than to exist just for the duration of the war. The Ogdensburg Declaration therefore constituted the initial step in general Canadian-U.S. defence co-operation. The April 1941 Hyde Park Agreement was both an economic extension of Ogdensburg and an initial step in what was to become an economic defence co-operation of extraordinary interdependence. From these initial steps sprang a host of wartime joint Canadian-U.S. committees and boards, and unprecedented co-operation and co-ordination during the War.

Looking to Arctic

The second period, that of preliminary contacts concerning air defence, lasted roughly from 1946 to 1949. At a 1946 meeting, the PJBD prepared its first major postwar recommendation, in which the need for some form of protection regarding the then undefended Arctic was emphasized. This plan was preparatory in nature, its object being a larger measure of co-ordination rather than combined commands and integrated forces. However, it did call for the construction of defence, meteorological and communication stations across the Canadian North for the purpose of gathering information and training in Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions. The Canadian Government was unreceptive to this plan. Also, early in 1946, a military exercise called "Muskox" was carried out, consisting of a mechanized force moving some 3,000 miles through Arctic Canada. U.S. observers and some American materiel were involved, and the results of the whole experience and tests of equipment were made available to both nations.

During this same period, U.S. B-29 aircraft conducted experiments over Arctic Canada in the use of the long-range navigation system. In 1947 an announcement was made in the House of Commons concerning Canadian-U.S. collaboration in

the maintenance of weather-stations in the Arctic. These stations would be operated by an equal number of personnel from the Canadian Meteorological Service and the U.S. Weather Bureau. At the same time postwar history was beginning to acquire a momentum that was as unsettling as it was to become demanding. In 1948, the Soviets exhibited the Tu-4 long-range bomber during their May Day parade, and the following year detonated their first nuclear device.

The third phase of NORAD's antecedents was a period of close Canadian-U.S. air-defence co-operation that began in 1950 and continued through the establishment of NORAD. The year 1951 witnessed "Project Charles," a U.S. study involving unofficial Canadian participation. Although this study did not recommend Arctic warning systems, it did emphasize the importance of additional warning-time. The year 1952 was marked by the formation of the Lincoln Summer Study Group; another was a U.S. endeavour involving Canadian participation. This study group recommended a distant-early-warning system. Initially, this recommendation was not accepted, but the August 1953 Soviet thermonuclear test provided an awesome impetus, culminating in an October 1953 statement by President Dwight D. Eisenhower while he was in Ottawa: "The threat is present. The measures of defence have been thoroughly studied by official bodies of both countries . . . Now is the time for action on all agreed measures."

Three warning lines

Meanwhile, construction had begun on warning lines, of which there were to be three: the Pine Tree Line, the Mid-Canada Line or McGill Fence, and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line). In operation by 1954, the Pine Tree Line ran for most of its length along the Canadian-U.S. border. It was originally a U.S. project, but was extended into Canada by an agreement of August 1951. The Mid-Canada Line, which came into operation in 1951, ran from Labrador to British Columbia, roughly along the 55th Parallel. It was a Canadian project in design, construction, financing and operation. This warning line was largely a product of the Canadian Defence Research Board. Finally the DEW Line, located about 1,400 miles north of the Canadian-U.S. border and running from Baffin Island to Alaska, came into operation in 1957, and was subsequently extended. Although the DEW Line is suffering from obsolescence, it continues to provide Canada and the U.S. with a 5,000-mile "radar fence" backed up by

Plan emphasized need for form of protection in Arctic area



—Wide World Photo

Headquarters for NORAD is located deep underground within Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Col. Among the monitoring devices there are large display screens which show what is going on

in space. These screens in NORAD's Combat Operations Centre can show the routes space satellites, such as the one charted here by a computer, take as they circle the globe.

continental bomber-surveillance network. The Mid-Canada Line became inoperative in 1965. The Pine Tree Line became part of the contiguous radar coverage or was discontinued on a site-by-site basis, depending on usefulness.

Apart from the actual construction of these radar warning line systems, there was, during this period, consistent and close Canadian-U.S. co-operation concerning North American defence. However, a division of forces generally occurred along national lines, each having responsibility primarily for its own country's defence. As the exigencies of the international political and strategic scene became more compelling, a need was perceived for greater Canadian-U.S. co-operation. In May 1956, a Canadian-U.S. Military Study Group was established to study the operational and technical problems that would be involved in a joint command. The committee issued its report in December 1956, recommending the creation of a joint headquarters that would provide for the operational control of Canadian-U.S. air defence. Approval from the Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of Staff was forthcoming, and in August 1957 a joint statement was issued announcing the interim agreement to create NORAD.

NORAD formally came into force in May 1958, through a Canadian-U.S. exchange of notes. The ten-year agreement acknowledged, to quote from the text of the Canadian note, that "for some years prior to the establishment of NORAD, it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the U.S. must be considered as a single problem". However, existing Canadian-U.S. arrangements had provided for co-ordination of separate plans instead of "the authoritative control of all air-defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker". The emergence of nuclear weapons and the requirement of rapid decisions necessitated a single air-defence plan, and an integrated headquarters with "the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries". This integration, it was emphasized, "increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America". Indeed, the Canadian note went on to say that defence co-operation between Canada and the United States "can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken".

In March 1968, an exchange of notes signalled the renewal of the 1958 agreement. However, under the renewal agreement, NORAD was to continue for five years instead of the original agreement's ten years. In addition, either government could terminate the agreement on one year's notice. The 1958 agreement had stipulated that, while NORAD could be "reviewed upon request of either country at any time", the agreement could not be terminated in less than ten years without the concurrence of both countries. Nor is there anything subtle about the eighth sentence of the ten-sentence U.S. note: "It is also agreed by my Government that this Agreement will not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defense."

The rationale for NORAD's renewal agreement was, to quote from the text of the U.S. note, based on "the need for the continued existence in peacetime of an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defense plan approved in advance by the national authorities of both our countries". It should be noted that the NORAD agreement itself has never defined specific Canadian and U.S. levels of force and facility contributions. Rather, these contributions are a function of continuing negotiations between the two governments.

Command operations

The essential import of NORAD is that Canada and the United States have placed their continental air-defence forces under full operational control of one commander-in-chief (an American) and his deputy-commander (a Canadian). The chain of command above the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD is, for Canada, through the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of National Defence to the Prime Minister. For the U.S., the chain of command passes through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense to the President.

NORAD is, in effect, a bilateral, integrated, military organization responsible for defending Canada and the United States and their approaches — an area of 10.5 million square miles — against air attack. For the United States, NORAD-related annual expenditures currently amount to \$1.26 billion; for Canada, they amount to \$136.6 million. At present, NORAD has approximately 300 locations situated throughout the United States and Canada. NORAD's forces involve 85,417 personnel, of whom 11,926 are Canadians. There are currently 250 U.S. military personnel as-

sociated with NORAD on Canadian territory and 210 Canadians on U.S. territory.

In terms of specific Canadian and U.S. NORAD force-level contributions, Canada has three regular fighter squadrons, equipped with 66 CF-101 *Voodoo* aircraft. The United States has 26 air-defence squadrons, consisting of seven regular squadrons of F-106s, and 19 squadrons of the Air National Guard, consisting of F-101s, F-102s, and F-106s. There are 63 *Nike-Hawk* batteries, all of which belong to the U.S. There are 99 long-range radars (LRR), 29 of which are located in Canada and the balance in the U.S. Finally, there are 32 DEW Line stations, of which 21 are located in Canada, seven in Alaska, and four in Greenland.

NORAD consists of three component commands (i.e., commands that make forces available for NORAD operational control): (1) The Canadian Armed Forces Air Defence Command; (2) the U.S. Army Air Defense Command; and (3) the U.S. Air Force Aerospace Defense Command (which provides approximately 60 per cent of NORAD's total personnel and equipment). However, the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaskan Command, which is a separate U.S. unified command, is also responsible to NORAD for the air defence of Alaska. In addition, the U.S. Navy contributes some personnel to the NORAD staff and makes some units available.

The Canadian contribution to NORAD lies in weaponry and surveillance functions. This is, of course, in addition to Canada's granting air-space and refuelling rights to U.S. components in the event of an emergency. In addition, Canada makes major contributions in air-surveillance detection and identification. Canada also operates devices supplying data on satellite traffic.

For operational purposes, Canada and the United States are considered as a North American power-grid, which is divided into eight NORAD geographic regions.

Complex in Colorado

The focal point of NORAD is the Combat Operations Center (COC), the nerve centre of the entire NORAD air system. The COC is located deep in the 9,565-foot Cheyenne Mountain, near Colorado Springs, consisting of a complex of 11 steel buildings covering 4.5 acres of tunnels and evacuated chambers. It is from here that the first warning of an air attack would come and from here that the control of the air battle would be directed. Data are continuously transmitted to the COC from

Level of forces, facilities remain as a function of negotiations

uch systems as the DEW Line across Alaska, Canada and Greenland, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) located in Alaska, Greenland and Britain, with some communications access across Canada. These data are stored in a computer complex, which can be used for displays on a closed-circuit television network. This network would show the tracks of enemy air activity, paths of orbiting satellites, available data on foreign military and intelligence ships, and the status of interceptor and missile weapons available to NORAD. There is a "hot line" communication system connecting the COC with such points as the Canadian Armed Forces headquarters in Ottawa, the White House, the Pentagon, control posts overseas, and so on.

To summarize NORAD's activities, it operates radar posts that scan both the sky and space, squadrons of interceptors, ground-to-air missile batteries, and command posts that would direct the defensive battle. More specifically (and at the risk of oversimplification), the NORAD mission can be divided into the functions of detection, determination of intent, and, in the case of attacking aircraft, destruction.

The *detection* function is carried out by means of three surveillance systems. The first, manned-bomber surveillance, consists of a massive network of radars over populated areas. North of this coverage is the DEW Line extending from the western Aleutian Islands across the top of the continent to Greenland. The second method of detection is the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, consisting of the BMEWS with sites in Greenland, Alaska and England. The third detection system is

concerned with satellite detection. This is the Satellite Detection and Tracking System, a network of radar, radio and optical sensors located in the northern hemisphere. Data from all three surveillance systems are fed to the Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain.

Canada's role

The *determination-of-intent* function of NORAD is to obtain rapid and accurate identification. The principal method of identification is based on flight-plan correlations, with North American air-space divided into air-defence identification zones. Finally, the *destruction* function of NORAD in the event of attack would be to hit an invading force with continuous attack from as far out as possible as it approached a target area. This is what is known as "defence in depth". For example, an enemy bomber would first be met by long-range manned interceptors, and then by *Nike/Hercules* and *Hawk* missiles.

The case can be made that Canada's decision-making role in NORAD is largely perfunctory, given the disproportionate Canadian-U.S. power capabilities and the respective Canadian and U.S. contributions to NORAD. However, the opposite case can also be made — that Canada plays an integral decision-making role in NORAD. Structurally, the Deputy Commander of NORAD is a Canadian, who is in charge when the Commander is absent. In fact, three of the ten generals currently assigned to the Commander's staff are Canadians, giving Canada a higher general-officer ratio that its actual force contribution would warrant. In addition, the deputy commanders of the four NORAD regions

*'Defence in depth'
concept applied
after use of zones
for identification*

In the defence of North America, Canada is inevitably closely associated with the United States

The Government concluded in its defence review that co-operation with the United States in North American defence will remain essential so long as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic military balance. Canada's objective is to make, within the limits of our resources, an effective contribution to continued stability by assisting in the surveillance and warning systems, and in the protection of the U.S. retaliatory capability as necessary. Co-operation between Canada and the United States in the joint defence of North America is vital for sovereignty and security

. . . To provide effective deterrence,

at the present time there is a continuing need for the integrated control over forces made available for the air defence of Canada and the United States as provided by the NORAD agreement. . . . The agreement does not specify any level of forces, equipment or facilities, so the nature of Canada's contribution continues to be a matter for decision by the Canadian Government. The NORAD agreement will be up for renewal in 1973. The policy of the Government at that time with respect to the agreement and the interceptor force posture required will depend upon the strategic situation extant, including progress in SALT

(Excerpts from Government White Paper, Defence in the 70s, August, 1971).

overlapping Canada and the United States are Canadians; and, in the fifth overlapping region, with headquarters at North Bay, Ontario, the region commander is a Canadian. Procedurally, there is evidence to suggest a high degree of Canadian participation at the senior-officer level. This involves not only details of administration but also the planning and programming functions of NORAD.

Discussions of NORAD tend to be

characterized by a surplus of answers to questions that are never asked. The purpose of this article is to ask, and answer the three most basic questions about NORAD: What are its origins, what is its statutory authority and how does it operate? This background information will, it is hoped, provide the reader with at least a minimal base upon which to draw his own conclusions about the future viability of NORAD.

NORAD: Choices for Canada

By Roger Swanson

Analyzing the ingredients and possible outcome of Canadian-U.S. negotiations over NORAD's renewal is rather like analyzing the finger painting of a pre-school child. No one is sure what the end product will be, but the process is certain to be elusive, if not messy. As already indicated in the foregoing background review, NORAD symbolizes a profound Canadian-U.S. consensus of purpose. However, NORAD also symbolizes a bilateral organizational tie with the U.S., which many Canadians would like to avoid. NORAD's history is one of perpetual battle against shifting threat-perceptions and technological obsolescence.

If NORAD's immediate antecedents coincided with the Russian detonation of an atomic device ending the U.S. nuclear-weapons monopoly, its conception coincided with *Sputnik I* and the advent of the ICBM. If NORAD's five-year renewal in 1968 coincided with the advent of the anti-missile age, its 1973 renewal coincides with the advent of the SALT age and increased *detente*. Preliminary discussions at the working level are now under way, and again Canadian-U.S. officials are addressing themselves to the two congenital NORAD considerations: To what extent is there a joint Canadian-U.S. assessment of a strategic threat to North America? And what is the military "state of the art" on the part of the U.S. and Canada in meeting this threat?

It is generally agreed that NORAD has been waging a losing battle against technological obsolescence. In short, modernization is essential if NORAD is to remain effective. There are three modernized systems constituting the new U.S. area air-

defence technology: the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar (OTH-B) and the improved Manned Interceptor (IMI). All of these systems would involve Canada. That is, their deployment over Canadian territory and air-space would be regarded by the United States as important, if not essential.

U.S. approach

However, it should be emphasized that U.S. defence policy does not currently include the deployment of these systems. Although there is general agreement among U.S. planners on which systems should be deployed, there is no certainty whether the funding and authority to proceed with their deployment will be forthcoming. Moreover, these three systems are not operational at present but are still in advanced stages of development. It is this uncertainty on the U.S. side, not Canadian recalcitrance, that is complicating Canadian-U.S. negotiations over NORAD's renewal.

The first system, AWACS, would consist of converted aircraft, probably Boeing 707s. According to some U.S. estimates, a total of 25 AWACS would be needed. The AWACS have a control facility that would direct interceptors to their targets, and a radar facility. Their value is based on their invulnerability in flight, their detection efficiency regarding low-flying aircraft, and their flexibility in directing air battle.

The second system is referred to as OTH-B. It would probably comprise four sites, the most important of which would be in Canada (assuming that the Canadian

government agrees) facing directly north. TH-B provides radar coverage up to the atmosphere and at a distance of some 2,000 miles. There are disadvantages to this system, however — the size of its radar sites makes them extremely vulnerable to attack, and it is not even known if the system can operate in the Far North, given atmospheric disturbances at the North pole. The primary advantage of the OTH-B system is that it would tremendously extend ground-based early warning, thereby precluding low-altitude penetration of enemy aircraft. Moreover, it is OTH-B that would give the warning for the AWACS not already in flight to go aloft.

The third system is referred to as IMI. While the F-106s would be retained, this new interceptor fighter would replace the F-101s and F-102s now being used by the U.S. in NORAD, probably with the Navy F-14 or F-15. The AWACS would direct these fighters in battle. Should the U.S. adopt the IMI, however, the rationale for Canada's replacing its CF-101 *Voodoos* would become more compelling, given dif-


ferences in radar facilities and speed.

In addition to these three systems that are not yet operational, mention should also be made of the SAM-D (surface-to-air missile), which has already been developed by the U.S. Army. The SAM-D would, in effect, constitute the fourth system in the modernization of the U.S. air-defence system. The SAM-D is a highly-mobile battlefield air-defence weapon, which would serve as a substitute for the high-altitude *Nike Hercules* missiles and the low-altitude *Hawk* missiles to provide a terminal defence of key U.S. complexes.

Political, military factors

The impetus for both the continuation and modernization of NORAD comes from the U.S., not Canada. It is difficult to define clearly Canadian and U.S. considerations regarding NORAD's renewal, owing to the varied and diffuse political and military factors involved.

Politically, suffice it to say that several arguments have been put forward in Canada concerning the advantages and disadvantages of Canadian NORAD par-



NORAD Photo

Radar antennas at one of the outposts in NORAD's Ballistic Missile Early Warning System cast shadows across the Alaskan landscape. These devices throw long radar beams 3,000 miles or more to spot an intercontinental ballistic missile strike

against North America and pass the alert to NORAD's Combat Operations Centre. This BMEWS station at Clear, Alaska, is part of a system with other radar sites at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor in Northern England.

Opponents see
'a defence system
in search
of an enemy'

ticipation. Some might argue that Canadian participation affords Canada access to and influence on the U.S. decision-making process; others, that Canada's participation not only does not yield political benefits but erodes Canadian sovereignty. Still others might argue that Canada should remain in NORAD merely because the political fallout from withdrawal would have a deleterious impact on the overall Canadian-U.S. interaction; others, that it does not really matter from a political standpoint whether Canada does or does not remain in NORAD.

Militarily, there are a multitude of arguments for the continuation of NORAD — for example, the possibility of damage limitation to North American urban-industrial complexes from Soviet manned bombers, prevention of damage from attacks by such nations as mainland China and Cuba, and the assertion that NORAD provides a complete mobile air-defence package. A definite school of thought also exists that maintains that these pro-NORAD arguments are, at best, not particularly compelling and that, at worst, NORAD is a defence system in search of an enemy. Whatever the validity of these "pro" and "con" military arguments, they all revolve about the question: Is there a manned-bomber threat to North America?

In this sense, it is interesting to observe that the August 1971 Canadian White Paper on defence noted a decline in the importance of manned bombers and, accordingly, of defences against them. However, the White Paper also noted that the only major military threat to Canada remained that of a nuclear war between the super-powers. The prevention of such a conflict is, therefore, seen as Canada's overriding defence objective.

As for the United States, it refuses to proceed on any assumption other than that a manned-bomber threat to North America does exist. Indeed, the United States sees its offensive strength — defined as its "retaliatory capability" — as consisting of three components: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. U.S. Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird's fiscal year 1973 net assessment of external threats includes that of the Soviet intercontinental heavy-bomber force, some aircraft of which are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles. This report also notes that the Soviets have test-flown the *Backfire*, a new supersonic, swing-wing, dash bomber, which they "could deploy in significant numbers over the next several years". According to U.S. figures, the United States in mid-1972 has 531 heavy bombers to the Soviets 140 (in addition, the Soviets have 50 tankers).

Previously, the United States had also argued that the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic-missile system (ABM) increased the importance of a bomber force. That is, the ABMs are dependent on a system of radars for locating and destroying incoming hostile missiles. The fact that these radars are vulnerable to attack by long-range bombers makes the requirements for a heavy-bomber defence more, not less, important. However, the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT) limits the deployment of ABM systems. This, correspondingly, then limits the relevance of the heavy-bomber rationale *vis-a-vis* the ABM.

White Paper context

At this point it might be useful to extend the conceptual scope somewhat by placing Canadian-U.S. NORAD considerations within the larger context of the Canadian defence White Paper and the Nixon Doctrine. The Canadian White Paper essentially reaffirmed existing directions: Canada would remain in NORAD through its 1973 renewal date, at which time the strategic situation would be re-examined. The United States would continue to have overflight and refuelling rights, including nuclear-armed flights on airborne alert in times of crisis, rights that the United States regards as essential to North American defence. In addition, the White Paper reiterated Canada's non-involvement in ABM defence, an involvement the United States is not especially interested in.

In addition to reaffirming existing directions, the White Paper revealed two new decisions. First, Canada agreed to open negotiations, requested by the United States, for U.S. interceptor and Strategic Air Command refuelling dispersal-sites in Canada. That is, Canada was willing to discuss the U.S. proposal that U.S. interceptors and SAC refuelling tankers be allowed to disperse to prearranged airfields in Canada, if the Canadian Government concurred in the U.S. estimate that the international situation necessitated such action. Secondly, the White Paper announced that the two anti-bomber nuclear-armed *Bomarc* squadrons, which had been a political liability for three successive Canadian Governments, were to be "retired". From the standpoint of a diplomatic trade-off, the United States attached much greater importance to the dispersal rights than to a continuation of the *Bomarc*s, even though the United States had urged Canada to maintain them until the late 1970s. Indeed, the Canadian decision to retire the *Bomarc*s can be inter-

reted as a political bonus for the United States by enhancing the palatability of the White Paper decision to begin dispersal negotiations. That is, the Canadian public and media were preoccupied with the requirement of the *Bomarc*s rather than with the dispersal negotiations.

In spite of what the White Paper does or does not say, three interrelated shifts of emphasis concerning the Canadian Armed Forces seem — to this observer — to be taking place: (1) in terms of budgetary priorities, defence programs will remain relatively frozen and thus assume a declining percentage of the GNP, while civilian programs will increase; (2) those activities that either conflict with or do not contribute to domestic requirements will be in jeopardy; (3) those roles that the Canadian military does assume will be multiple, with duties, training, equipment and organizational structure aimed at a number of "nation-building" functions.

These shifts of emphasis seem to reflect the underlying assumption that the primary threat to Canada is domestic. The corollary of this assumption is that Canada's relevance in joint defence is not only small but growing smaller, given the stabilization of the international system and technological developments in weaponry. This Canadian emphasis on the domestic picture focuses on possible terrorism in Quebec and on questions of Arctic sovereignty, but goes well beyond that to include all the economic and political problems of a nation of the size and complexity of Canada.

Hence, the three shifts in emphasis regarding civilian programs, complementary domestic-military activities, and multiple roles for the military. Indeed, this assumption of a domestic threat to Canada could be the genesis of the proposition that the greatest contribution Canada can make to Western collective security is to address itself to the domestic scene in Canada. Few U.S. officials would argue with the proposition that the disintegration of Canada would be a major strategic liability for the United States. Parenthetically, it might be noted that, not too long ago, a Canadian Prime Minister was declaring that Canada's first duty to the British Empire was not to disturb the English-French balance in Canada.

Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine, first articulated at Guam in 1969, constitutes a response to the growing imbalance between the scope of America's role and the potential of America's partners". To further quote from President Nixon's February 1971 *Re-*

port to the Congress: "In other countries there was growing strength and autonomy. In our own, there was nascent isolationism in reaction to over-extension." Essentially, the Nixon Doctrine reflects the twofold assumption that a major U.S. international role remains indispensable, but that other nations can and should assume greater international responsibilities. The Nixon Doctrine, therefore, theoretically constitutes an unprecedented post-Second World War response to the demands of the U.S. domestic scene. Thus, both the United States and Canada are embarked on a conceptual course in the 1970s of according increasing priority to domestic factors, notwithstanding changes in administrations. Indeed, the primary question in both countries is not will there be a return to the era of the 1950s and 1960s but will the trend toward domestic priorities culminate in a neo-isolationist era similar to that of the inter-war period.

The Nixon Doctrine, stated most simply, embraces the conception of "burden-sharing." That is, allies of the United States must materially help the United States as the major bearer of the burden of collective security. Although fashioned as a response to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was always meant to include all the U.S. defence interactions, and in fact has been reiterated time and again by the Nixon Administration. However, the most succinct and forceful restatement of the position appeared in President Nixon's dramatic announcement of August 15, 1971, of his New Economic Policy. That announcement contained a sentence that was largely ignored in the acrimonious reaction to the U.S. surcharge: "Now that other nations are economically strong the time has come for them to bear their fair share of the burden of defending freedom around the world."

President Nixon's New Economic Policy reflects an increased emphasis on economic considerations. However, no one in the Nixon Administration is arguing that the U.S. strategic deterrence and alliance system should be given less emphasis. The result — to this observer — could be confusion, so far as alliances tend to become ineffective in an atmosphere of undue international economic disorientation (e.g., the surcharge). In fact, allies can become enemies given that the key U.S. trading partners are generally also the key U.S. allies.

Moreover, the idea of "burden-sharing" itself becomes confusing. Essentially, it reflects the fact that for several years the U.S. defence budget is unlikely to grow substantially. Indeed, it is likely to be reduced. But how acceptable is the notion of

*Result of emphasis
on economic issues
could produce
alliance confusion*

U.S. may find that the limits of 'burden-sharing' have been reached

"burden-sharing" if it means that U.S. allies should do more so that the United States can do less? How realistic is it — whether justified or not — for the U.S. to ask its allies to maintain or increase their defence budgets to cover pre-existing U.S. responsibilities — something the United States is unwilling to do? The point is that the limits of "burden-sharing" may already have been reached. Thus, unless the United States itself is willing to allocate existing or greater budgetary sums to defence projects, these projects are likely to be downgraded or eliminated by default.

As far as Canada is concerned, the primary impact of "burden-sharing" is not that Canada should do more; rather, it is that Canada should not do less. In other words, the "burden-sharing" conception could tend to increase U.S. diplomatic resistance to Canadian reductions in joint defence activities.

The U.S. Government is not unaware of the trend toward East-West *détente*, a trend for which it is largely responsible. Nor is it unaware of the stability of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance, the irrationality of a deliberate attack, and the emergence of a multipolarity in the international system — trends that are noted in the Canadian defence White Paper. However, U.S. optimism over these developments is rather more restrained than that of Canada. Above all, the United States is of the opinion that these developments took place and may proceed only so far as the United States deploys and maintains a level of strategic forces sufficient to ensure the credibility of the Western deterrent. And the only way this credibility can be maintained is for the U.S. to continue to have a second-strike strategic capability.

Détente vs. deterrence

Nor would the Canadian Government disagree with this U.S. analysis. The focal point of possible Canadian-U.S. divergence revolves about the question of how much emphasis should be placed on deterrence and how much on *détente*. The United States, as a nation having profoundly international interests and the primary responsibility for ensuring the credibility of the Western deterrent, not surprisingly places a greater emphasis on deterrence than *détente*. Canada has a lower level of capability, international interests and international responsibilities than does the United States. It is, therefore, not surprising that Canada tends to be more concerned about itself as a united and prosperous nation than its role in either deterrence or *détente*. However, Canada is concerned

about the impact of deterrence and *détente* on the stability of the international system, so far as this stability affects its goals of unity and prosperity. In this light, it is interesting to note that, since the late 1960s, Canada seems to have been placing an increasing emphasis on *détente* rather than deterrence.

In discussing differing Canadian and U.S. approaches, it might be well to note the following: Those divergent Canadian-U.S. attitudes that do exist are not based on a difference of intelligence data. Because Canada has shared in U.S. and British intelligence efforts since the middle 1940s, this is not surprising. In fact, very seldom does Canada challenge U.S. intelligence data. However, it is in the evaluation of this intelligence from the standpoint of motivations and risks that divergent Canadian-U.S. attitudes may occur. In evaluating these data, the United States tends to regard capability and risk as synonymous, while Canada does not. Thus, if the United States concludes that the U.S.S.R. has 140 heavy bombers, it is axiomatic that these bombers constitute a net threat to North America — or, in other words, an increase in the risks to be faced by the U.S. Canada is less categorical, both concerning the validity of U.S. interpretations of Soviet motivations and U.S. responses to perceived external threats.

It is within this context that Canadian and U.S. officials are again grappling with such considerations as the degree of concurrence in their assessments of the air threat to North America and the necessity of air-defence modernization in meeting this threat. It remains to be seen whether 1973 will be, for NORAD, the culmination or continuation of an era of joint defence or a hiatus pending further study.

Whatever the outcome, it is encouraging to note that the rhetorical curtain shrouding Canadian-U.S. divergent attitudes and interests seems to be lifting. The Canadian-U.S. interaction is by now sufficiently mature to acknowledge the fact that it is just as important to examine the limits of Canadian-U.S. common interests as it is to emphasize a consensus of purpose. For, indeed, the Canadian-U.S. interaction is a dialectical combination of both ingredients. It is through a realization of this that NORAD's ambivalent symbolism can be translated into a viable policy option. But, then, this is merely another way of saying that the considerations involved in the negotiations over NORAD's renewal must be grounded in the realities of the Canadian and U.S. national and international experiences.

Increasing stress placed on détente over deterrence since the late 1960s

A hockey series that challenged Canadians' view of themselves

By Douglas Fisher

During Team Canada's first game in Stockholm, a nagging apprehension of mine became real. Nothing much could be done about it. Months before, I and other associates in Hockey Canada had compromised our control and direction of the operation in order to ensure that the U.S.S.R.-Canada hockey series took place.

The apprehension was that the behaviour and performance of the Canadian players and team management might be such as to hurt Canadian relations abroad — that what was stock or usual on our hockey scene would be translated as brutish and unsportsmanlike by foreigners. I was mindful of the reigning themes in our hockey, expressed in such popular aphorisms as "Nice guys don't win" or "If you can't lick them in the alley, you can't beat them on the ice".

Stockholm has a stolid and antiseptic air to it. The Johanneshall rink is spacious. The roominess of its aprons and seating run counter to the roaring, cockpit atmosphere of most hockey rinks. Fans need not stand to see incidents anywhere on the ice. Swedish fans are genteel by our standards. Perhaps the high cost of tickets for the Sweden-Team Canada games accentuated the sense of discretion and propriety which our players quickly challenged with vigorous stick-work, elbows and charging. Shortly after a wild scene in the penalty box area with several Canadian stars gesticulating about the ridiculous nature of their penalties and the incompetence of the referees, Alan Eagleson dropped into a seat beside me. He had been sitting several rows above in the distinguished company of ambassadors and ex-ambassadors.

I asked him if the view was better here. He said no, but he could no longer take his diplomatic neighbours' shocked reaction to the Canadians' play.

Eagleson's last word

Team Canada departed Stockholm for Moscow with Mr. Eagleson having the last word, telling the Swedish press that

Swedes as players and fans were "chicken", leaving the Canadian Embassy with the aftermath.

This is a rather out-of-context preface to a narrative and appreciation of the U.S.S.R.-Canada hockey series of September 1972. It is unusual in its personal emphasis. I use it to bring you quickly to Mr. Eagleson, executive director of the National Hockey League Players Association, because he symbolized for me the spirit and attitude of the Canadian team. It was his operation. He set its pattern.

If the unbelievable rally in Moscow which aroused Canada, if the certain defeat which became last-minute victory, was worth a lot — as millions seemed to think — then Mr. Eagleson deserves the chief credit. If many others abhor the means or some intrinsics in the behaviour which defeated the Russians, then they must ask themselves whether they are in tune with today's Canadianism. As I expressed my hunch in a newspaper column, Mr. Eagleson is probably more the archetypal Canadian than men like Mitchell Sharp and Maurice Strong.

We in Hockey Canada hoped to have a major international sporting event and a national happening of great interest out of the series. We wanted to establish the principle of "open play" between pros and so-called amateurs in international hockey.

Mr. Fisher, Canadian newspaper columnist and television commentator, has had a continuing interest in both amateur and professional sport. He was joint author of the report of the Federal Government's Task Force on Sport in 1969, which recommended changes in Canada's hockey development structure. He is currently chairman of Hockey Canada's executive committee. Before turning to political commentary, Mr. Fisher served for eight years as a federal Member of Parliament. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.



We wanted to make big money for furthering Hockey Canada's programs to improve domestic play. We dreamed that from out of the contrasts in style, training and methods offered by the Russians would come lessons for all stages of hockey in Canada.

Federal role

Success crowned all these hopes and plans. Despite this, other complications, including the tendency to ambivalence about Mr. Eagleson and Team Canada's behaviour, have given everyone I know in Hockey Canada reason to ponder the future of hockey in Canada and elsewhere, and to re-examine the role the Federal Government may play or should play.

In hockey we do not manifest ourselves as the fair, peaceable, high-minded neutrals projected by men like the late Vincent Massey and Norman Robertson. Some outline of the career of Alan Eagleson may explain this generalization, which most of those who have taken an interest in international affairs would tend to dismiss as unimportant because international sport has only peripheral importance.

Mr. Eagleson is 39 years old. His parents were Irish Protestant immigrants, his father a long-time shop steward and union activist in a Toronto factory. The young Eagleson was a sports enthusiast but a good physique and quickness were not enough to counter smallness and jerky coordination. By the time he reached university he had settled for managing teams rather than playing. At the University of Toronto his classmates came to know him as mercurial and bright, never as interested in good marks or in law as a scholarly field as he was in politics, contacts and mixing with people.

Mr. Eagleson became a public figure as a Conservative candidate in York West in the federal election of 1963. He lost heavily (and ironically) to the Liberal candidate, Red Kelly, the fine hockey star of Detroit and Maple Leaf fame. At this time the young lawyer was just emerging as the first major agent for professional athletes in Canada. The trend that brought lawyers into bargaining positions for players with owners began to run strongly in the Fifties in the United States during the war between the National Football League and the American Football League.

The huge sums won by high "draft" choices agitated the veteran players into a militancy that turned hitherto bland players' associations in baseball and football into aggressive groups with a willingness to strike in order to get improvements in contracts from owners. This militancy

was transferred to the National Hockey League Players Association, which, as a player-run group, had not made much headway with the owners.

In autumn 1963, Mr. Eagleson won the provincial riding of Lakeshore for the Conservatives. He held the seat for only one term, losing in 1967. One of the partisan charges against him in the latter campaign was that he was spending too much time as a wheeler-dealer in sport, not enough in the Legislature and at riding chores.

It was in this period that Mr. Eagleson established his ascendancy as the head of the NHL Players Association. In 1966 he had tied his fortunes to the brightest hockey prospect in generations, Bobby Orr. He dickered with Boston for the first professional contract of this Parry Sound boy. The NHL was a six-team league in 1966; the next year it began to expand, opening up "a players' market".

The first expansion of six teams affronted Canadian nationalism, particularly in Vancouver. All the new franchises were sold to U.S. cities. While Vancouver was admitted two years later (along with Buffalo), one consequence of its first failure was a deepening nationalist antagonism to the NHL. There were increasing complaints that the NHL dominated all levels of hockey in Canada but was more and more an American entertainment enterprise.

Nationalistic pressure usually finds its focus on the Federal Government. British Columbia ministers and MP were demanding action, noting that federal funds had helped build an arena in Vancouver suitable for major league hockey. There was a broad feeling that the NHL held all hockey players 16 years old and older in peonage to a foreign sports industry.

Mr. Eagleson raised another issue with the Federal Government, asking for the abolition of the "reserve clause", the traditional means in American pro sports by which leagues and teams owned and controlled players.

Election promise

Out of this dissatisfaction came the Pierre Trudeau election promise, made in B.C., to have sport examined and to develop a stronger federal role in sport than had followed the passage of the National Fitness and Amateur Sport Act in 1960. After the election, a Task Force on Sport, chaired by Harold Rea, a Toronto Businessman, was named. It was to make a quick report, announcing its recommendations in May 1969. One of the concerns it tackled was the limping fortunes of the imaginative

*Events have forced
a re-examination
of Ottawa's role*

Bauer concept". Any understanding of how the 1972 series with the U.S.S.R. came about depends on an appreciation of this noble failure.

Father David Bauer is a member of the noted hockey-playing family from Kitchener. He had been an outstanding coach at St. Michael's College in Toronto. In the early Sixties he had become disturbed by the growing domination of Soviet teams in international hockey and he challenged the values reigning in junior hockey with its emphasis on honing only the very best for pro career.

Father Bauer believed there should be another avenue open to boys who played hockey, particularly one which gave primacy to education and to nationalism. Rather than challenging or outflanking rules which forbade Canadian national teams to use professionals, Father Bauer planned a national "team-in-being", at a fixed place, with a permanent coach and in association with a university. He won backing for his idea from the federal Health and Welfare Department's Fitness and Sports Directorate, the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association, and from many prominent men, especially in Western Canada.


The CAHA is a federation, the parent body for all amateur hockey in Canada. It held, and holds, the right of representation in the IIHF. The IIHF has been master-minded since the 1930s by its permanent secretary and treasurer and oftimes president, Bunny Ahearne, a London travel agent.

The "Bauer concept" almost worked. The Canadian national team came close to beating the Russians and the other two European hockey powers, Sweden and Czechoslovakia, both at the annual world tournament and at the Winter Olympics. Father Bauer, working with the CAHA, had to scramble for players. A deepening antagonism toward this initiative came from the NHL, growing out of what that league considered interference with its control of players. Burgeoning costs made it more difficult for the CAHA and private friends of the national team to carry on. One of the underwriters, the Federal Government, kept hearing complaints that Canada was never going to win this way, that our national honour as hockey's creators and best practitioners was being forfeited in the name of an idealistic but unsuccessful project.

Task Force proposal

The Task Force on Sport recommended that the Federal Government sponsor the creation of a new body, Hockey Canada.

This non-profit corporation, with representation from all the major hockey interests in Canada, was to have a dual purpose: first, to manage Canadian representation in international tournaments; secondly, to take steps to improve the standards and skills of domestic hockey.



Canada's Phil Esposito—PM for a series

Health and Welfare Minister John Munro accepted this recommendation, guaranteed it federal financial backing until it could raise funds privately and encouraged the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association to devolve its responsibilities and debts regarding the national team on Hockey Canada. The "Bauer concept" was not dead. Rather it had been put in a larger frame, the hope being that greater co-operation from the NHL representation in Hockey Canada would open up a better player supply for the national team.

By early summer of 1969, Hockey Canada was under way, describing itself as an "umbrella organization for Canadian hockey". On its directorate were nominees from the CAHA, the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Association, the NHL Players Association (i.e. Alan Eagleson), the three Canadian teams in the NHL and men from sport and business with a deep interest in the game, including federal nominees.

The CAHA signed a contract with Hockey Canada. The latter took over the national team, including its debts. While the CAHA did not give up its representation in the International Ice Hockey Federation—it's doubtful if it could have transferred this to Hockey Canada—it agreed to work in concert with Hockey Canada and federal authorities.

The first aim was to get approval from the IIHF for the use of pro players in the world tournament. These, everyone

The Bauer concept was not dead but rather put in larger frame

agreed, were our "best". The three Canadian NHL team leaders and Clarence Campbell, the veteran, Montreal-based president of the NHL, guaranteed their cooperation. So did Mr. Eagleson, who by this time was the leading agent for hockey players as well as the chief actor in affairs of the NHL Players Association.

The panels of Hockey Canada's umbrella, despite their differing textures, agreed in the determination to assert Canadian supremacy by icing a "national"

team which would include the Orrs and Esposito of the NHL.

World tourney lost

The first assay of Hockey Canada was diplomatic. The triennial meeting of the IIHF was held in Switzerland in July 1969. There was a narrow failure to get free use of pro players. The compromise resolution would have permitted Canada to use nine non-NHL pros on its national team, then preparing for the 1970 World Tourna-



Canadian Press Photo

Paul Henderson, who scored the winning goal for Canada in the tense eighth game of the series, got an uproarious welcome on his return. He is pictured waving to thousands massed in Toronto's

downtown square as he is held aloft by goalie Tony Esposito (left) and Alan Eagleson, ubiquitous executive director of the NHL Players Association.

ment, scheduled for the first time in Canada. Late in 1969 the U.S.S.R. forced a review of the compromise, arguing convincingly to spokesmen for countries like Sweden and Finland that playing against such a Canadian team would jeopardize the eligibility of their best players for the 1972 Sapporo Olympics.

Mr. Ahearne agreed with the Russians and, in January 1970, Canada was faced with the choice of giving up the tournament and missing revenues of some \$600,000 or giving up its use of the pros as agreed to in Switzerland. Hockey Canada, after consultation with the CAHA and Mr. Munro, stood firm, lost the tournament, and refused to send a team to the new locale in Sweden.

Shortly afterward the national "team-in-being" was disbanded. From April 1970, Hockey Canada persisted in efforts to get the IIHF to change its ruling on pros. At the same time it approached the U.S.S.R., Sweden and Czechoslovakia with proposals for round-robin exhibition series in which Canada would use pros.

Annual draft

The killing of the tournament was especially hurtful in Winnipeg, one of the host cities and the base for the Bauer "team-in-being". The team would have been hard to sustain without any international competition in sight. Aside from that drawback, the expansion of the NHL was creating a mark-up in salaries and opportunities for hockey players with which educational scholarships and mere national representation could hardly compete.

In passing, we should note that out of the Task Force recommendations came an abandonment of the "amateur" farm system of the NHL in Canada and the institution of an annual draft of 20-year-old players. The draft payments went from the NHL to the amateur clubs through which the drafted players had developed. In 1972, this figure reached \$1.3 million. Of course, by this time, the NHL was doing an annual business of more than \$80 million and its new franchises were costing the successful bidders \$6 million each.

While a Hockey Canada-CAHA-federal troika, headed by President Charles Hay of Hockey Canada, worked on the Europeans for games with a team made up of our pros, Mr. Eagleson and his association had contracted with the NHL owners that neither group would enter international hockey competition unilaterally. Indeed, for several years Mr. Eagleson ranged around Europe trying on his own to set up a series between the NHL players and the Russians.

Mr. Hay believed that co-operation from the Europeans would become a fact once the '72 Winter Olympics were over. He was right. In April 1972, during the world tournament in Prague, the Soviet sports leaders formally agreed to an eight-game series for September, four games in Canada, four in Moscow. Canada could play anyone it wanted.

No sooner was the coup announced than it became apparent that the NHL owners, particularly the American ones, were much less enthusiastic about the series than was Mr. Eagleson. He used his bond with the players to dragoon the recalcitrant owners into line. One of his persuasive arguments was that half the net revenues of the series would go to supplement the NHL players' pension fund.

The achievement of Russian approval coincided with the appearance in substantial form of a new professional grouping, the World Hockey Association. This impudent rival to the NHL was sponsored by the American entrepreneurs who had launched the American Basketball Association. The WHA committed itself to the placing of four of its 12 franchises in Canada. The WHA insisted it would operate without a reserve clause. This meant a "player war" with the NHL and a fantastic bidding-up of salaries and the value of players as properties. These grand vistas for players were welcomed by the players' champion, Mr. Eagleson. If the NHL owners wished some stability in their labour force during their war with the WHA they needed, at the least, Mr. Eagleson's neutrality. This he gave in a general way and he did not antagonize the NHL by signing many of his own clients to WHA contracts.

Throughout the negotiations planned and completed by Mr. Hay with the Soviets, it had been understood by all the elements in Hockey Canada that the players for the September series would come from the NHL. Mr. Campbell agreed with this. So did Mr. Eagleson. It was also understood that team selection and management would be in the hands of men chosen with the advice of the NHL. It was agreed that Harry Sinden, a former coach of the Boston team, was the best man available to manage, choose and coach the team.

Hockey Canada, through Mr. Hay, conceded that Mr. Sinden should have complete control of the team side of the series. He would be accountable to Hockey Canada only for spending. Hockey Canada would arrange the series in matters involving tickets, television, radio, the U.S.S.R. team arrangements in Canada, the ancillary functions, the refereeing, and the tour in Europe, including a training

*American owners
less enthused;
bolstered fund
used as argument*

session and games in Sweden and a game or games in Czechoslovakia.

Eagleson in control

Unfortunately Mr. Hay took sick shortly after Mr. Sinden was named as manager-coach. Before his future contribution could be determined, Mr. Eagleson took over effective control of the team side of the operation, naming it Team Canada and hiring the trainers and other personnel, choosing hotel and travel arrangements. In effect, Mr. Eagleson, not Mr. Sinden, became the leader of the team. This initiative, quite unexpected by both Hockey Canada and NHL leaders, was given a further force when the time came for consideration of TV contracts for the series.

As a director of Hockey Canada, Mr. Eagleson disagreed with the tentative arrangements it had made to sell the TV rights to "Hockey Night in Canada" for \$500,000. When he was challenged to find better alternatives, he asked for time. He constituted a non-profit company in concert with Harold Ballard, owner of the Maple Leaf Gardens and another Hockey Canada director. Their company guaranteed Hockey Canada a minimum of \$750,000 for the North American TV and radio rights to the series. The offer had to be accepted, and, given the pervasive influence of TV on hockey arrangements, it put another aspect of series arrangements in Mr. Eagleson's control. The steering committee of Hockey Canada created because of Mr. Hay's illness had Mr. Eagleson as a participant.

Before the team members were announced in early July, Mr. Campbell had reminded Hockey Canada and Mr. Eagleson that the owners understood that candidates for the team must have signed contracts for the next season with their NHL team before they came to Team Canada's training camp. Bobby Hull, one of the ablest and most popular NHL players, had defected from the Chicago NHL team to the Winnipeg entry of the WHA in late June. The whole WHA had underwritten Mr. Hull's massive signing bonus and salary in order to gain the credibility for excellence which he gave to the new league.

Mr. Sinden named his 35 "best" players and included Bobby Hull. A national uproar followed when it was made clear by Hockey Canada that Hull would not be acceptable unless he was signed to a 1972-73 contract with his old club. This seemed to contradict Hockey Canada's much mooted objective of icing "our best". In Western Canada especially, it was seen as another example of NHL domination of Canadian hockey.

As chairman of the *ad hoc* steering committee for the series, I knew there would be a national hue and cry over the Hull matter if we honoured our understanding with the NHL. If we insisted that Hull should play, we would lose many of the other players whom Sinden had named. Mr. Eagleson could not guarantee that he could provide an excellent team even from his own 25 clients. The best of the latter Bobby Orr, was a doubtful starter because of a knee operation.

Hockey Canada decided after a long internal debate, political interventions from the Prime Minister and strong disagreement from a minority of its directors to go only with NHL players. The decision was most unpopular with the Canadian public, weakening further Hockey Canada's none too strong reputation.

While the Hull decision was still a public controversy, Mr. Eagleson and his team leaders, including Mr. Sinden, took off for Moscow and Stockholm to line up details on the series, including television coverage, percentages and practice arrangements in the Soviet Union and Sweden. This tour confirmed that he was the executive at the core of almost every important aspect of the series. His leadership was confirmed by the mix of awe and affection which the sporting press of Canada held for him. Most of Hockey Canada's small cadre of permanent people did not qualify as "snowbankers", that is, genuine hockey buffs. And as Clarence Campbell has lamented: "If you're not a snowbanker, you don't rate among Canadian hockey people and fans."

Mr. Eagleson is a fast talker, a fast thinker, one of the best natural salesmen and traders I have ever met. Metaphorically, he was at the throttle of the series juggernaut; we were passengers, waiting to straighten up the accounts after it was all over.

Mr. Eagleson and Mr. Sinden were convinced that the Soviet team would be well-beaten in all eight games. They brushed aside any suggestions from some of us in Hockey Canada that they should consult with those who had played and coached against the Russians. We were told with some disdain to "Leave it to the pros" or "Don't burden us with bushers." Team Canada was not to be a "chintzy operation". It was to be "first-class all the way" for the 35 players and the other 15 people required to keep them happy and going. All was to befit the best players in the world.

Clearly, here was a man and team heading for a fall, almost deserving it in their cockiness. When the team assembled

*Barring of Hull
produced uproar
after NHL star
on '35-best' list*

and began its exhibition schedules I realized how in tune with the players Mr. Eagleson was. We began to call him "Big Bird". The players were generally rough and ready, like teen-agers in their enthusiasms and interests; essentially simple men of instinct, not highly rational. Lusty, capricious, fun-loving and proud, quick to anger, always ready to belly-laugh and clown.

I feel one must note these boyish and unsophisticated qualities of Team Canada, to understand the shock and trauma that it suffered when the Soviet team won two and tied one of the four games in Canada to the accolades of many Canadians, enthused by the Russian speed and pattern-passing. The booing of Team Canada by the Vancouver crowd in the last game in Canada capped the shock. It was a shaken group that went off to Stockholm for a week which had been promised long before as fun and practice before the grimness of Moscow and the link-up there with wives and girl-friends.


What renewed old Swedish charges that Canadians were hockey barbarians was a Gethsemane for Mr. Eagleson and the team. Some of the stars were disaffected because they were not being played. Some players were carousing day and night. Others were terribly determined to recover their pride with a comeback in Russia. The Canadian reporters in Stockholm were dismayed by the team performance there, on and off the ice. The Soviet success had been traumatic for the reporters, almost all of whom had anticipated a Canadian romp. Everyone at home knew Team Canada was in trouble.

The scenario promised to unfold on further disaster in Moscow. One alleviating factor was apparent at once. The group of 3,000-odd Canadians in Moscow for the series brought with it a noisy, militant spirit, all out for the team and determined to cheer it on to victory.

Osmosis of spirit

While the Soviets won the first game in Moscow with a surprising, late comeback, they had been outplayed for most of the game. Four players from Team Canada reneged on the series and went home. Mr. Eagleson welcomed these defections: "Now we're getting down to the guys who care." The tactics on the ice stressed more and more what NHL players do best: tough checking, lots of body contact, challenges to the referees, scramble pressure-plays with lots of shooting. The goal-tending for Team Canada was excellent. There was an osmosis of spirit from the busy, colourful, cheering Canadian fans.

Team Canada turned it around with



Canadian Press photo

Team Canada's Coach Harry Sinden

three hard-won victories in a row. Any neutral would agree that they were outplayed in two of the three victories. Breaks, great goal-tending and magnificent opportunism in front of the net did the job. But the most marvellous quality of the team on the ice was simply absolute determination.

Few of us in Moscow — certainly not Mr. Eagleson and the team — really knew how the entire country at home was roused and watching. That realization didn't sink in until they saw the big crowds in Montreal and Toronto to welcome them.

It seems to me that it is stupid to press one's shame too far over the excesses of the players and Messrs Eagleson and Sinden in challenging the authority of the referees and in denigrating the Soviet sports officials.

Of course, the blasts at Soviet society, the maudlin assertions that "We played for democracy" or "We know now what democracy is" were juvenile. I won't forget Mrs. Eagleson, distraught at her husband's seizure by the police, screaming at the Russians around us: "We'll never come back to this bloody dictatorship."

Balance this excess against the long

pumping up to high pressure and tension which a desperate Mr. Eagleson and his colleagues had turned to in order to inculcate the determination to win. As one of the Team Canada doctors said to me the morning after the big win: "This is a powerful country with tough people and a harsh system. They'll respect what the Canadian players and fans have shown here in Moscow. We are not Nice Nellies. We are direct, crude and emotional, easily arrogant, even more easily bitchy and complaining, cherishing a sense of grievance. Before you and others crawl away and hide because of the embarrassment Eagleson and his antics have caused you, think it over: Is there any other way we could have done it and won?"

My answer is no, there was no other way, given the similarity in attitudes and values between Mr. Eagleson, Mr. Sinden and most of the players. Their world is a simplistic, emotional one; it is also a very fast-moving one.

Even the self-discovery out of this series that we are among the roughnecks of the world may be useful. There isn't a politician of my acquaintance in Canada who doesn't know that hockey is one of the deepest common denominators we have.

They know, even as the critics such as Dr. Wilder Penfield know, that in the recent series we shared an experience which has turned into a challenge of a long-held view of ourselves. I don't discount the eventual victory with public opinion for the critics of Alan Eagleson. Indeed, by his excesses he has made a future role for himself in international hockey doubtful. The NHL owners may never forgive him. Certainly, they'll never again approve an arrangement which will let him run the whole show. They have had the merit of their product jeopardized. They will resist future contributions to a Canadian "national team". They will go after encounters with the Russians and the other European countries on a basis of club teams against club teams. The Russians will not be anxious to deal with Mr. Eagleson again. Thus we are likely to be left with the memory of a one-shot, unique happening with most of it on our side under the aegis of Mr. Eagleson.

International sport, especially the Olympics, has always had a contradiction in it. The idealists theorize sweetly about the bridging and brotherhood accomplished by the contests and the association of athletes from different countries, unsullied by political motivation. All the while this "the game's the thing" is touted, the emphasis has kept building on winning, win-

International sport poses contradiction between brotherhood, 'game's the thing'



Canadian Press photo

Defenceman Bill White, laden with badges

ning for national pride, medal totals and point scores. Now we Canadians have shared in this contradiction and found victory most important.

Meanwhile, Hockey Canada and the parts of it are reconsidering the future. What can we do with an even more germane contradiction? Our major sporting interest involves hundreds and thousands of households, it pervades almost every city, town and village in Canada. But where does the interest lead? Still... to the United States for rewards and glory.

How do we be our own in hockey when the apex of our huge base triangle in hockey is overwhelmingly American in ownership and finances? And much as we know the renewal of a series such as the last one with the Soviets would excite Canada again, they are almost certain to be rare so long as foreigners call the tune. And this brings us back to Alan Eagleson. Now and in potential, he is the only one with the leverage — because almost all the players are still Canadian — to force the re-creation of the Team Canada idea.

After 25 years of hostility – the Korean freeze may melt

By D. Gordon Longmuir

Just over a year has passed since the Red Cross societies of North and South Korea agreed to meet to discuss the question of the reunion of ten million Korean families separated by almost 25 years of division. That agreement, and the political decisions in Seoul and Pyongyang that made it possible, set in motion a series of events which were to mark, in the following year, a profound change in the relationship between the mutually-antipathetic regimes in North and South.

In August 1945, with the end of the Second World War, liberation came to Korea after 40 years of Japanese domination. Under the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, Korea was to be granted independence "in due course". In the meantime, it was agreed that all Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel should surrender to the Soviet Command, while those in the South surrendered to the Americans. The division created by this allegedly administrative decision, frozen by the advent of the "Cold War", led to the establishment of two rival regimes: in the North the Communist Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and in the South the Republic of Korea, its government chosen in what were termed "reasonably free" elections under United Nations supervision in May 1948 and aligned with the Western powers. The destructive, and ultimately futile, Korean War of 1950-53 served to harden attitudes on both sides and to perpetuate the partition; it also had the global side-effect of placing China and the United Nations in an adversary position that was to endure for 20 years.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, North and South concentrated on reconstructing their shattered economies. The North had the advantage of being the industrial heartland of Korea, possessing the bulk of that country's mineral resources and having only about one-quarter of the total population. The more conservative, agricultural South, with its denser population, was forced to depend very heavily on aid from the United States and other

Western countries. The South Korean economy began to recover rapidly in the Sixties, however, and grew at an average rate of more than 10 per cent a year from 1961 to 1970.

Hostility flares

The open hostility which had lain rather dormant since the end of the Korean War manifested itself again sporadically between 1966 and 1969, when increased infiltration across the military demarcation line and shooting incidents in the demilitarized zone resulted in casualties on both sides. In January 1968, a carefully-planned raid was mounted by heavily-armed North Korean agents, who managed to enter Seoul with the apparent objective of storming the Presidential Palace and assassinating President Park Chung-hee. This so-called "Blue House raid" was overshadowed in the international press by the capture by North Korea of the United States intelligence vessel *Pueblo* and the subsequent shooting-down of an American reconnaissance aircraft.

With the apparent realization on the part of the North Koreans that this type of provocation was not a particularly effective formula for unifying the country on its terms, hostile activity slowed down late in 1969, and the infiltration rate dropped significantly. At the same time, Premier Kim Il-song, "the sun of the Korean nation and great leader of the revolution", began to make tentative proposals for peaceful contacts between North and South. At the same time, North Korea began a vigorous campaign to establish its international legitimacy at least on a par with that of the Republic of Korea. The R.O.K., understandably, was cautious about responding, and it was not until August 1971 that the contacts took place, in the form of the first "preliminary" meeting of

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the two Red Cross Societies at Panmunjom. "Talks about talks" continued fitfully throughout the autumn and winter and into 1972. These were held in the headquarters of the moribund Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and saw modest breakthroughs, such as a telephone link across the 38th Parallel and agreement on the broad lines that primarily humanitarian talks should follow.

North-South communique

In May and June 1972, apparently at the initiative of the R.O.K., secret negotiations were held in Seoul and Pyongyang — the first ever between officials of the two governments. These resulted in the surprise announcement of July 4 of a joint North-South communique stating, in summary, that, in an effort to "remove the misunderstanding and mistrust and mitigate increased tensions that have arisen between South and North as a result of long separation . . .", the two sides agreed:

- (a) to expedite reunification through independent efforts with no outside imposition or interference, renouncing the use of force, and recognizing that "national unity transcends ideology";
- (b) that both sides would refrain from provocations, armed or otherwise;
- (c) that exchanges "in many fields" would be established;
- (d) to seek early success in the Red Cross talks for the reunion of families;
- (e) to establish a "hot-line" between Seoul and Pyongyang; and
- (f) to establish a South-North Co-ordinating Committee, co-chaired by the two officials who negotiated the communique, Lee Hu Rak, Director of the R.O.K. CIA and Kim Yong Joo, Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the (North) Korean Workers Party.

It rapidly became evident that the interpretations of the communique by North and South differed in several respects. For example, the R.O.K. chose not to regard the United Nations presence in South Korea as "external imposition or interference", whereas Pyongyang continued its efforts to have all the UN activities in Korea halted. Nevertheless, the hot-line was established, and preliminary talks of the Co-ordinating Committee have begun.

August start

In the meantime, the Red Cross talks, encouraged no doubt by the terms of the July 4 communique, suddenly picked up momentum, and agreement was reached that substantive negotiations should begin in August. Late in July, the North Koreans proposed that the first meeting be held on

August 5. This suggestion, to the apparent surprise of Pyongyang, was immediately accepted by the R.O.K. Red Cross. It then became evident that Pyongyang was not quite ready to begin after all, and after further procedural discussion and some concessions, particularly on the part of the South, it was agreed that the first "substantial" meeting should be held in Pyongyang on August 30. Accordingly, 54 South Koreans, including "7 delegates, 7 alternates, 20 attendants and 20 newsmen", crossed into North Korea at the end of August for four days in Pyongyang. Only an hour or two was spent in the largely ceremonial opening talks. The visit was reciprocated (also by a party of exactly 54), when the North Koreans visited Seoul from September 12 to 16. The proceedings were again mainly limited to "ribbon-cutting", although several hours were required by a working group to agree on an agenda for the next meeting. The subsequent meeting of October 24 and November 22 have gone on to more substantial work, but progress is slow.

All of these rather startling developments must not be viewed *in vacuo*. The reasons behind the attempts on both sides of the 38th Parallel to reach a *modus vivendi* in the Korean peninsula are closely related to external events. Both Pyongyang and Seoul are well aware of the atmosphere of *detente* all around them in Asia. Japan has established normal relations with China; the United States has moved some distance in the same direction. Japan and the United States are each intent on improving political and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. The Cold War atmosphere in Korea has begun to look more and more anachronistic, and both North and South have received encouragement from their respective allies to get on with a peaceful settlement of their problems.

Rivalry for recognition

Nevertheless, 25 years of suspicion, hostility, and all-out war are obviously impossible to eradicate overnight. The intense rivalry between Pyongyang and Seoul for international recognition continues, and for many years each side, claiming to be the only legitimate government of Korea, has exercised a Korean version of the Hallstein Doctrine: neither would maintain full diplomatic relations with any country having such relations with the other.

The North Koreans tended to be the losers in such a process. Recently they have begun openly to court countries, especially in the "Third World", which already have

Seoul differed with Pyongyang on interpretation of July communique



—Wide World Photo

The first full-dress talks between North Korea and South Korea opened in Pyongyang at the end of August. In line with a North-South understanding announced in July, this four-day session was to deal initially with reunification

of families, but much of the meeting was ceremonial in nature. Before sessions began, Lee Bum-suk (left), chief delegate for the Republic of Korea, was greeted by his North Korean counterpart, Kim Tae-hee. Behind Lee are South Korean delegates.

relations with the R.O.K. There are signs that the R.O.K., too, may be showing some flexibility on this question, but the problem has not yet come to a head except in Chile, where its ambassador was withdrawn (but the embassy retained) in response to the Chilean announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. The North Korean regime has shown interest in increasing its trade and other relations with Western countries, including some close allies of the R.O.K., such as Japan, Australia and Canada. It has opened trade offices in France, Switzerland and Austria and there are prospects of success in its efforts to establish closer relations with the Scandinavian countries. All told, the R.O.K. enjoys diplomatic relations with about 85 countries, North Korea with 36 countries, and both governments have consular or trade officers in several capitals, including New Delhi, Islamabad and Singapore.

Although both sides are committed to working for unification, they have very different ideas as to how this should be achieved. North Korea's leaders wish immediate political negotiations: (a) to agree on the removal of the United Nations presence in South Korea, especially U.S. forces under the UN Command, and (b) to set up a "confederation" under which both "halves" would co-exist — each retaining its own political system, with ever-increasing integration at the social and economic levels.

R.O.K. position

The R.O.K. has adhered largely to demands based on the principles set out in the UN resolution of 1947 calling for democratic and representative government established in free, UN-supervised elections throughout Korea, proportional to the population in the North and South. The R.O.K. also calls for continuation of UN

*The old arguments
on UN presence
had no effect
on Korean problem*

activities in Korea until there is genuine progress toward peaceful unification. At the same time, it denounces "manoeuvring" by outsiders to perpetuate the division of Korea by such formulas as two Korean memberships in the United Nations.

The main forums in which the views of North and South Korea have been aired over the years have been the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom (the UN Command on one side, its spokesman a U.S. General, and the Korean People's Army/ Chinese People's Volunteers on the other, its spokesman a North Korean General) and the UN General Assembly.

The United Nations has been involved in Korea since 1947, when a UN Temporary Commission was set up to establish machinery for nation-wide elections. It soon became apparent that the Soviet Union would not permit UNTCK to operate in the North. In the end, elections were held in South Korea only, and the United Nations recognized the Republic of Korea as the only legal government in Korea. In 1950, the UN Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established to report to the UN General Assembly on the situation in the peninsula. UNCURK was composed of Australia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Chile and Pakistan. Chile resigned from the Commission in 1971 and Pakistan has long been an "inactive" member. Since 1966, UNCURK has been required only to submit its report to the Secretary-General. However, the inscription each year by allies of North Korea of items calling for the withdrawal

of all foreign forces from the South and the disbanding of UNCURK forced the Secretary-General to inscribe the UNCURK report as a separate item. The annual debate on the question of Korea thus dredged up all the old arguments for and against a UN presence in Korea — a process that was not only time-consuming but had no positive effect whatever in settling the Korean problem.

An important side-issue was the procedural question of invitations to both North and South Korea to participate without vote in the debate. The R.O.K. has observer status in the UN, and had traditionally been invited unconditionally to attend the debate in the First Committee and the General Assembly. North Korea, on the other hand, was invited only on condition that it accepted the "competence and authority" of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question. The R.O.K. in the past two years has been willing to accept a "non-discriminatory" invitation resolution, but has so far balked at an unconditional invitation to North Korea.

Debate deferred in UN

To the great relief of the majority of UN members, a motion was passed at the twentieth-sixth General Assembly in 1971 and again this year at the twenty-seventh session deferring debate on the Korean items until the following year. Proponents of the motion have cited the progress being made in the bilateral Red Cross talks and, this year, took into account the government-to-government contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang.

. . . The political and strategic picture of Asia is changing and, however reluctantly, North Korea is finding itself compelled to change its attitude toward the outside world as well.

A doughty champion of the old-fashioned cold war, the North — like the South — is finding that the major powers have changed the nature and the rules of the game.

South Korea, a ranking diehard of anti-communism, has been rocked by the United States-China *détente*. The North has been shaken no less by the advent of the pingpong season in China, by Dr. Henry Kissinger's journeys to Moscow and Peking and by President Richard Nixon's fruitful visits with Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev. Like

other small countries in either camp, North Korea is finding it difficult to insulate itself from the strong new currents in big-power relations.

The lesson of the pingpong interlude was not lost in Pyongyang. North Korea could not remain bellicose when at every other point on the map, the two rival camps were coming closer. Thus, Pyongyang's campaign since the late spring of 1971 to change its image, win friends and influence decisions

(Excerpt from an assessment of North Korea Premier Kim Il Sung's regime by Mark Gayn, who has just returned from a six-year roving assignment in Asia for the Toronto Star; published in The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 1, 1972).

Progress in the North-South negotiations is likely to be slow; full reunification of the peninsula remains a tenuous objective rather than a potential reality in the foreseeable future. The hopes of the Korean people have been raised by the renewed contacts, and it is likely that they will continue, concentrating first on humanitarian questions and later on economic and cultural relations (trade, sports exchanges). North Korea is doing its utmost to "politicize" the Red Cross talks, but the R.O.K. is playing a very cautious game, insisting upon gradual progress.

It is in the interests of those countries having friendly relations with the R.O.K. to encourage the process, recognizing that there still remains a high degree of mutual suspicion and hostility between Seoul and Pyongyang. Precipitate moves toward

Pyongyang or overt suggestions of a "two-Korea" policy, either in the bilateral or multilateral context, could be damaging to the delicate balance now prevailing in the peninsula. There is cause for rejoicing that the glacier appears to be moving, but the process will be a long one, bearing in mind the profound ideological and structural differences to be overcome between North and South as well as the divergent influences and interests of Korea's powerful neighbours. The communique of July 4 speaks of the aim of all Koreans to seek "a great national unity . . . transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems"; if Korean nationalism can transcend the differences in ideology between Seoul and Pyongyang it will be a unique accomplishment.

Canada and the Korean War: The boundaries of diplomacy

By Denis Stairs

Canadian security policies are prone to quick births and slow deaths. Born in times of urgent peril and crisis, when there are premiums on haste, they die in periods of tranquillity, the victims of indifference, neglect and the infirmities of old age. In their middle years, they are sustained as much by inertia as by purpose — creatures partly of genuine perceptions of external menace, but partly too of static habits of decision-making and unchallenged habits of mind.

The most recent crisis to generate spurts of major innovation in Canada's external affairs was not, as some are wont to suppose, the coming to power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as Prime Minister in 1968, or even the appointment in 1963 of Paul Hellyer as Minister of National Defence. Nor was it the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; nor any of the peacekeeping episodes of the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was instead the outbreak of the Korean War, which in Ottawa and other capitals in the West served to confirm and entrench, where it did not actually create, alarming perceptions of the Soviet Union and its "satellites" as aggressively hostile powers, ominous and threatening, not only politi-

cally but militarily as well. The members of the North Atlantic pact, hitherto an alliance in support more of morale than of military capabilities, looked accordingly to the expansion of their armies, and Canada's was among them.

In the winter of 1950-51, the Federal Government embarked upon a program of military expenditures that was to cost \$5 billion over three years. On its completion, the Canadian defence establishment had assumed dimensions that it was to maintain without major change for nearly two

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decades. This, taken together with the range and intensity of the policy community's rapidly-expanding linkages with other members of the alliance (notably the United States) and the strength and persistence of its perceptions of hostile Soviet intent, set parameters to the conduct of Canada's external relations which have begun only recently to display the symptoms of senility, weakening and giving way under the pressure of changing conditions abroad.

Of these latter transformations, the current advances in negotiations between the governments of North and South Korea are both a symbol and a part. But they are a reminder, too, of the only occasion since 1945 on which Canadian armed forces have been despatched abroad for the explicit purpose of combat. Canada's role in the diplomacy of the Korean War may thus warrant brief review.

Hardening of division

In the spring of 1950, the Korean peninsula was divided into two parts along the 38th Parallel, a politically convenient but economically and topographically meaningless boundary that had been established as the demarcation line between the American and Soviet zones of occupation at the end of the war with Japan. The failure of the occupation authorities to agree on procedures for the creation of a unified and independent Korean state, and the differences in their respective policies of occupation, had resulted (as in Germany) in a hardening of the division between the two sectors.

In the autumn of 1947 the Americans, as a last resort, had raised the matter in the United Nations General Assembly, and at their request a Temporary Commission on Korea had been charged with the task of supervising an election throughout the peninsula as a prelude to unification and independence. The Commission, of which Canada was a member, was denied effective access to the Soviet zone and, much to the disgust of Prime Minister Mackenzie King (whose opposition to Canada's involvement in the Commission's proceedings had generated for a time a major crisis within the Canadian Cabinet), it had ultimately decided to accede to an American proposal that it proceed with elections in the South alone. There duly emerged an administration under the leadership of Dr. Syngman Rhee, and it was followed in August 1948 by the transfer of governmental functions from the American occupation authorities to what was now described as the "Republic of Korea". Shortly thereafter the Soviets had administered

elections of their own, constructing in the area north of the 38th Parallel a "People's Democratic Republic". In December the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution declaring:

that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.

The resolution also created a new United Nations Commission on Korea, of which Canada was not this time a member. It was directed to continue the work of its predecessor by observing the withdrawal of occupation forces and by generally facilitating the process of political transition and eventual (it was hoped) unification.

Hostile relations

During the ensuing months, relations between the two Korean regimes, supported by their respective great-power patrons, were hostile and uneasy, with indications on both sides of acquisitive intent. In the first half of 1950, military and para-military skirmishes of ambiguous origin erupted along the border areas with such frequency that when John W. Holmes, the Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, first heard of the North Korean invasion on June 25, he assumed that nothing unusual was afoot.

Revisionist historians now dispute the claims of American policymakers to innocence in the events leading up to the North Korean attack, assigning them at least partial responsibility for the developing conditions of conflict. In some of the more extreme versions they are accused of connivance and conspiracy too. Of these two classes of argument, the first is far more convincing than the second, but in either event they have little bearing on the Canadian case. For whatever one believes of Washington, there can be little doubt that in Ottawa the outbreak of major hostilities in Korea came as a complete surprise.

So did the American response. Policymakers in Washington had been making it clear for some time that they considered the Korean (and Formosan) theatres to be outside their strategic defence perimeter

*Failure to agree
on procedures
for the creation
of a unified state*

in the Pacific and, as recently as February 1950, General Douglas MacArthur had advised the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs during a visit to Tokyo that Korea was strategically unimportant to the United States, and therefore did not fall within the American protective umbrella. In consequence, External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson assumed that the U.S. Government would respond with little more than verbal protests, a view which was shared by John Holmes in New York and by Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington.

Soviet absent

In the absence from the Security Council of the Soviet Union (which since January had been boycotting the proceedings on the matter of Chinese representation), the United States secured the passage of a resolution on the afternoon of Sunday, June 25, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces. The resolution also requested reports on developments in the theatre from the United Nations Commission on Korea, and asked "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities". This initiative received Mr. Pearson's support in the House of Commons on June 26, when he expressed the hope "that as a result of the intervention of the United Nations some effective action may be possible to restore peace". But in an off-the-record press conference some hours later, he told reporters that he did not anticipate that military measures would be taken by either the Americans alone or the United Nations as a whole.

As early as Sunday evening, however, President Truman had authorized General MacArthur to evacuate American nationals from Korea, under the protection south of the Parallel, if necessary, of the United States Air Force. He was authorized also to offer logistical support to the South Korean forces, and to assume operational command of the Seventh Fleet. Late the following day he was ordered in addition to give combat air and naval support to the South Koreans in Republic of Korea territory, and to despatch the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosa Strait. These measures were to be made legitimate in the name of the United Nations, from which an authorizing resolution would be pursued at a meeting of the Security Council scheduled for Tuesday afternoon.

Throughout the early phase of the war, the principal concern of the Canadian

authorities was that the American response (upon which depended the postures of all the other Western allies, Canada included) be conducted under United Nations auspices. This was partly because it was felt that the strength of the organization as an agent for the maintenance of collective security depended on its being used, or at least on its being *seen* to be used, as the primary vehicle for counter-ing aggression. If actions in constraint of "aggressor" powers were taken unilaterally, such promise as the United Nations still held out for international methods of security enforcement would be lost. More immediately, however, it was also because the Canadians realized that, if the Americans acted unilaterally, there would be little opportunity for constraining their behaviour, whereas if they responded through the United Nations, their policies would be exposed (within limits) to inhibiting multilateral influences, of which Canada's was one.

This was regarded as particularly important in the Korean context because it was possible, in the absence of such constraints, that the Americans, by a mixture of distorted perceptions of self-interest and inflexibly ideological conceptions of their opponents, would be drawn into a major Asian war, thereby involving the Soviet Union and/or the Communist Chinese. This would be a disaster in itself. In addition, it would mean that American attentions and resources would be diverted away from Western Europe, which in the Canadian view — as in that of the other Western allies — was a far more vital theatre.

When, on Tuesday morning, Mr. Pearson was informed by the U.S. Ambassador of the President's decisions, therefore, he telephoned Hume Wrong in Washington to stress the importance of urging the Americans to bring their action under United Nations auspices, and to withhold public announcements of their initiative until the Security Council's authorization had actually been obtained. When Mr. Wrong raised the matter at a late morning meeting of State Department officials with the Washington ambassadors of the NATO powers, however, he was advised that the American view was that the June 25 resolution had provided them with all the authority required. On the apparent assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to boycott the Security Council, they believed in any case that the matter of timing was not serious since their informal discussions with other Council members had revealed that their proposal for a more explicit resolution would pass that

*Response via UN
would represent
inhibiting factor
for U.S. policy*

*Canada subjected
to more pressure
for contribution
in conduct of war*

afternoon without great difficulty — as indeed it did. In it, the Council recommended “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area concerned”. Later in the week, on June 30, President Truman ordered General MacArthur to impose a naval blockade on the Korean coast and to make full use of the ground forces under his command in responding to the North Korean assault.

Had the Americans decided to intervene against the North Koreans entirely without the blessing of the United Nations (as the State Department’s George Kennan would have liked them to do), Canadians would have had as little to do with the war in Korea as they had subsequently had to do with the war in Vietnam — perhaps less, given that Canada was not a member of the UN Commission on Korea whereas it was, and is, a member of the International Control Commission. With the passage of the resolutions of June 25 and 27, however, the Canadian Government acquired on the one hand a battery of pressures, from constituents at home and abroad alike, to contribute to the conduct of the hostilities themselves (an outcome of which the Americans heartily approved), and on the other a licence to intervene in the making of decisions (a consequence with which the Americans were naturally displeased).

Restricted involvement

To the extent that payment of dues buys access to the club, the second of these acquisitions was contingent on the first and, like buyers in every market, the Canadians sought to maximize their marginal utilities. Their military expenditures came, therefore, in dribs and drabs, constrained in part by the poverty of their resources (early in July the Director of Military Operations and Plans was to advise the Minister of National Defence that, if all the units of the Active Force Brigade Group were brought up to strength and allowed to concentrate on training, they would be reasonably efficient after a period of six months), in part by the fear — soon dispelled — that such dabblings in overseas wars would not go down well in Quebec, in part by a reluctance to divert Canada’s meagre defences away from the North Atlantic area, and in part by the simple sluggishness of the mechanics of collective military effort.

The first instalment, as it happened, came easily. Three Canadian destroyers sailed for the Western Pacific on July 5 and were ultimately assigned to General

MacArthur’s Unified Command on July 12. But in Korea, armies, not navies, were in the greatest jeopardy and hence in greatest need. On July 14, therefore, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie despatched a message to 53 member governments asking them to examine their “capacity to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces”, and his multilateral plea was supported by American bilateral pressure. On July 19 the Canadian Cabinet accordingly deliberated again. And again it settled on equipment, not men.

A squadron of RCAF long-range transport aircraft was assigned to service in the Pacific airlift (its efforts were later augmented by civilian flights chartered from Canadian Pacific Airlines). But of ground forces there were none. Not until August 7, under steadily-increasing pressure at home and abroad, did the Government finally announce its intention of recruiting a brigade-size Special Force of volunteers “for use in carrying out Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact”. The full deployment of the brigade in the Korean theatre was even then not finally determined until late in February 1951.

But, if the Canadians paid their dues with reluctance, they exercised their privileges with enthusiasm. Their principal concern throughout the diplomacy of the war was to constrain and to modify American behaviour (since they could not hope themselves to modify the behaviour of America’s opponents) with a view ultimately to containing the scope and duration of the hostilities. Their principal dilemma was to find a way of doing so without alienating the Americans entirely from their practice of acting in concert with their allies in the United Nations. For Mr. Pearson in particular, therefore, the exercise of diplomatic judgment involved not merely decisions with regard to the timing and tactics of diplomatic manoeuvre but also calculations with respect to the limits of American patience.

On what issues did the maintenance of allied pressure on Washington offer some possibility of success? On what issues did it not? And precisely when in particular cases was it “better” to give in to American resistance and fight again another day than to persist in one’s opposition? Such preoccupations reflect a utilitarian morality upon which it is possible for good men to differ, but their importance for the conduct of Canada’s diplomacy in the Korean War was so central as to warrant illustration.

The pattern of Canadian behaviour be-

came very evident, for example, in the first few days after the passage of the resolutions of June 25 and 27, when State Department officials turned their attention to drafting yet a third Security Council proposal — this one authorizing the United States to establish a United Nations Command. Hume Wrong was deluged with instructions from Ottawa.

To emphasize the "United Nations" character of the commitment in Korea, he was to recommend to the Americans that they reduce in their draft the number of references to the "United States". To diminish the possibility of UN forces becoming involved in issues other than the purely Korean, he was to suggest that they improve upon the precision of such casual phrases as "in the area", which were used in their resolution to define the scope of UN objectives. To secure the explicit exclusion of Formosa from the sphere of UN Command operations, he was to propose that they include in the draft a geographically-defined boundary around Korea within which General MacArthur would be acting on UN authority, and beyond which he would not.

On receiving the last of these directives, Mr. Wrong gave vent to his exasperation. In a reply which accorded well with the opinion of Mr. Holmes in New York, he advised Ottawa that so complex an amendment might seriously delay the progress of proceedings at the United Nations. The Americans, in any case, had made it clear that their "neutralization" of Formosa was an ingredient of their own policy, which was quite independent of the UN. They would not react favourably to a suggestion that implied scepticism about the reliability of their guarantees, and which was redundant besides. There was, moreover, a limit to the number of "treks" he could undertake with dignity to an already harassed Department of State.

In consequence of Mr. Wrong's complaints, this particular "trek" appears not to have been taken at all, while the ones that were proved ultimately to have been in vain. But the episode nonetheless exemplifies not only the substance of the Government's intent but also the tactical calculations to which the pursuit of its intent was constantly subject.

Two requirements

To provide another example, if late June and early July, when Canada had still to announce a significant contribution to the conduct of the war, was an inappropriate time to influence the course of American policy, then an appropriate time was when the Government was in the process of pay-

ing its dues. Hence, when Mr. Pearson flew on July 29 to Washington to inform the Americans of plans then being developed for the recruitment of a Canadian Army Special Force and to discuss the conditions under which it might be made available, he used the occasion to insist on two requirements. The first was that the troops would not be ordered into combat before they had been trained to the satisfaction of their Canadian officers. The second was that under no circumstances would they be involved in the defence of Formosa. To these, the Americans readily agreed (although in connection with China their inability later to control effectively the public utterances of General MacArthur subsequently led, on more than one occasion, to additional Canadian protests).

Definition of objectives

Once MacArthur had reversed the fortunes of the war after his amphibious attack through Inchon in mid-September, there ensued a new series of policy questions which, until then, had not been explicitly considered. These related in particular to the definition of the UN's general objectives in the theatre. The resolution of June 27, devised while the North Koreans were still hurtling down the peninsula, had made vague reference only to the need "to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area". On the face of it, this suggested that the UN's task would be completed once the security of South Korea had been re-established at the 38th Parallel. At the same time, however, the United Nations had been committed since the winter of 1947-48 to the ultimate objective of Korean unification, and it did not officially recognize the government in the North as a legally-constituted regime. Now that the North Korean army was in total disarray, therefore, the temptation to occupy the northern zone and settle the matter once and for all was difficult to resist. The danger was that an advance into North Korean territory would escalate the conflict beyond manageable proportions by inciting the intervention of the Communist Chinese.

General MacArthur had advised the American Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, as early as July 13 that his intention was to destroy the North Korean forces entirely, and not merely to drive them out of South Korea, and he was not long in persuading his colleagues to a similar view. On September 7 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that ground operations be carried "beyond

*Temptation to seize
northern zone
difficult to resist*

the 38th Parallel as necessary" to ensure the destruction of the North Korean forces. President Truman, after discussions with his National Security Council, agreed on September 11 that MacArthur should be authorized to proceed into North Korean territory, subject to there being "no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force". In the more detailed directives which the General received later in the month, he was instructed also to ensure that "no non-Korean ground forces" would be used in areas of North Korea bordering on Soviet or Chinese territory.

There remained the question of the involvement in these decisions, *post hoc*, of the United Nations. At first, the Americans argued that a formal resolution would not be necessary because the Security Council had already authorized the restoration of "international peace and security in the area", an ambiguity to which the Canadians had objected from the beginning, and to which they — among others — were not now disposed to fall victim. Fearful of a Soviet or Chinese intervention, they at first strongly opposed any crossing of the Parallel, and when after several days of informal discussions the Americans succeeded in having Britain and seven other countries sponsor a resolution recommending, among other things, that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea", Mr. Pearson was urged by his senior staff not to support their initiative. Assured privately by the Americans, however, that the advance would not be allowed to proceed beyond the narrow waist of the Korean peninsula (roughly half-way between the 38th Parallel and the Manchurian border), and anxious to support the implementation of other features of the new resolution (which recommended procedures under United Nations auspices "for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign state of Korea"), Mr. Pearson ultimately decided to support it.

An informally-expressed Canadian suggestion that the passage of the resolution be postponed until there had been diplomatic contact with the North Korean regime was rejected by the American Secretary of State, and Canadian plans for proposing modifications in the draft in order to win the support of the Indians had to be abandoned because of the swiftness of events. On October 7 the resolution carried by a vote of 47 (Canada reluctantly included) to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 7 abstentions (India's among them). Within hours, American units in Korea had fol-

lowed the earlier example of their South Korean counterparts and had crossed the 38th Parallel.

China's entry

Their sojourn in North Korea was to be short-lived. By the end of the month, General MacArthur's headquarters were receiving sporadic reports of contacts with Chinese forces. On November 5 he filed a special report to the United Nations advising the members that his troops "in certain areas of Korea" were "meeting a new foe". Three days later President Truman authorized him to bomb bridges linking North Korea and Manchuria across the Yalu River.

Throughout the preceding weeks there had been repeated attempts by the British, French and Canadians at the United Nations and elsewhere to obtain explicit agreement from the Americans to establish an unoccupied "buffer zone" in Korea's northernmost provinces, but to no avail. General MacArthur was in any case unreceptive to such restrictions, and his superiors in Washington were not disposed to insist. When on November 14 the Truman Administration requested allied approval of the "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft into Manchurian air-space, it was discouraged by the vehemence of the response (Canadian opposition was conveyed to American officials within two hours of the arrival in Ottawa of their inquiry).

Now that there was evidence that the Chinese were already in the field, Hume Wrong was instructed yet again to press upon the State Department the need to keep United Nations forces well away from the northern areas and to exercise the greatest possible degree of military restraint. In advising an audience in Windsor, Ontario, on November 15 of his view that "nothing should be done in the establishment of a united and free Korea which would carry the slightest menace to Korea's neighbours", Mr. Pearson suggested that it was still possible that the Chinese were engaged only in "a protective and border mission", and a case could therefore be made for the United Nations attempting to get in touch with them "to find out their intentions". But it was much too late. On November 26, the Chinese "volunteers" launched a major offensive, and by December 15 the United Nations Command had been driven in a chaotic 120-mile retreat down the peninsula to lines located once again in the general vicinity of the 38th Parallel.

In thus so rude a fashion were the allied powers compelled to abandon their plans for a Korea unified and "democratized" by

*Sanction provided
for MacArthur
to proceed north*

*Rapidity of events
forced Canada
to abandon
proposed changes*

force of United Nations arms. All they could hope for now was an eventual securing of the peace, if necessary on terms reflecting no more than the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. But here, too, the Americans and their colleagues in the United Nations were prone to quarrel. For, in the case of the United States, the intervention of the Chinese had made the war more, not less, difficult to resolve. This was partly in consequence of the political pressures to which it gave rise at home, but more because in the American perspective it escalated the international significance of the crisis as a "Communist" challenge which could not safely be ignored. For the allies and the "neutrals", on the other hand, it strengthened immeasurably the argument that every effort should be made to contain the hostilities and to treat the issues involved as if they were reflective of nothing more than a localized breach of the international peace. From this vantage-point it was essential to restore the limited character of the UN's objectives in the theatre, and to persuade the Peking regime that the security of Chinese territory was not under threat.

Chinese position

There ensued a complex series of negotiations among the Americans and other members of the United Nations, focusing on the question of whether discussions might usefully be initiated with the Chinese. The essence of the American position was that no progress could be expected until the military fortunes of the UN Command had improved at the front, and that concessions ought not to be granted in any event under military pressure. The British view, shared in general if not in detail by the Canadians among others, was that an intensification of United Nations military and other sanctions would harden, not soften, the Chinese position, and that Peking, therefore, ought to be approached instead in a spirit of accommodation. Certainly there could be little harm in making the attempt. If a cease-fire could be arranged, a conference in pursuit of a political settlement might shortly follow (the British, in fact, were prepared to make a number of the political concessions in advance, but the Americans would have none of this and the Canadians thought it futile to press them).

Confronted by these insistent demands, and convinced in any case that the Chinese would not agree to a cease-fire without advance political concessions, the Americans finally gave their blessing to an attempt "to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation". They made it

clear, however, that in the event the negotiations failed, a resolution labelling the Chinese as aggressors would be brought before the General Assembly for its approval.

Cease-fire group

The immediate result was the passage of a resolution in the General Assembly authorizing the creation of a Cease-fire Group to initiate discussions with the Communist Chinese. Its members included Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, Sir Benegal Rau of India and Mr. Pearson.

The history of the group's activities need not be recorded in detail here. Suffice it to say that the American requirement that a cease-fire precede, rather than follow, negotiations on the unification of Korea, the recognition of the Peking regime, and other political issues appeared to be unacceptable to the Chinese. At the same time, however, Peking's communications in response to the Cease-fire Group's inquiries were sufficiently ambiguous to lead a number of UN powers — notably Britain, Canada, France and several of the Arab and Asian states — to conclude that there was still room for manoeuvre.

In consequence, when the Americans ultimately introduced on January 20 a resolution in the General Assembly declaring that the Chinese People's Republic had "itself engaged in aggression in Korea", they encountered stiff resistance. In the meantime, the Canadians and the British had gone independently in search of a clarification of the Chinese position. A series of questions conveyed to Peking by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent through New Delhi produced a reply which suggested that the mainland government might be prepared to consider at least a short-term, conditional cease-fire pending negotiation of some of the more immediately important political issues. Thus encouraged, the Asian powers, under the leadership of India, introduced an Assembly resolution calling for a 48-hour adjournment of the Korean proceedings in order to permit further study. To the fury of the Americans, whose condemning resolution had been ready to come to a vote when the Chinese reply to Mr. St. Laurent's private inquiries arrived in New York, the Indian proposal was adopted. The American delegation subsequently complained with some bitterness that the Canadians had been negotiating with Peking behind their backs. Such was their resentment that Mr. Pearson was to recall the episode in later years as one of the most serious in the history of Canadian-American relations.

*Americans angered
as bid for delay
sought by India
adopted by Assembly*

*Demands of unity,
need to avoid
alienation of U.S.
dictated final vote*

But, in the end, the Americans were to have their way. Peppered throughout the ensuing week by the pleas and propositions of diplomats representing the full spectrum of neutral and allied United Nations powers, they would agree only to minor modifications of the wording in their own draft. They were paying the piper, and they were calling the tune.

Since "the methods of peaceful negotiation" had not yet been "completely exhausted", Mr. Pearson confessed that he thought the measure "premature and unwise". But like the British, the French, and other sceptics in the Western camp, he ultimately voted in its favour. The demands of "allied unity", and the need to avoid alienating the United States entirely from the machinery of UN decision-making, were factors that he considered too important to ignore. In the utilitarian calculus of foreign policy, the strategy of constraining the Americans had passed, for Canada if not for India, beyond the point of productive return.

Armistice negotiations

With the Chinese thus diplomatically condemned, the contest was left for a time with the military, and it was not until July 10, 1951, that armistice negotiations finally began. They endured for more than two years, and in them the United Nations played only a sporadic part. Even here, however, the pattern was the same, with the United States again the object of concerted diplomatic manoeuvres in which the Canadians assumed a prominent role. In the autumn of 1952, for example, the American authorities were compelled to accept a General Assembly resolution incorporating proposals for the repatriation of prisoners-of-war of which they did not entirely approve. Advanced initially by the Indians, it had been moulded only in part to American taste by the attentions of the Canadians, British and French, and it left Dean Acheson with so prolonged a

sense of irritation that years later he was to write of Lester Pearson and India's Krishna Menon as "adroit operators" against whose proposals it had been necessary to maintain a constant guard.

Although little was achieved by the resolution at the time of its initial passage — it did not then appeal to the Chinese — it was later mobilized again in constraint of United States behaviour at the climax of the armistice negotiations in May and June of 1953, and the Americans were compelled once more to accede to its provisions. Within a month the war in Korea was over. The lines of demarcation had shifted a little, but the peninsula was as divided at the end as it was at the beginning.

Perhaps the most central feature of Canada's diplomacy throughout was the fact that its targets were friends rather than enemies. For the United States, the most important actors in the conflict were the North Koreans, the Chinese and potentially, at least, the Soviet Union. The allied and neutral powers that were so active in the United Nations were relevant, too, but more as restive constituents than as primary targets of policy. They complicated America's diplomatic life; they did not determine its central direction.

For the Canadians, on the other hand, these conditions were reversed. Since the "enemy" powers were clearly beyond the reach of Canadian influence, they could not be made the immediate object of Canadian policy. In the final analysis, their behaviour could be directly affected only by the United States. Hence, if the Canadians wished to modify the dynamics of East-West relations, they had little choice but to concentrate on the behaviour of the Americans, amplifying Canada's influence wherever possible by acting in concert with the governments of other powers. For the pursuit of such strategies, the United Nations was a convenient instrument.

North Korea and South Korea agreed during the second round of political talks in Pyongyang in early November to organize joint machinery to arrange political, economic and other exchanges between the two Koreas. These were seen as part of a process leading to eventual peaceful reunification.

The two sides also agreed to stop propaganda broadcasts and leaflet distribution including psychological warfare activities.

A joint statement indicated the two

sides had reached accord on the composition and management of the co-ordinating committee agreed on earlier and announced in the communique of July 4. This committee would work out specific programs and carry them out within a five-part set of guidelines dealing with problems of reunification; political, economic cultural and social exchanges; easing of tensions and fostering of joint activities abroad. (*Digest of New York Times dispatch from Seoul, Nov. 5, 1972*).

Examining China's world view on an appointment in Peking

The Chinese, "like any great people, are fervently convinced of the correctness of their world view," John K. Fairbank, director of Harvard University's East Asian Research Centre, noted in his article *The New China* in the current issue of the American quarterly review *Foreign Affairs*. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, recently concluded a ten-day trip to the People's Republic of China and his conversations with China's leaders underline the aptness of Mr. Fairbank's observation.

In their talks with Mr. Sharp, China's Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei etched a role for China in opposition to "superpower domination" of the world — opposition to a kind of tacit hegemony by the Soviet Union and the United States.

"They made it very clear that they do not want to be a super-power", Mr. Sharp recalled. "They don't consider themselves to be such They do not yet possess nuclear weapons comparable to the systems which are employed by the Soviet Union and the United States

"It is part of their approach to world affairs that everyone is equal — and that no country should be in a position to impose its views upon other countries."

The accompanying article is the result of an interview with the Secretary of State for External Affairs after his return from a ten-day visit to the People's Republic of China late in August. Mr. Sharp held discussions with Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Chiao Kuan-hua, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other officials and had a three-hour meeting with Premier Chou-En-lai during his five days in Peking. Mr. Sharp also visited Canton, Shanghai and Hangchow, as well as points of interest in the countryside, and made a pilgrimage to the graveside of Dr. Norman Bethune in Shihchiachung, 150 miles south of Peking. The Minister presided at the opening of the Canadian Trade Fair in Peking on August 21.

Despite Chinese pronouncements about shunning the role of a super-power, it is difficult for others to assign them a subordinate position. As Mr. Sharp put it, for example, "we couldn't help but look upon them as being one of the powers with a great influence on the course of events" on a global scale.

The External Affairs Minister said that the Chinese put themselves forward as champions of the smaller countries and this was primarily how they saw themselves — "the champions of independence". To reinforce that view, he said, they asserted that they themselves would not become dependent upon any other country. "Their aim is self-reliance. They dealt at great length with their former dependence upon the Soviet Union and how Soviet aid had been withdrawn in the late 1950s The Chinese leaders made it clear that never again would they permit their country to be in such a position of dependence."

The Chinese concept of super-power domination and their opposition to it was couched in a variety of ways, but it has obviously motivated Peking's stance on a broad range of world issues.

Nuclear arms control

On the topic of nuclear arms control, and particularly in their attitude to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the Chinese leaders suggested the treaty amounted to a hegemony established over the world by the super-powers that possessed the major nuclear weapons. "They couldn't admit that hegemony," Mr. Sharp said, ". . . and that was their justification for proceeding with their nuclear testing. They told me they would like to get rid of all nuclear arms, but in the meantime since two countries (the United States and the U.S.S.R.) are dominating the world with their nuclear arms — "we can't permit that to happen we will need them too.'"

Mr. Sharp, who put the case for adherence to the non-proliferation treaty during the talks, suggested that the Chinese were taking a very idealistic position in pressing to rid the world of all nuclear

arms at once: "I said I found this very difficult to see as possible and therefore I feel that we ought to proceed at least to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The Chinese saw little to salute in the first-phase strategic arms limitation agreements reached by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese saw the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) accord as being relatively meaningless in reducing the nuclear threat. The superpowers were still continuing to improve nuclear arms despite the much heralded progress in the SALT.

In dealing with the arguments for nuclear disarmament put forward by Mr. Sharp, the Chinese Premier said it was because the superpowers were able to threaten to use nuclear arms that they were able to "terrorize" other countries into submission — and he cited the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example of this process.

Mr. Sharp said his discussions with Chou En-lai buttressed his belief that relations with the Soviet Union represent a dominant factor in current Chinese foreign policy.

It is a key element, for example, in the complex set of relationships flowing from the Indo-Pakistan conflict in late 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh. China had opposed the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations, Peking leaders told Mr. Sharp, because they believed that this was an Indian initiative backed and fostered by the Soviet Union as part of an approach aimed at breaking up Pakistan and eventually establishing greater Soviet influence in South Asia.

Mr. Sharp said he got no feeling from his conversations in Peking that the Chinese had any ambition or desire to dominate the countries around them, but neither did they want those countries to be dominated by either of the super-powers.

Approach to Indochina

In Southeast Asia, the Chinese saw the United States as the power attempting to impose itself on the area through "aggression" in Indochina. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei — in response to questions from Mr. Sharp — said he saw no useful future role for the original International Control Commission in Indochina nor did he see any need for an international peace force or observer group after a settlement had been achieved in Vietnam. "They said Vietnam is a domestic problem, not an international one at all — there's no need for anybody to interfere, in their view," Mr. Sharp related.

Apart from the condemnation of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, the attitudes and actions of the United States took up little time in the discussions, Mr. Sharp said. And even the denunciation of the United States for its Southeast Asian moves appeared *pro forma*; The Chinese seemed preoccupied with the initiatives of the Soviet Union.

Two questions on the current United Nations agenda were reviewed in Mr. Sharp's talks with Chinese leaders.

On the question of the two Koreas, the Chinese presented the case for debating the issue in the United Nations and urged the ouster of UN forces (or American troops, as they characterized these forces) in the Republic of Korea. In Chinese eyes, these troops had committed aggression in Korea and had no place there. Mr. Sharp replied that Canada had taken part in the UN operation in Korea and Canada had "never in its history engaged in a war of aggression".

The Canadian External Affairs Minister said it would be undesirable to risk the possibility of a breakdown in the early stages of the current talks between North and South Korea by injecting this controversial item into the UN debate. Since Mr. Sharp's visit, the General Assembly did decide to defer until next year debate on the Korean question.

On the status of Bangladesh, which occupied a good deal of time in the Peking discussions, Mr. Sharp put forward the argument that it was desirable to establish as much universality as possible in the membership of the UN and hence to admit Bangladesh.

"I said what is the reason for denying representation to 75 million people. I noted that when we (Canada) took the initiative to help you occupy the China seat (in the UN), it was with that in mind — we wanted to have the vast numbers of the people of China represented in the UN — and it seems a bit inconsistent that China should be opposed to the entry of Bangladesh."

Mr. Sharp said the Chinese reply was in effect a question: How could Bangladesh be admitted when India and Bangladesh were not observing the resolutions of the UN? Mr. Sharp said he hoped there would be fewer of the kind of resolution approved by the UN where the chances of compliance were minimal because this lowered the prestige of the world body. But Mr. Sharp asked what would be the purpose of keeping Bangladesh out because the Indians had allegedly not complied with UN resolutions? "Bangladesh is not yet in the UN, so how could it be in default . . . I said I should have thought we

*Role of Soviet
dominant factor
in Chinese policy*



Globe and Mail, John Burns

External Affairs Minister Sharp – taking time out from conversations with Chinese leaders for a sightseeing trek – mingled with off-duty soldiers, tourists and

teen-agers on the Great Wall about 45 miles north of Peking. With camera at hand, Mr. Sharp climbed to a turret along a roller-coaster stretch of the historic wall.

could deal just as effectively with Bangladesh in as with her out — and indeed better.”

In the general talks with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, both Chou En-lai and China's Foreign Minister referred with some gratitude to the initiatives taken by Canada in moving to recognize the People's Republic of China and to Canada's support for Peking's entry into the UN. Canada undoubtedly had an advantage in dealing with China because it had carried through on its undertakings.

Canada had been able to serve in a sense as adviser to the Chinese on the machinery of international institutions, since China had been “out of circulation” for so long. The talks with Chinese leaders were carried on with complete frankness by both sides, Mr. Sharp stressed.

In this atmosphere of confidence, it is no surprise that further progress was made in bilateral relations in such fields as trade and cultural and scientific exchanges.

Dealing with wheat, which had made

up the great bulk of Canada's exports to China, the Chinese Premier went even further than his officials had in the past. The Chinese Government had already made it clear, before Mr. Sharp undertook his trip, that Canada would have a preference as supplier — in other words, the first opportunity of supply. In the course of his meeting with Mr. Sharp, the Premier noted that China was not short of food. China was currently producing enough food to feed itself, but it was deliberately exporting rice and importing wheat. Canada, therefore, could look upon China as a long-term market for Canadian wheat — not an "in-and-out" purchaser —

provided Canada was competitive with other potential suppliers.

The Chinese were also prepared to see Canada diversify its exports to China. "What is important about the Chinese attitude to trade is their insistence upon self-reliance," Mr. Sharp said. "And that means they are not going to be interested in importing consumer goods; they expect to produce them in China . . . What they are interested in is machinery, equipment, some raw materials perhaps, but principally production goods rather than consumer goods."

Mr. Sharp recalled that during his visits to Chinese cities such as Shanghai,

Beyond the fair...

Canada's first industrial exhibition in the People's Republic of China, held in Peking from August 21 to September 2, produced results on two levels. In specific terms, orders placed and contracts negotiated with Canadian exhibitors have been valued at \$25 million, and there could be more. In broader terms, the Canadian trade fair served as the focal point for the process of acquiring

firsthand knowledge of the respective economic potentials of both countries, for the Chinese to learn about the range of products Canada had to offer and for the establishment of contacts. For example, there were opportunities for subsequent meetings between representatives of Canadian firms and those from China's state-trading corporations.

The fair itself, staged by some 550 Canadians from industry and government, attracted an estimated 250,000 visitors, including technical personnel from China's industrial and agricultural spheres.

A total of 219 companies and trade associations set out displays in 206 exhibit areas. Sectors represented ranged from aerospace and road, marine and rail transport to electricity and electronics, medical and pharmaceutical fields, forestry, minerals, mining and agriculture, including heavy off-the-road machines used in mining, forestry and agriculture.

Almost all the heavy machinery on exhibit was sold and orders were completed for electrical, geophysical-survey and medical equipment. Other contracts involved a large shipment of nickel, pulp and paper products, potash and livestock. Sales may be stimulated for light planes and offshore oil-drilling rigs, a category in which even one advanced unit would be worth \$25 million.

The fair, under the general direction of L. J. Rodger of the Industry, Trade and Commerce Department, was opened on August 21 by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, and was visited by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and China's Foreign Trade Minister, Pai Hsiang-kuo.



Jean-Luc Pepin, at that time Trade and Commerce Minister, in Montreal Harbour gets an elevated look at the first

shipment of nickel bound for China after deal was concluded during 10-day Peking fair.

he saw a wide range of consumer goods of the highest quality, but obviously the great mass of the people of China were not yet in a position to buy them.

Regarding Chinese exports to Canada, Chinese officials realized that they would have to adapt their production to meet the requirements of the North American and European markets and they were apparently prepared to do so.

Mr. Sharp's trip produced the announcement about tentative agreement on a series of exchanges in cultural, scientific and sports fields between the two countries.

In the area of cultural exchange, the Chinese agreed to discuss arrangements for sending an exhibition of recent archaeological finds to Canada in the second half of 1973. The collection has been described as a national treasure for the people of China, with international historical importance. In return, Canada will send China an exhibition of Eskimo prints which has toured the Pacific area. The Chinese approved a proposal to send an acrobatic troupe to Canada.

Scientific missions

In science and technology, the Chinese accepted an invitation to send a team of scientists to Canada. Their interests will cover a broad range of scientific fields including particularly biology, chemistry and physics. The Chinese also agreed to send a team of experts to Canada to study the petroleum industry. In return, at least two Canadian missions to China have been worked out. A Canadian petroleum group will visit China in 1973 and in the same year a group of Canadian agricultural scientists will make a separate Chinese tour.

In medicine, the two countries agreed to an early resumption of the Bethune medical-exchange program, which had earlier been suspended. The program, commemorating Dr. Norman Bethune, previously provided for an annual exchange of two doctors, the Canadian nominees to be chosen by McGill University and the Chinese by the University of Peking. The two sides discussed the desirability of further exchanges of medical delegations.

In sports, officials of the Canadian and Chinese sports federations meeting in Peking at the same time as Mr. Sharp's sessions with Chinese leaders agreed in principle on an exchange of volleyball, table tennis, hockey and gymnastic teams. The two sides also reviewed possible exchanges in basketball, figure skating and soccer, as well as the exchange of coaches, films and literature.

Mr. Sharp and the Chinese Foreign Minister discussed possible student and teacher exchanges and agreed that such exchanges would be mutually beneficial. The subject will require much further discussion before any formal program can be worked out.

The proposed air link between China and Canada was merely touched on during Mr. Sharp's talks since full-fledged negotiations were already under way. The Chinese indicated they were anxious for negotiations to proceed quickly. These talks, conducted in both Peking and Ottawa, have since resulted in a Sino-Canadian civil air agreement announced in mid-October. Direct flights between the two countries are expected to begin early in 1973.

Pride in results

The general impression left with Canada's External Affairs Minister after his official talks and his tours through city and countryside was of a people and a leadership proud of their accomplishments in industrial and agricultural spheres. This was a feeling present in a peasant's home outside Canton, in a bicycle factory in Shanghai, in a crowded department store and in the upper echelons of the administration — a feeling of pride in the results of mass effort. "What you remember is this spectacle of vast areas of cultivated land — cultivated so carefully; there isn't a square foot of arable land that isn't being used. You see people planting, harvesting, fertilizing to the limit — and probably the greatest accomplishment of this regime is to have removed the threat of starvation . . .," Mr. Sharp said.

The Chinese were ready to engage in self-criticism and to hear criticism from outsiders. "At the end of any visit or any occasion, the Chinese who was in charge will ask: 'Well now, have you any criticisms or any suggestions . . . ?' The pilot of your plane, the cook, the head of the commune — they always end by saying: 'Well now, you've been around, have you any suggestions or criticisms?'"

Mr. Sharp said he was impressed with the range of Premier Chou En-lai's mind and his knowledge of the nuances of Sino-Canadian relations, although the External Affairs Minister did not hesitate to differ vigorously with the Premier on some aspects of international affairs. As to Canadian affairs, Mr. Sharp added with a smile: "The only thing I had to correct him on was that he accepted the American version of the War of 1812."

*In peasant's home,
in bike factory –
pride in results
of mass effort*

— Murray Goldblatt

Egypt's heritage and dilemma in a world of rival power blocs

By Lorne M. Kenny

In 1957 Alfred Lilienthal wrote a book entitled *There Goes the Middle East*. His thesis was that U.S. fears of international Communism, coupled with an emotional involvement with the state of Israel, had blinded the United States both to the injustice done to the Arabs and also to its own interests. The inevitable result, he foresaw, would be to force the Middle East irrevocably into the arms of the Russian bear.

Recent events have shown, however, that the Arabs, who were thought to be in immediate danger of being swallowed up, have no greater love for Russian than for Western imperialism. This is true not only of Anwar Sadat's Egypt but also of the rest of the Arab world. Arab leaders may feel that there is no other source to turn to in their quarrel with Western imperialism and with Zionism, which they regard as an extension of the former; but no Arab country or government has turned Communist and there is not a single one amongst them, including Iraq and Syria, that is not dragging its feet with respect to Soviet demands for more direct influence upon their policies and for a greater say for the local Communists in affairs of state.

If the Arab states do not relish the thought of becoming Soviet satellites, why, then, do they flirt with the Communist bloc and put themselves so far in its debt that it will be most difficult for them to reassert their independence (although

Egypt has recently made an astonishing move in that very direction)? The political behaviour of the Arabs seems incomprehensible to many people in the Western world, whereas, as a matter of fact, there is little mystery attached to it. (It might be added that the Arabs find our political behaviour just as mysterious.)

One cannot generalize about the Arabs, though, for the various Arab states do not follow identical policies because of the differences in their individual histories, political experience and a host of other factors. Let us turn, therefore, to one Arab country, Egypt, and try to understand the factors behind its recent action in dismissing its Russian advisers, its attitude toward Israel and the Palestinian cause and Egypt's embarking upon yet another experiment in Arab unity.

Illustrious history

Egypt is possessed of a long and illustrious history, of which it is justly proud. The Valley of the Nile was one of the earliest centres of civilization and an awareness of his Pharaonic past runs deeply in the veins of every Egyptian, if more consciously so in those of the educated class. Egypt has often been the seat of an empire embracing Greater Syria, the Sudan and both shores of the Red Sea, including the Yemen, and at times North Africa as far as Tunisia: a resurgent Egypt naturally looks in these directions. More important than its Pharaonic heritage in determining present attitudes and policies is its Islamic past. Egypt was a Christian country for half a millennium before the Moslem conquest in 640, and although the Arabic language and the Islamic faith gradually gained dominance over a period of four or five centuries, there is still a significant Coptic (derived from the word "Egypt") minority and influence present in the country. However, Egypt is mainly a Moslem country and the Islamic circle, as Gamal Abdel Nasser indicated in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, is one of the three important circles within which Egypt moves. Pres-

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ident Sadat is a deeply religious Moslem who finds Communism, with its materialistic philosophy, quite distasteful. (The same is even more true of Libya's fundamentalist Qaddafi.)

It is interesting to note that some Russian officials in Egypt are said to have voiced similar sentiments to those expressed by Lord Cromer, the British pro-consul, before his departure from Egypt in 1907, to the effect that Egypt would never make significant progress while the nation held to the Islamic faith. But Egypt is not about to abjure its faith, as anyone who walks down Cairo's thoroughfares at the hour of the Friday noon prayer will realize, when he has to direct his steps to the middle of the street in order to avoid the prayer-mats spread out to accommodate the crowds of worshippers. The Russians have been wise enough not to press openly for the acceptance of Communism; nevertheless the Arabs have remained wary. They may be forced into an alliance with the Communists, but President Sadat has confessed that he regards this as an alliance with the devil, which, when it turns out to the advantage of the devil, must be repudiated.

Second circle

The second circle in which Egypt has a role to play, in Nasser's view, was Africa. Egypt's destiny, because of its dependence upon the waters of the Nile, is inextricably bound up with the Sudan. The Sudan question was a main bone of contention between Egypt and Britain for more than half a century, until their agreement on the right of Sudanese self-determination in 1953. Egypt has developed political and economic ties with black Africa, but it is Islam that forms the most important bond between the two. Thousands of black African students flock to Cairo, especially to Azhar University, the great Islamic centre of learning.

Nasser's third circle, the Arab, was destined to become the most important of the three politically, as it had been culturally for a millennium. Much is made of the divisive factors among the Arabs (regional variations, interests and jealousies), all of which is true. The Arabic language and culture, however, do provide a powerful unifying force and, though the spoken idiom may vary markedly from one region to another, the same newspapers and books may be read anywhere. In spite of the political and economic interests which the Arab countries have in common, the loose association known as the Arab League has not been an outstanding success, to say the least.

Nevertheless, joint action would seem to be essential for the Arabs in order to protect their interests and to contain the threat of Israeli military and economic power. In a world characterized by huge political and economic blocs, they must co-ordinate their policies and action in order to exert their proper influence and make the most of their vast resources, both human and material, especially oil. Arab unity has often been called a mirage, and Arab steps in this direction may be stumbling and uncertain; but the ideal will remain, and we can expect further attempts to realize it, in economic and cultural areas as well as in the political arena.

Arab world's unity called a mirage but more attempts will be undertaken to realize goal

Element of colonialism

Egypt's experience of European colonialism over the past century is another very important determinant of Egyptian political attitudes. The door to political and military intervention was opened by the penetration of European capital through resort to ruinous loan arrangements. In order to protect these financial interests and to insure control of strategic communications through the recently-opened Suez Canal, Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. That British officials and administrators did make a contribution to Egypt's development, for instance in the field of irrigation, has to be admitted. However, Egypt cannot forget the colonial administration's neglect of education, its opposition to the development of an independent Egyptian economy and the repressive hand of foreign domination deeply impressed upon the Egyptian consciousness by such events as the vicious punishments meted out at Dinshawai in 1907.

Parliamentary democracy never had a fair trial in Egypt; it fell between three stools — the landowning gentry, the monarchy and the British residency. The last-mentioned stood somewhat in the background, but was always able to enforce its will, as it did in February 1942, when the British High Commissioner rode up to King Farouk's palace accompanied by an armoured contingent and forced the King to install a new prime minister. Having won its independence after a long and sometimes bitter struggle, Egypt, like other Arab countries, is not likely to barter away its freedom of action easily to any imperialist power, new or old. Of course the devil you don't know seems less dangerous than the devil you do know, and the Russian bear did appear on the scene in the mid-Fifties as a disinterested friend, willing to supply arms and also assistance in such projects as the Aswan High Dam when such assistance was available from

*History created
love-hate relation
with the West
and a large fund
of potential goodwill*

the West only with all sorts of strings attached. The Russian strings were to appear later.

The Egyptian experience of Western imperialism does not, however, exhaust the country's legacy from the Western world. Ever since Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798, Europe and the West have stood for the wonders of modernity and technological progress. Western-style education and legal systems were adopted. European literature, together with the revival of Egypt's own Arabic heritage, provided the stimulus for a new literary renaissance. In short, over the past century and three-quarters, Egypt has become culturally oriented to the West. This orientation cannot be changed overnight. The result of both the political and cultural experiences of Egypt in modern times is its peculiar love-hate relation with the West. There does exist in Egypt a large fund of potential goodwill toward the West, especially toward France and the United States.

Given the historical facts here touched upon — its Pharaonic past, its Arab-Islamic history, its experience of European imperialism and institutions, and the founding of the state of Israel in spite of repeated Arab protests and resistance — it was only natural that Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's first native son to rule the country in two and a half millennia, should resist pressure to join any Middle East defence organization dominated by the West, and should opt for a "neutralist" course in the Fifties. Yugoslavia's Tito and India's Nehru became Nasser's mentors as he rode high to a position of prominence in the neutralist bloc and the Arab world.

Dependent on Soviet

Gradually, however, Egypt became more and more dependent upon the Eastern bloc, as the United States more and more assumed the role of guarantor and supplier at large for Israel. The total of Soviet aid to Egypt has been estimated at anywhere from \$4 billion to \$6 billion, with an outstanding debt of at least \$3 billion, while the United States has supplied Israel with much larger amounts of capital and equipment.

Then came the catastrophic Six-Day War in June 1967, with Egypt's loss of Sinai to Israel in addition to vast amounts of equipment and men. Russia agreed to rearm and train the Egyptian forces, but never to provide the offensive missiles and air-strike capability required for Egypt to attempt to regain its lost territory. While the United States has supplied Israel with 100 *Phantom* supersonic fighter-bombers,

with 40 more promised (*Phantoms* that, by the way, have not yet been supplied to its NATO partners or to the Northern Tier Middle East nations), the U.S.S.R. has sent only a few T-U16 subsonic *Badger* bombers to Egypt. The MIGs stationed in Egypt are definitely inferior to either the *Phantoms* or *Skyhawks* and, without some semblance of equality in the air, any war against Israel would be suicide. The missiles supplied to Egypt were also essentially defensive.

President Sadat journeyed to Moscow three times in order to press his demand for more offensive weapons, but to no avail. The Russian leaders were looking ahead towards a *détente* with the United States, and when the Nixon visit to Moscow came about last May, Egypt undertook a serious re-evaluation of its policy. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the influential editor of *al-Ahram*, convened a symposium on the Nixon-Brezhnev talks, which concluded that the "no-peace, no-war" situation with Israel was beneficial to the interests of all parties except Egypt. In spite of Haykal's belief that Egypt needs Soviet friendship and has little to expect from the United States, still the May symposium opted for a policy of non-alignment, in spite of its risks, rather than for reliance upon one power. This is the policy President Sadat dramatically announced on July 18, which resulted in the expulsion of some 15,000 Soviet military advisers.

There were other factors that entered into this decision. The Russians were never liked by the Egyptians, who regarded them as boors and detested taking orders from them. There were also clandestine Russian attempts to subvert the middle echelons of the Egyptian bureaucracy and to win over some of the journalists. A decisive factor was the growing feeling that Egypt was being used by the Russians for its own ends of strengthening the U.S.S.R.'s strategic entrenchment in the Mediterranean area and carrying on a surveillance of the American Sixth Fleet, all the while disregarding Egypt's military needs and goals. Egypt would be a friend but not a satellite. It might be bribed but could not be bought and owned.

Symbolic gesture

In some ways, Sadat's gesture of defiance was more symbolic than real. True, it has been a blow to Soviet prestige in the area, and the Egyptians have been only too happy about the lessening of the Russian presence. Egypt cannot, however, at once pull itself out of the Russian orbit. Sadat's action also contained a silent, but urgent, plea to the world, and especially to the



Wide World photo

After a series of meetings between Soviet and Egyptian leaders, President Sadat announced in July that the bulk of Soviet military advisers, technicians

and instructors were being asked to leave. Pictured are three of the Russians as they pass the Soviet club in the Cairo suburb of Zamalek.

West, for help in arriving at the settlement with Israel. Sadat affirmed that there was no Arab-U.S. problem, only an Arab-Israeli one.

But his plea was met with a deafening silence in every Western capital, and even France refused Sadat's suggestion for a visit to Paris to talk things over. The United States seems committed to the *Realpolitik* approach and the view that Israel is the one great bastion against Communist inroads in the region (although it was the creation of Israel that opened the door to the strategic penetration of the Russians into the area). Egypt will thus continue to be dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for weapons and the servicing of its military machine.

Aziz Sidqi, Egypt's Prime Minister, who is far from being a Communist, is reported to have been apprehensive that Sadat's action might disturb Egypt's financial and commercial relations with Russia. The Soviet Union is deeply involved in 40 major industrial enterprises in Egypt, and such patterns of development and trade cannot be changed overnight. Egypt signed another \$100-million trade agreement with Russia last June, and in order to meet its obligations to the Eastern bloc, Egypt ships to it perhaps as much as 80 per cent of its annual cotton crop. It is reported from Beirut that the main Russian naval base will be removed from

Egypt to the Syrian port of Latakia, though Egypt will continue to provide port facilities for the Russians in exchange for military spare parts.

What, then, has Sadat accomplished by his dramatic move, which was characterized by Edward Sheehan in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 6 as "an act of desperation — a spectacular diversion, a colossal attempt to buy more time, a heroic grasping at straws, a blind groping to find a way out of Egypt's dilemma"? At least, Sadat has let the Russians know that Egypt intends to be master in its own house and that Egypt's interests must come first.

Offer from Libya

Sadat may have no real alternative to Russian help, but he did have one card up his sleeve — he had had an offer from President Qaddafi of Libya for the union of their two countries. The sceptic may be justified in asking whether the marriage will be consummated by the time of the announced wedding date of September 1, 1973. Again, as in the case of Egypt's union with Syria, it is the smaller partner that is urging the union, and Libya has an attractive dowry to offer. Various loose federal unions between Egypt and other Arab states have been announced since the breakup of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961 — with Syria and Iraq in 1963, with Libya and the Sudan in 1969, and with

Syria and Libya in 1971 — but these have achieved little. Libya has always been afraid of being swallowed up by its comparatively gigantic neighbour, but possibly Qaddafi's ardour and Egypt's experience can find the right formula for success. Whatever happens to this proposed union, it is safe to say that Egypt is deeply and irrevocably committed to the Arab cause, and that Egypt and its neighbours will pursue the ideal of Arab unity.

As to Egypt's form of government in the future, there is little likelihood of a return to parliamentary democracy. In Egypt this system, imported from the West, was exploited by the privileged few for their own ends. It has, in fact, been successfully applied in few of the developing nations. Probably, as Arnold Toynbee has said, parliamentary democracy is a luxury of the affluent society. The emphasis of Egypt's present regime has been upon "social democracy" under a paternalistic, authoritarian government, the form most often adopted by countries in a hurry to modernize and industrialize.

Egypt, then, while remembering its Pharaonic heritage, will continue to choose a path in keeping with its Arab-Islamic past. Internally, Egypt will urgently pur-

sue the goal of industrial development and a modified state socialism under the direction of a highly-centralized, bureaucratic regime. In the international sphere, Egypt will pursue a policy of non-alignment as far as it is allowed to in a world of power blocs.

Since there is little likelihood of obtaining redress for the sufferings of the Palestinian Arabs or of recovering Sinai in the near future, the struggle with Israel will go on. Egypt's leaders cannot negotiate with Israel on the basis of the surrender of Arab territory and Arab rights and hope to stay in power. Although Egypt cannot embark upon an all-out war with Israel with any prospect of winning, the situation is volatile and could explode unexpectedly. Another possibility is that Egyptian frustration at the state of "no war, no peace" might prompt them to a renewal of commando attacks across the Suez Canal into Sinai. However, the demand for some sort of action may have been satisfied for the time being by the expulsion of the Russian military "advisers". The confrontation may therefore be postponed and deflected into other channels — economic, political and diplomatic.

Soviet role in the Middle East

. . . In contrast to Europe, where the Soviet leaders have chosen a policy of stabilization and *détente*, the Middle East has presented a shifting political scene in which the U.S.S.R. is engaged in an active political and military competition with the United States which both sides frankly admit is dangerous to world peace.

In contrast to South Asia, where the Soviet leaders, although virtually compelled to support North Vietnam and oppose the United States for reasons of solidarity with a Communist state and of competition with China, have limited their involvement, the Middle East has witnessed such a heavy concentration of Soviet effort and such deep Soviet involvement as to suggest that the leaders in Moscow see vital interests at stake. In contrast to . . . South Asia, where they chose to back India — the stronger party — and made notable gains at small risk, in the Middle East they have sided with Arab states of proven weakness and instability.

The inevitable question is: Why? . . . What has the Soviet Union gained in military positions, political influence and general prestige? How solid is the founda-

tion on which these gains rest?

The recent action of Egypt in requesting the withdrawal of most of the Soviet military advisers and experts appears to have posed that last question in stark form.

This dramatic move and the circumstances surrounding it are not yet sufficiently clear to enable us to reach firm conclusions . . . As an expression of nationalism, it can hardly be overestimated. Some call it a historic turning point, a basic shift in the balance of power, indicating that the Soviet position in the Middle East has passed its apogee and can only decline henceforward. Others pass it off as a temporary setback, or even a sly game of collusion. Probably neither interpretation is correct . . .

. . . Egypt has been and remains the centrepiece of the Soviet position in the Middle East. The country's size, geographic location and influence on other Arab states were as apparent to Moscow as to Western capitals. . . . (*Excerpts from study of Soviet role in Middle East by John C. Campbell, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (New York) Problems of Communism September-October, 1972*).

Seeking nuclear-arms control —the hard lessons of SALT I

By John Gellner

The first stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks — SALT I, as it is beginning to be called in anticipation of further stages to come — was concluded by the signing in Moscow, on May 26 last, of a U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and of an Interim Agreement and Protocol on Strategic Offensive Missiles. Also part of the package are a number of "agreed interpretations" and "common understandings". The whole represents the net result of seven rounds of bargaining (four in Helsinki, three in Vienna) that began on November 17, 1969.

After reading the texts, and going entirely by what they say, one can only come to the conclusion that the mountains laboured mightily to bring forth a mouse — and a rather sickly one at that. If it were not for the indirect, the imponderable as it were, results it may have, SALT I would have to be written off as yet another of those exercises in futility which arms-control negotiations so often are.

The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) pact limits the treaty partners to two complexes of 100 missiles each, one round the national capital, the other round a grouping of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). There are some further restrictions on the area covered and on the deployment of radar, but not such that they would interfere with what the two sides have or intend to have: for the Russians, the already-emplaced ABM system around Moscow; for the Americans, the *Safeguard* ABM installation at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which is under construction and slated for completion late in 1974. As things look now, the Soviets will probably thicken and modernize the ABM shield protecting Moscow, but neither side is likely to pick up its second option, which would be an ABM system defending a Soviet ICBM complex and a *Safeguard* installation ringing Washington.


All in all, the ABM pact amounts to an admission by the two powers that the chances for a successful nuclear first strike are so slight as not to be worth consider-

ing; the aggressor cannot save himself from being crushed by the counter-attack, the second strike, whether or not there are anti-ballistic missile defences. This is pretty plain. We do not know, of course, what Russian thinking on this point was earlier, but there could not have been any doubt in American minds — not after 1966, when the Soviets started deploying ICBMs and building missile-carrying nuclear submarines at an unprecedentedly rapid rate. The punch a nuclear force can deliver is often expressed in megaton equivalents (MTE), equal to two-thirds of the explosive yield of the nuclear weapons that can be counted upon to reach enemy territory. For some time, it has been unwritten U.S. military doctrine that the delivery of about 400 MTEs would result in the "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union.

The latest estimate by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) puts the present "maximum theoretical capacity" of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces at just under 19,000 megatons, and that of the Soviet Union at 15,000 megatons, or about 12,300 and 10,000 MTEs. Even though the figures for deliverable weapons would be less (not all nuclear submarines would be on station, not all ICBMs or bombers would be serviceable), no conceivable first strike, in whatever way executed, could reduce the weight of the inevitable counter-attack to less than 400 MTEs.

So, at least as far as the military

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balance between the two super-powers is concerned, the ABM is an irrelevancy. The standstill agreement negotiated under SALT I merely confirms this fact.

Problem of verification

One provision of the ABM pact is, however, worthy of note; it concerns verification, the problem that has bedevilled past nuclear-arms control negotiations. Article XII states that "each party shall use *national* technical means of verification . . ."; it "undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party . . . (and) not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification . . .". This is important. The Russians, in particular, have, in their *Kosmos* space-vehicle series, tried out an earth-satellite destroyer that could sweep American reconnaissance spacecraft from the skies above the Soviet Union. They have now promised not to do so. Also, the formulation of Article XII is such that it may lend itself to adaptation to future nuclear-arms control agreements, perhaps (but this is very much open to question) even to a comprehensive test ban.

If there is at least some merit in the ABM pact, there is none in the strategic offensive missiles agreement — at least, none that would be readily discernible. There is something like a quantitative freeze in respect to missile-launchers, but at a level higher than that which the Soviet Union has reached. (The United States is already at the maximum level set by the agreement.) Even more significant — and regrettable — is that there are no qualitative restrictions to speak of.

The United States currently has 1,710 missile-launchers, 1,054 for ICBMs and 656 for SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), in 41 nuclear submarines. This is also the total number allowed it under the agreement, except that the 54 oldest and most vulnerable missiles, the *Titan* ICBM, can be replaced with SLBMs, to a maximum of 710 in 44 submarines. The Soviet Union at present possesses 2,090 ICBM and SLBM launchers. Depending on which of two options open under the agreement the Soviets decide on, they can increase that number to 2,424 or 2,358 (the larger number would not necessarily give them a stronger punch). In any case, there must not be in the ultimate weapons "mix" more than 950 SLBMs in 62 submarines, or more than 309 of the most powerful land-based ICBMs, the SS-9.

At first sight, this looks like a bad deal for the United States, the more so as the Soviet land-based missiles are, in general, considerably more powerful than the

American. This, however, overlooks other factors that tend to equalize — some would say, more than equalize — the odds.

First of all, the Moscow agreements do not cover manned bombers. Here, the United States is vastly superior, with 455 (if only the B-52s are counted) or 531 (if the somewhat dubious, because of their more limited range, FB-111As are added) carriers to the Soviet 140. It is often argued that bombers would have a difficult time penetrating modern defences. This is a contentious question; it would lead too far to enter into it here. In any case, the U.S. bombers are just in the process of being equipped with a reputedly highly effective air-to-surface missile, the SRAM; the later versions of the B-52 will carry 20 of these each and the FB-111As six each. Since the explosive power of a SRAM is, according to reports, 200 kilotons, one B-52 would be able to deliver four megatons in 20 warheads, each of which is ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, while staying well outside the range of the close anti-aircraft defences ringing an important target (the range of SRAM is reported to be about 100 miles). Thus the least that can be said is that the manned bomber cannot be simply discounted as a nuclear-weapon carrier. It follows that the U.S. superiority in this category remains a factor in the general strategic balance.

Another factor to be considered is that the U.S. force can deliver from fewer launchers more warheads than the Soviet. This is because of the development, so far not matched by the Soviet Union, of multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles — MIRVs; each *Minuteman* 3 ICBM and each *Polaris* A 3 SLBM can carry three 200-kiloton MIRVs, each *Poseidon* SLBM ten 50-kiloton MIRVs. That these are relatively-low-yield weapons, at least by comparison with the mammoth Soviet ICBMs, is not all that important assuming — as one must — that either kind is meant to deter a first strike by the threat of retaliatory counterattack. Since the latter could logically be directed only against cities (if there had been a first strike, the enemy's nuclear-weapon carriers would be gone by the time the counterattack was launched), the yield would not greatly matter; either 50 or 200 kilotons is frightful enough. It is the more frightful as a single *Poseidon* submarine could conceivably hit 160 targets simultaneously. At the end of the current rearmament program, the United States will have 31 *Poseidon* submarines, with 496 launchers and 4,960 warheads.

This brings us to the principal failing

*Freeze in pact
is quantitative
rather than
qualitative*



—UPI photo

Leonid Brezhnev (left), general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, chats with President Nixon after offering a toast

to mark the initialling of the strategic arms limitation pacts reached during the U.S. President's visit to Moscow.

of the offensive strategic missiles agreement — the absence of effective qualitative restrictions, which means that, where improvement and replacement of existing weaponry is concerned, the nuclear-arms race can go on unabated.

There is every indication that it will. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are working on a new supersonic strategic bomber (the Soviet Union has already flown one). The Russians are modernizing their fleet of missile-carrying submarines, both by replacing diesel-powered units with nuclear-powered and by developing an SLBM with a longer range than the now standard SS-N-6, the SS-N-8. They are also experimenting with multiple warheads, though apparently not yet independently-targeted. The Americans, for their part, are in the process of updating both their *Minuteman* ICBM and their ballistic-missile submarine forces. They also intend to replace the ten oldest nuclear submarines, which are not slated for conversion from the *Polaris* to the *Poseidon* missile, with the new *Trident*-class submarines, which will carry the first SLBMs of intercontinental range. Finally, the accuracy of both the American and Soviet missile warheads is continuously being improved by better guidance systems. Much research and development work is also being done on manoeuvrable warheads that would be able to evade ABM defences.

In sum, the offensive strategic mis-

siles agreement can be called an arms-control measure only if one interprets that term very broadly. It *does* put an upper limit on the number of missile-launchers the two super-powers will have, and it *does* establish a rough equilibrium between American and Soviet capabilities in this field. On the other hand, at the end of the life of the agreement in May 1977, the offensive nuclear forces of both treaty partners will undoubtedly be quite a bit stronger than they are today. Their "overkill" capacity, already tremendous, will be greater still. One cannot know, of course, but a case could certainly be made for the contention that this increase in strength would not be much greater without a limiting agreement, so-called.

So, if one took into consideration only the hard-and-fast results attained, the final verdict on SALT I would have to be that it represents at best a tiny step in the direction of nuclear-arms control. It does not even touch the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Accomplishment in talks

As for the less obvious achievements of SALT, the one that should perhaps be classed as the most important is that the two super-powers persevered in negotiating for two-and-a-half years until they reached the sort of agreement that was sealed in Moscow last May. They did so in spite of all the difficulties that emerged

'Overkill' capacity will be greater by accord's end during May of 1977

*Results meagre
but good exercise
in negotiation
on concrete terms*

along the way, and despite recurrent deadlocks, especially in the earlier stages of the negotiations. If one remembers how far the two sides were apart, even on basic principle, this was indeed an accomplishment.

For instance, Moscow's understanding of what are "offensive strategic weapons" differed sharply from Washington's; the Russians wanted to include in this category every type of weapon that could reach the territory of the U.S.S.R., that is, among others, the so-called "forward-based systems" (FBS) — in essence, American tactical airplanes based in Europe or on aircraft carriers. This would have weighted the scales in favour of the Soviet Union, which has no FBS and would thus have been able to offset these weapon systems of rather limited value with additional, fully effective ICBMs or SLBMs. When the Americans, naturally enough, demurred, the Russians proposed that the issue of offensive weapons be dropped from the agenda altogether. It took infinite patience, an unconscionable amount of time, and above all readiness, on both sides, to compromise, before problems like this one were got out of the way.

SALT I, however meagre the results, was thus for the two super-powers at least a good exercise in dealing with one another in concrete terms (as distinct from the sweeping pronouncements and totally unrealistic proposals for complete disarmament in which the Soviets, particularly, indulge in the United Nations) on matters of arms control. It is to be hoped that this will have a beneficial effect on other negotiations that are forthcoming, on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR), on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and, of course, on the continuation of the strategic-arms limitation talks, SALT II. It would be just as wrong to underestimate this particular intangible result of SALT I as to overestimate it. The two delegations, and in particular the delegation chiefs, Gerard Smith for the United States and V. S. Semenov for the Soviet Union, who have faced one another across the conference table for more than two and a half years, have reportedly established a certain *rapport*. This, too, is an imponderable, which one of these days could be of importance.

Effect on NPT

Nor should the effect SALT I may have on the fortunes of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be overlooked. It has been called discriminatory by the non-nuclear weapon states, and so it is, at least for the present. Still, there is Article

VI of the treaty to act as a palliative. It binds the nuclear-weapon states, the "haves" so to speak, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . .". This is, in fact, the essence of the NPT. It asks the "have-nots" to refrain from aggravating the problem by rushing to get nuclear weapons too, while the "haves" attempt to bring about nuclear disarmament.

At any rate, this is the idea. One can — indeed one must — be sceptical about its ever being translated into practice. Still, even if Article VI did nothing but assure the non-nuclear weapon states that the military superiority the nuclear powers have over them at present will not get greater still, it would achieve much of its purpose. On the other hand, if the three nuclear powers that have acceded to the NPT did not even show that they were trying to comply with Article VI, the floodgates of nuclear proliferation would be bound to burst open eventually. After all, a number of countries that would be capable of providing themselves with nuclear weapons have not signed, or have signed but not ratified, the treaty. For the present, they are still on the fence. Their decision will no doubt, at least in part, depend on whether the nuclear powers uphold *their* side of the bargain, and to what extent.

This is why both Moscow agreements make a point of stating that they represent only a first step on the road to nuclear-arms control. Thus Article XI of the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems says: "Each of the parties undertakes to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms." And Article VII of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Missiles states: "The parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations of strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this interim agreement shall not prejudice the scope of terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations."

The vital interest both the United States and the Soviet Union have in keeping the NPT operative — and making it universal, if this were only possible — enhances the chances of SALT II, which is now certain to follow SALT I (and may be under way by the time this magazine is in the reader's hands). Such success will admittedly be more difficult to achieve than in the case of SALT I. In the latter, the objective, perhaps not from the beginning but certainly from the time the two sides came down to

brass tacks, was to establish force parity between the two super-powers and thus to provide a basis on which future understanding might be reached. (This, incidentally, will have to be done in MBFR as well if it comes to negotiations on this subject, as now seems likely; the thorny road trodden in SALT I cannot be avoided.) The next step is to apply the principle of parity to gradual, balanced reductions of armaments.

This task will be tackled in SALT II. It will no doubt be an extremely difficult one. Reductions of armaments will have to be related to each side's perception of its security requirements, and these are quite different in many respects. Under such circumstances, arriving at acceptable trade-offs will pose enormous problems.

In a recent issue of *Newsweek* magazine, a U.S. official was quoted as saying that "progress will be slow". "Compared to SALT II, SALT I is going to look like a lightning process," the article declared. This is probably true, though regrettable — and perilous, if for no other reason than that, with every year that passes without substantive progress toward nuclear-arms control, the danger of nuclear proliferation increases sharply. Still, it is too early to say what will happen at SALT II. It is certain that, if it has come about at all, it is because there was SALT I, and this in itself is something to enter on the credit side of the ledger. Where arms control is concerned (let alone disarmament, which has not even been tackled yet in earnest), one has to be thankful for small mercies.

Military balance intact, political effects less certain

The SALT agreements are clearly the most significant outcome of the Moscow summit. . . . These agreements will not, however, end active competition in strategic missiles. Within the agreed numbers, both sides are free to modernize and improve their missile systems.

Thus the United States can continue to install multiple guided warheads (MIRVs) on its *Minuteman* ICBMs and in its *Polaris* submarines, or indeed to develop new missile submarines. By 1975 or so, the United States would . . . have about three times as many warheads as the Soviets though each would be much smaller.

Conversely, the U.S.S.R. will have at least three times as much destructive force (megatonnage) as the United States. And as the U.S.S.R. develops its own MIRVs (as it surely will), its greater number of missiles and the enormous size of its 300 SS-9's should enable it eventually to surpass the United States in total warheads.

. . . The prospect is that the U.S.S.R. will ultimately have 30 to 50 percent more strategic missile-launchers and submarines, with several times as much megatonnage, and potentially could have more warheads. Some people will fear that this disparity will give the Soviets military "superiority". In military terms, this concern seems to have been mistaken. . . . As long as the U.S.S.R. could not hope to disarm the United States by a first

strike, it will be deterred from purposely initiating nuclear war. In those terms, the interim agreement will not upset the military balance.

Its political effects are less certain. Will the U.S.S.R. conclude that its relative "superiority" could be converted into greater leverage or influence in trouble spots like the Middle East or even in Western Europe? . . . If it does, the effect could be destabilizing and very dangerous

In U.S. domestic politics, the agreements are likely to sharpen and polarize the debate over military spending. One group will stress the growing Soviet power Others will rely on the agreements in pressing for major cuts in the military budget Actually, these pacts provide no real basis for substantial savings. . . . Any major savings will depend on whether the interim agreement leads to further restrictions

The effort to achieve further restrictions should be pursued with vigour and patience. The reduction of the armaments burden could be a genuinely shared interest of the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of parity if the Soviets are willing to forego efforts to gain political advantage from illusory "superiority". (*Excerpts from an analysis by Dr. Robert R. Bowie, director of the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, in the Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1972*).

A fresh architectural face to fit External Affairs' role

By Humphrey Carver



Colin Price Photo Features

External Affairs: its own presence and personality

When the Department of External Affairs moves into its new building on Sussex Drive in Ottawa early in the new year, it will emerge into public view for the first time as an organization with its own presence and personality. Hitherto it has been an element of the Federal Government with its head offices secreted somewhere in the corridors of the East Block, behind the green baize doors to the antechambers of the Prime Minister and the Privy Council. This has preserved the rather elitist image of a department whose personnel have, in fact, been scattered

through many downtown buildings in the Capital. Now all will be brought together in the new headquarters, which becomes the corporate image of the department.

You may not like the style of the building or feel that it properly expresses the department's role, but henceforth everyone who lives in or visits the Capital will know "this is the Department of External Affairs". Architecture is a powerful language; people "read" buildings in the same way as they interpret personalities from the outward appearances of faces and clothes. What kind of building is it?

First of all, its site is superb. From the penthouse terrace that surrounds the diplomatic dining-room on the ninth floor, there is a broad view up and down the Ottawa River, across to the Quebec side and on to the horizon of the wooded Gatineau Hills. To the left are the spires of Parliament Hill, just below is Earnscliffe, the modest Victorian home of Canada's first Prime Minister, and beyond the French Embassy to the right is the Prime Minister's official residence. Additional conversation pieces are the old National Research Council building just across the street, the Ottawa City Hall right beside us and, just over there, that rather gruesome fortress the Mint. Displaying this whole scene to a visiting diplomat, one could with justice say: "Here is Canada". One could also explain that Sussex Drive is a kind of processional route between Parliament Hill and Rideau Hall, which together symbolize the sovereignty of the nation.

In such a superb setting, so closely associated with the symbols and affairs of state, it would certainly have been a temptation to choose a stately architectural design, in the traditional sense. Should there, perhaps, have been some historic reference to the classical columns and courtyards of the Foreign Office in Whitehall, or some recollection of the ornate architectural good manners of the Quai d'Orsay, or even, perhaps, a bow to that crusty stylistic monster, the old State Department Building in Washington? But all of these got their Roman style from an imperial age in diplomacy and more appropriate, perhaps, would have been some overtones of the blander architecture of the United Nations building, signifying the period in which Canada became actively involved in international affairs. All these recognizable architectural conventions can be used by a competent firm of architects with the expectation of winning gold or silver medals if the conventions are used in a stylish and graceful way.

Surprising design

However, the architects for the new External Affairs building, the firm of Webb, Zerafa, Menkes and Housden, did not use any of these architectural conventions, but put their minds to work on the real-life requirements of the Department. This has produced a design that has taken everyone by surprise because of its unexpected form and unconventional character. It is not quite like anything the public has seen before, and it has, consequently, been the target for some rather foolish criticism.

This is not really a single building but a three-dimensional cluster of several pieces, stretching nearly 300 yards along Sussex Drive, linked together and planned round a very handsome main entrance and foyer. The whole composition is raised on a podium, with a battered wall 12 feet high, that gives a robust strength to the design and provides a setting for garden terraces and groups of large trees. The highest tower in the cluster is the principal diplomatic centre, with the protocol and reception facilities at the foyer level, the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the tenth floor just above the penthouse terrace, and the officers of the Department on the second to the eighth floors. Also facing Sussex Drive, in a separate, lower building, is the Passport Office and, behind this, a general departmental office building.

At the main entry from Sussex Drive one either drives directly into the parking space below the podium or up to the main foyer doors, circling round the ascending steps of patterned gardens and under the shelter of a *port-cochère* roof. Entering the richly-sculptured bronze doors, one finds oneself immediately within the entry hall, which is two storeys high, not unlike the foyer of a large hotel, and serves the function of a kind of town-square surrounded by the whole cluster of buildings and their various features. In one direction from the foyer is the open hall of the Passport Office and the large cafeteria dining floor, both of which look into an interior courtyard that faces out towards the Rideau River; this garden courtyard will be a very pleasant place for lunch in the summer. At the back of the foyer is the Library, with a well-lit reading-room, a public display of documents on the history of Canada's external relations and, under greater security, a collection of NATO documents.

In another direction from the "town-square" is the international conference centre, with its own lobby and a smaller courtyard garden; there is a theatre-style auditorium seating about 220 and a highly-sophisticated conference chamber in which

*Robust strength
plus a setting
for garden terraces
and towering trees*

Humphrey Carver, town-planner and authority on the social-policy aspects of housing, served as chairman of the research committee and later as chairman of the advisory group of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation during nearly 20 years with CMHC. Mr. Carver is author of Cities in the Suburbs, and acted as chairman last year of the jury for the Vincent Massey Awards for Excellence in the Urban Environment.



more than 30 delegates can sit round an oval table, surrounded by supporting staff and aided by four-language translation and such facilities as television coverage. And, finally, from the central foyer, foreign visitors will be escorted to the protocol reception area under the main tower of the building. All this has been contrived for some theatrical effect: the stepped gardens leading up to the bronze entrance doors, the high-ceilinged central hall and the vistas into the surrounding floor-spaces and courtyards. The activities arising out of Canada's relations with the rest of the world are thus grouped round this central square, which should be a lively and interesting place. It is to be hoped that the Department will not be too security-conscious and that the general public will be encouraged to come in and catch the spirit and openness of this central place.

Should encourage general public to catch spirit of central square

(When I walked through the interiors of the buildings in late September, the floors and wall-surfaces were not yet finished and the ceiling frameworks were still festooned with cables, ducts, pipes and all kinds of apparatus for climate-control and intercommunication. I cannot comment, therefore, on the atmosphere and mood, which will depend so much on the colour, the furnishings and the works of art that are to be installed.)

The outward appearance of the buildings in the cluster, the strong horizontal layers of window-strips and the pre-cast

stone cladding, come simply from the acceptance of a normal arrangement or working-office floors, each planned around a service core and lit by continuous windows that do not obstruct a flexible partitioning system. In its outward appearance, the whole composition could be thought of as an enormous stratified sculpture with interesting and unexpected projections and overlappings and layers of garden terraces. If this terraced and layered effect is, at first sight, a bit exotic (some people have suggested that it looks like some Aztec temple or Babylonian ziggurat), it is in fact a quite natural extension of the common office-floor plan. It should also be noted that the building will unavoidably look rather barren until it has been clothed with the landscape texture that will be as important to the character of the exterior as the furnishings will be to the interior.

Ottawa has not been blessed with many fine pieces of architecture since the original Gothic Revival composition on Parliament Hill. The new National Arts Centre is perhaps the only other architectural work of first rank, and its design has an obvious relation to the new External Affairs buildings. They are not only built of the same rugged pre-cast slabs but are alike in being sculptural three-dimensional compositions, not just street architecture or rectangular boxes. They are each whole city-scapes, with terraces



—Information Canada Photo

William Rankin, Public Works Department project manager for construction of the External Affairs Department building, clambers up a ladder to get an overall view of the ninth-floor diplomatic

reception area. This area, overlooking the Ottawa River and the Gatineau Hills beyond, is located in Block A, highest of the four towers that make up the four-block complex. Block A rises ten stories.

and landscape built into them and upon them. This is a kind of architecture that takes us back to the grandeur and scale of medieval building, of castles and cathedrals and great stone walls rising like cliffs from the earth, mellowing with the passage of time, with the rhythm of the seasons and the evolving shapes of trees and garden plants. Perhaps this is a direction in which urban architecture may develop, now that the last possible dramatic effect has been squeezed out of the steel and glass towers of Mies van der Rohe, with all their austere and puritanical elegance. The firm of Webb, Zerafa, Menkes and Housden is to be congratulated for this essay in a new and more human kind of city-scape.

There has been criticism of the site chosen for the External Affairs headquarters, standing at the Ontario end of the Macdonald-Cartier Bridge and caught in the network of approach ramps. It has also been said that the traffic generated by a work force of 3,200 people will spoil the rather quiet and dignified character of Sussex Drive and put an unmanageable load on the neighbourhood streets of New Edinburgh and on the arterial roads linked to the bridge. There are obvious difficulties ahead and the External Affairs staff will have to accept the limitations of parking and traffic space; there are parking spaces for 575 cars and some bicycles. The staff will learn to act more like those who work in other Capital cities that do not have the same generous acres of car-parking space that Ottawa civil servants have

customarily enjoyed but have been such a blight on the city. In the future, more Ottawa people will have to ride on public vehicles.

The capital city of a democratic country is a place where people go to rediscover the essential character of their nation, its history, its aspirations and its place in the world. It is one of the functions of Ottawa (and of Hull, too) to help Canadians understand their own country better, how its government works domestically and how its relations with the rest of the world are managed. The new External Affairs building has a special qualification for this process of internal communication because it is one of the very few public-service buildings in the Capital that has been sensitively designed to fit a particular complex of departmental functions. Most government buildings are faceless boxes filled with interchangeable bureaucrats, who, so far as the expressiveness of the building goes, could just as well be concerned with agriculture, defence, finance or welfare. In its new headquarters it will be possible for External Affairs to consider not only the department's working convenience and the favourable impression to be made on visiting diplomats; it should also be possible to consider the needs of the ultimate employer, the people of Canada, who come to their Capital wanting to find out what goes on here and how Canada looks out upon the rest of the world through the medium of this department.

*Sensitive design
unlike counterparts
most of which
are faceless boxes*

Next stage in humanitarian law

By D. M. Miller

Law is never wise but when merciful, but mercy has conditions; and that which is mercy to the myriads, may seem hard to the one; and that which seems hard to the one, may be mercy when viewed by the eye that looks on through eternity.

Bulwer Lytton

The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims are widely known, if not as extensively understood or appreciated. Drafted in the rejuvenated "never-again" atmosphere of the post-Second World War period, they definitively codified and progressively developed important aspects of the international law of armed conflict.

Since 1949, however, the nature of war has changed dramatically, with the consequence that civilians have become more exposed to danger.

New forms of humanitarian action are urgently required to protect more effectively civilian populations against the dangers and destruction of modern means of warfare — against, of course, "the Bomb" but also against the all-too-frequent employment of "lesser conventional weaponry", more often than not in situations of "armed conflict not of an international character" in which terrorists, so-called guerrillas and irregular or regular armed forces act to the direct detriment of the civilian population.

*Ways to ensure
better protection
for both civilians
and combatants*

To its credit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was among the first to realize the inherent inadequacies of the Geneva Conventions. In October 1965, the twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross adopted a formal declaration, the Vienna Declaration, on the protection of civilian populations against the dangers of indiscriminate warfare. Some of those who attended this historic meeting in the Hofburg suggested that the ICRC should develop and present to states new proposals intended not to replace the Geneva Conventions but to elaborate and supplement them as necessary.

In a parallel and closely related manner, the International Conference of Human Rights held in Tehran in 1968, 20 years after the universal adoption of the Declaration on Human Rights, drew to the attention of the organs of the United Nations the steps that could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian conventions and rules in all armed conflicts, and the need for additional legal instruments to ensure better protection for civilians, prisoners and combatants and the limitation of the use of certain means of warfare. The United Nations General Assembly gave effect to the Tehran resolution by inviting the Secretary-General to undertake related studies, by deciding to examine the problems arising in this field at each of its regular sessions, and by noting with appreciation the work of the ICRC.

In September 1969, added impetus was provided by the twenty-first International Conference of the Red Cross, held at Istanbul, where the ICRC tabled a report entitled *Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts*, covering not only weapons of mass destruction but also the problems inherent in contemporary forms of conventional and guerrilla warfare and non-international armed conflicts.

Canada's initiatives

The Canadian delegation at Istanbul took several successful initiatives. It co-sponsored, with the Norwegian delegation, the Declaration of Principles in Disaster Situations, subsequently adopted with no opposing votes, which affirmed mankind's concern for all forms of human suffering, recognized the need for effective international relief to civilian victims and declared six important principles. These dealt with the protection of the individual

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and safeguarding of basic human rights; the non-political and humanitarian nature of relief to civilian populations; the necessity for the effective co-ordination of international action; the provision of relief on a non-discriminatory basis, which should never be regarded as an unfriendly act; the facilitation by states of the admission, transit and distribution of relief supplies; and similar facilitation by other authorities.

In company with the Swedish delegation, the Canadian delegation also drafted a resolution requesting the ICRC to: (a) propose as soon as possible concrete rules to supplement existing humanitarian law; (b) invite governmental Red Cross and other experts, representing the world's principal legal and social systems, to meet with the ICRC for this purpose; (c) submit these proposals to governments for comment; and (d), if desirable, recommend the convening of diplomatic conferences of states that are parties to the Geneva Conventions and other interested states, to elaborate international legal instruments incorporating these proposals. The delegation also co-sponsored a resolution requesting the ICRC, with the co-operation of governmental experts, to devote special attention to the subject of non-international armed conflicts given the unfortunate fact that since 1949 this type of armed conflict has been increasing and has caused much suffering.

Convinced that a definite trend had been established favouring the development of conventional humanitarian law to cover all armed conflicts, the ICRC immediately began working toward a diplomatic conference to adopt new instruments of a legally-binding character supplementary to the Geneva Conventions and the even more dated Hague Conventions codifying international legal rules governing combat operations.

It was apparent that such a conference would require careful preparation. Accordingly, encouraged by the United Nations Secretary-General, the ICRC in May 1971 convened in Geneva the first Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, to provide informed advice on the various issues involved. Thirty-nine governments provided delegations composed of some 200 diplomatic, legal, military and medical experts. The ICRC, with pre-conference assistance from a number of national Red Cross societies, prepared extensive background documentation on such subjects as: measures intended to reinforce the implementation of

existing law; protection of the civilian population against dangers of hostilities; rules relative to behaviour of combatants; protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts; rules applicable in guerilla warfare; and protection of the wounded and sick.

Basic standard

The Canadian delegation vigorously promoted the view that, building upon common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, there should be a basic minimum standard of humanitarian treatment applied in all armed-conflict situations, whether these were characterized as "international" or "non-international". The Canadian experts presented a draft protocol embodying this concept in which an encouraging number of other experts expressed interest.

Considering that the prime purpose of the conference was to discuss the intricate issues involved in an informal and non-binding manner and not necessarily to achieve any conclusions or solutions, the results of the conference, as reflected in the reports of its four commissions, provided a useful insight into government thinking of sufficient value to warrant the subsequent decision by the ICRC to organize another such gathering one year later and to invite all states that are parties to the 1949 Geneva conventions to submit concrete proposals in the form of draft texts.

As a result, the ICRC convened a meeting of more than 460 experts from 76 states (including Canadian experts from the Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, and University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law), together with observers from the United Nations and from non-governmental organizations, in Geneva from May 3 to June 3, 1972, to consider two draft protocols, and accompanying commentaries, to the Geneva Conventions — one, concerning international armed conflicts, and the other, as proposed by Canada at the first conference, concerning armed conflicts not of an international character. A preparatory meeting of national Red Cross experts was held in Vienna in March.

As at the first conference, there were two days of plenary meetings and general debate, followed by the organization of the experts into four commissions and two sub-commissions. Commission I considered the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in international armed conflicts. It discussed those parts of the first protocol which extend to civilian medical

establishments and personnel protection equal to that accorded to military medical personnel by the Geneva Conventions. Commission II, which was again chaired by a Canadian expert, examined the second protocol on non-international armed conflicts. Commission III dealt with those parts of the first protocol relating to the behaviour of combatants, protection of the civilian population, protection of non-military civil defence organizations and, at the request of the UN Secretary-General, protection of journalists engaged on dangerous missions in areas of armed conflict. Commission IV was concerned primarily with measures intended to reinforce the implementation of the existing law, its supervision, including the appointment of protecting powers, and penalties for breaches of the law.

Hundreds of proposals

Accordingly, each commission worked on parts of the two protocols. Hundreds of proposals and amendments were submitted in writing and considered by the expert delegations. Since the rules of procedure followed both in plenary and commission sessions encouraged experts to speak in their personal capacity without binding their governments, efforts to co-ordinate these submissions and to accommodate conflicting opinions were meagre and largely illusory. The rules did permit indicative voting on individual proposals, but not many such votes were recorded.

In addition, no verbatim or summary records were kept and no resolutions or recommendations were adopted formally. This permitted fairly free-ranging and generally apolitical discussions which were reflected in the voluminous reports of the four commissions. These reports were adopted by the conference as a whole at its closing plenary sessions. It was left to the ICRC to draw up a complete report of the conference for circulation to states parties to the Geneva Conventions and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The basis of work for Commission I was the relevant articles of the first draft protocol (Articles 11 to 29) on international armed conflicts, dealing with two major topics: one, the protection of wounded and sick and civilian medical personnel, and the other, the safety of medical transports. The commission also considered the provision of additional assistance to national Red Cross societies and other relief agencies.

The commission selected a drafting committee to prepare texts for its consideration on the basis of the ICRC draft

*Bid to co-ordinate
all of submissions
proved illusory*

*Regulations to cover
medical personnel,
new-born as well
as infirm persons*

articles and proposals submitted by experts, and then arrived at recommendations on the basis of these texts, notwithstanding the fact that some experts objected that the commission had no authority to take decisions.

For instance, the Commission recommended that: special protection should be extended to civilian medical personnel (complete with a medical identity card) and to all kinds of civilian medical institutions — permanent or temporary (while in use), public or private — provided they were duly recognized by the competent authorities of the state within whose territory they operated; medical air transports should be included rather than excluded within the definition of “medical transports”; special protection and respect should be granted to the new-born as well as to infirm persons, expectant mothers and maternity cases; any act endangering health (i.e. physical mutilation and medical and scientific experiments, including the grafting or removal of organs, not justified by medical treatment) should be prohibited; and persons should not be punished for having carried out medical activities or been compelled to commit related acts contrary to professional rules and ethics. The provisions recommended by the commission were designed to be part of a comprehensive protocol to all four Geneva Conventions, rather than merely to the Fourth Convention (Protection of Civilian Persons) as envisaged at the first conference.

Commission I also drafted articles calling for the full protection of medical aircraft in the battleground area under the control of the party to the conflict employing the aircraft, and on the basis of flight plans agreed on in more forward areas where such control did not exist. The commission agreed that whenever a medical aircraft were recognized as such, it should not be the object of attack. To better identify such aircraft, the commission established a technical subcommittee which drafted an annex entitled *Recommended Standards, Practices and International Procedures for Identifying and Signalling Ambulance Aircraft*. This provided for better visual identification by means of flashing blue lights, improved radio voice communications on specific frequencies and secondary surveillance by radar beacon transponder systems.

Finally, the commission called upon the parties to a conflict to extend to national Red Cross societies the facilities and assistance necessary for the performance of their humanitarian activities.

Commission II reviewed the second

draft protocol, which dealt with non-international armed conflicts at present covered by Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. At the first conference, the Canadian experts had asserted that this article did not provide sufficient protection for the victims of internal conflicts.

Although the need to expand common Article 3 was largely accepted by the experts, the question of whether this should be done in a separate second protocol was debated actively. Some argued that the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts should be protected equally by a single protocol, but most believed that the nature, conditions and basic differences of non-international conflicts required separate treatment. It was generally agreed, however, that wherever possible the language of the two protocols should be similar.

The ICRC draft protocol, which it was admitted was based essentially on the 1971 Canadian draft but which went far beyond the Canadian draft by introducing rules of combat as opposed to purely humanitarian rules, was defined to apply to all situations where hostilities of a collective nature occurred between “organized armed forces under the command of a responsible authority”. Experts differed over whether the application of the protocol should be made broad and flexible to cover internal armed conflicts of relatively low intensity, or be made narrow and precise to cover only conflicts of high intensity where both parties, including the rebels, had at least quasi-governmental authority, control of some territory and the capacity to abide by the protocol. Some experts considered that “wars of national liberation” were international in nature and, therefore, should be excluded from the second protocol and treated differently from conflicts of secession or dismemberment of a territory.

Practically all experts agreed, however, on the need to provide captured combatants with the humane treatment not at present provided for in common Article 3. Although some favoured the granting of prisoner-of-war status, or a similar status, to guerrilla fighters and other persons meeting certain minimum requirements, most favoured the more basic treatment extended to civilians deprived of their freedom for acts connected with the conflict. Some experts proposed the abolition of the death penalty for combatants who had fought fairly, i.e. had respected the essential provisions of the laws of armed conflict. Others considered that the execution of combatants should simply be suspended until hostilities had terminated in

the expectation that a general amnesty would then be granted.

Commission II also considered the effectiveness and supervision of relief operations in non-international conflicts in the light of the ICRC's desire to eliminate the lacunae existing under common Article 3 by including in the draft protocol provisions to facilitate humanitarian assistance and support and strengthen the activities of national Red Cross societies and other relief agencies. Most experts considered that the ICRC draft articles were excellent, but some, with an eye to balancing the security requirements of the parties to the conflict and the humanitarian requirements of its victims, advocated the reinforcement of the obligations in the protocol rather than reservations limiting its scope. Others were apprehensive that humanitarian assistance in the form of outside relief might, in some instances, constitute interference in a state's internal affairs.

When rules of a humanitarian character in relation to international conflicts were proposed and discussed in greater detail in the other commissions, there was relatively little difference of view on such subjects as protection of the wounded and sick and of the civilian population as a whole.

Provisions on combatants

Commission III dealt principally with the provisions on combatants and protection of the civilian population contained in Parts III and IV of the first protocol on international armed conflicts. The vast number of proposals submitted necessitated the establishment of a co-ordinating committee to evaluate amendments to certain articles.

The two most contentious subjects concerning combatants were the means of combat and guerrilla warfare. Some experts, notably those from Sweden, strongly advocated that the prohibition in the 1907 Hague Regulations against weapons causing unnecessary suffering should be expanded in the protocol by including a list of specific weapons causing indiscriminate damage (e.g. delayed action, incendiary and fragmentation bombs), rather than by resorting to the more subjective standard advanced by the ICRC of forbidding "particularly cruel methods and means" of using such weapons. Later in plenary, several experts proposed that the ICRC convene a special group of specialists to examine the effects of these particular conventional weapons with a view to their prohibition or limitation.

As in Commission II, the experts in

Commission III expressed differing opinions on the entitlement of irregular combatants, such as guerrilla fighters, to be treated as prisoners of war. Although almost all agreed that the relative provisions of the Geneva Conventions should be liberalized and made more flexible, there was considerable disagreement over how far to go in this direction. On the one hand, some insisted that, to become eligible for such treatment, irregulars must be distinguishable from the civilian population by carrying their arms openly or, as suggested by the ICRC, by wearing a distinctive sign. On the other hand, a few experts stated that it would be more realistic to treat all combatants as prisoners of war when rendered *hors de combat*.

The commission also tried to define rules on perfidy, use of flags of truce, conditions of capture and surrender (including flyers in distress), and the treatment of members of armed forces on independent missions.

Protection of civilians

The other major area of concern to the commission was the protection of the civilian population against the dangers of hostilities. The Geneva Conventions protect civilians only against arbitrary action by the enemy authorities in whose power they happen to be, whereas the articles of the ICRC draft protocol prohibited attack against individual civilians or the civilian population, and restricted military activities if the probable injury to the civilian population was likely to be disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage. Not surprisingly, experts concentrated on the definition of such key terms as civilian population, civilian objects and military objectives, but after prolonged discussion little or no consensus emerged.

For instance, some argued for a broad category of objects indispensable to civilian survival or containing dangerous forces (e.g. dams and dikes) and for their absolute immunity from attack, whereas others spoke of the increasing difficulty in armed-conflict situations of separating military and civilian objectives and activities. Consequently, while the experts reaffirmed that the civilian population should not be the object of attack, they disagreed about what protection should be given to civilians indirectly exposed to danger by being in the vicinity of military objectives. This disagreement highlighted the difficulty of introducing rules of combat into a Geneva (humanitarian) context with the result that it was hard to reach consensus. For example, no consensus was reached on the ICRC proposal to prohibit

Little consensus on the definition of military goals, civilian population

target-area bombardment.

The experts did agree that children under 15 years of age should not be employed in any way in military operations.

Finally, the commission discussed the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions, a topic considered by various UN agencies and the General Assembly's Third Committee during the past two years and submitted for comment to the conference by the Secretary-General. Some experts expressed concern that a multiplicity of categories of protected persons might weaken the general protection due to the civilian population, but most accepted that if the majority of states favoured such special protection, suitable rules should be drafted.

Implementation phase

Commission IV was asked to consider the preamble to the first protocol, the general provisions, including those relating to the implementation of its provisions, and the final clauses. It also examined a possible draft resolution on disarmament and a draft declaration on the application of international humanitarian law in armed struggles for self-determination. The commission took some indicative votes.

Most experts considered that it was necessary to reinforce the international machinery designed to assure and facilitate impartial supervision of the implementation of the Geneva Conventions. The commission established a special working group to achieve a composite text on the appointment of protecting powers (i.e. states, not involved in the conflict, responsible for representing the interests of belligerents in the territories of adversaries, and for supervising the application of the Geneva Conventions) and their substitutes. The final text approved by the commission included provisions for the exchange of lists of prospective Protecting Powers, the setting of time-limits for the choice of a Protecting Power, and, ultimately, the obligatory acceptance of the ICRC as a substitute.

On the basis of the alternatives presented by another working group, the commission decided that the protocol should apply from the commencement of any armed conflict, as well as in all cases of partial or total occupation, and that it should cease at the close of military operations or the termination of occupation, with protected persons continuing to be protected until their release or repatriation.

The commission also dealt with provisions on penal sanctions. There was clear support for the inclusion of an article al-

lowing a subordinate to refuse to obey an order that would entail the commission of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions or the protocols. Most experts also favoured including an article obliging member states to provide adequate sanctions for such breaches.

The commission voted to omit from the protocol any provision indicating when reprisals were permissible. In fact, the majority of experts supported forbidding any reprisals against persons and property protected by the protocol (a proposal of far-reaching effect — in the final analysis, it may be wiser to leave the question of reprisals unanswered).

In the examination of the final clauses, the experts tended to support the inclusion of an article prohibiting reservations. Opinions were divided on whether this should apply to all of the protocol or just to the provisions relating to supervision.

Debate on self-determination

The commission's consideration of the draft declaration on self-determination sparked a highly political debate. Several experts opposed the declaration since the subject matter was beyond the scope of the protocol, while others strongly favoured including in the protocol provisions on wars of national liberation. By a large majority, however, the commission decided not to include an article stating that wars of national liberation should be regarded as international conflicts. The commission's debate on a possible disarmament resolution proved far less decisive and was without significant result.

The work of the four commissions and the conference on the ICRC's two draft protocols, while less than optimal, represents considerable progress in the further identification and clarification of the main issues by a far larger number of experts than at the first conference. On a number of important points, it was possible to attain a measure of *rapprochement*, if not complete agreement. For example, progress additional to that at the first conference was made on the protection of the wounded and sick and on the articles on medical aircraft. The extent of similar protection in non-international armed conflicts was further developed, even if the problem of the status of rebels remained unresolved and progress was registered during consideration of the implementation of existing law.

The ICRC, as indicated by the rules of the conference, never expected more than informal and non-binding advice on how the draft protocols might be improved in preparation for a diplomatic confer-

Protocol to apply from beginning of armed conflict or total occupation

nence. This the experts provided, often in bewildering abundance. The task of deciding how best to redraft some of the crucial points over which views differed widely will not be easy. However, the President of the ICRC announced in the final session of the conference that the results obtained were ample for the ICRC to recommend that the diplomatic conference be held in the near future after revised protocols have been presented to the twenty-second International Conference of the Red Cross in Tehran in autumn 1973.

Provided the governments of states that are parties to the Geneva Conventions

prove willing, the diplomatic conference could crown one of the most significant advances in the progressive development and codification of international humanitarian law in the past 25 years. Certainly, the second Conference of Government Experts both expanded and strengthened the foundations laid at the first conference. It is worth remembering that the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law is a political as much as a juridical problem. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that most states approach the subject with considerable caution.

New trends in international law

The Canadian Council on International Law, established in June of this year, met in Ottawa in mid-October to review a series of international legal issues in which Canada has major interests.

The Council is designed to provide a forum for Canadian academics active in public international law and organization and to facilitate closer contact between the academic community and government officials in the field. The Council also wants to broaden relations between Canadian international lawyers and interested individuals and organizations outside Canada.

In the Ottawa meeting, keyed to the theme "New Approaches to International Law", there was discussion of such questions as Canada's Arctic pollution-zone legislation, exclusive offshore fishing-zones, extended concepts of the territorial sea and internal waters and jurisdiction over the continental margin and deep-sea bed. Other issues under review included the right of self-defence in response to environmental threats, telecommunications and new techniques of surveillance and mass propaganda and acts of international terrorism by private groups and individuals.

The meeting attempted to take account of new forces and altered roles in the international community, with special attention to the impact of summit conferences, direct negotiation and agreement by the super-powers on global issues, the prospective role of the United Nations, the present relevance of the

International Law Commission and the future of the International Court of Justice.

The Council hopes to recommend measures for more effective operation of international organizations and to promote the imaginative use of peaceful methods of dispute settlement, including resort to the International Court of Justice.

Among those participating in the Ottawa sessions were Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, perhaps the best known advocate of reform of the law of the sea; Professor Myres McDougal of Yale University, consultant to the U.S. State Department; Allan Gotlieb, Deputy Minister, federal Department of Communications; J. Alan Beesley, Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs; and Maxwell Cohen, Professor of International Law at McGill University. The President of the Canadian Council is Dean R. St. J. Macdonald of the faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.

The Council awarded medals in recognition of distinguished contributions to international law to Judge John E. Read, formerly of the International Court of Justice, and to Professor Percy E. Corbett, now of Princeton, New Jersey, and formerly of McGill University, a Canadian pioneer in international law.

The Council is planning to inaugurate a summer program in Canada on public international law modelled on the lines of the Hague Summer Academy.

Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

I. Recent Books

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Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The reader will find under this heading a list of the most recent documents that have been published by the Department of External Affairs on international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Statements and Speeches, published by the Information Division of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

No. 72/20 An Optimistic Assessment of the UN Achievement. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the opening of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 28, 1972.

No. 72/21 Canada and a New World Power — China. An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Ontario Region of the Canadian Junior Chamber of Commerce in Toronto, October 14, 1972.

Press Releases, published by the Press Office of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

No. 45 (June 13, 1972) Third International Conference on Adult Education, Tokyo, July 25 - August 7, 1972.

- No. 47 (June 20, 1972) Statement Delivered by Mr. J. A. Beesley, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.
- No. 48 (June 23, 1972) Pacific Economic Advisory Committee.
- No. 49 (June 23, 1972) Ratification of The Hague and Montreal Conventions.
- No. 51 (July 6, 1972) Canada-U.S.S.R. General Exchanges Agreement: 1972-1973.
- No. 54 (July 12, 1972) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the People's Republic of China.
- No. 57 (July 27, 1972) Exchange Program among Members of the Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique.
- No. 58 (August 10, 1972) Establishment of Canadian Embassy in Manila.
- No. 59 (August 9, 1972) Official Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, to the People's Republic of China.
- No. 60 (August 10, 1972) Canadian Government Grant to the Centre of Asian Studies.
- No. 61 (August 16, 1972) Assignment of Foreign Service Visitors.
- No. 62 (August 17, 1972) Tribute Paid to Dr. Norman Bethune.
- No. 63 (August 22, 1972) Talks with Chou En-lai.
- No. 64 (August 22, 1972) Exchanges with China.
- No. 65 (August 28, 1972) Signature of the Revised Agreement on Air Service Between Italy and Canada.
- No. 67 (September 11, 1972) First Meeting of the Canada-Japan Sub-committee on Mineral and Energy Policy.
- No. 68 (September 15, 1972) Canadian Delegation to UN General Assembly.
- No. 69 (September 21, 1972) Canada-United States Body to Help in Clean-up of St. John River Basin.
- No. 70 (September 28, 1972) Ratification of UN Charter Amendment.
- No. 71 (October 3, 1972) Canadian Statement Regarding the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam — September 29, 1972.
- No. 72 (October 4, 1972) Canada Joins Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.
- No. 73 (October 12, 1972) IJC Report on Transboundary Air Pollution in the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers Areas.
- No. 74 (October 13, 1972) Seventeenth General Conference of UNESCO.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Guatemala

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Re-

public of Guatemala constituting a Reciprocal Amateur Radio Operating Agreement. Signed at Guatemala City August 28, 1972. In force September 12, 1972.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America regarding the preservation of the quality of water in the international section of the St. John River. Signed at Ottawa September 21, 1972. In force September 21, 1972.

Multilateral

Convention, Final Protocol and Detailed Regulations of the Universal Postal Convention.

Done at Tokyo November 14, 1969.

Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union.

Done at Tokyo November 14, 1969.

General Regulations of the Universal Postal Union.

Done at Tokyo November 14, 1969.

Signed by Canada November 14, 1969.

In force for Canada July 1, 1971.

Convention on the ATA Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods.

Done at Brussels December 6, 1961.

Canadian Instrument of Accession deposited July 10, 1972.

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Constitution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, with Final Provisions and General Regulations.

Done at Santiago November 26, 1971.

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